FRQM THE LIBT^R^ OF
TRINITY COLLEGE
TORgT^TO
A TREATISE ON THE
AUGUSTINIAN DOCTEINE
OF
PREDESTINATION
By J. B. MOZLEY, D.D.
I.ATR CANON OF CHRIST CHURCH AND REGIUS PROFESSOR OF DIVINITY AT OXFOKD
THIRD EDITION
WITH ANALYSIS OF CONTENTS AND INDEX
LONDON
JOHN MURRAY, ALBEMARLE STREET
1883
II
&T
£/ c
ML
LON'DOX : PRINTED BY
AXU co., NKW-STREET
PARLIAMENT STREET
1 1 7 1 0 0
OCT 1 91984
CONTENTS.
PAGK
SUMMARY OF CONTENTS [7]
CHAPTER
/ I. STATEMENT OF THE ARGUMENT FOR PREDESTINATION . I
II. EXAMINATION OF THE ARGUMENT FOR PREDESTINATION 15
III. THE PELAGIAN CONTROVERSY ...... 40
IV. DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF ORIGINAL SIN . . 100
AUGUSTINIAN DOCTRINE OF PREDESTINATION . . . 12(»
UGUSTINIAN DOCTRINE OF GRACE . . . . .148
B? AUGUSTINIAN DOCTRINE OF FINAL PERSEVERANCE . . 1 7l>
AUGUSTINIAN DOCTRINE OF FREEWILL . . . . 10«
IX. SCHOLASTIC THEORY OF NECESSITY . . . . 238
X. SCHOLASTIC DOCTRINE OF PREDESTINATION . . . 259
XI. CONCLUSION 29H
NOTES . 321
SUMMAEY OF CONTENTS.
CHAPTER I.
STATEMENT OF THE ARGUMENT FOR PREDESTINATION.
PAGE
Distinction between the predestinarian and necessitarian view 1
Ground of the Supralapsarian, of S. Augustine, of the
Jansenists .......... 4
Mode in which the doctrine of Predestination is extracted from
that of original sin 5
Distinction drawn in Scripture between two covenants . . 9
The predestinarian's defence of his doctrine on the score of
justice 12
Nakedly stated the doctrine paradoxical 14
CHAPTER II.
EXAMINATION OF THE ARGUMENT FOR PREDESTINATION.
Two different kinds of truths on which philosophy proceeds ; one
of which, the conception, is absolute, the other indistinct . 16
Ideas of substance, cause, infinity ...... 16
On the mysteriousness of infinite numbers . . . .20
The human mind can have relation to truths without the
medium of distinct ideas 21
On the maxim that every event must have a cause . . .22
Real question at issue, have we, or have we not, a sense of
originality in our actions ? 23
The ideas of Divine power and freewill are truths on which we
cannot raise definite absolute systems . . . .27
All imperfect truths run into contradictions when pursued . 29
The counter principles of humility and self-respect in human
nature .......... 30
We are not to measure the mysterious consequences of the sin
of Adam by human analogies ...... 33
Language of Scripture two-sided on this question . . .35
Predestination comes before us in Scripture as an impression
upon the mind of the individual. . . . . .37
In the New Testament the Christian is addressed as the heir to
eternal glory ......... 40
a
[8] Summary of Contents.
I'AOE
The doctrine of Predestination profitable or mischievous accord
ing to the moral principle of those who receive it . .42
The feeling of being predestinate not a literal certainty in
those who hold it, only a strong impression . . .45
CHAPTER III.
THE PELAGIAN CONTROVERSY.
History favours the assertion that Pelagianism was a reaction
from Augustinianism ........
Formula nihil botiimi sine gratia satisfied the Primitive Church .
When minds began to reason the combination of grace and free
will issued in two opposing assertions ....
The Pelagian position ........
S. Augustine's objection to the Pelagian doctrine of grace
In what sense the Pelagian argument lay at the root of the
errors of Pelagianism . . . . . . . .
Doctrine of perfectibility as held by Pelagius and his opponents
Heads of the great controversy — the power of the will, the
nature of virtue and vice, and the Divine justice
Pelagius' appeal to instinctive sense of freedom of the will ;
S. Augustine's counter-appeal to the sense of sin
The power of custom over the will . . . .
Pelagius relied on sense of bare ability in spite of habit .
And disputed the fact of hereditary sin .....
On trial of the will as condition of highest human virtue .
Trial not necessary to all goodness
Power of choosing good or evil not perfection of man's nature .
Christian doctrine of grace in accordance with our nature ;
Pelagian reduction of all virtue to effort an artificial limit .
The question of the Divine justice ......
S. Augustine's argument stated ......
The general fact of human sinfulness requires some law of sin
in our nature to explain it .
Remarks on the argument which infers sin from pain
The Manichean and Pelagian theories on the existence of evil .
Between these the Church has taken a middle course
Bearing of the Pelagian arguments on the Catholic doctrines of
the original state of man, the Incarnation, and the Atonement
S. Augustine on the first sin of man .....
The Pelagian doctrine in denying the Fall rejected Paradise .
Its bearing on the Incarnation .......
S. Augustine's answer ........
The Pelagian fundamentally opposed to the doctrine of the
Atonement. .........
The philosophical fault in Pelagianism
Its low moral tendency ........
Summary of Contents. [9]
CHAPTER IV.
DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF ORIGINAL SIN.
PAGTC
The language of the Primitive Church on this doctrine . . 101
Its principal writers, Justin Martyr, Clement of Alexandria,
and others, came from the ranks of Gentile philosophy . 106
Prominence given by the early Church to doctrine of the Logos 106
S. Clement of Alexandria 011 the effects of the Fall . . . 108
Statements of three first centuries bearing on this question . 112
The view of the early Church before S. Augustine's time with
respect to virtuous heathen and unbaptized infants . .115
The Western Church has entered more deeply than the Eastern
into the mysteries of the inner man ..... 116
S. Augustine explained the corruption of human nature as the
loss of freewill ......... 118
Difference between Augustine and Clement in the estimation
of heathen morals ........ 110
S. Augustine's modification of view in such cases as Socrates
and Fabricius . . . . . . . . . 121
Pelagians adopted a future state between heaven and hell . 122
Remarks of the author on the extreme results of S. Augustine's
doctrine of original sin . . . . . . .124
CHAPTER V.
AUGUSTINIAN DOCTRINE OF PREDESTINATION.
-*•"• Statement of S. Augustine's doctrine ..... 126
Qualified doctrine held by other schools ..... 131
(— r- S. Augustine regarded Predestination as a perplexing mystery,
a hidden justice ......... 134
<— -=• His argument drawn from the Incarnation .... 143
r Difference between S. Augustine's doctrine and the Scriptural
one ; Scripture asserts contrary truths .... 146
If Revelation as a whole does not state a truth of Predestination
that stopping short is a designed stopping short . . . 147
CHAPTER VI.
AUGUSTINIAN DOCTRINE OF GRACE.
Language of the Church always been that grace assists the will 148
S. Augustine's treatise De Gratia Ckristi .... 149
His answer to Pelagius' book on freewill ..... 150
The gift of perseverance . . ...... . 155
[TO] Summary of Contents.
S. Augustine's argument that sin is a negation . . . 161
The attribute of God as Creator a truth almost peculiar to the
Bible. . 161
Difference between the Bible and ancient philosophy on the
world invisible ......... 162
S. Augustine's argument from the fact of prayer . . . 166
Summary of his doctrine of Grace ...... 169
His definition of Christian love 172
Observations on S. Augustine's doctrine of Irresistible Grace . 176
CHAPTER VII.
AUGUSTINIAN DOCTRINE OF FINAL PERSEVERANCE.
Doctrine of Final Perseverance not a predestinarian one but one
of morals and religion ....... 180
On Solon's rule of happiness in life 181
On change of character ........ 183
The doctrine of trial and probation 184
A case for charitable supposition . . ... . . 186
Rule of final perseverance as a test depends on our discrimina
tion in applying it ........ 187
S. Augustine on this doctrine ....... 188
His book De Dono Perseverantise ...... 193
Summary of S. Augustine's doctrine ..... 194
CHAPTER VIII.
AUGUSTINIAN DOCTRINE OF FREEWILL.
On the existence of the will 195
Locke's position stated ........ 197
Locke's conclusion against a self -determining power in the will
inconsistent with his admission of a class of indistinct ideas 201
Important results in theology follow the decision of this
question /. 201
Archbishop Whately quoted /. . 202
His argument adopts necessitarianism . . ./ . . 20$
The question pursued in a note . . . , ' . . . 204
The language of S. Augustine in his book De Liber o Arbitrio . 20t
It coincides with Locke's . . . ./-' .... 20£
On the determination of the will ; S. Augustine's language is
against the common doctrine of Freewill . . . .21]
Statement wherein lies the peculiarity of S. Augustine's view . 22C
Summary of Contents. [ 1 1 ]
CHAPTER IX.
SCHOLASTIC THEORY OF NECESSITY.
PAGE
Remarks on S. Augustine as a teacher ; one such writer is in
himself a whole age . 233
The doctrine of S. Augustine reigned in the mediaeval Church
till the Reformation, when the Roman Church fell back
upon a strong doctrine of freewill ..... 234
S. Thomas Aquinas, the great representative of mediaeval
Augustinianism ; the character of his intellect. Reserved
for a modern age to call forth the analytical power . . 235
Aquinas' mind shows enormous grasp and capacity . . . 230
One great vice of the scholastic intellect ..... 230
The doctrine of Predestination in his system rests in philosophy 230
Idea of the Divine power ; argument of the schoolmen stated . 230
The existence of evil explained by them under two heads . 245
The first head an extreme instance of verbal explanation . . 245
The argument of variety ........ 250
The obvious answer to it as unjust ...... 252
The word Form in scholastic language ..... 253
Negative position of evil as mere privation no real expla
nation .......... 255
Real source of the schoolmen's vain solutions .... 256
Divine power incomprehensible to us . . . . 257
Fact of human ignorance recognised by the schoolmen but not
acted on 257
The mind of the schoolmen too busy for the stationary attitude
of reflection and self -analysis ...... 259
CHAPTER X.
SCHOLASTIC DOCTRINE OF PREDESTINATION.
Archbishop Lawrence on the doctrine of the schoolmen . . 202
He confuses different schools. The doctrine of Aquinas . . 202
Doctrine of grace as more generally understood at present day 207
The Augustinian and Thomist doctrine . . . . . 209
Verbal subtleties of language incorporating Aristotle's doctrine
of habits with the doctrine of grace ..... 271
The three theological virtues ; the seven gifts .... 273
Remarks of the author on the doctrine of habits . . . 273
Cause of confusion in the technical, quaint division of habits . 275
Aquinas in fheSumma Theologica lays down the doctrine of Abso
lute Predestination ........ 278
Author's remarks on difference of tone in applying this doctrine
— in S. Augustine positive good and positive evil . . 279
[i 2] Summary of Contents.
Tendency in Aquinas to reduce the distinction to a higher and
lower good ..... . . 281
The Clementine view struggles in his mind with the Augustinian 285
Case of infants dying in original sin ; Augustine's doctrine . 287
What the schoolman could not contradict he could explain . 288
Aquinas' mild solution of the difficulty 289
The position laid down in the case of infants cannot stop short
of a wider application. ....... 290
The author's remarks on this question 291
CHAPTER XI.
CONCLUSION.
Need of a philosophical perception of human ignorance . . 293
This only to be attained by close introspection . . . 294
Activity of human mind opposed to passive attitude of thought 295
The human mind has a luminous and dark side . . . 29fi
The deeper sense of ignorance not unattended by danger. . 298
To Hume and Hobbes we may oppose Butler and Pascal . . 30C
Tendency of controversial minds to force incomprehensible
truths to their logical results ...... 301
With respect to the Divine power S. Augustine took up an ill-
considered position ........ 30$
The mixture of weakness and power in some leading minds
makes the task of estimating authorities difficult . . 30£
S. Augustine and his school commenced with an assumption
which no modern philosopher would allow .... 304
The common sense of mankind acknowledges contradictory
truths 30(
The Pelagian and Augustinian systems both arise upon partial
and exclusive bases ........ 30*3
Wherein the predestinarian is at fault 30*3
The Pelagian, on the other hand, offends against the first
principles of piety ........ 30£
The seventeenth article of our Church has allowed a place for
a predestinarian school ....... 31]
Proposal in the last century for a change in its wording . . 31$
The object for which this present life is given us is not philo
sophy and reasoning ........ 31^
The propensity to over-estimate particular or supposed truths
shown alike by the Roman Catholic and Protestant . . 31 1
In the limited state of our capacities those who differ from one
another should remember that they may differ not in hold
ing truth and error but different sides of the same truth . 311
INDEX OF PEOPEE NAMES.
ALVAREZ
ALVAREZ, 406
Ambrose (St.), 338
Auselm (St.), 208, 234, 338
Aquinas (St. Thomas), 4, JO,
234, 236, 239, 244, 249, 250,
253, 257, 260, 263, 264, 266,
270, 272, 275, 279, 281, 282,
285, 289, 290, 323, 339, 396,
400
Aristotle, 271, 336
Athanasius (St.), 101, 111, 377
Athenagoras, 107
Augustine (St.), 1, 3, 4, 10,13,
44, 46, 49, 52, 54, 56, 71, 73,
74, 76, 82, 84, 86, 90, 92, 95,
100, 105, 112, 114, 117, 118,
120, 122, 124, 126, 131, 132,
134, 136, 140, 143, 145, 146,
148, 150, 153, 158, 160, 163,
167, 170, 172, 176, 179, 187,
188, 191, 192, 195, 206, 209,
210, 212, 215, 219, 221, 223,
226, 232, 234, 253, 265, 285,
286, 288, 302, 304, 343, 360,
364, 366, 373, 374, 376, 379,
381, 383, 386, 388, 390, 393,
394, 399, 406, 409
BASIL (St.), 101, 377
Bellarmine, 226
Bernard (St.), 234, 397, 399
Bradwardine, 10, 52, 210, 234,
237, 268, 279, 362
Bull, 10, 76, 105, 107, 111, 377
Butler, 300
IREX^EUS
CALVIN, 3, 393, 394, 396, 399,
401, 402, 405, 407, 408
Catarinus, 340
Cclestius, 56
Chrysostom (St.), 289, 379
Clement of Alexandria, 106,
108, 112, 119, 120, 377, 379,
380
Coleridge, 79, 367, 368, 371
Cornwallis, 312
Cyprian (St.), 32, 116, 163,
377
Cyril (St.), 107, 377, 378
EDWARDS, 3, 23, 25, 28, 44,
143, 213
FABRICIUS, 121
GOODE, 178
Gotteschalcus, 3, 389
Gregory Nazianzen, 114, 380
Gregory Nyssa, 114, 378, 380
HAGENBACH, 107, 378
Hinckmar, 389, 391, 392
Hippocrates, 336
Hilary, 53, 136
Hobbes, 300
Hooker, 131, 358, 386, 388,
389
Hume, 18, 21, 300, 325, 335
IREN^EUS, 101, 106,377
t'4]
Index of Proper Names.
JACKSON
JACKSON, 7, 10, 322, 356, 358
Jansen, 4, 48, 52, 160, 226, 277,
362, 383, 409
Julian, 51, 53, 60, 62, 70, 72,
77, 92, 94, 98, 120, 171, 375,
376
Justin Martyr, 101, 106, 109,
113,346,377,378
YORKE
Paulinas, 360
Percy, 312
Pinelar, 83
Polybius, 336
Porteous, 312
Prosper, 136, 407
EEMIGIUS, 389, 390, 392
KING, 202
LAURENCE, 262, 264, 266
Lessius, 226
Locke, 21, 197, 198, 208, 324
Lombard (Peter), 3, 10, 234,
237, 239, 246, 248, 265, 400
MILL, 25, 326, 328, 330, 332,335
Molina, 226
NEANDER, 361
Newton, John, 31 7
ORIGEN, 101, 109, 113, 357
Overall, 178
PASCAL, 20, 21, 33, 282, 300,
401, 402, 404, 408
Paul, 290, 340
Pelag-ius, 49, 51, 52, 54, 55, 56,
60, 150, 278, 360, 367
SENECA, 290
Simeon Barsema, 348
Socrates, 121
Solon, 180
Stilling-fleet, 324
Suarez, 226
TACITUS, 336
Tatian, 101, 107, 111, 377, 378
Taylor, Jeremy, 33, 34, 340
342, 344, 346, 348, 350, 380
Toplady, 2, 5, 7, 28, 321
Tertullian, 101, 107, 116, 117
377, 378
USHER, 3
VINCENTIUS VICTOR, 114
WALL, 114
Wbately, 77, 202, 204, 353
Wollaston, 312
YORKE, 312
THE
AUGUSTINIAN DOCTRINE
OF
PREDESTINATION.
CHAPTER I.
STATEMENT OF THE ARGUMENT FOR PREDESTINATION.
THE design of this treatise is to give an account of S.
Augustine's doctrine of Predestination, together with such
comments as may be necessary for a due examination of, and
judgment upon, it. Before entering, however, on S. Augus
tine's statements, some general description of the doctrine
itself, its grounds, and its defences, will be necessary : and
these will require special consideration, with a view to
ascertaining their soundness and validity. This introduc
tory matter will occupy the following chapter, in addition to
the present one, in which I shall endeavour to give a general
description of the doctrine.
A distinction must, in the first instance, be drawn be
tween the predestinarian and the necessitarian or fatalist.
The predestinarian and the fatalist agree, indeed, in the
facts of the case, and equally represent mankind as acting
necessarily, whether for good or evil, in distinction to act
ing by an original motion of the will. But the fatalist
goes to philosophy for the reason of this state of things, the
predestinarian to a truth of revelation ; the former argues
from the nature of things, the latter from a particular fact
of which he has been informed by competent authority.
B
The Argument
CHAP. T.
The fatalist takes the general ground that every event must
have a cause ; and applying it to the case of human actions,
argues that just as the action must have a cause, so that
cause, even if we say it is the will's own choice, must have
itself a cause; this further cause another cause. Being
thus provided with an unlimited series of causes in the case
of every human action, while the past existence of the agent
is limited, he extends this series backwards till it reaches
a point at which it goes outside of the agent ; who is con
sequently proved to have acted ultimately from causes over
which he had no control.
There is another kind of necessitarianism, again, which
takes for its basis, instead of a physical assumption, like
the one just mentioned, a religious one — the attribute of
the Divine power ; and argues downwards from the First
Cause, instead of backwards from human action. To the
metaphysician who believes in a Creator or First Cause,
and who contemplates man in relation to that Being, one
great and primary difficulty presents itself in the question
how a being can be a creature, and yet have freewill, and
be a spring of action to himself, a self-moving being. Our
very notion of cause and effect is of the cause as active, the
effect as passive ; and, therefore, if man is an effect, how
is he an active being ? A tool or instrument that we make,
issues inert out of our hands, and only capable of that
motion which the maker of it gives it. To make a machine
is to cause the whole series of motions which it performs.
Our idea of creation is thus at variance with the idea of
free agency in the thing made. Man as a self-moving
being and the originator of his own acts, is a first cause in
nature ; but how can we acknowledge a second first cause
— a first cause which is an effect, a created originality?1
Of course the fact of moral evil is at once an answer
to this line of argument ; so far, at any rate, as to disprove
the cogency and decisiveness of it. For unless we make
1 If man be a self-determining as there are men in the world? —
agent, will it not necessarily follow, Toplady, vol. vi. p. 31. If I am an
that there are as many First Causes independent animal, I am also neces*
(i.e in other words, as many Gods) sarily self-existent. — p. 4o.
CFAP. i.
For Predestination.
God the author of evil, moral evil must be referred to some
original source other than God ; in which case the attribute
of the Divine omnipotence is seen to meet in the first in
stance with something counter to it ; and so cannot be
argued upon as if it were the whole of the truth in the
question under consideration. But so far as we attend to
this attribute exclusively, as is the fault with some schools,
this is the natural argument from it.
The necessitarian thus believes freewill not only to be
false, but to be impossible. On the other hand, the pre-
destinarian cannot believe it to be impossible, because he
admits, on the authority of Scripture, that the first man
Adam, in the state in which he was created, had it.1 He
only believes that man has since the fall been deprived of
it, and regards it as an historical fact, not an existing one.
He is thus excluded, on this question, from the ground of
philosophy, from the perfect and consistent theory of the
fatalist, and draws his conclusion from the revealed doctrine
of the fall.
But though predestinarians, as such, draw their con
clusion from the particular sin of Adam, such a ground is
so unsatisfactory to a philosophical mind, that few have, in
fact, confined themselves to it. Some have dispensed with
it altogether, and adopted the philosophy either of causes,2
or of the Divine power : the latter being the ground of the
supralapsarian, who asks how such a universal effect could
follow from a particular sin, except by the will of (iod
1 Augustine endows Adam with 15. Though the latter afterwards
freewill: ' Potuit non peccare primus calls the notion of Adam's fivcwill
homo, potuitnon mori.potuit bonum 'frigidum commentum,' and ;isks
nondeserere. Nunquiddicturi sumus why he should not have been the
non potuit peccare qui tale habebat subject of a decree, as his posterity
liberum arbitrium.' — De Corr. et were: 'Atqui predestinatio vdint,
Grat. c. 12. 'Homo male utens nolint, in posteris se profert. Nequo
libero arbitrio et se perdidit et enim factum est naturaliter Mt a
ipsum.' Ench. c. 30. Lombard (L. salute exciderent omnes uniu.s '^ar-
2. Distinct 24. 1.), Gotteschalus entis culpa. Quid eos prohibet fateri
(Usher, p. 29.), and Calvin, follow de uno homine quod inviti dr toto
Augustine: 'In hisprseclarisdotibus humano genere concedunt.' — Jnstit.
excelluit prima hominis conditio. 1. 3. c. 23.
... In hac integritate libero arbi- 2 Edwards, On the Freedom of
trio pollebat homo.'— Instit. 1. 1. c. the Will.
B 2
The Argument CHAP. i.
ordaining it so, and so pushes back the ground of fact
immediately to one of philosophical principle.1
have not without detriment to their consistency as reasoners,
mixed the two grounds. The ground which S. Augustine
adopted and which the Jansenists revived, was in the mam
that of Scripture, though the former joined to it occa
sionally that of philosophy1 : the medieval predestinanans
took in the main the ground of philosophy, mixing with it
occasionally that of Scripture. The theory of necessity
last described, was adopted under the name of 'the physical
predetermination of the will ' by this medieval school,2
who maintained that there could be but one true cause of
every event, all other causes being secondary and inter
mediate ; and applying it to the case of human actions,
explained that though they had a 4 voluntary cause,' or a
cause in the human will, this was only secondary and inter
mediate between the agent and the first cause ; protecting
this position from the consequence which it apparently in
volved in the case of evil actions, that God was the author
of evil, by distinctions which it is not necessary here to
state ; yet the same writers referred to the fact of the fall
as the ground of the doctrine of predestination.3 Pre-
destinarian preachers, again, guided half by sentiment and
half by theory, are accustomed, though using the scriptural
ground as their basis on this question, to speak of the
doctrine of freewill as an insult to the Divine Power, which
1 NOTE I. doctrine of efficacious grace, which
At qui omnium connexionem re- rests upon original sin. 'Predeter-
rumquo causarum qua fit omne quod minatio physica necessaria statuitur
fit, fati nomine appellant ; non mul- omnibus agentibus ex vi causse
turn cum iis de verbi controversia secundse quse essentialiter tarn in
certandum atque laborandum est, operari quam in esse suo subordina-
quandoquidem ipsam causarum ordi- tur primse, a qua ad agendum prse-
nem et quandam connexionem, summi moveri debet ; Christi adjutorium
Dei tribuunt voluntati. — De Civit. nequaquam sed Isesse voluntati prop-
Dei, 1. 5. c. 8. ter sohim vulnus necessarium est.' —
2 Jansen draws the distinction De Grat. Christi Salvatoris, 1. 8. c.
between the theory of the 'predeter- 1, 2.
minatio physica ' of the will ' ex s Ratio reprobationis est origi-
philosophia profecta,' and which nale peccatum. Aquinas, vol. viii.
' defenditur a sectatoribus sancti p. 330.
Thomse,' and the predestinarian
CHAP. i. For Predestination. 5
is to mix the two grounds ; for while the scriptural ground
is one of fact, the argument of the Divine power is an ab
stract argument.
Assuming, however, the doctrine of the fall or original
sin as the proper ground of the doctrine of predestination,
how, it will be asked, is the one doctrine the reason and
basis of the other ? In the following way.
The doctrine of original sin represents the whole human
race as in a state of moral ruin in consequence of the trans
gression of the first man, incapable of doing anything
pleasing and acceptable to Grod, or performing any really
good act1 ; that is to say, it represents the human race as
without freewill. And such being the condition of man,
the Divine mercy determines on his rescue out of it, on
raising him from a state of ruin to a state of salvation.
But how can the rescue of a ruined and powerless being
be effected except by an absolute ace of power on the part
of the Deliverer ? The subject of this rescue is supposed
to be unable to do anything for himself ; and therefore, if
he is saved at all, he must be saved without any waiting for
or depending upon his own individual agency.2 It may
perhaps be replied that, as God endowed man with freewill,
or the power to act aright, as distinguished from a necessary
virtue, at the creation ; so when he raises him out of this
state of ruin and slavery of the will, he may endow him
again with freewill only, leaving the use which he may
make of it to himself, as before. It may be said that this
would be a true act of grace or favour on the part of Grod,
and therefore that we need not suppose that in the act of
delivering man out of the wretched and impotent state in
which he is by nature, (rod does anything more than this.
1 We have no power to do good anything towards our own recovery
works pleasant and acceptable to Hence it was God's own arm which
God, without the grace of God by brought salvation Conver-
Christ preventing us. — Art. x. sion is a new birth, and resurrection
Works done before the grace of a new creation. What infant ever
Christ are not pleasant to God, . . . begat itself ? What inanimate ear-
rather we doubt not but they have case ever qu'ckened and raised itself ?
the nature of sin. — Art. xiii. What creature ever created itself?
2 So totally are we fallen by — Toplady, vol. iii. p. 363.
nature, that we cannot contribute
The Argument
CHAP. I.
But though such a mode of acting on (rod's part does not
involve any positive contradiction, it must be allowed to be
at variance with our reasonable notions of the Divine deal-
ino-s; for what is this but to institute the first dispensation
over 'again, and repeat a trial which has been undergone
once, and had its issue ? Suppose a man carried away by
a torrent, to master which he had proved himself unequal,
would it be a reasonable or consistent act to take him out
only to recruit his strength for a second resistance to it ?
So, after man in the exercise of freewill has fallen and lost
freewill, is it not a mockery to save him by giving him free
will again? What will he do with the gift, but tall again ?
On such a mode of Divine dealing, the fall may be re
peated indefinitely, and the Divine purposes for the salvation
of man may remain in perpetual suspense, and never attain
completion.
The principle, then, being acknowledged that God does
not repeat His dispensations, it follows that a second dis
pensation cannot be the first one a second time instituted,
but must be a different one in itself; divided substantially
from the old one in the nature, character, and effect of the
aid which it supplies to man for attaining salvation. A
dispensation which left the salvation of man dependent on
his will, was highly suitable as a first one ; suitable alike
to the justice of the Creator and the powers of the untried
creature, and such as we should naturally expect at the
beginning of things : but such having been the nature of
the first, the second must, for that very reason, be a dis
pensation of a different kind, effecting its design not by a
conditional, but by an absolute saving act.
And independently of all reasoning, the fact is plain
from Scripture that the new dispensation differs substan
tially from the old in the nature of the aid which it
supplies to man for attaining salvation. God is not repre
sented in Scripture as repeating his dispensations, but as
altering them according to the wants of man. The Gospel
aid to salvation, then, is, in accordance with the fundamen
tal difference in man's own state, fundamentally different
from that which man had before the fall ; and if funda-
CHAP. T. For Predestination. 7
mentally different, different in the way which has been just
mentioned. For whatever peculiarities of the second dis
pensation may be appealed to, if the grace of it depends
on the human will for its use and improvement, it is funda
mentally a dispensation of freewill like the first one.
The Divine act, then, in the salvation of man being, as
the result of the doctrine of original sin, an absolute one,
effecting its purpose with infallible certainty, the rest of
the doctrine of predestination follows upon ordinary Chris
tian grounds. It is confessed by all that, whatever God
does, He determines or decrees to do from all eternity ; for
no one who believes properly in a Grod at all, can suppose
that He does anything on a sudden, and which He has npt
thought of before. There is, therefore, a Divine decree
from all eternity to confer this certain salvation upon those
on whom it is conferred. And, again, it is universally ad
mitted that only a portion of mankind are saved. But these
two admissions complete the doctrine of predestination
which is, that Grod has decreed from all eternity to save by
His absolute and sovereign power a select portion of man
kind, leaving the rest in their previous state of ruin.
The doctrine of predestination being thus reduced, as
its essence or distinctive part, to an absolute saving act on
the part of Grod of which man is the subject, we have next
to consider the particular nature and character of this act.
The doctrine of predestination, then, while it represents
Grod as deciding arbitrarily whom He saves, and whom He
leaves for punishment, does not by any means alter the con
ditions on which these respective ends are awarded. His
government still continues moral — pledged to the reward
of virtue and punishment of vice. It follows that in ordain
ing those whom He does ordain to eternal life, Grod decrees
also that they should possess the qualifications necessary for
that state — those of virtue and piety.1 And if Grod decrees
that particular persons shall be virtuous and pious men,
1 They who are predestinated to that life, such as repentance, faith,
life are likewise predestinated to all sanctification.and perseverance unto
those means which are indispensably the end. — Toplady, vol. v. p. 251.
necessary in order to their meetness, Jackson mistakes the predestinarian
entrance upon, and enjoyment of position on this head. — NOTE II.
The Argument CHAP. i.
He necessarily resolves to bestow some grace upon them
which will control their wills and insure this result. There
are two main kinds of grace laid down in the schemes of
divines, one, assisting grace, which depends on an original
act of the human will for its use and cultivation, and which
was therefore conferred on man at his creation when the
power of his will had not been as yet tried ; the other, effec
tive or irresistible grace, given when that will has been tried
and failed, and must have its want of internal strength
supplied by control from without. The Divine saving act
is the bestowal of this irresistible grace. The subject of
the Divine predestination is rescued by an act of absolute
power from the dominion of sin, dragged from it, as it
were, by force, converted, filled with the love of God and
his neighbour, and qualified infallibly for a state of ulti
mate reward.
Here, then, it must be observed, is the real essence and
substance of the doctrine of predestination. Predestinarians •
do not differ from their opponents in the idea of eternal
Divine decrees, which, though popularly connected with this
system more than with others, belongs in truth to all theo
logical systems alike. For the believer in freewill, who
only admits an assisting grace of God, and not a controlling
one, must still believe that God determined to give that
assisting grace, in whatsoever instances He does give it,
from all eternity. Nor do they differ from their opponents
in the ground or reason of God's final judgment and dis
pensing of reward and punishment1 ; for this takes place in
both schemes wholly upon the moral ground of the indi
vidual's good or bad character. But the difference between
the predestinarians and their opponents is as to that act
which is the subject matter of the Divine decree, and as to
the mode in which this difference of moral character is pro
duced ; that is to say, the two schools differ as to the nature,
quality, and power of Divine grace under the Gospel ; one
1 Vita geterna . . . gratia mincu- dirnn est, sed tibi gratia est, cui
patur non ob aliud nisi quod gratis gratia est et ipsa justitia. — Aug. Ep.
datur, nee ideo quia non meritis 194. n. 19. 21.
tlatur . . . Justitise quidem stipen-
CHAP. i. For Predestination. 9
school maintaining that that grace is only assisting grace,
depending on the human will for its use and improvement ;
the other, that it is irresistible grace. To the former school
belong those who hold one interpretation of the doctrine
of baptismal regeneration ; who maintain the sacrament of
baptism to be the medium by which the power of living a
holy life is imparted to the previously corrupt and impo
tent soul ; which power, however, may be used or neglected
according to the individual's own choice.
The mode in which the doctrine of predestination is
extracted from the doctrine of original sin, being thus
shown, it may be added that, by thus reducing as we have
done the former doctrine to its pith and substance, we evi
dently much widen the Scripture argument for it, extending
it at once from those few and scattered passages where the
word itself occurs, to a whole field of language. The whole
Scripture doctrine of grace is now appealed to as being in
substance the doctrine of predestination, because there is
only the Divine foreknowledge to be added to it, in order
to make it such. Scripture distinguishes in the most marked
way between two covenants. The first was that under which
mankind was created, and which ended at the fall. Its lan
guage was — This do, and thou shalt live. It endowed man
with freewill, or the power to obey the Divine law, and in
return claimed the due use of this power from him, the
proper exertion of that freewill. The burden of obedience,
the attainment of salvation, was thrown upon the man him
self. And of this covenant the Mosaic law was a kind of
re-enactment ; not that the law was really a continuation of
it, but it was so by a supposition, or as it may be called an
instructive fiction, maintained for the purpose of exhibit
ing and proving the consequences of the fall. Man was
addressed under the Mosaic law, as if he had the full power
to love and obey Grod, and the issue of the attempt showed
his inability ; he was addressed as if he was strong, and the
event proved his weakness. This was the covenant of works.
The covenant of grace was opposed to it. But how could
it be opposed to it, if under that covenant the salvation of
man still continued, as before, dependent on his freewill ?
'
\
\
IO The Argument CHAP. i.
If it be said that there was the addition of grace under the
second covenant, given besides and for the support of free
will, and that this addition makes the distinction between
the two covenants, the reply is obvious, that whatever addi
tion of grace there may be under the second, no substantial
difference is made out so long as the use of this grace re
mains dependent on the will. The burden of obedience is
still thrown on the man himself in the first instance, and
his salvation depends on an original act of choice, as it did
under the first. Moreover, it has been always held that man
had grace in addition to freewill, even under the first
covenant.1 Then, in what are the two opposed, except in
the nature, quality, and power of that grace which they
respectively confer, that in the one grace was, and in the
other is not, dependent on any original motion of the will
for its effect ? The grace of the gospel issues in being an
effective and irresistible grace, converting the will itself,
and forming the holy character in the man by a process of
absolute creation ; according to such texts as the following :
'We are His workmanship, created in Jesus Christ unto
good works, which God hath before ordained that we should
walk in them2 ; ' ' It is God that worketh in us both to will
and to do of His good pleasure3 ; ' ' According as God hath
1 Bull ' On the State of Man Homini in creatione, sicut de
before the Fall,' gives this as the angelis diximus, datum est per gra
doctrine of all the early Fathers. tiam auxilium .... Non talis
Nam et tune (cum natura erat natura facta est ut sine Divino
Integra et sana) esset adjutorium auxiiio posset manere si vellet.' —
Dei et tanquam lumen sanis oculis Lombard, L. 2. Dis. 24.
quo adjuti videant, se prseberet vol- Jackson objects to a super-
entibus. — Aug. De Natura et Gratia, natural original righteousness, on
c- 48. the ground that nature would not be
Quod fuerit conditus in gratia corrupt by the loss of it. ' If the
videturrequirereipsarectitudoprimi righteousness of the firat man did
status in qua Deus homines fecit. — consist in a grace supernatural, or
Aquinas Summ. Theol. Prima Q. 95. in any quality additional to his
Art. 1. See NOTE III. constitution, as he was the work of
Hoc autem (the need of grace), God, this grace or quality might
nedum est yerum propter depres- have been, or rather was, lost, with-
sionem liberi arbitrii per peccatum, out any real wound unto our nature.'
A-erum etiam propter gravedinem — Works, vol. ix. p. 6.
liberi arbitrii naturalem qua ad 2 Eph. ii. 10.
principaliterdiligendumsealligatur. 3 Phil. ii. 13.
— Bradwardiue, p. 371.
CHAP. T. For Predestination. 1 1
dealt to every man the measure of faith1 ; ' ' Who maketh
thee to differ from another ? and what hast thou which thou
hast not received2? ' ' No man can come to Me, except the
Father which hath sent me, draw him3 ; ' 4 Who hath saved
us, and called us with an holy calling, not according to our
works but according to His own purpose and grace, which
was given to us in Jesus Christ before the world began4 ;'
' By grace, ye are saved through faith ; and that not of
yourselves, it is the gift of God5 ; ' ' By the grace of God I
am what I am6 ; ' * Of Him are ye in Jesus Christ, who of
God is made unto us wisdom, and righteousness, and sanc-
tification, and redemption 7 ;' 'If any man be in Christ, he
is a new creature8 ; ' ' And I will give them one heart, and
I will put a new spirit within you ; and I will take away
the stony heart out of their flesh, and will give them a heart
of flesh.' 9 The ground of Scripture for the doctrine of
predestination thus becomes a large and general one, con
sisting of a certain pervading language, instead of being
confined to a few texts in which the word itself is men
tioned, and which are popularly regarded as its ground; and
the doctrine appears to be no more than the gospel doctrine
of grace, with the addition of the Divine foreknowledge.
From the basis and structure of the doctrine of predes
tination, I now come to its defences. An arbitrary decree
ordaining from all eternity, and antecedently to any diffe
rence of desert, some of the human race to eternal life, and
others to eternal punishment, is in direct opposition to our
natural idea of justice, and plainly requires a defence. And
the defence given for it rests on the same article of belief
out of which the structure of the doctrine arose — the article,
viz., of original sin.
It is true, then, predestinarians say, that we do maintain
an arbitrary decree, ordaining, antecedently to any difference
of desert, the eternal salvation of some and punishment of
others of the human race : but remember in what state this
decree finds the human race. It finds the whole of the
1 Rom. xii. 3. « 2 Tim. i. 9. 7 1 Cor. i. 30.
2 1 Cor. iv. 7. s Eph. ii. 8, 9. 8 2 Cor. v. 17.
8 John vi. 44. 6 1 Cor. xv. 10. 9 Ezek. xi. 19.
12 The Argument CHAP. *•
human race deserving of eternal punishment. This decree,
then, does indeed confer gratuitous and undeserved happi
ness upon one portion of mankind ; and to that nobody will
have any objection ; for it would indeed be a rigorous justice
which objected to an excess of Divine love and bounty: but
it does not do that which alone could be made matter of
accusation against it, inflict gratuitous and undeserved
misery upon the other. It simply allows the evil which it
already finds in them to go on and produce its natural fruits.
Had this decree, indeed, to do with mankind simply as
mankind, it could not without injustice devote any portion
of them arbitrarily to eternal punishment : for man has not,
as man, any guilt at all, and some guilt is required to make
his punishment just. But this decree has not to do with
human nature simply, but with human nature under certain
circumstances. Mankind are brought into a particular
position before it deals with them. That position is the
position of guilt in which the doctrine of original sin places
them. Viewed through the medium of that doctrine, the
whole human race lies before us, prior to the action of this
decree upon them, one mass of perdition. This decree only
allows a portion to remain such. Viewed through that
medium, all are under one sentence of condemnation : this
decree only executes this sentence upon some. But if it
would be just to punish the whole, it cannot be unjust to
punish a part. If two men owe us debts, we may certainly
sue one. If all antecedently deserve eternal punishment, it
cannot be unjust that some should be antecedently con
signed to it. Or would we fall into the singular contradic
tion of saying that a sentence is just, and yet all execution
of it whatever unjust ?
The question of justice, then, is already settled, when
man first comes under this decree ; and the question which
is settled by it is not one of justice at all, but one of Divine
arrangement simply. The same human mass which, if
innocent, would have been the subject of God's justice,
becomes, when guilty, the subject of his will solely. His
absolute sovereignty now comes in, and He hath mercy upon
whom He will have mercy, and whom He will He hardeneth.
CHAP. i. For Predestination. 1 3
' Hath not the potter power over the same lump to make
one vessel to honour, and another to dishonour ? ' Are we
to complain of God's justice in some cases, because He shows
mercy in others ? To do so would be for the creature to
dictate to the Creator. Man, guilty, has lost his rights, and
falls under the jurisdiction of (rod's absolute and sovereign
will, with which remonstrance is ridiculous.1
Such is the defence of the doctrine of predestination on
the score of justice. Absolutely, or apart from any previous
supposition, it is admitted to be unjust ; but the defence is
that it must not be considered absolutely, but in its real
and intrinsic relation to another doctrine, which in theo
logical order precedes it. If you think the doctrine unjust,
it is said, it is only because you do not realise what the
doctrine of original sin is, and what it commits you to.
You go on really, and in your heart thinking the human
mass innocent before actual sin, and therefore you are
scandalised at the antecedent consignment of any part of
it to punishment. But suppose it really guilty, as your
creed represents it, and you will not be scandalised at it.
Fix upon your mind the existence of real ill-desert ante
cedent to actual sin, and condemnation will appear just
and natural. The first step mastered, the second has no
difficulty in it.
The doctrine of predestination itself, and its defence on
the score of justice, thus rest upon the one doctrine of
original sin. There is another objection, however, made
to it, which is met in another way ; for this doctrine, it is
objected, contradicts our experience and consciousness,
1 Hie si dixerimus quanto melius possumus dicere, quoniam bona sunt
ambo liberarentur ; nihil nobis con- cuncta ista quse fee-it, quanto melius
venientius dicetur quam, 0 homo, tu ilia duplicasset, et multiplicasset, ut
quis es qui respondeas Deo? Novit multo essent plura quam sunt; si
quippe ille quid agat, et quantus enim ea non cap^ret mundus nun-
numerus esse debeat primitus om- quid non posset etiam ipsum facere
nium hominum, deinde sanctorum, quantum vellet ampliorem ? Et
sicut siderum, sicut angelorum, tamen quantumcunque faceret rel
atque, ut de terrenis loquamur, sicut ilia plura, vel istum capaciorem et
pecorum, piscinm, volatilium, sicut majorem, nihilominus eadem de
arborum et herbarum, sicut denique multiplicandis illis dici possent, et
foliorum et capillorum nostrorum. nullus esset immoderatus modus. —
Nam DOS humana cogitatione adhuc Aug. Ep. 186. n. 22.
The Argument
CHAP. I.
describing us as acting from an irresistible influence either
for ffood or evil ; whereas we are conscious of will and
choice and feel that we are not forced to act in one way
or another. But it is replied that this objection proceeds
from a misapprehension as to the nature of this irresistible
influence. The terms irresistible, necessary, and other like
terms, imply, indeed, in their common use an inclination
of the will which is opposed, and express a certain over
whelming" power exerted upon the man, in consequence of
which he is obliged to act against this inclination. But
in the present instance these terms are, in defect of proper
language for the purpose, used incorrectly, and express a
power which inclines the will itself, in the first place, and
does not suppose an inclination already formed which it
contradicts. Between our experience and consciousness,
then, and the exertion of such a power as this upon our
wills, there is no opposition. Our consciousness is only
concerned with the inclination of the will itself, beyond
which we cannot by any stretch of thought or internal
scrutiny advance, being obliged to stay at the simple point
of our will, purpose, inclinations as existing in us. But the
inclination itself of the will is the same, however it may
have been originated ; no difference therefore respecting
its origin touches the subject matter of our consciousness.
This question affects the cause, our consciousness is con
cerned only with the fact ; these two, therefore, can never
come into collision. And though in popular language
such a grace would be spoken of as obliging a man to act
in a particular way, as if it obliged hirn so to act whether
he willed or not, operating as physical force does, indepen
dent of the will of the agent altogether ; such a description
of it is incorrect, and misses the fundamental distinction
in the case. The agent is not caused by it to act in spite
of his will, but caused to will.
This general description of the structure and defence of
the doctrine of predestination will perhaps be sufficient as
an introduction to the present treatise. Nakedly stated,
the doctrine is simply paradoxical, and those who are ac
quainted with no more than the mere statement of it, are
CHAP. i. For Predestination. 15
apt to feel surprise and perplexity how it could have been
maintained by the pious and thoughtful minds that have
maintained it. But it must be admitted that its para
doxical character is diminished, when we come to examine
its grounds and construction. It happens in this case, as
it does in many others, that the surprise which the con
clusion produced is lessened by an acquaintance with the
premisses, the steps by which it was arrived at.
Simplicity of system is a great object with one class of
minds. The attribute of Divine power has also in many
religious minds the position not only of important, but
favourite truth. It is evident how acceptable on both these
grounds must be a system which contrives in harmony with
the facts of experience and the rule of justice, to secure
the one great idea of the whole spiritual action of the
human race being the pure creation of Almighty will.
They are attracted by a conclusion which gives so signal
a rebuke -to human pride, and witness to Divine mercy, and
embrace a doctrine which alone appears fully to set forth
that man is nothing and (rod all in all.
CHAPTER II.
EXAMINATION OF THE ARGUMENT FOR PREDESTINATION.
WHEN particular truths of philosophy or religion are used
as grounds to support conclusions which are repugnant to
natural reason, there are two things for us to do. First,
we have to examine if the reasoning upon these truths is
correct, and if they really contain the conclusions which
have been drawn from them ; and, secondly, if this should
be the case, we have to examine the nature of these truths,
and the sense or manner in which we hold them ; for if the
truths themselves cannot be questioned, and yet the logical
conclusions from them are untenable, there only remains
for extricating ourselves from the difficulty, the considera-
Examination of the CHAP. n.
tion that these truths must have been held in some sense
or manner which was improper ; which impropriety in the
manner of holding them has heen the reason why, however
certain themselves, they have led to such untenable results.
Let us take the case of philosophical predestination in
the first place, or of predestination as resting on philoso
phical grounds, or what is ordinarily called necessitarianism
or fatalism ; and let us examine the nature of these grounds.
It will be evident to any one at all conversant with philo
sophy, and who will summon to his mind a few instances of
the different kinds of truth, to which it calls our attention,
and which it assumes and uses in its arguments and specu
lations, that there are two very different kinds of truths
upon which philosophy proceeds — one, of which the con
ception is distinct and absolute ; the other, of which the
conception is indistinct, and only incipient or in tendency.
Of ordinary facts, such as meet the senses — of the facts of
our internal consciousness, our own feelings and sensations,
bodily and mental, we have distinct conceptions, so far at
least, that these are complete and absolute truths embraced
by our minds. On the other hand, there are various truths
which we partly conceive and partly fail in conceiving ; the
conception, when it has begun, does riot advance or come
to a natural termination, but remains a certain tendency
of thought only. Such are the ideas of substance, of
cause, of infinity, and others which we cannot grasp or
subject to our minds, and which, when we follow them up,
involve us in the utmost perplexity, and carry us into
great apparent contradictions. These, as entertained by
our minds, are incipient truths, not final or absolute ones.
In following or trying to follow them, we feel that we are
in a certain right way, that we are going in a certain true
direction of thought ; but we attain no goal, and arrive
at no positive apprehension.
In contemplating material objects, I encounter a num
ber of impressions, such as hardness, softness, smoothness,
roughness, colour, which are only qualities ; but I cannot
rest in them, but push on to some substance to which they
belong, and from which it is absurd to imagine them apart.
CHAP. ii. Argument for Predestination. 17
But I cannot form the least idea of what substance is. I
find myself only going in the direction of something which
I cannot reach, which mocks all pursuit, and eludes all
grasp ; I have only a sort of idea of a confused something
lying underneath all the sensible qualities of matter — that
is to say, beyond and outside of all my real perceptions.
And I am just as incapable of forming any idea of a spirit
ual substance or myself, though I am said to be conscious
of it ; for this plain reason, that it is in its very nature
anterior to all my ideas.
Again, I have the idea of force or power, or, what is
the same thing, of cause. After contemplating any event
in life or nature I find myself going in thought beyond it,
to consider how it came to pass ; and this thought in me,
once set going, tends, by some instinctive law, some con
stitutional motion inherent in it, in the direction of a cause
of that event ; something not merely antecedent to it, but
which stands in such a relation to it, as that, in consequence
of it, that event or thing exists. The intellect pushes on
to this ultimate resting place, and satisfaction of its own
indigenous want and desire. But while the movement
towards a cause, or some kind of idea of one, is part of our
rational nature, I find, on reflection, that I can form no
distinct conception whatever of what a cause is. What is
that of which existence is the necessary fruit and result ?
We can form no idea of what goes on previous to, and with
infallible cogency and force for, producing existence. All
this preliminary agency is so entirely hid from us, and our
faculties so completely stop short of it, that it seems
almost like an absurdity to us, that there should be any
thing of the kind. The order of nature puts before us an
endless succession of antecedents and consequents, but in
no one instance can we see any necessary connection
between the antecedent and its consequent. The relation
between the so-called cause and effect — the circumstance
in a cause which makes it a cause, is wholly removed from
my view. I see that fire melts metals and hardens clay,
but I do not see why it does either ; and prior to experience,
I should have thought it as likely that these effects would
c
j g Examination q/ the CHAP. "•
have been reversed. The motion which one ball set in
motion communicates to another, might or might not have
taken place prior to experience. I see nothing in the first
motion to produce the second, and can conceive no motion
upon impact with as little contradiction as motion. Again,
I look into myself, and observe my own motions, actions,
thoughts. I find that by a certain exertion of the will, I
can move my limbs, raise ideas, excite or suppress affec
tions and emotions ; but the nature of that power by which
the will does this, is absolutely hidden from me. When I
exert all my force to lift some weight or remove some bar
rier, I may seem at first to myself to have an inward
perception of that force, and the manner in which it
operates ; but on examination, I find that I have only the
idea of a motion of the will, and of a strain of the muscles
which succeeds, not of any connection between the two.1
I have looked around and within me then, and I do not see
a cause anywhere. My reason, as surely as it leads me up
to the truth, that there is a cause of things, stops at that
point, and leaves me in utter perplexity and amazement as
to what a cause is. It is a wonder, a mystery, an incom
prehensible truth. My reason forces me towards the idea
of something, of which I can give no more account to
myself than I can of the most inexplicable article in a
creed. What can be more astonishing than a power by
which anything in nature is. Do all the mysteries of
revelation — do even the wildest dreams of superstition ex-
1 It may be pretended that the its command over ideas and limbs,
resistance which we meet with in ... Secondly, this sentiment of an
bodies, obliging us frequently to endeavour to overcome resistance
exert all our force, and call up all has no known connection with any
our power, thus gives us the idea of event ; what follows it, we know by
force and power. It is this nisus or experience, but would not know it a
strong endeavour of which we are priori. It must, however, be con-
conscious, that is the original irn- fessed that the animal nisus which
pression from which this idea is we experience, though it can afford
copied. But, first, we attribute no accurate or precise idea of power,
power to a vast number of objects enters very much into that vulgar
where we can never suppose this inaccurate idea which is formed of
resistance or force to take place ; to it.— Hume, ' Enquiry concerning the
the bupreme Being, who never meets Human Understanding,' sect. 7.
with any resistance ; to the mind in
CHAP. n. Argument for Predestination. 19
ceed it ? What is it that prevents my reason from reject
ing such an idea ? Simply, that my reason gives it me — •
gives it me, though in that incipient and incomplete state
from which this perplexity ensues.
Again, the idea of infinity is part of our rational
nature. Particular times, spaces, and numbers, end ; but
we cannot possibly think of time, space, and number in
general as ending. Any particular number is suggestive
of further number. In two or three straight strokes I see
a necessary capacity of multiplication, two, three, or any
number of times ad infinitum. I imagine myself at the
top of a high mountain, with the largest conceivable view
all around me. I might know by geography that there
are countries which lie beyond it on all sides, but I do not
wait for that information. There is something in me by
which 1 9 know antecedently, that the space is going on all
the same as space, however differently it may be occupied,
beyond my sight as within it. Having raised in my mind
the largest picture of space I can, so that if I try to in
crease, I simply repeat it, I have still a sense of limitation.
There is at the furthest line of the horizon an excess
which baffles me, which is not included in the imagined
space, or it would not be an excess, and which yet belongs
and is attached to it and cannot be removed ; an incipient
beyond which must be endless, for the very reason that it
begins ; because this indefinable excess, for the very reason
that it exists itself, must be succeeded by the like. It is
the same with respect to time. Time, space, and number,
then, do not end, but go on at the very last ; that is the
very latest perception we have of them, the last intelli
gence as it were ; they are ultimately going further. They
go onward, not only to the end (which particular portions
of them do), but at the end — i.e. their utmost defined
extent in our imagination ; for their very nature is pro
gressive ; they are essentially irrepressible, uncontrollable,
ever-growing, without capacity for standing still and sub
ject to the absolute necessity of being continually greater
and greater.
But while we find in our minds the idea of infinity, we
c 2
20 Examination of the CHAP. IT-
have no idea of what infinity is. I mean that we have no
idea of an actual infinite quantity of anything. We ap
prehend so much of extent or number as we can measure
or count, and can go on adding ; but wherever we stop, we
are on the margin of an infinite remainder, which is not
apprehended by us. Imagine a large crowd increasing in
all directions without end ; it is obvious that such number
is unintelligible to us ; as much so as any mysterious article
in a creed. ° Some idea of infinity we have no doubt, other
wise we should not be able to think or speak of it at all ;
and that seems to be more than a negative idea, as it has
been asserted to be ; for it is the idea of a progress, or going
further, which is not negative, but positive ; but it is no
mental image or reflection of actual infinity.1
We find then a certain class of truths in philosophy of
which we have only a half conception ; truths which, as
entertained by us, are only truths in tendency, not absolute,
not complete. We are conscious of the germs of various
ideas which we cannot open out, or realise as whole or con
sistent ones. We feel ourselves reaching after what we cannot
grasp, and moving onward in thought towards something
we cannot overtake. I move in the direction of a substance
and a cause in nature which I cannot find : my thought
reaches after infinity, but the effort is abortive, and the idea
remains for ever only beginning. I encounter mysterious
truths in philosophy before I come to them in religion,
natural or revealed. My reason itself introduces me to
them. Were I without the faculty of reason, I should not
have these ideas at all, or derive therefore any perplexity
from them. I should want no substance underneath my
impressions ; I should have no sense of an excess beyond
the range of my eye : but reason creates thesa movements
1 It is an oblique proof of the ce qu'il est. II est faux qu'il soit pair,
mysteriousness of infinite number, il est faux qu'il soit impair; car en
tli at it can be neither odd nor even. ajoutant 1'unite, il ne change point
' Nous connaissons qu'il y auninfini, de nature: cependant c'est un nom-
et ignorons sa nature, comme nous bre, et tout nombre est pair ou im-
s-iyons qu'il est faux qua les nombres pair ; il est vrai que cela s'entend
soient finis; doncilestvraiqu'ilyaun de tous nombres finis.— Pascal (ed.
infini en nombre, mais nous ne savons Faugere), vol. ii. p. 164.
CHAP. it. Argument for Predestination. 2 r
in my mind, and so introduces me to indistinct and myste
rious truths within her own sphere.
And this, it may be remarked, is an answer to those
who object to such truths in religion, and reject or put
aside certain doctrines on the ground that they relate to
subject-matter of which we can form no conception, and
which, therefore, it is argued, we cannot entertain in our
minds at all ; cannot make the subject of thought, or there
fore of belief. It is wrong to say that we are wholly unable
to entertain truths of which we have no distinct idea ; and
those who suppose so have an incorrect and defective notion
of the constitution of the human mind. The human mind
is so constituted as to have relations to truth without the
medium of distinct ideas and conceptions. The constitu
tion of our minds makes this mixed state of ignorance and
knowledge possible to us. Were the alternative of pure
ignorance or pure knowledge necessary, it is evident that,
as soon as we turn from sensible objects and mathematics,
we should be in a state of absolute ignorance and unmixed
darkness ; we should not only be ignorant of the nature of
many other truths, but should have no sort of idea what
those truths were of which we were ignorant ; we should
be unable to think of or discuss them on that account, or
even to name them. We should be cut off wholly from
metaphysics, and all that higher thought and philosophy
which have occupied the human mind in all ages. But this
alternative is not necessary.1
With the general admission, then, of this class of truths
in philosophy, we come to the grounds upon which philo
sophical predestination or fatalism is raised. We find these
to be mainly two — first, the maxim that every event must
have a cause, and, secondly, the idea of the Divine Power ;
the first being a physical, the second a religious assumption,
but both alike forming premisses from which a scheme of
absolute necessity in human actions is logically inferred.
1 'Nous sommes sur un milieu prises; il se derobe, et fuit d'une
vaste, toujoursincertains, etflotlants fuite eternelle: rien ne pent 1'ar-
entre 1'ignorance et la connaissance ; reter.' — Pascal. Locke and Hume
et, si nous pensons aller plus avant, both substantially admit the class of
noire objet branle, et echappe a nos indistinct ideas. — NOTE IV.
22
Examination of the CHAP. n.
To take first, then, the maxim that every event must
have a cause. This is a maxim undoubtedly that approves
itself to our understanding. If we see a body which has
hitherto been at rest, start out of this state of rest and
begin to move, we naturally and necessarily suppose that
there must be some cause or reason of this new mode of ex
istence. And this applies to moral events or actions as well
as to events physical. Every action which is performed is
undoubtedly a new event in nature, and as such there must
have been some cause to produce it. Moreover, on the same
principle that the action itself must have a cause, that cause
must have another cause, and so on, till we come to some
cause outside of and beyond the agent himself. The
maxim, then, that there must be a cause of every event once
granted, the conclusion of a necessity in human actions
inevitably follows.
But though the maxim that every event must have a
cause is undoubtedly true, what kind of a truth is it ? Is
it a truth absolute and complete, like a fact of sensation or
reflection ; or is it a truth indistinct, incipient, and in ten
dency only, like one of those ideas which have just been
discussed ? It is a truth of the latter kind, for this simple
reason, that there is a contrary truth to it. When we look
into our minds, and examine the nature and characteristics
of action, we find that we have a certain natural and irre
sistible impression or sense of our originality as agents.
We feel beforehand that we can do a thing or not as we
please, and when we have taken either course, we feel after
wards that we could have taken the other, and experience
satisfaction or regret, as may be, on that particular account.
That our actions are original in us, is the ground upon
which arise peculiar pleasures and pains of conscience,
which are known and familiar to us. Could we really think
that they were not, we should be without these particular
feelings ; we should not have a certain class of sensations
which we know we have. We have, then, a certain sense
or perception of our originality as agents, that an action
is original in us, or has no cause.
This originality in human actions is, for want of better
CHAP. ir. Argument for Predestination. 23
language, sometimes expressed by what is called the self-
determination of the will ; and from this mode of express
ing it persons have endeavoured to extract a reductio ad
absurdum of the truth itself. For it has been said, ' If
will determines will, then choice orders and determines
choice, and acts of choice are subject to the decision and
follow the conduct of other acts of choice ; ' in which case
every act whatever of the will must be preceded by a for
mer act, and there must therefore be an act of the will
before the first act of the will.1 But in the first place it is
evident this is at the best an argument drawn from a par
ticular mode of expressing a truth, and taking advantage
of the inherent detects of language ; and in the next place
that it does not do justice even to the language; for however
inconceivable self-motion strictly speaking may be, what we
mean and, so far as we can, express by it, is one indivisible
motion, not a relation of one motion to another, of some
thing moving to something being moved, as is supposed in
this argument, and is necessary to the force of it. The real
question, however, at issue is, in whatever way we may
express it, have we or have we not a certain sense of origi
nality in our acts ; that we are springs of motion to our
selves ; that however particular motives and impulses from
without may operate on us, there is a certain ultimate
decision, which we can make either way, and which there
fore when made, in one way or the other, is original. If
we have, we have a certain sense or perception of action as
being something uncaused, i.e. having nothing anterior to
it, which necessarily produces it — a sense or perception
which goes counter to the other, which was also admitted
to exist in us, of the necessity of a cause for all events,
1 Edwards ' On the Freedom of Et si quidam ipsa moverat seipsam
the Will,' part 2. sect. 1. Aquinas ad volendum oportuisset, quod medi-
in arguing for the necessity of an ante consilio hoc ageret ex aliqu4
extern il source of motion to the voluntate prsesupposita Hocautem
will (moveri ab aliquo exterior! est procedere in infinitum. Unde
principio) reasons in the same way. necesse est ponere quod in primum
4 Manifestum est quod voluntas in- motum voluntatis voluntas prodeat
cipit velle aliquid cum hocprius non ex instinctu alicujus exterioris mo-
vellet. Necesse est ergo quod ab ventis.' — Sum. Theol. p. 2. q. 9. art.
aliquo moveatur ad volendum. ... 4.
Examination of the
CHAP. ir.
actions included. Kegarding actions in their general cha
racter as events, we say they must have a cause ; but in their
special character as actions, we refuse them one : our whole
internal feeling and consciousness being opposed to it.
Here then are two contradictory instincts or perceptions
of our reason, which we must make the best of, and arrive
at what measure of truth a mixed conclusion gives. We
certainly have both these perceptions, and one must not be
made to give way to the other. However reason may de
clare for the originality of our acts, it says also that every
event must have a cause ; again, however it may declare
for a cause of every event, it says that our acts are original.
Metaphysicians on both sides appear to have under
valued the one or the other of these rational instincts or
perceptions, according to their bias ; the advocates of free
will thinking slightly of the general instinct for a cause, the
advocates of necessity thinking slightly of our perception, as
agents, of originality. The former have simply dwelt on
our inward consciousness of power of choice, dismissing the
principle of causes, as if, however, it applied to other events,
it did not apply to actions, being excluded from this ground
ipso facto by this sense of the originality of our actions.
But if the necessity of a cause of events is true at all, it
must apply to actions as well as to other events ; and to
suppose that it is ipso facto deprived of this application
by this special sense of originality in the case of actions, is
to assume that we cannot have two contradictory ideas ;
which, according to what I endeavoured to show in this
chapter, is a false assumption, and not true of us in the pre
sent imperfect state of our capacities, in which we may have,
and have, imperfect opposing perceptions ; though it is of
course absurd to suppose that this can be the case except
in a very imperfect state of being, or that there can be
absolute and perfect perceptions in opposition to each other.
The latter, on the other hand, have regarded the principle
of causation as the only premiss worth taking into account
on this question, and have dismissed the sense of originality,
as if it were a mere confused and blind sentiment, which,
when examined, really spoke to nothing, and was found to
CHAP. IT. Argument for Predestination. 25
issue in a mere cloud, or evaporate altogether. They have
voted the one idea to be solid and philosophical, the other
to be empty and delusive. But I cannot see how they are
justified in thus setting up one of these ideas to the exclu
sion of the other. Express the idea of causation as you will,
whether as the perception of an abstract truth that there
must be a ca^ise of all events, or simply as the observation
of the fact, that all events are connected with certain ante
cedents as the condition of their taking place1 — what is it,
after all, but a truth so far as it goes, and so far as we per
ceive or observe it to be such ? The reason desiderates a
cause of anything that takes place, says one philosopher,
putting it as the perception of an abstract truth ; but this
necessity is not to be acknowledged in any more unlimited
sense than that in which it is perceived. In the case of
events in nature, the axiom reigns supreme, and is not in
terfered with; but when we corne to moral events or actions,
.it is there met by an innate perception — viz. that of origin
ality which is just as rational as the other. Another philo
sopher says that we observe causation as a fact.* We do ;
but though we observe it in nature, we do not certainly
observe it in will ; and observation can only speak to those
cases to which it extends. The consideration of ourselves
as agents presents another truth to us — viz. that of origin
ality in our acts ; and this instinct or perception must be
taken into account as a philosophical premiss. How should
we have the idea of the will as being self-moving and self-
determining at all in the way in which we have it, unless
there were truth in the idea ? For nature does not deceive
us and tell us falsehoods, however it may tell us imperfect
truths. And though it may be said that all that we mean
by the will's self-determination, is that we act with will as
distinct from compulsion, however that will may have been
caused ; this is not true upon any natural test ; for, put this
distinction before any plain man, and he will feel it as an
interference in some way with his natural consciousness, and
will reject the idea of an externally-caused will, as not pro
perly answering to his instinct on this subject. And if it
1 The former is Edwards's, the latter Mr. Mill's position. NOTB V.
2 5 Examination of the CHAP, n.
be argued that we cannot have this sense of originality or
self-determination in the will, because all that we are ac
tually conscious of is our will itself, the fact that we decide
in one way or another, and not the cause of it, whether in
ourselves or beyond us ; it is sufficient to say that this sense
or perception of originality is not professed to be absolute
or complete, but that it is still a sense or perception of a
certain kind. There is a plain instinct in us, a perception
of a truth, in this direction ; and that being ^the case, to say
that it is not apprehension and does not arrive at a positive
conclusion or point, is to say no more than may be said of
many other great ideas of our intelligent nature, such as that
of substance, cause, infinity.
There being these two counter ideas, then, with respect
to the necessity of a cause ; as on the one hand we demand
a cause, and on the other reject it; neither of these can be
truths absolute and complete ; and. therefore, neither of
them a basis for an absolute and complete theory or doctrine
to be raised upon it, So far as the maxim that there must
be a cause of every event is true, so far it is a premiss for
a scheme of fatalism. But it is not true absolutely, and
thus no absolute system of this kind can be founded upon
it. Did the fatalist limit himself to a conditional incom
plete conclusion, i.e. — for this would be all that it would
come to in such a case — to a mystery on this subject, no one
could object. But if he raises a definite scheme, his con
clusion exceeds his premiss.
The same may be said of any absolute doctrine of Pre
destination drawn from the attribute of the Divine Power,
or the idea of God as the cause of all things. There is an
insurmountable contradiction between this idea and that of
freewill in the creature ; for we cannot conceive how that
which is caused can itself be a first cause, or a spring of
motion to itself. And therefore the idea of Divine Power
leads to predestination as its result. But what is this truth
of the Divine Power or Omnipotence, as we apprehend it ?
Does it belong to the class of full and distinct, or of incom
plete truths ? Certainly to the latter, for there appears
at once a counter truth to it, in the existence of moral evil
CHAP. IT. Argument for Predestination. 27
which must be referred fco some cause other than (rod, as
well as in that sense of our own originality to which I have
just alluded. The Divine Omnipotence, then, is a truth
which we do not understand— mysterious, imperfect truth ;
and, therefore, cannot be used by the predestinarian as the
premiss of an absolute doctrine, but only as that of an in
definite or conditional one.
The two ideas of the Divine Power and freewill are, in
short, two great tendencies of thought inherent in our minds,
which contradict each other, and can never be united or
brought to a common goal ; and which, therefore, inasmuch
as the essential condition of absolute truth is consistency
with other truth, can never, in the present state of our
faculties, become absolute truths, but must remain for ever
contradictory tendencies of thought, going on side by side
till they are lost sight of and disappear in the haze of our
conceptions, like two parallel straight lines which go on to
infinity without meeting. While they are sufficiently clear,
then, for purposes of practical religion (for we cannot doubt
that they are truths so far as and in that mode in which we
apprehend them), these are truths upon which we cannot
raise definite and absolute systems. All that we build upon
either of them must partake of the imperfect nature of the
premiss which supports it, and be held under a reserve of
consistency with a counter conclusion from the opposite
truth. And as I may have occasion hereafter to use it, I
may as well say here that this is what I mean by the dis
tinction between absolute truths, and truths which are
truths and yet not absolute ones — viz., that the one are of
that kind which is distinct and consistent with other truth ;
the other of the kind which is indistinct, and especially such
truth as has other truth opposed to it, and which is there
fore obviously but half-truth.
I will add as a natural corollary from this relation of these
two ideas, that that alone is a genuine doctrine of freewill
which maintains such a freewill in man as is inconsistent
with our idea of the Divine Power. There is a kind of
freewill which is consistent with this idea. All men.
whatever be their theory of the motive principle of, admit
2 8 Examination of the CHAP, n.
the fact of, the human will ; that we act willingly and not
like inanimate machines ; nor does the necessitarian deny,
that the human will is will, and as far as sensation goes
free, though he represents it as ultimately moved from
without. Here, then, is a sort of freewill which is consistent
with the idea of the Divine Power. But this, as was above
explained, is not such a freewill as meets the demands of
natural consciousness, which is satisfied with nothing short
of a characteristic of will, which comes into collision with
our idea of the Divine Power — viz., originality.
Again, the objection against the doctrine of freewill,
that it would remove human actions from the Divine Pro
vidence,1 and so reduce this whole moral scheme of things
to chance, has an immediate answer in the very nature of
the truth as here described. Undoubtedly there is a con
tradiction in supposing that events really contingent can
be foreseen, made the subjects of previous arrangement,
and come into a scheme of Providence ; and though this
is sometimes met by the answer that the Divine foresight
is the sight of the events as such, and not in their causes
only, and that therefore contingent events can be foreseen
by God as being events, which however future to us, are
present to His eternal eye ; it must be owned that such a
foresight as this is a contradiction to our reason2, and that
1 If the will of man be free with no use to direct and regulate perfect
a liberty ad utrumlibet, and if his accident. — Edwards ' On Freedom of
actions be the offspring of his will, the Will,' part 3, sect. 4.
such of his actions which are not yet 2 That no future event can be
wrought, must be both radically and certainly foreknown whose existence
eventually uncertain. It is therefore is contingent and without all neces-
a chance whether they are performed sity, may be proved thus : it is im-
or no. ... So that any assertor of possible for a thing to be certainly
self-determination is in fact, whether known to any intellect without evi-
he mean it or no, a worshipper of the dence . . . But no understanding,
heathen lady named Fortune, and an created or uncreated, can see evi-
ideal deposer of Providence from its dence where there is none . . . But
throne.— Toplady, vol. vi. p. 90. if there be a future event whose
If it be said that volitions are existence is contingent without all
events that come to pass without necessity, the future existence of
any determining cause, that is most the event is absolutely without evi-
palpably inconsistent with all use of dence.— Edwards, ' On Freedom of
laws and precepts; for nothing is Will,' part 2, sect. 12.
more plain than that laws can be of
CHAP. ir. Argument for Predestination. 29
therefore an answer wbich appeals to it, to solve the con
tradiction of freewill to Providence, only gets rid of one
contradiction by another. Allowing, however, the contradic
tion between Providence and freewill to remain, what comes
in the way of argument from it ? All imperfect truths run
into contradictions when they are pursued. Thus, a great
philosopher has extracted the greatest absurdities out of
the idea of material substance ; and the idea of infinity is
met by the objection that all number must be either odd or
even. In the same way freewill, when pursued, runs into
a contradiction to Providence, but this does not show that
it is false, but only that it is imperfect truth.
The same mode of treatment applies to the great prin
ciple of religion (substantially the same with that of the
Divine Power) that God is the Author of all good, if used
as a basis of an absolute doctrine of predestination. Un
doubtedly from this principle the doctrine of irresistible
grace follows ; for according to it man derives all his good
ness from a source beyond himself ; and with this doctrine
of grace, predestination. But what kind of a truth is this
principle that God is the Author of all good ? an absolute
or an imperfect truth ? Plainly the latter. There is, indeed,
a principle of humility in our nature, whether belonging to
us as fallen creatures, or necessary to the very relation of
dependence implied in created being, which leads us to dis
own any source of good within ourselves. The enlightened
moral being has an instinctive dread of appropriating any
good that he may see in himself to himself. This is a great
fact in human nature. Our hearts bear witness to it. We
shrink from the claim of originating good. If the thought
rises up in our minds, we put it down, and are afraid of
entertaining it. As soon as we have done a good action,
we put it away from us ; we try not to think of it. Thus
praise is a mixture of pleasure and pain : the first motion
in our minds of pure pleasure is immediately checked by
fear : we are afraid of the consciousness of being praised,
and wish to cast it out of our minds. The general manners
of society, the disclaiming of merit which always takes
place as a matter of form, the readiness to give place to
Examination of the
CHAP. jr.
others, bear witness to a great principle of humility in
human nature, by which it is ever ejecting the source of
o-ood from itself, and falling back on some source external
and unknown. The act of prayer is a witness to the same
principle ; for we pray to God for moral and spiritual good
ness, for conversion and renewal both for ourselves and
others. Our very moral nature thus takes us out of ourselves
to God, referring us to Him as the sole and meritorious
cause of all moral action ; while it takes upon itself the
responsibility of sin. This constitutional humility, this
fixed tendency of our minds to an external source of good,
expressed in the formal language of theology, becomes the
doctrine of irresistible grace, from which that of predestina
tion immediately follows. But is there not a counter
principle to this co-existing with it in our nature, a princi
ple of self-appreciation and self-respect, whereby we are able
to contemplate ourselves as original agents in good actions ?
Let us turn now from philosophical to theological pre
destination, or to the doctrine of predestination as resting on
scriptural grounds. It must, I think, be admitted accord
ing to the argument stated in the last chapter, that the
predestinarian draws his conclusion naturally from the
doctrine of original sin ; while at the same time, that
conclusion must be allowed to be repugnant to natural
reason and justice. For there is no man of ordinary moral
perception, who, on being told of a certain doctrine which
represented God as ordaining one man to eternal life, and
ordaining another to eternal punishment, be fore either had
done a single act or was born, would not immediately say
that God was represented as acting unjustly. There re
mains, however, for extricating us from this dilemma an
examination of the sense and manner in which the church
imposes, and in which we hold, the doctrine of original sin.
From the doctrine of the fall, then, which represents
man as morally impotent, unable by nature to do any good
thing, a lost and ruined being, the conclusion is undoubtedly
a legitimate one, that if he is to be restored, he must be
restored by some power quite independent of and external
to him, or by that act of grace which divines call irre-
CFAP. ii. Argument for Predestination. 31
sistible. But to what kind of truth does the doctrine of
the fall belong ? Tt is evident on the mere statement of
it, that it is not a truth which we hold in the same manner
in which we do the ordinary truths of reason and experience.
Because it is met immediately by a counter truth. Man
kind has a sense of moral power, of being able to do good
actions and avoid wrong ones, which, so far as it goes,
contradicts the doctrine of the fall. For so far as it is true
that we can do what we ought to do, our nature is not
fallen ; it is equal to the task imposed upon it ; and it is
our own personal fault, and not our nature's, if it is not
done. The conclusion, then, of the necessity of an irre
sistible grace to produce a good life, has in the doctrine of
the fall not a complete, but an imperfect premiss, and
must follow the conditions of that premiss. The doctrine
of the fall is held under a reserve on the side of the con
trary truth ; the doctrine of irresistible grace, then, must
be held under the same reserve. So far as man is fallen,
he wants this grace ; but so far as he is not fallen, he does
not want it. One inference, then, from one part of the
whole premiss lies under the liability to be contradicted by
another from another part ; and the legitimate issue is no
whole or perfect conclusion, but only a conditional and
imperfect one.
The predestinarian, however, neglects this distinction,
and upon an imperfect basis raises a definite and complete
doctrine. Or, which is the same thing, he does not see
that the basis is imperfect. He does not consent to hold
ing the doctrine of the fall with this reserve, but imagines
he has in this doctrine a complete truth ; and he proceeds to
use it as he would any ordinary premiss of reason or experi
ence, and founds a perfect argumentative structure upon it.
Thus much for the structure of the doctrine of predes
tination, as raised on the basis of original sin. And the
same answer may be made to the defence of the justice of
the doctrine on the same ground ; to the argument that,
inasmuch as all mankind deserve eternal punishment ante
cedently to actual sin, it cannot be unjust to consign a
portion of them antecedently to it.
Examination of the
CHAP. n.
Undoubtedly the doctrine of original sin represents the
whole human race as subject to the extreme severity of
Divine wrath in consequence of the sin of Adam. It has
two ways or forms in which it represents this. The doctrine
is sometimes so expressed as to represent mankind as being
actually parties to the sin committed by Adam, and so
condemned, on a principle of natural justice, for a sin
which is their own. All men are said to have sinned in
Adam, and Adam, or the old man, is spoken of as the root
or principle of evil in every human being. Sometimes it
is so expressed as to represent mankind as punished, on a
principle of vicarious desert, for the sin of their first parent,
regarded as another person from themselves.1 But which
ever of these two modes of stating the doctrine of original
sin is adopted, it is evident that in dealing with it, we are
dealing with a mystery, not with an ordinary truth of
reason and nature. If we adopt the former mode, it is
contradictory to common reason, according to which one
man cannot be thus the same with another, and commit a
sin before he is born. If we adopt the latter, it is contra
dictory to our sense of justice, according to which one man
ought not to be punished for another man's sin. Under
either form, then, we are dealing with a mystery, and that
which is described in this doctrine as having taken place
with respect to mankind, has taken place mysteriously, not
after the manner of common matter of fact.
And this distinction, it must be observed, is necessary
not only to guard what we build upon the doctrine of
original sin, but for the defence of the doctrine itself. This
doctrine is sometimes called an unjust one, and this charge
of injustice is sometimes met by an attempt to reduce and
qualify the statement itself of the doctrine ; as if it attri-
1 Quantomagis prohiberi [a bap- propna sed aliena peccata (Cyprian,
tismo] non debet [infans]qui recens Ep. ad Fidum, 64. ed. Oxon.) The
natus nib.il peccavit, nisi quod se- more common and recognised mode
cundum Adam carnaliter natus con- however of expressing the doctrine
tagium mortis antiques prima nativi- is that which represents mankind as
tate eontraxit, qui ad remissam pec- having sinned in Adam, and having
catorum accipiendamhocipsofacilius been parties in the act. — NOTE VI.
accedit, quod illi remittuntur non
CHAP. IT. Argument for Predestination. 33
buted only negative consequences to the sin of Adam — a
loss of perfection, a withdrawal of some supernatural aids.
But such a qualification of the doctrine is contrary to the
plain language of Scripture, as well as that of catholic
writers. The proper defence of the doctrine is not a limi
tation of its statements, but a distinction as to the sense
in which these statements are to be held. When this
distinction has been drawn, objectors may exhibit as forci
bly and vividly as they will the paradoxical nature of these
statements ; they gain nothing by doing so. We may be
asked how it is possible that (rod should be angry with
innocent infants, should condemn persons before they are
born to the torments of hell and other like questions ; but
with the aid of this distinction it is easy to see that such
objections suppose an entirely different mode of holding
such statements from that which every reasonable believer
adopts. We are not to measure these mysterious conse
quences of the sin of Adam by human analogies, as if the
act of Grod in visiting the sin of Adam upon all mankind
were like the act of a human monarch who punished a
whole family or nation for the crime of one man. They
are of the order of mysterious truths, and represent modes
of Divine dealing which are beyond the sphere of our
reason.1
Upon the premiss, then, contained in the doctrine of
original sin, that all mankind deserve eternal punishment
antecedently to actual sin, it is correctly argued that it
cannot be unjust to consign a portion antecedently to it.
1 Le peche originel est folie de- bien loin de 1'inventer par ses voies,
vant les homines; mais on le donne s'en eloigne quand on lelui presente.
pour tel. Vous ne me devez done — Pascal (ed. Fauge:es), v. ii. p. 106.
pas reprocher le defaut de raison en Nous ne concevons ni 1'etat glo-
cette doctrine, puisque je le donne rieux d'Adam, ni la nature de son
pour etre sans raison. Mais cette peche, ni la transmission qui s'en est
foiie est plus sage que toute la sa- faite en nous. Ce sont choses qui se
gesse des homines ; sapientius est sont passees dans I'&tat d'une nature
hominibus. Car, sans cela, que dira- toute differente de la notre, et qui
t-on qu'est l'homme ? Tout son 6tat passent notre capacit6 presente. — p.
depend de ce point imperceptible. 369.
Et comment s'en fut-il aper9u par sa Jeremy Taylor loses sight of this
raison, puisque c'est une chose au- principle of interpretation in his ar-
dessus de sa raison ; et que sa raison, gument on Original Sin. — NOTE VII.
-4 Examination of the CHAP. ir.
But it must be remembered what kind of a premiss this is.
If it is a truth of revelation that all men deserve eternal
punishment in consequence of the sin of Adam, it is a
truth of our moral nature equally certain, that no man
deserves punishment except for his own personal sin. And
the one is declared in revelation itself as plainly as the
other ; for it is said, < The soul that sinneth, it shall die :
the son shall not bear the iniquity of the father, neither
shall the father bear the iniquity of the son ; the righteous
ness of the righteous shall be upon him, and the wicked
ness of the wicked shall be upon him.' ' It is a truth,
then, of reason and Scripture alike that no man is respon
sible for another's sin : and so far as this is true at all, it
is universally true,2 applying as much to the case of
Adam's sin, as to that of any other man. For though God
suspends the operation of general laws on occasions, such
laws are only modes of proceeding in the physical world.
Moral truths do not admit of exceptions. The premiss,
then, on which we proceed in this question is a divided
one ; and if the predestinarian from one part of it concludes
the justice of his doctrine, his opponent can, from the
other, conclude the contrary. If the mystery of our
responsibility for the sin of Adam justifies his scheme, the
truth of our exclusive responsibility for our own sins con
demns it.
Both in structure and defences, then, the doctrine of
predestination rests on an imperfect premiss, and can only
1 Ezek. xviii. 20. our father's sins to us, unto eternal
2 Jeremy Taylor's argument is damnation ; and is it otherwise in
sound so far as he insists that the this only?' — Vol. ix. p. 383.
case of original sin should not be It is evidently wrong to treat the
treated as an exception to God's or- case of original sin as an exception,
dinary justice. * When your lord- in one particular instance, to God's
ship had said that "my arguments ordinary justice; for there can be
for the vindication of God's goodness no justifiable exception to the rule
and justice are sound and holy," your of justice. All God's acts must be
hand run over it again, and added just. It must be treated as a mys-
" as abstracted from the case of ori- tery, something unknown, and against
ginal sin." But why should this be which, on that account, we can bring
abstracted from all the whole eco- no charge of injustice. For before
nomy of God, from all His other we can call an act unjust, we must
dispensations ? Is it in all cases of know what the act is.
the world unjust for God to impart
CHAP. n. Argument for Predestination. 35
be held as imperfect truth ; for we cannot build more upon
a basis than it can bear, and from what is conditional and
incomplete extract what is absolute and determinate. But
the predestinarian holds the premiss itself as complete and
perfect, overlooking the contrary one to which it is opposed ;
and therefore raises upon it a complete and determinate
doctrine. He does not consider, in the first instance, that
the fall of man is, however clearly revealed to us, but one
side of the whole truth as regards human nature ; that it
is mysterious, as distinguished from intelligible truth. He
should revise the whole sense and manner in which he holds
this doctrine.
To turn from reasoning to Scripture. Predestination
comes before us in Scripture under two aspects, as a truth
or doctrine, and as a feeling, and under both the conclusion
is of that indeterminate character which has been described
here as its proper and legitimate one.
1. The general conclusion of Scripture on this question,
considered as a question of abstract truth, is indeterminate.
There exists undoubtedly in Scripture, as was observed in
the last chapter, a large body of language in which man is
spoken of as a lost and ruined creature, and impotent by
nature for good. And in this state he is pronounced to be
saved by an act of Divine grace alone. And this language,
as has been explained, is substantially the assertion of pre
destination ; because we have only to add to it the acknow
ledged truth of God's eternal predetermination of all His
acts, in order to make it such. And in addition to this
general body of language, particular passages (such, espe
cially, as the eighth and ninth chapters of the Epistle to
the Komans) assert the express doctrine of predestination
in such a way that we cannot escape from their force except
by a subtle and evasive mode of explanation, which would
endanger the meaning of all Scripture. The terms elect
and predestinated in Scripture mean, according to their
natural interpretation, persons who have been chosen by
God from all eternity to be called, justified, or made righ
teous, and finally glorified.1 But Scripture is two-sided OP
1 NOTE VIII.
D 2
36 Examination of the CHAP. IT.
this great question. If one set of passages, taken in their
natural meaning, conveys the doctrine of predestination,
another conveys the reverse. The Bible, in speaking of
mankind, and addressing them on their duties and respon
sibilities, certainly speaks as if all had the power to do
their duty or not, when laid before them ; nor would any
plain man receive any other impression from this language,
than that the moral being had freewill, and could determine
his own acts one way or another. So that, sometimes
speaking one way, and sometimes another, Scripture, as a
whole, makes no assertion, or has no determinate doctrine
on this subject.
To some persons, perhaps, such an estimate of the
general issue of Scripture language on this subject may
seem derogatory to Holy Scripture ; because it appears, at
first sight, to be casting blame upon language, to say that
it is self-contradictory; the form of such an assertion
suggesting that the expression of something definite was
aimed at, but that the language fell short of its aim. But
it will not, upon consideration, be found that any such
consequence attaches to this estimate of Scripture language.
For though Scripture is certainly said not to be consistent,
and, therefore, not to give support to a determinate doctrine
of predestination, it is not said that the expression of any
determinate doctrine was designed. And, therefore, the
assertion made is not that Scripture has fallen short of an
object which it aimed at ; rather, it is quite consistent with
Scripture having most completely and successfully attained
its object.
Were the nature of all truth such as that it could be
expressed — that is, put into statement or proposition, to
the effect that such is or is not the case, explicitness and
consistency would be always requisite for language ; because
real expression is necessarily explicit and consistent with
itself. All intelligible truths— matters of fact, for example
— are capable of expression ; and therefore, in the case of
such truths, explicit statement is necessary, and contradic
tion is ruinous. But it is not the case that all truth can
be expressed. Some truths of revealed religion cannot be
CHAP. ir. Argument for Predestination. 37
stated without contradiction to other truths, of which
reason or the same revelation informs us, and, therefore,
cannot be stated positively and absolutely without be
coming, in the very act of statement, false.
The truth of absolute predestination cannot be stated
without contradiction to the Divine justice and man's free
agency. It belongs, then, to that class of truths which
does not admit of statement. It is an imperfect truth —
that is, a truth imperfectly apprehended by us. There is
a tendency, as has been said, to a truth on this subject,
but this tendency never becomes a conclusion ; and an idea
which is true, as far as it does advance, never does advance
to any natural limit. The intellect stops short and rests
in suspense, not seeing its way, and the line of thought,
though it may admit of such a completion as will make it
a truth, is not a truth yet. and cannot be made a propo
sition.
But with respect to this kind of truth which is only
in tendency, and does not admit of statement, if anything
is to be said at all, such contradictory or double language
only can be employed as Scripture does employ on the
subject of predestination. Consistent language would do
more than, indeed the very reverse of what was wanted,
inasmuch as it would state positively. Inconsistency could
certainly be avoided by saying nothing at all, but that
mode of avoiding inconsistency could not be adopted here,
because there is a defective and incomplete truth to be
expressed in some such way as is practicable. Something,
therefore, is to be said. But to say something, and yet on
the whole to make no positive statement, to express suit
ably such indeterminate truth, what is to be done but first
to assert the truth and then by counter statement to bring
round indefiniteness again ; thus carrying thought a certain
way without bringing it to any goal, and giving an incli
nation and a direction to ideas without fixing them.
2. Predestination comes before us in Scripture as a
feeling or impression upon the mind of the individual.
All conscious power, strength, energy, when combined with
a particular aim, tend to create the sense of a destiny —
3 8 Examination of the CHAP. IT.
an effect with which we are familiar in the case of many
remarkable persons. A man who feels in himself the
presence of great faculties which he applies to the attain
ment of some great object, not unnaturally interprets the
very greatness of these faculties as a providential call to
such an application of them, and a pledge and earnest of a
successful issue. Thus, in proportion to the very strength
and energy of his own will, he regards himself as but a
messenger from, an instrument of, a Higher Power ; he
sees in himself but a derived agency, an impulse from
without. It seems necessary that he should refer those
extraordinary forces, which he feels working within him,
to some source beyond the confines of his own narrow
existence, and connect them with the action of the invisible
Supreme Power in the universe. He is in a sense, in which
other persons are not, a mystery to himself ; and to account
for so much power in so small and frail a being, he refers
it to the unknown world in which reside the causes of all
the great operations of nature. This is the way in which
he expresses his own sense and consciousness of remarkable
powers ; he would have regarded an ordinary amount of
power as his own, but because he has so much more, he
alienates it, and transfers it to a source beyond himself.
Thus heroes and conquerors in heathen times have some
times even imagined themselves to be emanations from
the Deity. But a common result has been the idea of a
destiny, which they have had to fulfil. And this idea of a
destiny once embraced, as it is the natural effect of the
sense of power, so in its turn adds greatly to it. The per
son as soon as he regards himself as predestined to achieve
some great object, acts with so much greater force and
constancy for the attainment of it ; he is not divided by
doubts, or weakened by scruples or fears ; he believes fully
that he shall succeed, and that belief is the greatest assist
ance to success. The idea of a destiny in a considerable
degree fulfils itself.
The idea of destiny, then, naturally arising out of a
sense of power, it must be observed that this is true of the
moral and spiritual, as well as of the natural man, and,
CHAP. ii. Argument for Predestination. 39
applies to religious aims and purposes, as well as to those
connected with human glory. A strong will in moral things,
a determination to resist the tendencies of corrupt nature,
a sustained aim at the perfect life — this whole disposition
of mind does, if recognised and contemplated in himself by
the possessor, in proportion to its extent create a sense of a
spiritual destiny ; and the Christian in his own sphere, as
the great man of the world in his, feels himself marked out
for a particular work and the final reward which is to follow
it. According to his calculation of his resources is his
conviction that he shall attain his object ; and from the
calculation that ne will, the sense that he is destined to
succeed, almost immediately arises. Not that this result
need take place in all Christian minds, for there are dif
ferences of natural character as well as of moral power
which would affect it. Some minds are constitutionally
more self-contemplative than others, and have before them
their own condition and prospects, while others pursue the
same actual course with less of reflection upon themselves
as agents. So far, however, as a man thinks definitely of
himself and of his own spiritual strength, and so far as the
result of the inspection is satisfactory, this will be the
result. He perceives in himself now that which must
ultimately overcome, and looks forward to the issue as to
the working out of a problem, the natural fruit of moral
resources already in his possession. Nor need this result
be confined to remarkable and eminent Christians. What
ever be the degree and standard of goodness before the
mind, so far as a man definitely recognises in himself the
capacity for attaining it, so far he will have the sense of
being marked out for its attainment.
And it is evident that one whole side of Scripture en
courages Christians in this idea. In the first place, without
imposing as necessary, Scripture plainly sanctions and en
courages that character of mind which is self-contemplative,
or involves reflection upon self, our own spiritual state and
capacities. The more childlike temper has doubtless its
own praise ; but the other is also set forth in Scripture as a
temper eminently becoming a Christian. Indeed, placed as
4Q Examination of the CHAP. n.
we are here, with an unknown future before us, of good or
evil, and possessed by nature of the strongest self-love and
desire for our own ultimate good, is it to be said for a
moment, that we ought not to think of ourselves, our pro
spects, the object of our existence, and our amount of re
sources, the degree of our strength and ability to achieve
it ? Certainly, such a consideration is highly befitting our
state, and suitable to a Christian man. And accordingly
the New, as distinguished from the Old Testament, appears
specially to encourage this peculiar tone of mind, and to
direct men more to reflection upon themselves ; it recom
mends a grave foresight, a prudential regard to our own
ultimate happiness; it promotes a deep moral self-interested-
ness and spirit of calculation. The eye of the soul is turned
inward upon itself to think of its own value, and estimate
its own capacities, and prospects. ' Which of you intending
to build a tower, sitteth not down first and counteth the
cost, whether he have sufficient to finish it ? Or what king
going to war with another king, sitteth not down first and
consult eth whether he be able with ten thousand to meet
him that cometh against him, with twenty thousand.' l
But if a man makes the estimate which is here recom
mended to him, and if he conscientiously finds it a favour
able one — i.e. if he feels himself possessed of strong moral
purpose and will, what is to prevent him from thinking
that he is destined to the end, with a view to which the
estimate is made? That he is marked out by Providence
to build this tower and conquer this foe ? History and
experience show, that the human mind is so constituted as
to receive this impression.
Accordingly, Christians are addressed in the New Tes
tament upon this supposition. It is one of the first lessons
which the Gospel teaches us, that the ends which earthly
greatness proposes to itself, are but shadows of those to
which Christians are called ; that the conquest of sin is the
true glory of man, and the heavenly his true crown. The
Christian, therefore, is addressed as one predestined to
eternal glory. He is encouraged to regard himself as a
1 Lukexiv. 28, 31.
CHAP. ir. Argument for Predestination. 41
favourite of Heaven singled out from the world, and
stamped from the very commencement of his course, with
the token of future triumph. The resolution to obtain the
spiritual crown is supposed to impart to him the same
sense of a destiny, that the consciousness of a commanding
mind imparts to the man of the world ; and the life eternal
is represented as an end assured to the individual before
the foundation of the world. His life in this world is de
scribed as a passage, laborious and painful indeed, but still
conducting him by a sure succession of steps to this end.
It obstructs and postpones rather than involves any real
hazard to his spiritual prospects ; the goal is pledged, and
he has only to go forward till he reaches it, putting aside
the hindrances as they arise. Life is to him a purgatorial
rather than a trial state, purifying him by affliction, and
exercising him by conflicts, through all which, however, he
passes steadily onward with the seal of God upon him,
marking him infallibly from the very beginning as His
own. Nor is this position confined to a few eminent saints,
but supposed to be the position of all Christians, who,
whatever be the differences among themselves, are all saints
in comparison with the world around them. This is the
natural construction of the language of S. Paul ; and as
this idea of a destiny is the result of, so in its turn it
strengthens, the moral energies of the Christian. The
conviction that he is marked out for a heavenly crown,
elevates and inspires him in the pursuit of it.
This is ' the godly consideration of predestination,' re
commended in the seventeenth Article of our Church. The
sense of predestination which the New Testament en
courages is connected with strength of moral principle in
the individual ; the Christian being supposed always to be
devoted to his calling, so much so that he is even by anti
cipation addressed as if he were dead to carnal desires, and
in the enjoyment of the new and heavenly life. But no idea
can be more opposed to Scripture, or more unwarrantable,
than any idea of predestination separated from this con
sciousness, and not arising upon this foundation ; the notion
x>f the individual that, on the simple condition which he
42 Examination of the CHAP. n.
cannot violate, that of being the particular person which
he is, he is certain of salvation. It is not to the person
simply as such, but to the person as good and holy, that
eternal life is ordained. Does a man do his duty to God
and his neighbour ? Is he honest, just, charitable, pure ?
If he is, and if he is conscious of the power to continue so,
so far as he can depend on this consciousness, so far he may
reasonably believe himself to be predestined to future hap
piness. But to suppose that a man may think himself
predestined, not as being good, but as being, whether good
or bad, himself, is a delusion of the devil, and the gross
fallacy of corrupt sects, that have lost sight, first of duty,
and next of reason, and have forgotten that the government
of the world is moral. The doctrine of predestination is
thus, in effect, a profitable or a mischievous doctrine,
according to the moral condition of those who receive and
use it. It binds and cements some minds, it relaxes and
corrupts others. It gives an energy to some, a new force
of will, bringing out and strengthening high aims; it
furnishes an excuse to others, already disinclined to moral
efforts, to abandon them, and follow their own worldly will
and pleasure.
The above remarks will supply a ground for judging of
the doctrine of assurance ; assurance being nothing else but
the sense of predestination here spoken of. It is evident,
in the first place, that assurance ought not to be demanded
as a state of mind necessary for a Christian ; for it can
only arise legitimately upon a knowledge of our own moral
resources and strength ; and there is nothing to compel a
Christian to have this knowledge. He may innocently be
without it. He may do his duty without reflecting upon
himself as an agent at all ; and if he does think of himself,
he may innocently make an erroneous estimate of his own
strength. It sometimes happens that at the time of trial
a man finds that he has more strength than he counted
upon, and is surprised at his own easy victory. Nor should
it be forgotten that the principle of humility in man is one
which tends to an under-estimate of his own power and
resources ; and though to carry it to this extent is not per-
CHAI>. ii. Argument for Predestination. 43
fection in respect of truth and knowledge, yet our moral
nature is so fine and intricate, that it must be owned that,
in the case of many minds, there is a sort of perfection in
this very imperfection : and one would not wish them to
estimate themselves correctly ; if they did, we should feel
the absence of something, and a certain indefinable grace
which attached to them would be missed. This is one of
those results which flow from the variety which marks the
Divine creation and constitution of the world, whether
physical or moral. Some characters are designed to raise
our affections on one plan, others on another ; some are
formed to inspire what is commonly called love, others
respect, principally ; both being only different forms of the
scriptural principle of love. These are diversities of His
instituting who is Himself incomprehensible, and who has
made man a type in some measure of Himself; with a
moral nature which cannot be reduced to one criterion of
right, but which attains perfection in different forms, and
satisfies our moral sense, under modes which we cannot
analyse, but to which that moral sense responds. For
human goodness is not a simple thing, but a complex ; nor
is it a measurable, but an indefinable thing ; attaining its
perfection often by seeming excesses, incorrectnesses in the
latter, and faults transmuted by the medium of the general
character into virtues. The stronger mind confides in, the
more amiable one distrusts, itself. Both are good accord
ing to their respective standards, and therefore, on a prin
ciple of variety, such difference is desirable. It is desirable
also, on another ground — viz. that different instruments
are wanted by Providence to execute its designs in the
world. Large and difficult objects can only be achieved by
men who have confidence in themselves, and will not allow
obstacles to discourage them ; and a sense of destiny helps
these men. The tie, on the other hand, of mutual confi
dence, is aided by self-distrust. Did none confide in
themselves, there would be none to command ; but those
who do so, are at the same time constitutionally slow to
obey.
Accordingly the doctrine of assurance does not neces-
44
Examination of the
CHAP. II.
sarily go along with the doctrine of predestination, because
it does not follow that if a particular person is predestined
to eternal life that therefore he should have the inward
sense or feeling that he is. The Divine decree may be
conducting him by sure steps all his life through to final
glory, and he may not be aware of it ; for the only condition
necessary to being one of the elect, is goodness ; and a good
man may act without contemplating himself at all, or, if
he does, he may distrust himself. Predestinarians accord
ingly, both Augustine and his school, and modern ones,
have disowned the doctrine of assurance, so far as it is
maintained in it that assurance is necessary for a Christian.1
Secondly, assurance separated from a good life, and the
consciousness of resolution to persevere in it, is unreasonable
and wicked. Thirdly, assurance united with both of these
and arising upon this foundation, is legitimate.
The sense or feeling, then, of predestination is, as has
1 As to what follows in your let
ter, concerning a person's believing
himself to be in a good state, and its
being properly of the nature of faith;
in this there seems to be some real
difference between us. But perhaps
there would be none, if distinctness
were well observed in the use of
words. If by a man's believing that
he is in a good estate, be meant no
more that his believing that he does
believe in Christ, love God, &c. ; I
think there is nothing of the nature
of faith in it ; because knowing or
believing it depends on our imme
diate sensation or consciousness, and
not on Divine testimony. True be
lievers in the hope they entertain of
salvation, make use of the following
syllogism, whosoever believes shall be
saved. I believe, therefore, fyc. As
senting to the major proposition is
properly of the nature of faith, be
cause the ground of my assent to
that is Divine testimony, but my as
sent to the minor proposition, I
humbly conceive, is not of the na
ture of faith, because that is not
grounded on Divine testimony, but on
my own consciousness. The testimony
that is the proper ground of faith
is in the word of God, Eom. x. 17.,
' Faith cometh of hearing, and hear
ing of the word of God.' There is
such a testimony given in the word
of God, as that ' he that believeth
shall be saved.' But there is no such
testimony in the word of God, as
that such an individual person, in
such a town in Scotland or in New
England, believes. There is such a
proposition in Scripture, as that
Christ loves those that love Him, and
therefore this every one is bound to
believe or affirm. Believing thus on
Divine testimony is properly of the
nature of faith, and for any one to
doubt of it, is properly of the hein
ous sin of unbelief. But there is no
such proposition in the Scripture,
nor is it any part of the gospel of
Christ, that such an individual per
son in Northampton loves Christ. —
Edwards, ' On the Eeligious Affec •
tions,' Letter 2. to Mr. Gillespie.
CHAP. ii. Argument for Predestination. 45
been shown, both sanctioned and encouraged in the New
Testament. But while this is plain, it is also obvious that
this is only one side of the language of the New Testament.
There is another according to which all Christians, what
ever be their holiness, are represented and addressed as
uncertain, and feeling themselves uncertain, of fiDal salva
tion. They are exhorted to ' work out their own salvation
with fear and trembling';1 to 'give diligence to make
their calling and election sure ' ; 2 and S. Paul himself the
great preacher of predestination, who, if any, had the right
to feel himself ordained to eternal life, and who said that
there ' was laid up for him a crown of righteousness,' 3 also
tells us of his careful self-discipline, ' lest that by any means
when he had preached to others, he himself should be a
castaway.' 4 Indeed to anyone who will fairly examine
the nature of this feeling of destiny which we have been
considering, and how far and in what mode it is entertained,
when it is entertained rationally, it will be evident that it
is not by any means an absolute or literal certainty of mind.
It is not like the perception of an intellectual truth. It is
only a strong impression, which however genuine or rational,
and, as we may say, authorised, issues, when we try to follow
it, in obscurity, and vanishes in the haze which bounds our
mental view, before the reason can overtake it. Were any
of those remarkable men who have had it, asked about
this feeling of theirs, they would confess it was in them no
absolute perception but an impression which was consistent
with a counter feeling of doubt, and was accompanied by
this latent and suppressed opposite in their case.
Whether regarded, then, as a doctrine, or a feeling,
predestination is not in Scripture an absolute, but an in
definite truth. Scripture has as a whole no consistent
scheme, and makes no positive assertion ; it only declares,
and bids its readers acknowledge, a mystery on this subject.
It sets forth alike the Divine Power, and man's freewill,
and teaches in that way in which alone it can be taught,
the whole, and not a part alone of truth.
1 Phil. ii. 12. 2 2 Peter i. 10. s 2 Tim. iv. 8. « 1 Cor. ix. 27.
46 The Pelagian Controversy. CUAP. m.
CHAPTER III.
THE PELAGIAN CONTROVERSY.
FROM a general introductory statement and examination of
the argument of predestination, I turn now to the history
and formation of this doctrine as exhibited in S. Augustine's
writings. And as the Augustinian scheme of predestination
rests upon the basis of original sin, the inquiry will suitably
commence with an account of the latter doctrine. I shall
therefore devote the present chapter to a general sketch of
the Pelagian controversy : — First, the mode in which it
arose ; secondly, the main arguments involved in it ; and,
thirdly, its bearing upon the leading doctrines of Christi
anity. Antagonist systems moreover throw light upon each
other, and an inquiry into the doctrines of S. Augustine
will be aided by a previous account of the system of
Pelagianism.
I. It may seem at first sight unnecessary to inquire into
the mode in which the Pelagian controversy arose, because
it appears enough to say that one side maintained, and an
other denied, the fall of man. But the doctrine of the fall
though substantially, did not expressly or by name, form
the original subject of dispute, but was led up to by a
previous question.
It has been disputed whether the Augustinian system
was a reaction from the Pelagian, or the Pelagian from
the Augustinian. Historical evidence favours the latter
assertion.1 But the dispute, whichever way decided, is not
an important one. The controversy between these two was
contained in an elementary statement of Christian doctrine,
which, as soon as it came to be examined intellectually,
was certain to disclose it. The language by which the
Christian church has always expressed the truths of man's
freewill and Divine grace has been, that the one could do
no good thing without the aid of the other, nihil bonum
1 NOTE IX.
CHAP. nr. The Pelagian Controversy. 47
sine gratia. This formula satisfied the simplicity of the
primitive church as it has satisfied the un controversial faith
of all ages ; and no desire was felt for further expression
and a more exact truth. But it is evident that this state
of theology on this subject could not last longer than the
reign of a simpler faith. When minds began to reason
upon this formula and analyse it logically, it lost its finality,
and the combination of grace and freewill divided into
two great doctrines of an absolute power of freewill and an
absolute power of grace.
For was the grace here asserted to be necessary for do
ing any good thing, a grace which assisted only the human
will or one which controlled it ? If it was the former, it
depended on some action of the human will for being
accepted and used, which action therefore could not be said
without contradiction to be dependent upon it. Assist
ing grace, then, must be used by an unassisted will, and
there must be some motion of the human will for good to
which Divine grace did not contribute, but which was
original and independent in the person who accepted and
availed himself of that grace. Take two men who have
both equal grace given to them, but of whom one avails
himself of this grace, while the other does not. The differ
ence between these two is not by the very supposition, a
difference of grace ; it is therefore a difference of original
will only ; and in one there has been a self-sprung, inde
pendent act for good, which there has not been in the other.
But how great, how eventful a function thus attached to
the unassisted human will ? It decided the life and con
duct of the man, and consequently his ultimate lot, for
happiness or misery. That difference between one man
and another in consequence of which one becomes a child
of God and daily grows in virtue and holiness, and the
other becomes a servant of sin, is no difference into which
grace even enters, but one of natural will only. Indeed,
was not the unassisted human will, according to this doc
trine, more than a real agent, the chief agent in the work
of virtue and piety ? For the general sense of mankind
has, in the case of any joint agency, assigned the part of
48 The Pelagian Controversy. CHAP. nr.
chief agent to the one that uses and turns to account the
action of the other. If one man furnishes another with
the means and resources for any undertaking, and the other
applies them to it, both indeed COD tribute action ; but the
latter is the chief contributor, and would, in ordinary
language, be called the doer of the work. Thus to the
act°of learning a teacher and a learner both contribute,
the one by giving information, the other by apprehending
it ; but the act of learning is the learner's rather than
the teacher's act. Apply this distinction to the case of
the human will using the assistance of Divine grace for the
work of a holy life. While the giver and the user of that
assistance are both agents in that work, the user is the
principal one.1 In cases where the use of means, if sup
plied, takes place easily and as a matter of course, the
result may be properly referred to the supplier rather than
the user of them. But the act of the will in using grace
is no easy or matter-of-course one, but involves much effort
and self-denial.
The combination of grace with freewill thus issued in
the assertion of an independent freewill on the one hand,
while this logical result was avoided on the other, only by
a recourse to the opposite extreme. It was seen that an
assisting grace could only be protected by making it some
thing more than assisting, and that the will must have the
credit of the unassisted acceptance and use of it, unless it
were controlled by it. The original formula, therefore,
issued on this side in the doctrine of a controlling and
irresistible grace ; and upon these two interpretations of the
primitive doctrine rose, with their respective accompani
ments and consequences, the Pelagian and Augustinian
systems.
Pelagianism then started with the position, that, how«-
ever necessary Divine assistance might be for a good work
as a whole, there was at the bottom a good act or move-
1 ' Nam quando ad eundem actum tis, sine qua non potest fieri, sed illi
liberum concurrunt plura sine quibus quse nutu suo totam machinam ad
libertas agendi in actum suum exire motum impellit, aut otiosam esse
non potest, non illi causse tribui sinit.' — Jaiisen, De Grat. Christi, p.
debet exercitium actus aut volunta- 935.
CHAP. in. The Pelagian Controversy. 49
ment, which the human will was able to and must perform
without Divine assistance. And this position supplies the
clue to the solution of the Pelagian's apparently contradic
tory language about grace. The Pelagian asserts the ability
of nature at one time ; he asserts the necessity of grace at
another.1 Now his opponent explained this apparent in
consistency, by saying tha.t by grace he meant nature ; that
he used the word dishonestly in a sense of his own, and
only included in it the natural will and endowments of
man, which, as being Divine gifts, he chose to call gracs.2
And, in the same way, he was charged with meaning by
grace only the outward means of instruction and edifica
tion, whicli (rod had given to man in the Bible and else
where, as distinct from any inward Divine influence. This
is the explanation of the Pelagian grace, as Lex et Natura,
which we meet so often in S. Augustine. But with all
deference to so great a name, I cannot think that this
adverse explanation is altogether justified by the language
of the Pelagians themselves. A verbal confusion of nature
with grace is undoubtedly to be found there ; nor is such
a confusion in itself unpardonable. In one sense nature is
grace ; freewill itself, and all the faculties and affections of
our nature being the gifts of (rod ; while, on the other
hand, grace may not erroneously be called nature, inas
much as when received, it becomes a power which we have,
and which belongs to us ; especially acting, as it does, too,
through the medium of our natural faculties, our conscience,
and good affections. And in this sense of nature, the
Pelagians asserted that nature was able to fulfil the law —
Posse in natura3 — a statement, which so understood, is no
1 Anathemo qui yel sentit vel effectu locamus. — De Grat. Christi.
dicit gratiam Dei non solum per n. 5.
singulas horas, aut per singula mo- 2 De Natura et Gratia, n. 12. 59. ;
menta, sed ttiam per singulos actus De Grat. Christi, n. 3.
nostros non esse necessariam. — 3 To the objection of the Catholic,
Pelagius ap. Aug. De Grat. Christi, ' Protest quidern esse, sed per gra-
n. 2. He repeats the same state- tiam Dei,' Pelagius replies, 'Ego ne
ment often. — De Grat. Christi, n. 5. abnuo qui rem confifcendo, confitear
29. 33.; Contra Duas. Ep. 1. 4. n. 13. necesse est et per quod res effici
On the other hand he says, Passe in potest ; an tu qui rem negan^o, et
naturd, velle in arbitrio, esse in quicquid illud est, per quod res
cO The Pelagian Controversy. CHAP. JIT.
more than a truism; nature comprehending, in this sense
of the word, all the moral power, from whatever quarter,
of which a man is possessed, grace included. Again, the
Pelagian, in his explanations of grace and its operations,
certainly dwells most commonly on the outward helps which
revelation and Providence afford to man in the path of
obedience. But while he is so far open to the charge of
his opponent, it does not appear that he limits the idea
of grace, either to nature in the sense of the powers with
which man was originally endowed at his creation, or to
the outward he]ps of the Divine law. On the contrary, he
includes in it those internal Divine impulses and spiritual
assistances commonly denoted by the word.1 This is the
natural interpretation of his language ; nor is there any
thing in his argument, as a controversialist, to require the
exclusion of such grace. The Pelagian maintained the
power of the human will ; but if he admitted the need of
the Divine assistance at all to it, as he did in the shape of
the created affections, and general endowments of our
nature, there was no reason why he should limit such assist
ance to that creative one. The distinction of prior and
posterior, grace creative and grace assisting the creature
already made, was of no importance in this respect. There
was no difference, again, in principle between inward and
outward grace ; and any one who acknowledged Divine
assistance, by means of instruction, warning, and exhorta
tion addressed to us from without, would have no difficulty
in acknowledging it in the shape of spiritual incitement
and illumination carried on within. The clue, then, to the
solution of the Pelagian's apparently contradictory lan
guage respecting grace, is rather to be found in the logical
necessity there was for an unassisted act of the human
will, in accepting and using Divine assistance. Admitting
Divine grace to be wanted, but regarding the use of it as
efficitur procul dubio negas . . . Natura et Gratia, n. 11.
Sive per gratiam, sive per adjuto- * ' Sanctificando, coercendo, pro-
rium, siye per misericordiam, et vocando, illuminando.' — Op. Imp. 1.
quicquid illud est per quod esse homo 3. c. 1 06. ' Bum nos multiformi et
sine peccato potest, confitetur, quis- ineffaLili dono gratiae ccelestis illu-
quis rem ipsam confitetur.' — De minat.' — De Grat. Christi, c 7.
CHAP. in. The Pelagian Controversy. 5 1
independent of grace, claiming some real power for un
assisted nature, though not all, he was led into a double
and inconsistent language, which sometimes asserted the
necessity of grace, and sometimes the ability of nature
alone.
Indeed, it is clear from the argument of the book De
Gratia Christi, that, whatever objection Augustine may
raise to the Pelagian doctrine of grace, on the ground that
grace in it only means Lex et Natura, his main objection
to that doctrine is, not that it maintains an external grace
as distinguished from an internal, or a grace creative as
distinguished from additional to created nature, but that
it maintains a grace which depends entirely on an in
dependent act of the will for its acceptance and use, as dis
tinguished from a grace which supplies that act and secures
its own use. Pelagius defines what the function of grace
in his idea is, and he confines it to that of assisting the power
of the natural will — possibilitatem adjuvat1; the phrase
supposes a foundation of independent power in the will, to
which grace is an addition. Augustine, on the other hand,
says it is more than this, and condemns this definition as
insufficient and insulting to the Divine Power. This is
the question, then, to which the whole argument is sub
stantially reduced, and on which the whole book hinges ;
and it is one concerned, not with the circumstances, so to
speak, of grace, as the other distinctions were, but with
its substantial nature, its relation to the human will ;
1 ' Nos sic tria ista distinguimus, ipsam possibilitatem gratise susead-
et certum velut in ordinem digesta juvat semper auxilio.' — Pelagius de
partimur. Primo loco posse strttui- Lib. Arb. apud Aug. de Grat. Christi,
mus, secundo velle, tertio esse. n. 5.
Posse in natura, velle in arbitrio, Thus Julian : ' Adsunt tamen ad-
esse in effectu locamus. Primum • jutoria gratiae Dei quse in parte
illud, id est, posse, ad Deum pro- virtutis nunquam destituunt volun-
prie pertinet, qui illud creaturse suse tatem: cujus licet innumerge species,
contulit : duo vero reliqua, hoc est, tali tamen semper moderatione ad-
velle et esse ad hominem referenda hibentur, ut nunquam liberum arbi-
sunt, quia de arbitrii fonte descen- trium locopellant, sed prsebeant ad-
dunt. Ergo in voluntate et in opere minicula,quamdiueisvoluerit inniti ;
bono laus hominis est ; imo et homi- cum tamen non opprimant reluctan-
nis et Dei, qui ipsius voluntatis et tern animum.' — Op. Imp. 1. iii. c.
operis possibilitatem dedit, quique 114.
B 2
The Pelagian Controversy. CHAP. m.
whether that relation is one of dependence upon the will
for its use, or not.1 This is the ultimate difference between
the two ; and it must be seen, that it does make all the
difference in the nature and quality of Divine grace.
The charge against the Pelagian that he held human
merit always to precede grace, appears to be alike without
satisfactory foundation. He disowned the position him
self2, nor was it necessary for his argument, Grace is,
indeed, sometimes taken in a final sense, for the designed
effect of assisting grace ; and stands for an ultimate
spiritual habit, as when we speak of the graces of the
Christian character, the grace of charity, and the like ;
and in that sense, if the human will is to have any share
in the matter, grace must be the consequence in part of
human merit. As the crown of human efforts, it supposes
such efforts having been made. But it would be absurd
to maintain that grace, in the sense of assisting grace,
requires a previous effort of the human will for obtaining
it, and that the individual must show goodness before he
receives the Divine assistance to be good. All Christians
allow that such grace is given to sinners in the very depth
of their sin, and in order to draw them away from it : nor
does the admission at all affect the Pelagian position of
the independent power of the will ; for this would be
exerted in the acceptance and use of such grace. I will
add that this distinction between the grace which crowns
and that which stimulates the efforts of the will explains
1 Bradwardine and Jansen thus — Pelagius ap. Aug. De Gratia
understand the Pelagian doctrine of Christi, c. 22. Augustine argues
grace: ' Non enim existimandum est incorrectly from this passage that
solam legera atque doctrinam esse Pelagius holds that merit must pre-
ppssibilitatis adjutorium. . . . Pela- cede grace; whereas he only sa^-s it
giaiiijtnotus indeliberatos bonus sub may, — that grace may be obtained
gratia complexi sunt : nam sive by merit, or good works. On the
motus illos a Deo conditos inseri, other hand Pelagius at the Synod of
si vemente per istam gratiam pulsata, Diospolis ' damnavit eos qui decent
ultenus naturaliter a corde proficisci gratiam Dei secundum merita nostra
decernerent, eorum causam Deum dari.' — De Grat. Christi, c. 3., and
adjuvantem esse sentiebant' Jansen, Ben. Ed. preface, c. 1 0.— Nor is there
De Grat. Christi, p. 127. NOTK X. anything in the Pelagian statements
'Ostendit quomodo resistere to show that assisting grace was
aebeamus Diabolo, si utique subditi considered to wait till human merit
simus Deo, ejusque faciendo volun- earned it.
tatem divinam mereamur gratiam.'
CHAP. in. The Pelagian Controversy. 53
the apparently contradictory language used by divines to
explain the combination of freewill with grace ; sometimes
the commencement of the spiritual life being attributed
to the human will and its completion to grace, and some
times its completion being attributed to the human will
and its commencement to grace. Under both modes of
speaking, the power of the human will is secured : but
under the one the will uses an assisting, under the other it
earns a crowning grace.1
Thus apparently sound and forced upon reason by the
necessity of the case, this position of an ultimate unassisted
strength in the natural will, was, nevertheless, the root of
all the errors, the extravagances, and the impieties of
Pelagianism. It was a position logically true, indeed, and
such as could not be denied without admitting the alter
native of irresistible grace or necessitarianism. Nor had it
been maintained with due modesty and reserve, as being
one side of the whole mysterious truth relating to human
action, would it have been otherwise than orthodox. But
to maintain absolutely and definitely an ultimate power in
the human will to move aright independently of God, was
a position untrue, and shocking to natural piety ; a separa
tion of the creature from the Creator, which was opposed
to the very foundation of religion. And to proceed to
argue upon such a truth, and develop it, as if it were a
complete and ascertained premiss, upon which a system
could be erected, was to mistake its nature, and to run
at once into obliquity and error. But this was what the
Pelagians did.2 For from this position the conclusion was
1 The general language of the opem.' — Ep. Prosperi inter Aug.
Pelagians allows an initiative grace Ep. 225. ' Quod enim dicitur. Crede
(provocans, excitans), and maintains et salvus eris ; unum horum exigi
a crowning will : ' Quod possumus asserunt, aliud offerri ; ut propter id
bonum facere illius estqui hoc posse quod exigitur si redditum fuerit, id
donavit ; quod vero bene agimus quod offertur deinceps tribuatur.' —
nostrum est.' — De Grat. Christi, c. Ep. Hilarii apud Aug. Ep. 226.
4. The Semipelagians speak of an Julian the Pelagian speaks of a cer-
initiative will and a crowning grace: tain state of perfection as a crowning
' Priorem volunt obedientiam esse grace : ' ut hoc ipsum non peccare
qxiam gratiam, ut initium salutis ex prsemium censeamus.' — Op. Imp.
eo qui salvatur, non ex eo creden- Contra Jul. 1. 2. c. 166.
dum sit stare qui salvat, et voluntas 2 ' Quod possumus omne bonum
hominis divinse gratiae sibi pariat facere, dicere, cogilare, illius est qui
54 The Pelagian Controversy. CHAP. m.
immediately drawn that every man had the power of
fulfilling the whole law. The will was able to make use
of grace ; but every man, as the Divine justice required,
had sufficient grace given him. For confining sometimes,
as a matter of language, the term grace to such higher
grace, or grace par excellence, as was given under the
gospel, — such grace as facilitated goodness rather than was
necessary for it 1 ; the Pelagians held really that every one
had in the sense of natural or other endowments, provi
dential aids, spiritual impulses, sufficient Divine assistance
or grace to enable him to do his duty. Every man, there
fore, having sufficient grace, and the absolute power to use
it, had the power to fulfil the whole law.
The doctrine of the perfectibility of man in this life
was held, indeed, by the opponents of Pelagius, as well as
by himself, but upon a totally different ground from that
on which he based it. Augustine maintained that no
limits were to be put to the power of Divine grace ; but
that it might please Grod in a particular instance so to
control and direct all the motions of a human will, that
the person might even in this life become perfect.2 The
admission, however, is made with much hesitation ; he
confesses such a case would be a miracle, as being contrary
to all the established laws of the operation of grace ; and,
what is most important, he rests the possibility of it solely
upon the ground of grace, or the Divine power. Pelagius,
on the other hand, naturalised this perfectibility, making
it part of the constitution of man, and drawing it from the
hoc posse donavit: quodverobcne vel implere per gratiam.'— Pelagius de
agimus, vel loquinmr, vel cogitamns Lib. Arb. ap. Aug. Epist. 186. n.
nostrum est, quia haec omnia vertere 35.
m malum possumus.'— Pelagius, ap. ' Sed formidantes multitudinem
Aug. De Gratia Christian. 5. Christianam, Pelagianum verbum
1 'In omnibus est liberum arbi- supponitis, et quserentibus a nobis,
trram, sequaliter per naturam, sed quare moxtuus sit Christus, si natura
m sobs Christiani s juvatur a gratia.' vel lex efficit justos ; respondetis ut
-Letter of Pelagius to Innocent, ap. hoc ipsum facilius fieret, quasi posset,
Aug. de Gratia Christi, n. 33. quamvis difficilius fieri tamen, sive
' Ideo Dei gratiam hominibus per naturam sive per legem.' Op
dan ut quod facere per liberum ju- Imp. Contra Jul. 1. 2. c. 198
bentur arbitrium facilius possint 2 NOTE XI
CHAP. in. The Pelagian Controversy. 55
essential power of the human will.1 However rare, there
fore, its attainment might be, perfection, upon his system,
was attainable by everyone : indeed some he asserted had
actually attained it : an assertion from which S. Augustine
shrank. The possibility admitted in theory, his practical
belief withdrew the admission, and bound man, as long as
he remains in this mortal state to sin, obliged to cry with
the Apostle ' who shall deliver me from this death ? ' and by
the simple profession of 4 having no sin ' infallibly con
victed of falsehood and pride.
The original position respecting the will thus led im
mediately to the other great question : and we find our
selves thrown at once on the great subject of the Pelagian
controversy. Such a doctrine of the power of the human
will was evidently opposed to the doctrine of the fall :
for such a will was evidently not a corrupt, but a sound
will, inasmuch as it could perform its proper function. It
may be doubtful, therefore, whether Pelagius in the first
instance meant to attack the catholic doctrine of the fall ;
he certainly showed reluctance to come into express col
lision with it, and resisted the logical strain upon him :
his attitude was at the first a defensive rather than aggres
sive one, as if, provided the church would let him hold
what he considered to be the plain facts of human nature,
he did not wish to interfere with any received doctrine :
and his answers at the Synod of Diospolis2 are perhaps too
1 ' Ante omnia interrogandus est ergo cum peecato esse; et jam pec-
qui negat hominem sine peecato esse catum non erit, si illud debere con-
posse, quid sit quodcunque peccatum, stiterit. Aut si hoc etiam dici ab-
quod vitari potest, an quod vitari non surdum est, confiteri necesse est
potest. Si qxiod vitari non potest, debere hominem sine peecato esse,
peccatum non est ; si quod vitari po- et constat eum non aliud debere
test, potest homo sine peecato esse quam potest. . . . Iterum quse-
quod vitari potest. . . . Iterum rendum est quomodo non potest homo
quserendum est peccatum voluntatis sine peecato esse, voluntate an na-
an necessitatis est. Si necessitatis tura. Si natura, peccatum non est ;
est, peccatum non est; si voluntatis si voluntate, perfacile potest voluntas
est, vitari potest. . . . Iterum voluntate mutari.' — Pelagius ap.
quserendum est, utrumne debeat Aug. De Perfectione Justitise, c. 2.
homo sine peecato esse. Proeul du- 3. 6.
bio debet. Si debet, potest ; si non 2 Benedictine Editor's preface to
potest, ergo nee debet ; et si nee Augustine's Antipelagian Treatises,
debet homo esse sine peecato, debet c. x.
5 6 The Pelagian Controversy. CHAP, m.
summarily attributed to duplicity rather than a real in
disposition to advance beyond his original statements,
though his disciple Celestius had been bolder. But the
assertion of such a freewill as Pelagius asserted was m
itself a denial of the fall, and therefore necessarily carried
him, whatever his direct intention at first was, to the
express denial of that doctrine. And thus the question
assumed that shape in which it has come down to us in
the Pelagian controversy.
II. With this introduction, then, I come to my second
head, and shall endeavour to state in succession, and with
such explanation as may be necessary, the main positions
and arguments involved in that controversy ; and which
may be conveniently placed under three general heads —
the power of the will, the nature of virtue and vice, and
the Divine justice.
1. The first and most obvious argument against the
doctrine of the corruption of human nature, was contained
in that power of the will which has been just now described.
Here nature seemed to bear testimony to its own com
petency, and the doctrine of its corruption to be contra
dicted by a plain fact ; for we are conscious of freewill,
power of choice, and self-determination. The Pelagians
appealed to these instinctive convictions, and pointed out
their contrariety to the doctrine of a captive and corrupted
nature. Nor was their argument unsound had they been
content to direct it against an absolute doctrine of human
corruption and captivity. But they pressed it too far and
lay more weight upon it than it could bear. They fancied
themselves in possession of the whole ground because they
had this sense of freedom on their side. But S. Augustine
could appeal, on the other side, to a representation of
human nature, which carried with it its own evidence, and
met a response in the human heart — 'To will is present
with me, but how to perform that which is good I find not.
For the good that I would I do not, but the evil which
I would not that I do. ... I see a law in my members,
warring against the law of my mind, and bringing me
CHAP. in. The Pelagian Controversy.
57
into captivity to the law of sin.' ! The sense of freedom is
a true part of human nature ; but there is also, on the
other side, a sense of captivity : and as Pelagius appealed
to one side of our consciousness, Augustine appealed to the
other.
The conscience of every enlightened man, as all con
fess, bears witness to the presence of sin. But — more than
this — the enlightened conscience bears witness to a certain
impossibility of avoiding sin altogether. It is true we are
conscious of freewill, and feel we have the power of doing
right and abstaining from wrong on each occasion. Nay,
the very sense of sin depends upon this sense of the power
to avoid it; for we do not feel responsible for what we
cannot help. But with this sense of freedom there is also
a certain sense of necessity — a perception that sin is not
wholly avoidable in this present state of our nature. We
cannot imagine an enlightened conscience in which there
would not be this inward sense : no good man could ever
1 ' In mediiim procedit homo ille
qui clamat, " Non quod volo facio
bonum, sed quod nolo malum hoc
ago." '—Op. Imp. 1. 6. c. 18. ' Qui
per legem quam vidit in membris
suis repugnautem legi mentis suse
et captivantem se sub lege peccati,
clamat, " Non quod volo," &c. Si
habet liberum arbitrium, quare non
facit bonum quod vult?'— L. 3. c.
112. Augustine, assuming this
captivity as an evident fact, proves
original sin from it: 'Nam si pecca-
tum non pertransisset, non omnis
homo cum lege peccati quse in mem
bris est nasceretur.' — L. 2. c. 63.
1 Homo qui non cogitas ubi sis, et
in diebus malis tanquam in bonis
ceecus extolleris ; quando erat libe
rum arbitrium, nondum homo vani-
tati similis factus erat.' — L. 3. c.
110. 'Quidicit, "Quod nolo malum,
hoc ago," responde utrum necessita-
tem non habeat.' — L. 5.c. 50. 'Non
ei possibilitatis inanitas, sed neces-
sitatis inerat plenitudo.' — L. 5. c. 59.
The Pelagians interpreted this
text as referring to the force of cus
tom, 'Ille enim in membris legem
consuetudinem malam vocabat, quae
ab eruditis etiam seculi dici solet
secunda natura.' — Op. Imp. 1. I.e.
69. An interpretation which Augus
tine turned against them, as com
mitting them to the admission that
sin might be necessary, and yet real
sin, and so to the principle of origi
nal sin. ' Nam et ille qui dicit,
" Non quod volo, ago," certe secun-
dum vos necessitate consuetudinis
premitur : hanc autem necessitatem,
ne liberum auferatis arbitrium, eum
sibi voluntate fecisse contenditis, et
tale aliquid in natura humana factum
esse non creditis.' — L. 4. c. 103. ;
also 1. 1. c. 105.; 1.4. c. 91. 'The
body of this death was interpreted
of the guilt of past sin.' ' Quis me
liberavit a reatu peccatorum meorum
quse commisi, cum vitari potuisseut.'
—Op. Imp. 1. 1, c. 67.
^ 8 The Pelagian Controversy. CHAP. nr.
possibly think that he could be without serious sin in this
world. This sense of a law working for evil in our nature
is a consequence and a part of goodness ; and conscience
witnesses to opposite perceptions which it cannot harmonise.
Experience, indeed, shows the great improbability of perfec
tion in this life, but the enlightened conscience speaks to
its impossibility, because it sees a law of our present nature
to which it is opposed. Experience shows that men never
have been perfect, but not that they could not be : but the
enlightened conscience would, upon the mere hearing of
some or other human being who was perfect, justify the
setting down the assertion as in itself absurd and incredible;
containing, according to the Scriptural criterion, its own
refutation, ' If we say we have no sin, we deceive ourselves,
and the truth is not in us.' But what is this but a sense
of necessity on the side of evil ; for if it is simply absurd
that the state of man in this life should not be sinful, it
must be necessary that it should be.
From this sense of freedom on the one side, and of
captivity on the other, proceeds that mixture and opposi
tion in our nature, that whole ambiguous state of mind of
which man is so deeply conscious in moral action ; that
subtle discord in the will ; that union of strength and
weakness. Take the case of any action above the standard
of ordinary practice that a man may propose to himself to
do ; with what a mixture of feelings does he approach it ?
He feels, on the one hand, that he is certainly able to do it,
and can exert a force over himself sufficient for the pur
pose ; and he prepares for the turning point of a resolve
under this impression. On the other hand, the level of
ordinary practice pulls him down, and the weight^of habit
rests upon him. Nature falls back, the will is unnerved,
and invincible repugnance and disinclination contradict his
natural sensations of moral power. He doubts the sincerity
of these sensations, as if, however innate, they were specious
and deceptive. Can he, then, really do the good act ? Has
he freewill or not ? He alternates between both impres
sions, unable to deny his freedom, yet apparently unable
to use it, feeling no constraint, yet inferring from the diffi-
CHAP. in. The Pelagian Controversy. 59
culties of the case some unfelt one, existing too deep in
nature for actual apprehension, and only showing itself in
its effects. Such is the inward struggle of the imperfect
moral agent described by St. Paul.
Take, again, the known power of custom over the will.
A man under the most inveterate bad habit, has on every
successive occasion the feeling of a power to do the action
opposed to it. However long and uniformly he may have
acted on the side of his habit, the very next time he has
to act he appears to himself to be able — though it be no
more than naked, bare, ability — still able, I say, to do what
he has never yet done. But it is evident that such an idea
of power is not to be taken as a certain exponent of the
fact. There is an idea of power, indeed, which represents
faithfully the reality, a conscious strength of purpose, which
is generally the result of moral preparation. But this is
altogether a distinct sort of conviction from that mere sense
of bare ability to do a thing which is now referred to.
The sense of freedom then in our nature, with whatever
force and vividness it may appeal to us, is not to be relied
upon absolutely, as if it represented our whole state. A
larger insight into ourselves, a general survey of facts, mo
difies the result of the impression, and does not sanction
the profession of absolute power. But the Pelagian relied
upon this sense of bare ability, as if it were an infallible
footing for the most complete conclusion, and betrayed that
want of due and circumspect distrust which never forsakes
the true philosophical mind, that knows how nature abounds
in pitfalls to catch the unwary ; and, however considerate
of, is ever jealous of, appearances. He trusted with blind
confidence a single impression and instinct, so blindly
indeed, as to put aside the plainest facts, when they inter
fered with it.
For nothing can show more strongly the reckless and
hasty faith, which the Pelagians reposed in this one impres
sion, than that they supported it against the most palpable
facts connected with nature and habit ; arguing, that sin not
being a substance, but only an act which took place and
was then over, could not by any amount of repetition affect
60 The Pelagian Controversy. CHAP. m.
this power and impair freewill1 ; but that a man after any
amount and duration of sin, had as much freewill as ever.
The reason was that, as I have just stated, the sense of bare
ability continues in spite of any length of habit; on which
sense the Pelagian absolutely relied. But this was not a
reasonable, but a fanatical2 doctrine of freewill ; a gross
delusion, belonging to that class and rank of absurd ideas
upon which corrupt and fantastic sects arise ; forsaking the
broad, inclusive ground of truth for some narrow conceit,
some one notion to which everything gives way, and which,
losing by such exclusiveness all its original share of truth,
becomes a shadow and a lie. This was a departure from the
first principles of morals, as attaching no consequences
within the soul itself to moral evil, which is thus repre
sented as passing off, and leaving no trace behind. The
moral being incurred, indeed, the external consequence of
liability to punishment, but was not in himself impaired by
sin ; remaining the same as before. But it is the internal
consequences of sin, which fasten the idea of sin, as being
such, upon us, and make us regard it as the real evil it
is. Take away these consequences, and sin is little more
than a shadow which just rests a moment on the soul, and
is then gone. It ceases to be a serious thing, it ceases to
1 ' Liberum arbitrium et post gius ap. Aug. De Nat. et Grat. n.
peccata tarn plenum est quam fuit 21. ' Materiam peccati esse vindic-
ante peccata.' — Julian ap. Op. Imp. tarn, si ad hoc peccator infirmatus
1.1. c. 91. 'Nos dicimus peccato est ut plura peccaret.' — n. 24.
hominis non naturae statum mutari 2 It was perhaps an ironical charge
sed meriti qualitatem, id est et in against the Pelagians that they held
peccato hanc esse liberi arbitrii na- ' etiam parvulos propria per liberum
turam, per quam potest a peccato arbitrium habere peccata. . . .
desinere, quae fuit in eo ut posset a Ecce inquiunt, Esau et Jacob intra
justitia deviare.' — c. 96. ' Primo de viscera materna luctantur, et, dum
eo disputandum est quod per pecca- nascuntur, alter supplantatur ab al-
tum debilitata dieitur et immutata tero, atque in pede prsecedentismanu.
natura. Unde ante omnia quseren- consequent! s ettenentis inventa, per-
dum puto quid sit peccatum, sub- severans quodammodo lucta convin-
stantia aliqua, an omnino substantia citur. Quomodo ergo in infantibus
carens nomen, quo non res, non exis- hsec agentibus, nullum est vel ad
tentia, non corpus aliquid, sed per- bonum vel ad malum proprise volun-
peram facti actus exprimitnr. Credo tatis arbitrium, unde prsemia sive
ita est. Et si ita est quomodo potuit supplicia meritis prsecedentibus sub-
humanam debilitare vel mutare na- sequantur.' — Ep. 186. n. 13.
turam quod substaiitia caret.'— Pela-
CHAP. ITT. The Pelagian Controversy. 61
be sin ; its very substance is that part of it which survives
the act, and its continuance is its existence. The Pelagian,
then, secures his unqualified freewill at the cost of the very
rudiments of morals ; his theory would injure the moral tone
of any mind that received it, and its natural effect, if it
spread, would be a relaxation of the religious standard, and
a lowering of the sense of sin in the world ; showing how
impossible it is to carry one truth to an excess without im
pairing another. Those who will not allow the will to be
the less free for any amount of sin must accept the alterna
tive, that sin has very little effect, — with its natural corol
lary, that that which has so slight an effect cannot be a
very serious matter itself. And thus an unlimited freewill
can only be maintained by abandoning the sanctity of moral
principle.
2. The argument respecting the will was succeeded, in
the Pelagian controversy, by the argument respecting the
nature of virtue and vice. How could there be such a
thing as hereditary sin ? sin transmitted from father to
son, and succeeded to by birth ? How were moral disposi
tions involved in the operations of nature? 1 This appeal to
reason was properly answered by an appeal to mystery — an
answer, however, which was needlessly perplexed by too
minute attempts to define the mode of the transmission of
sin ? 2 The explanation of a mystery cannot really advance
beyond the statement of it, but the too subtle explainer
forgets his own original admission and the inherent limits
1 ' Amentissimum est arbitrii ne- hodie conceptos aiite tot secula ha-
gotium seminibus immixtum putare.' buisse sensum, judicium, efficientiam
— Julian, Op. Imp. 1. 6. c. 9. 'In- voluntatis.' — L. 4. 104.
justum est ut reatus per semiria 2 Op. Imp. 1. 6. c. 22. ; 1. 2. c.
traderetur.'— L. 3. c. 11. ' Habue- 123.; 1. 4. c. 90—104., 1. 6.; c.
runt ergo parvuli voluntatem non 9 — 23. An elaborate attempt at an
solum antequam nascerentur, verum explanation of this difficulty, by the
etiam antequam proavi eorum gene- analogy of bodies, quae affieiendo
rarentur ; et usi sunt electionis ar- transeunt, non emigrando (L 5. Con-
bitrio, priusquam substiintise eorum tra Jul. Pel. n. 51.), concludes thus:
semina conderentxir. Cur itaque ' Sic et vitia cum sint in subjecto ex
metuis dicere, in eis tempore concep- parentibus tamen in filios, non quasi
tuum eorum esseliberam voluntatem, transmigratione de suo subjecto in
qua peccatum non trahant naturalitei1 subjectum alterum, sed affectione et
sad sponte committant ; si credis eos contagione pertranseunt.'
52 The Pelagian Controversy. CHAP. m.
of his task, and imagines himself solving what is inex
plicable.
But the question of transmitted or hereditary sin gave
place to the larger question of necessary sin. Sin was re
presented, in the doctrine of the fall, as attaching to human
nature, i.e. as necessary. But was not this opposed to the
self-evident truth, that sin must be voluntary ? * To deserve
properly praise or blame, must not a man be a free agent ?
and was he a free agent if he could not act otherwise than
as he did ? The Pelagian thus adopted, as a plain maxim
of reason, and a fundamental truth of morals, the position
that virtue and vice derived their essential characteristics
from the power of the individual beforehand to choose the
one or the other ; possibilitas utriusque partis; that an
act of the will, to be good or bad, must be a decision out
of a neutral or undecided state.2 The Pelagian controversy
thus took up the question of the conditions of virtue and
vice ; whether virtue or vice were consistent with necessity
or repugnant to it, whether they involved in their own
nature the trial of the will or not.
The Pelagian, then, as the above statement shows, ex
pressed himself unguardedly on this question, and exposed
himself immediately to the irresistible answer of S. Augus
tine, that, on the ground he adopted, he must be prepared
to deny all goodness to the angels in heaven, to the saints
in glory,3 and even to God Himself. The impossibility of
sinning belonged to the Divine Being as His nature, and
to the saints and angels as a privilege and reward ; and
therefore were contingency, or the absence of necessity,
1 ' Naturale nullum esse peccatum ex utraque parte per sequalia mo-
potest.' — ' Si est naturale peccatum menta suspendere, ut voluntas quan-
non est voluntarium.'— ' Voluntas turn sit ad malum, tantum etiam sit
necessitati non potest admoveri.'— ad bonum libera.' — Op. Imp. 1. 3. c.
' Non potest velle antequam potuerit 112. 117. 'Sic definis liberam vo-
et nolle.' — ' Suum non est si neces- luntatem, ut nisi utrumque, id est,
sarium est.' et bene et male agere possit, libera
2 Julian : ' Inculco liberum arbi- esse non possit.' — L. 3. c. 120.
trium nee ob aliud datum esse, nee 3 ' Accedere nobis debet virtus
intelligi in alio posse, quam ut nee major in przemio, ut rnalam volun-
ad justitiam, nee ad iniquitatem, tatem sic non haberemus, ut nee
captiva aliquis voluntate rapiatur.' habere possemus. 0 desideranda
Augustine : ' Libra tua quam conaris necessitas ! ' — Op. Imp. 1.5. c. 61.
CHAP. in. The Pelagian Controversy. 63
essential to goodness, neither Grod, nor the angels, nor the
saints would be good.
Thus easily and summarily refuted, however, his argu
ment involved a mixture of truth and error. So much
must be conceded to the Pelagian, that the trial of the will
is the necessary condition of the highest kind of virtue that
comes within our cognisance and experience. Of the Divine
Nature, as being beyond our comprehension, we cannot
speak, though we know that it must be infinitely good,
while it must also be without trial. But the assertion is
true of the moral creature in this present state. For what
ever may be the sweetness of the good affections, — even
though we could imagine them from the first in full pos
session of the mind, and so powerfully moving it, that it
felt no inclination to act otherwise than as they dictated ;
even though we could imagine such an uninterrupted flow
of virtue from a source of feeling, — such a result could not
bear a comparison with the victory of the will. The good
affections are aids and supports to goodness ; aids and sup
ports indeed not casual or adventitious, but permanent,
and belonging to our nature ; yet having the effect of
saving pain and effort. But in trial we have to act with
out this aid. For though even the will itself cannot be said
to act without affection, inasmuch as some love of what is
good appears to enter as an ingredient into any decision
in favour of it, we are properly said to act from the will
as distinct from the affections, in the case of trial ; such
trial being in truth caused by the balance of the affections
being on the side of evil. Trial, therefore, throws the man
upon himself in a deep and peculiar sense. He is reduced
to the narrowest condition, and with all the excesses of a
bountifully constituted nature cut off, sustains from ulti
mate conscience and the bare substance of the soul, the
fight with evil. But such a combat tests and elicits an
inner strength which no dominion of the good affections,
however continuous, could do. The greater the desertion
of the moral being, and his deprivation of aids, the deeper
appears his fidelity ; the triumph is greater in proportion
to the scantiness of the means with which it is gained ;
64 The Pelagian Controversy. CHAP. ITT.
and in this adoption of, this cleaving to, barren good, is a
depth of affection, a root of love, contrasted with which, all
the richness of the untried affections is a poor and feeble
offering to Grod.
But though trial is the necessary condition of the high
est kind of goodness in this life, it is not the necessary
condition of all goodness. It is evident that we recognise
and feel toward, as goodness, certain moral states and dis
positions which have not been the result of trial, but are
altogether natural. We may see this in a very low degree
even in the case of animals of the gentler, more generous,
and confiding character who engage our affections in con
sequence, and towards whom we instinctively feel as pos
sessing a kind of goodness. But the good natural dispo
sitions of moral beings deserve a serious consideration.1
For though it may be doubted whether these dispositions
are ever sustained entirely without trial of the will, and
though we may not be able to tell in a particular case,
whether what appears to be the man's natural disposition
has not been formed in part by early trial and past moral
acts, still the general sense of mankind acknowledges wnat
are called good natural dispositions ; that some persons
have by nature a good bias in one or other direction, are
amiable, courageous, truthful, humble naturally, or have
a certain general happy conformation ; that tht-y have, that
is, by nature, not only the power to act in a certain way,
but the disposition so to act already formed within them ;
a habit implanted, or, as the schoolmen say, infused, in
distinction to being acquired by acts. But it would be
absurd to say that such dispositions as these were not vir
tues, and that such natural goodness was not real goodness.
We feel towards persons who possess such dispositions as
persons of a particular character, which character is good;
nor do we do this on even the imaginary supposition that
they have acquired it for themselves, the existing moral
1 ' Cur non anmrimus esse quos- in setate qua usus incipit esse ra-
dam natura misericordes, si natura tionis, sicut ipsa ratio, incipiunt
quosdam non negamus excordes ? apparere.'— Op. Imp. 1. 4. c. 129.
Stint enim nonnulla congenita, quse
CHAP. HI. The Pelagian Controversy. 65
state being the thing we attend to independent of any
source from which it may have sprung. The system of
trial and probation under which we are placed is thus to
some extent a modified one ; not throw 'ng us1 wholly upon
ourselves, to work our way up to the virtuous character by
the power of the mere will, but more or less, and in por
tions, endowing us with it, and producing in us to begin
with the ultimate forms of moral being.
And it is proper, as a further answer to the Pelagian
confined idea of virtue, to add, that no exact limit is, to
the eye of reason apparent, to the operation of such a
power of infusing virtue into the human soul. It would
undoubtedly be something like a contradiction to suppose
that the distinctive effect of trial could be obtained without
trial as the cause, and it must be granted that there must be
some ultimate difference in favour of that virtue which is,
over that which is not, the effect of trial. But there is no
other apparent goal to an untried virtue. We know that
a certain excitement of the feelings produces a pleasure in
virtue, and that particular circumstances, junctures, appeals
from without, act with an exciting power upon the feelings,
kindling zeal, enthusiasm, and love. But this being the
case, it is impossible to say to what extent this system of
impulse and excitement existing in our constitution might
be carried ; what duration these conditions of mind are in
themselves capable of, and whether they might not be
made, by Divine power applying a fit machinery and suc
cession of exciting causes, permanent. We only know
that such a system would not serve that particular end for
which the present system of trial is designed.
But the Pelagian was further wrong. As trial is not
the necessary condition of all goodness, so it is not the
necessary condition of the highest kind of goodness always.
The system of probation points according to the reason of
the case, to its own termination. It is designed for an
end ; but the end, when attained, implies the cessation of
the means. There is a plain incongruity in the perfected
being remaining still dependent on a contingent will, and
exposed to moral risk ; i.e. being for ever on his trial. A
F
56 The Pelagian Controversy. CHAP. m.
time must come, then, when this will cease, when there
will be no more deciding between good and evil, when that
power of choice which makes our virtue here will be over,
and the goodness of the moral creature will be necessary
goodness, from which he will not be able to depart for
evermore.
And this consideration is much confirmed by another.
The trial of the will is undoubtedly the condition here of
the highest kind of virtue ; but it must be admitted at the
same time that it produces this virtue in an incipient and
elementary stage. A distinction must be made between
trial itself and its effects. The undergoing of trial is the
intensest moral act we know of ; but when we leave the
primary stage of resistance made, strength manifested,
and difficulty overcome, and look for the results, we are
disappointed. Virtue, which is the result of this process,
and arises wholly from effort or self-discipline, is deficient
in its crowning characteristic — its grace, or what moralists
call its beauty. It betrays effort, conscious aim and
design ; is practised with too much apparent system and
method ; it wants ease and naturalness ; and is more or
less hard, formal, and artificial, and to a spectator unat
tractive, which it is not its proper nature to be. Thus,
take a person of an ambitious and assuming habit of mind
originally, who has come to the resolution to cultivate
humility ; how little progress does he appear to make in
the task compared with the sincerity of his intentions.
Whatever acts he may do in conformity with his design,
and however he may succeed in imposing on himself a cer
tain general line of behaviour, something is wanting to
animate it ; the vital spirit keeps aloof, and some envious
influence from original temper still works below to mar
the growth of discipline. Compare this acquired virtue
with the natural virtue of humility as seen in any one of
a gentle and humble disposition by nature, how imperfect,
how abortive, does the result of human effort appear by
the side of the Divine gift ? Were present effects alone
to be considered, it were better to be simply shone upon
by the creative grace of Grod, and without labour of our
CHAP. in. The Pelagian Controversy. 67
own to receive straight from His hands an unearned virtue.
And this poverty in acquired virtues arises from the very
fact that they are acquired, from the very manner of their
growth and formation. It is essential to perfect virtue
that it should he truly natural and part of ourselves ; and
self-discipline, care, and culture, much as they can do,
cannot make a nature. For though custom is called a
second nature to express its great power, it only in truth
renders natural or easy to us the original act which it
adopts. And therefore if this act is one of self-control, or
resistance to evil, it only renders resistance to evil easy,
not goodness itself natural. Custom, in short, improves
a character upon its own basis, but does not give a new
one, or make a man what Scripture calls a new creature.
Nor, in fact, do we see it perform even this inferior function
perfectly. For it must be asked, with all the correcting
force of custom, where do we see in the world what may,
in a thorough sense, be called renovation of character ?
Nor do I mean an eradication wholly of wrong tendencies,
but even a complete and successful suppression of them
existing. A serious fault originally attaching to a charac
ter assumes in some persons subtler forms and a more dis
creet and politic bearing, and is finely trained and educated
rather than really resisted. In others it meets a resist
ance ; but where is it suppressed, so that, after a life of
self-improvement, we do not see it ? The possibility of
true mora|| renovation is a truth of faith rather than of
experience.
But such being the defects inherent in the system of
trial, if virtue is ever to be perfect and what it ought to
be, it must be removed from this basis altogether. It must
in a future state become in a way indigenous in us. It
must become a nature, an inspiration, a gift ; be cut away
completely from the ground of effort ; and be like what
we call natural goodness here, though with this important
difference, that it will have been produced by trial. That
is, to become what it ought to be, it must become ne
cessary.
The highest and the perfect state of the will, then, is
F 2
58 The Pelagian Controversy. CHAP. in.
a state of necessity ; and the power of choice, so far from
being essential to a true and genuine will, is its weakness
and defect. What can be a greater sign of an imperfect
and immature state of the will than that, with good and
evil before it, it should be in suspense which to do ? That
it should take the worse alternative is its prostration ;
but that it should be even undetermined is weakness.
Even with the good action done, does not a great sense of
imperfection attend the thought that it was but an instant
ago uncertain whether it would be clone or not ? And, as
we dwell in recollection on the state of our will previous
to its decision, in that interval of suspense in which we
might have acted in one way or another, does not so un
steady and indeterminate a source of action interfere even
with the comfort of certainty which is derived from the
action as being done? Is not the circumstance that it was
but just now uncertain whether it would be done or not a
surviving reflection upon the agent ? Was it a sort of luck
that he did it ? And would he do it again if tried again ?
We have indeed at first an idea that the power of choice
is that which ennobles and dignifies the will, and that the
will would be an imperfect one without it : but this arises
from a misconception. The power of choosing good or evil
is indeed that which ennobles the will of man as compared
with the lower wills of the brute creation ; but it is not
therefore the perfection of man's will. If we imagine it
to be so, we appear to attach this value to* it, for this
reason, viz., because a power in the will of determining
itself either way is power, and we suppose power to be an
advantage. But power is not itself an advantage. In our
ordinary mode of speaking, indeed, we regard it as such ;
because we ordinarily associate power with an advantageous
subject-matter, or think of it as the power to do things
which are advantageous to ourselves. But power in itself
is neither an advantage nor the contrary, but depends
entirely on its object, or that which it has the power to
do, for being the one or the other. The power to do that
which is injurious to oneself is a disadvantage, inasmuch
as it involves the chance of injury ; and the power to do
CHAP. in. The Pelagian Controversy. 69
evil is the power to injure oneself. Such power has no
more an advantage as power than it has as liability. It
is true that, when the subject-matter of power is good, then
the power to accomplish it has an excellence as power ;
that is to say, it is an additional advantage that the good
which happens to us is from ourselves, and not from an
exteinal source. And on this ground the attribute of power
as belonging to the Supreme Being is an excellent attri
bute : it being an excellence that the good which He enjoys
comes from Himself, and not from any other source.
The actions, again, which the good will perform in a
future state of necessity will not be the less good on that
account, and because they do not proceed from a power of
choice. It is true that in one sense a good act which
proceeds from the exercise of a power of choice is more
meritorious than one which proceeds from a will acting
necessarily right. If we measure the merit of an action
by the degree in which it is in advance of the general
condition of the agent, then undoubtedly an action which
proceeds from a will determined necessarily to good has no
merit, because it is simply on a level with, and not at all
in advance of such a will. On the other hand, an action
which proceeds from a will which has to exert a power of
choice in order to compass it, has merit, because it is in
advance of such a will ; inasmuch as the certainty of an
action done is an advance upon the mere power of doing it.
But it is evident that that which is here spoken of is not
the positive merit of an action, but only a relative one ;
its merit as compared with the condition and ability of the
agent. A will which acts of necessity for good is the very
strongest will on the side of good ; and therefore, compared
with the ability of this agent, a good act is a little result.
A will which has to exert a power of choice, and use
struggle and effort, is a weaker will ; and therefore a good
action, as compared with the ability of this agent, is a
greater result. The superior merit, then, of a good act, in
this case, is arrived at by comparing it with the weakness
of the agent ; in the same way that the merit of a work
of art is sometimes arrived at by comparing it with the
70 The Pelagian Controversy. CHAP. nr.
inferiority of the instrument by which it was executed.
It is a merit, therefore, which tells against the perfection
of the will, and not in its favour. The act, as such, if we
can separate the act from the will, is more meritorious ;
but that very superior merit of the act is gained at the
cost of the will, from which it proceeds. The act is better
because the agent is worse.
What has been said of natural or necessary goodness
may be said of natural or necessary evil. Amid the
obscurity which attaches to this class of questions, some
thing to which mankind had borne large testimony would
be relinquished in denying the existence of bad natural
dispositions. And the system of trial points as much to a
necessary evil state as it does to a necessary good one
as its termination. It must be added, that the law of
custom unhappily produces much nearer approaches in
this life to a necessary state in evil than it does to the
same in good ; furnishing a proof of the compatibleness
of a necessary with a culpable or sinful state, to which
Augustine often appeals in defending the doctrine of
original sin against the Pelagian objection on that
head.1
The rational doctrine, then, of voluntariness, i.e. how
far the trial of the will is involved in the nature of virtue
and vice is a modified one. Freewill and necessity have
both their place in it, nor does it oppose the necessary to
1 ' Consuetude fructus est volun- quo abstinere liberum fuit.' — L. 1. c.
tatis, quoniam ex voluntate gignitur, 105. '" Dicis quod contr.-mum sit
quse tamen id quod agit, negat se necessitas et voluntas, ita ut se mu-
agere voluntate.' — Op. Imp. 1. 4. c. tua impugnatione consumant ; " inde
103. The admission of Julian, nos arguens quod " alterum alterius
' Evenire hominihus affectionalem subdamus effectui, dicentes necessi-
qualitatem, atque ita inhserescere, ut tatem de fructibus voiuntatis exor-
aut magnis molitionibus, aut nullis tarn," cum videas necessitatem con-
separetur omnino,' and the Pelagian suetudinis fructum esse manifestis-
interpretation of the text Quod nolo simum voiuntatis. Nonne quod tibi
malum hoc ago, on the ground of impossible risum est, "sua se
custom, were thus turned to the voluntas multiplication delevit, et
account of original sin. ' Ac per sta'tum proprium operata mutavit,"
hoc etiam secundum vos peccandi quge multiplicata necessitatem con-
necessitas unde abstinere liberum suetudinis fecit.'— Op. Imp. 1. 4. c.
non est, illius peccati poena fait, a 103.
CHAP. TIL The Pelagian Controversy. 7 1
the voluntary. But the Pelagian adopted an extreme
and unqualified doctrine on this head ; throwing every
thing upon the direct choice or exertion of the will, and
separating absolutely the necessary from the voluntary.
Virtue, in the heavenly state, then, could be no virtue in
his eye^, because it had ceased to require effort and choice.
He allowed, so far as his language went, no room for an
ultimate and perfect state, and established an eternal rest
less contingency in the moral world. Not, however, to
fasten this extreme meaning upon his language, which
was perhaps hardly intended, inasmuch as the Pelagian
nowhere denies the received doctrine of a future state ;
and understanding him only to mean that a man could not
be good or bad in this life except by his own individual
choice, his position is still a narrow and one-sided one.
The general sense of mankind is certainly on the side of
there being good and bad natural dispositions, and we
attach the idea of goodness to generous excitements and
emotions, which do not arise from any effort of the will
but spontaneously. The Christian doctrine of grace which
makes goodness a divine gift or inspiration is thus fully in
accordance with the instincts of our nature, while the
Pelagian doctrine, which reduces all virtue to effort and
discipline, is felt as a confinement and an artificial limit
in morals.
There are, however, two distinct questions properly
involved in this subject ; one, whether the trial of the will
is, as opposed to implanted dispositions, essential to the
nature of virtue or vice ; the other relating to the deter
mination of the will on its trial, — whether its self-deter
mination is necessary to the nature of virtue and vice as
distinct to its determination from without. The Pelagian
thought it essential that, for this purpose, the will should
determine itself, that virtue and vice, in order to be such,
must be of our own originating. S. Augustine maintained
a goodness and a sinfulness to which the will was deter
mined from without. Both these positions are true, if
held together, and both false if held apart.
3. To the questions of the power of the will, and the
7 2 The Pelagian Controversy. CHAP. nr.
nature of virtue and vice, succeeded the question of the
Divine justice.
The doctrine of original sin described all mankind as
punished for the sin of Adam, deriving a positive sinful-
ness, and even a necessity to sin, a slavery, and a captivity
from it. But how was it consistent with justice that one
man should be punished for the sin of another ; that man
kind should be created guilty, and derive from one par
ticular act committed before they were born a positive
necessity to sin ? 1 The objection of the Pelagian was met
in two ways ; first, by an appeal to mystery ; and, secondly,
by an appeal to facts.
1. The objection that it was contrary to the Divine
justice to punish one man for the sin of another was met
by an appeal to mystery, and the answer that the Divine
justice was incomprehensible. And this was a sound and
proper answer, but the form in which it was put was not
wholly faultless.
For it is one thing to say that the Divine justice is
incomprehensible, and another thing to say that the Divine
justice is different from human justice ; or that we are to
have a different idea altogether of justice as a human and
as a Divine characteristic. In saying that the Divine
justice is incomprehensible we make no assertion about it
at all, and therefore do not establish any contradiction
between it and our natural ideas of justice. Having con
ceived of it, so far as we conceived of it at all, as the
ordinary natural quality so called, we only cease at a
certain point to form any conception about it. But to
say that the Divine justice is different from human is to
confuse our moral notions altogether. Pressed by the
Pelagian with the strong testimonies in Scripture to the
rule of natural justice, that no man should be punished except
1 'Ais credere te quidem condi- nuum suarum Deus; et quod per-
torem Deutn,sed malorum hominum suasit diabolus teuuiter. solerter et
. . . . et Dei sanctitati informa- perseveranter fingit et protegit et
tionem sceleris appulisti. Great format Deus. Et fructum ab horaine
igitur malam Deus et puniuntur bonitatis reposcit, cui malum in-
iniipcerites propter quod fecit Deus ; genuit Deus.' — Julian, ap. Op. Imp.
et imputat hominibus crinien ma- 1. 3. c. 124. et sea.
CHAP. in. The Pelagian Controversy. 73
for his own sins, S. Augustine properly appealed to another
set of texts which represented God as visiting the sins of
the fathers upon the children1, and showed that Scripture
asserted an incomprehensible as well as a natural justice.
But he further proceeded to explain away these assertions
of the rule of natural justice itself, as intended to apply to
human, not to the Divine conduct. The rule laid down
in Deuteronomy, that the 4 fathers shall not be put to death
for the children, neither the children for the fathers, but
every man for his own sin2," was interpreted as applying
to human judges only, not to God, who was altogether free
from such an obligation.3 And the natural rejoinder of
the Pelagian, that God was not less just than He wanted
man to be, was overruled by the argument, that God did
many things which it would be wrong for man to do.4
But such an argument was fallacious. The Being who
gave life has a right to take it away, and the supremely
good Being has a right to praise Himself ; but the differ
ence in the rightfulness of such acts in the case of God and
man is not any difference of the moral law by which God
and the creature act, but a difference in their respective
positions, which justifies these acts in God, and not in the
creature. Indeed, the chapter in Ezekiel applies the rule
1 Op. Imp. 1. 3. c. 30. aliquando contra quse facienda man -
- Deut. xxiv. 16. davit. Nee opus est ut multa com-
3 Augustine : ' Aliter mandavit memorem. Mandavit liomini Scrip-
homini, aliter judicavit ipse.' — Op. tura dicens " nou te laudet os tuum "
Imp. 1. 3. c. 33. Julian: ' Si quae (Prov. xxvii. 2), nectamen dicendus
sunt justa a nobis fieri velit, et ipse est arrogans aut superbus, cum se
faciat quod injustum est : justiores innumerabiliter laudare non desinit.'
nos, quam ipse est, cupit videri; imo — c. 22. ' Hoc judicium Deus ho-
non justioies, sed nos sequos, et se minum voluit esse non suum, qui
iuiquum.' — Julian, ap. Op. Imp. 1. dixit, Reddam peccata patrum in
3. c. 24. filios. (Deut. v. 9.) Quod etiam per
4 ' Hoc quidem prseceptum dedit hominem i'ecit, quando per Jesum
hominibusjudicantibus, ne pater pro Nave non solum Achan, sed etiam
tilio, vel filius pro patre moreretur. filios ejus occidit; vel per eundem,
Caeterum judicia sua Deus non alii- filios Canaanorum etiam parvulos
gavit hac lege.' — Op. Imp. 1. 3. c. 12. damnavit.' — c. 30. ' Q,uis enim homo
' Non est legis suae prsevaricator Justus sinit perpetrari scelus quod
Deus quando aliud facit Deus ut habet in potestate non sinere ? Et
Deus, aliud imperat homini ut ho- tamen sinit haec Deus.' — c. 24.
mini?' — c. 23. 'Facit enim Deus
74 The Pelagian Controversy. CHAP. in.
of natural justice directly to the Divine conduct, and
represents God as asserting of Himself, that He punishes
no man except for his own sins, and so gives no ground
whatever for such a distinction. But this declaration was not
allowed its obvious interpretation, as stating a universal
law of the Divine dealings, but only a special prophetical
one, as alluding to the Divine mercy under the gospel
dispensation and the covenant of grace,1 under wh'ich the
effect of original sin, the punishment of mankind for the
sin of their first parent, was removed.
But the punishment which all mankind suffered for the
sin of Adam was punishment of a peculiar kind ; because
it was not only pain but sin, and not only sin but captivity
to sin and inability to do any good thing. This worst and
strongest penalty, then, attaching to the sin of Adam, was
defended by an appeal to a remarkable law of (rod's
judicial administration, discernible in his natural provi
dence, and specially attested by Scripture ; the rule, >viz.
of punishing sin by further $\\\,peccatum pcena peccati, —
a rule which, in the present instance, only received a
mysterious application, as being extended to the case of a
mysterious and incomprehensible sin.
S. Augustine argued, then, that original sin was real
sin in the being in whom it resided ; and being such, was
justly punishable by the abandonment of the person guilty
of it, to sin ; that the natural man, therefore, could not
plead his want of moral power as any excuse for his sins,
any more than a man in common life, who had contracted
a bad habit, could plead the dominion of that habit as
such an excuse. That bad habit might be so strong that
he could not help committing the sins to which it inclined
1 ' Hsec per Ezechielem proplie- dicatur . . . . " Non dicetur in Is.
tarn promissio est novi Testament!, rael" recte diceres, si veros Israelites
quam non intelligis, ubi Deus re- regenerates videres in quibus hoc
generates a generatis si jam in non dicetur.' — c. 39. 41. Jeremiah
majoribus setatibus sunt, secundum xxxi. 21 — 32. is adduced to confirm
propria facta discernit.' — Op. Imp. this interpretation. ' In diebus illis
1. 3. c. 38. '"Si dicetur amplius non dicent ultra. Patres comede-
parabola " : . . . non arguit quia runt,' &c. — c. 84. See Contra Jul.
dicebatur, sed permittit ubi non Pel. 1. 6. n. 82.
CHAP. in. The Pelagian Controversy. 75
him ; but he was responsible for those sins, in that he was
responsible for their cause. In like manner, man was
responsible for the sins which in the state of original sin
he could not avoid, in that he was responsible for original
sin itself.1
Two difficulties, however, presented themselves to the
application of such a law to the case of original sin. In
the first place, though it is true that all sin, so far as it is
indulged, predisposes the mind to further sin, or creates
a sinful habit, this effect is in proportion to the amount
of such indulgence ; and it is only extreme indulgence
that produces an uncontrollable habit, or a loss of freewill :
whereas the sin of our first parents, to which this extreme
effect was attached, was but a single sin, and not appar
ently a heinous one. But the sin of our first parents, it
was replied, was neither a single nor a light one. The
outward act was but the consummation of a course of
inward sin, self-pleasing, pride, and departure from God.
And, even were its subject-matter light, the sin itself was
disobedience ; the more wanton, that there was no strength
of passion as yet in man's nature to excuse it. Who would
measure the greatness of a first sin as being the first, a
departure from created rectitude, the primary act of the
will for evil, to which no previous evil predisposed ? But
the subject-matter was only externally light, not really,
being not a mere fruit of a tree, but good out of their
existing state of union with God, which was grasped at ;
showing a greediness for which Grod did not suffice ; and
that alien good being, moreover, the presumptuous position
1 ' Sed vos ista peccata ex illis liberum non est, illius peccati poena
venire peccatis quse nulla necessitate fuit a quo abstinere liberum fuit,
commissa sunt, in illo saltern con- quando nullum pondus necessitatis
ceditis, qui dicit, "Quod nolo malum urgcbat. Cur ergo non creditis
hoc ago." Qui enim, ut istam patiatur tantum saltern valuisse illud primi
necessitatem, non nisi peccandi con- hominis ineffabiliter grande pecca-
suetudine premitur, procul dubio turn, ut eo vitiaretur humana natura
priusquam peccaret, nondum necessi- tiniversa, quantum valet nunc in
tate consuetudinis premebatur. Ac homine uno secunda natura? ' — Op.
per hoc, etiam secundum vos, pec- Imp. 1. i. c. 105.
candi necessitas unde abstinere
76 The Pelagian Controversy. CHAP. in.
of being gods themselves — a pride which was the very
counterpart of our Lord's humility, who emptied Himself
of a Divinity which was His right, while they grasped at a
divinity to which they had none.1
But, however serious the sin of our first parents might
be, a much greater difficulty presented itself in the question
how individuals could be responsible for a sin to which they
were not themselves personally parties. But this difficulty
was overruled by an appeal to the doctrine of original sin
itself, which rested upon Scripture, and the very foundation
of which was, that all men had in some sense sinned in
Adam. This was, indeed a mystery, and beyond our com
prehension, but faith accepted it as true ; and if true, the
basis which this argument required was supplied to it.
Such an explanation was only the application to a mys
terious subject-matter of a law, which we recognise as just
in that sphere of providence which comes under our know
ledge. We see the justice of the law that sin hardens the
heart, as applied to the case of actual sin because we know
the sin ; we see a justice in such sin, long indulged, leading
to actual slavery and loss of freewill : but the justice of this
law as applied to the case of original sin was a mysterious
and incomprehensible justice, that which is its subject-
matter being a mysterious and incomprehensible sin.
\Yhen S. Augustine, however, left the ground of mystery
for that of reasoning, he adopted doubtful positions. The
appeal to the Divine foreknowledge of men's evil lives,
in spite of which He creates them, as a defence of a creation
1 ' In occulto autem mali esse 9. ' Tanto graving peccavit quanto
cceperunt, ut in apertam inobedien- ibi major nou peccandi facilitas erat,
tiam laberentur.'— De Civit. Dei, 1. ubi vitiata natura nondum erat.'—
xiv. c.l 3. et seq.^ ^ Quantum malum Op. Imp. 1. 2. c. 189. ' Tanta im-
spla inobedientia.'— De Gen. ad pietate peccavit quantam nos metiri
iteram, 1. 8. c. 13. 'Noluithomo atque sestimare non possumus.'—
inter dehcias paradisi servare jus- Ibid. 1. 3. c. 65. 'Illius natura
titiam.'— De Pecc. Merit, et Remiss. quanto magis sublimiter stabat,
1. Z. n. 55. ' Quid avanus illo cui tanto magis graviter occidit
i)eus sufficere non potuit.'— In Ep. Peccatum quanto incredibilius, tanto
Joannis ad Parthos, Tr. 8. n. 6. damnabilius.'— Ibid. 1. 6. c. 22. See
Kapere voluerunt divinitatem, per- Bull on the State of Man before the
iderunt fehcitatem.'— In Tr. 68. n. Fall, vol. ii. (Oxford ed.) p. 64.
CHAP. in. The Pelagian Controversy.
77
under a necessity to evil, was plausible 1 ; but there is
plainly a difference between exposing men to the risk, and
subjecting them to the certainty of moral evil, and that
evil in some cases eternal. The issue being alike foreseen
in both cases ; in the one the sinner has had the opportunity
of a better issue given him, and has therefore only himself
to blame for the worse one ; in the other he has had no
such opportunity. The appeal to God's natural providence
and his support and nourishment of evil men in the world
as an analogous case to the creation of men as evil, was
still more incorrect.2
2. The objection to the punishment of mankind for the
sin of Adam, on the score of the Divine justice, was an
swered by an appeal to facts ; an appeal which divided into
two great heads — the fact of sin, and the fact of pain.
First, how were we to account for the fact of sin, as it
1 ' Ut quid creat quos impios
futures et damnandos esse prsescivit.'
—Op. Imp. 1. 1. c. 48., vid. 119.
121; 1. 5. c. 13.
The argument, however, with a
modification, may claim the more
recent authority of Archbp. Whately,
who says : ' We should be very
cautious how we employ such wea
pons as may recoil upon ourselves
. . . Why the Almighty does not
cause to die in the cradle every
infant whose future wickedness and
misery, if suffered to grow up, He
foresees, is what no system of re
ligion, natural or revealed, will
enable us satisfactorily to account
for.'— Essays on S. Paul, p. 88. But
is there not some confusion of
thought in this argument ? As
stated by S. Augustine, it is inform
absurd. For the difficulty in the
constitution of things which he sets
against that of reprobation, or
creating a being to be eternally
miserable, is this, that God foresees
men's evil lives and their judicial
result, and i/et creates them. But if
God forsees men's evil lives, He by
the hypothesis creates them, and it
would be a contradiction that He
should not. Facts cannot first be
foreseen, and then because they a,re
foreseen be prevented. Archbishop
Whately, however, relieves the ar
gument from this absurdity, by
making foresight to be the foresight
" of men's future wickedness and
misery if suffered to grow up" But
what can be meant by the foresight
of events which, by the very suppo
sition, may not take place ? This
alleged difficulty, then, in the con
stitution of things, cannot be stated
without a great absurdity and con
tradiction ; whereas the difficulty of
God creating a being to be eternally
miserable is as plain and simple a
one as can be conceived.
2 ' Sic creat malos quomodo pascit
et nutrit malos.' — De Nupt. et Cone.
1. 2. n. 32, 33. Julian : ' Quod pascit
Deus etiam peccatores, benignusque
est super ingratos et malos pietatis
est ejus testimonium non maligni-
tatis. . . . Vide ergo quarn nescias
quid loqueris, qui de exemplo miseri-
cordiae voluisti crudelitatem pro-
bare.' — Op. Imp. 1. 5. c. 64.
7 8 The Pelagian Controversy. CHAP. m.
met us in the world— the universal depravation and cor
ruption of mankind? could we account for this by chance,
or the contingent action of each man's freewill ? Or did it
not at once point to some law in our nature, on the same
principle on which, in the physical world and common life,
whenever we see a uniform set of phenomena, we refer them
to some law ?
The argument, however, for original sin derived from
the prevalence of actual sin in the world, though un
doubtedly sound and unanswerable, requires some caution
and discrimination in the use of it. And in the first place
it must be observed that, when we examine this argument,
we find, that upon a nearer view it divides into two dis
tinct arguments, depending upon two different kinds of
reasoning. One is the argument simply of cause and effect.
On the principle that every event must have a cause, actual
sin must have a cause anterior to itself, from which it
proceeds: and for the same reason that this cause is wanted
itself, another cause is wanted for it, and so another and
another in succession, till we arrive at some origin or first
cause of sin. But this origin of sin cannot be in the
Divine will, it must therefore be in the human; which
ultimate and original evil in the will is what is signified
by original sin.
This argument, then, for original sin, does not at all
depend on the amount of actual sin in the world, but would
be just as valid on the supposition of one sin, as on that of
universal ; original sin itself following from the simple fact
of actual, though its universality depends on the univer
sality of actual. And the validity of this argument depends
on the validity of the general argument of cause and effect,
or upon the truth of the axiom, that every event must have
a cause, — an axiom which I discussed in the last chapter,
when I defined the degree and measure of truth which
belonged to it. It will be enough to say here of this
rationale of original sin, that it is a wholly philosophical,
as distinguished from a scriptural one ; because, in repre
senting original sin as anterior to all actual sin, it repre
sents it as anterior to the sin of Adam, and as much the
CHAP. in. The Pelagian Controversy. 79
condition of man at his first creation as it ever was after
wards.1
The other and the more common argument, is the
argument of probability, — that it is contrary to the doc
trine of chances, that every one of those innumerable
millions that have lived in the world should have been a
sinner, if such sin had depended on the mere contingency
of every individual's freewill ; such a universal fact evi
dently proving the existence of some law of sin in our
nature. But the correctness of this argument for original
sin depends on the sense in which we understand sin in the
preliminary statement, that every one of the human race
has been, and is, a sinner.
If by sin is meant here the absence of perfection only —
that every man that has ever lived has done something
wrong in the course of , his life, there appears to be nothing,
even in a universal faultiness of the human race, in such a
sense, more than may be accounted for on the principle of
each man's contingent will, or that requires the operation
of a law. For, considering the length of human life, the
constant succession of temptations in it, and their variety,
the multiplicity of relations in which a man stands to others,
all of which have to be fulfilled in order to constitute him
faultless, is there anything very remarkable in the coinci
dence that every man should, on some occasion or other in
his life, have diverged from the strict duty ? If, on the one
hand, it may be said, that out of so great a number of in
dividuals as there have been in the world some few perfect
men might have been calculated upon ; on the other hand,
it may be said that, with so Vast a number of trials, we
could not calculate any one's universal success under them.
The chances in favour of cases of perfection which the
number of individuals in the world presents, are met by
the chances against it, contained in the number of trials
in the life of each individual.
But if by sin we understand not only a loss of perfection,
1 Mr. Coleridge, in his ' Aids to his usual mixture of obscurity and
Keflection,' adopts this rationale of power. See NOTE XII.
original sin, and discusses it with
8o The Pelagian Controversy. CHAP. in.
but positive depravity, certainly the general fact of sin in
this sense cannot be accounted for on the mere principle
of contingency. Supposing ourselves calculating before
hand the result of the action of freewill in the human race,
we should have no more right to calculate on general de
pravity and wickedness as the result, than on general piety
and virtue. Undoubtedly there is this important distinc
tion between vice and virtue, that vice is pleasant, and
virtue painful at the time ; and it maybe thought perhaps
that, in making any calculations beforehand as to the con
duct of mankind, we should be justified in expecting that
the generality would do what was easiest at the time. But
if anyone will examine the real ground on which he forms
this expectation, he will find that he forms it upon the
experience of the result, and not upon any ground of
antecedent calculation. He sees that this is the general
way in which mankind act, and, therefore, he imagines
himself expecting it beforehand. But it is evident that,
in calculating the conduct of mankind beforehand, we
should have no more right to calculate on a general pre
ference of present to future interests, than on a general
contrary preference. The choice that freewill would make
in the matter would be as probable one way as another.
Understanding sin, then, in the sense of depravity and
wickedness, the general fact of human sinfulness in this
sense certainly requires some law of sin in our nature as its
explanation ; such a law as is asserted in the doctrine of
original sin. But while such a fact must be allowed as a
proof of the doctrine of original sin, it must at the same
time be remembered, that the assertion of general depravity
and wickedness is a very grave assertion to make respecting
the human race. It is an assertion, however, which rests
on a ground of actual observation and experience, confirmed
by the authority of Scripture, and is true in two different
ways.
First, every man is depraved in the sense of having
vile, selfish, and proud desires, which have a certain power
over him, and occupy and fill his mind with sufficient
strength and frequency to constitute a depraved condition
CHAP. ni. The Pelagian Controversy. 8 1
of mind. A certain tendency to evil is indeed no more
than what is necessary to constitute a state of trial, and
does not show depravity or corruption in the moral being.
But it is evident that evil desire, in the degree in which
it exists in human nature, is more than such a tendency as
this, and is in itself a disease ; inasmuch as men feel it as
something sinful in itself, independent of its gratification.
Test even the best of men, with this strength of evil desire
residing in him, by a perfect standard, and it must be seen
that he is a corrupt being, whom we can only think of at
all as good by a kind of anticipation, regarding this as a
transient condition of mind, of which he is one day to be
relieved. In the sense, then, of having concupiscence,
which hath of itself the nature of sin, all mankind are
depraved.
Secondly, the generality of mankind are depraved in
the sense of actual bad life and conduct ; as the former was
a fact of inward experience, this latter being a fact of
observation. The wickedness of the generality of mankind
was acknowledged even by the heath en, and has been gene
rally admitted. It is proved, therefore, in the only way in
which a general fact admits of being proved, viz. by large
general and consentient observation ; observation, more
over, which, when once made, keeps its ground, and meets
with comparatively little contradiction. It is, moreover,
strongly asserted in Scripture, which refers to it, however,
as a known and ascertained fact, rather than professes to
reveal it in the first instance. Such being the case, it is
evident, even supposing particular persons should say that
their own observation had been otherwise, that their indi
vidual testimony is no counterbalance to the general obser
vation of mankind. And though the reluctance of all
persons to form judgments upon their relations, friends, and
acquaintances may be appealed to, as counter-evidence on
this subject, it should be remembered that a judgment of
charity does not supersede that of observation.
Secondly, the defence of the doctrine of original sin, on
the ground of fact, from the objection urged on the score
of the Divine justice, appealed straight to the great fact of
G
g2 The Pelagian Controversy. CHAP. m.
pain and misery in the world. How was this to be accounted
for ? It could not be accounted for on the ground of men's
actual sins, because it was evidently a part of the present
constitution of nature, and in the case of infants preceded
actual sin. Anyhow, then, we were in a difficulty with
respect to the Divine justice ; for if we gave up the doctrine
of original sin, there was nothing to account for this fact,
and the charge of injustice could be brought against God
for an undeserved infliction of pain.1
The argument, however, which infers sin from pain,
should be used with caution ; we do not know enough of
the whole scheme of things to decide whether, distinct from
judicial grounds, pain may not be necessary simply as a
preparation and training for a higher state of existence.
That kind of pain which is involved in effort and the over
coming of difficulty we do not naturally regard as at all of
necessity judicial; and S. Augustine exceeds the limits of
a common sense judgment, when he appeals to the slow
and gradual growth of the understanding in man, the im
becility of infancy, and the difficulties which accompany
the progress of education, as evidences of the Divine wrath.2
But pain of the positive and acute kind certainly suggests
1 S. Augustine, in Op. Imp. 1.1. 2 ' Sed illi parvuli nee flerent in
c, 92., 1. 2. c. 89. 104. 116. 124. 139. paradise, nee muti essent, nee ali-
144., 1. 3. c. 7. 48. 89. 95. 154. 198., quando uti ratione non possent, nee
1. 5. c. 1., 1. 6. c. 7- 9., and passim, morbis affligerentur, nee a bestiis
refers to the general fact of human laederentur .... nee surgentes in
misery as a proof of original sin : pueritiam domarentur verberibus,
' Teste ipsa generis humani miseria aut erudirentur laboribus.'—Op. Imp.
peccatum originale monstratur.' — 1. 3. c. 198. ' Omnibus cogenita est
L. 3. c. 89. ' Constat mala hujus qusedam tarditas mentis, qua et hi
vitae quibus plenus est mundus qui appellantur ingeniosi, non sine
Manichaeos cum Catholicisconfiteri : aliqua laboris serumna, vel quas-
sed undo sint haec non utrosque idem cunque artes, vel eas etiam quas
dicere : quod ea Manichaei tribuunt liberales nuncupant discunt ....
alienee naturae malae, Catholici vero Si in paradiso aliquid disceretur,
et bonae et nostrae ; sed peccato quod illi vitas esset utile scire, sine
vitiatse, meritoque punitae.'— L. 6. c. ullo labore aut dolore id assequere-
14. 'Si parvuli sine ullius peccati tur beata natura, vel Deo docente
meritopremunturgravijugo,iniquus vel seipsa. Unde quis non intelligat
est Deus.' — L. 2. c. 124. ' Si ergo in hac vita etiam tormenta discen-
nulum esset in parvulis ex origine tium ad miserias hujus sasculi, quod
meritum malum, quicquid mail pati- ex uno in condemnationem propaga-
nntnr esset injustum.'— L. 3L c. 204. turn est, pertinere.' — L. 6. c. 9.
CHAP. in. The Pelagian Controversy. 83
a judicial source ; nor can we reflect on the dreadful forms
of misery and the diseases, bodily and mental, which attach
to human nature, without being led instinctively to the
idea of some moral evil residing in that nature. It admits
perhaps of a doubt, whether the overwhelming nature of
present pain, whether as a sight or feeling, does not dis
order us as judges on such a question ; nor can we say for
certain that, supposing ourselves to be looking back from
the immense distance of a happy eternity upon the pains
of this mortal life, the greatest amount of these might not
appear so small in comparison with the happiness which
had succeeded them,1 that they might be regarded, then,
as a simple preparation for and introduction to futurityr
and accounted for on that ground, superseding the judicial
one. The common spectacle of human misery, however,
has, in fact, impressed the religious portion of the world
in all ages, Christian or pagan, in the latter way ; and
the general feeling of mankind has connected it with some
deep though undefined root of sin in the human race.
Thus maintained and defended on the several grounds
of the power of the will, the nature of virtue and vice, and
the Divine justice, the Catholic doctrine of original sin
adopted, as an account of the existence of evil, a middle
ground between two extreme theories on either side, which
prevailed in the world. According to the Manichean theory,
evil was an original substance in nature, coeval with the
Divine. It was therefore an ineradicable, unconquerable
thing ; for though some triumph over the Gentes tenebrarum
was talked of, a part of the Divine nature was irrevocably
polluted in the contest. The practical meaning of this
theory was, that the world was a mixture ; that good and
evil had gone on together in it from all eternity, and would
to all eternity continue to do so ; that things were what
they were, and that there was no altering them ; — much
the view taken by practical worldly men, who cannot per
suade themselves to believe that there is such a thing as
1 ' 'Eo'Awi' yap VTTO 'xp.p\i.far<av "Orav ©eat) fioipa W/MTTJ
'Ape«as o\€ ov tyri\6v.'
PINDAB. Olymp. 2.
a 2
84. The Pelagian Controversy. CHAP. m.
pure good, the whole of experience going so much against
it, and therefore virtually disbelieve in Him who is abso
lute goodness. The other extreme theory was the Pelagian,
which accounted tor the universal corruption of the world
simply upon the ground of each individual's will ; and the
practical tendency of the Pelagian, as of the Manichean
theory, was to carelessness and indifference ; attributing too
slight a power to sin over the liberty of the will, and so
lowering our idea of the nature of sin ; as the other gave it
too much, and so abandoned us to it. Between these two
theories the Church has taken the middle line, denying
evil to be original in the universe, but asserting it to be
original in our present nature ; giving it a voluntary be
ginning but a necessary continuance, and a descent, when
once begun, by a natural law. This mixture and balance
of voluntariness and necessity makes up the doctrine of
original sin ; and the practical impression it leaves, is that
of the deep and awful nature, but not the dominance of sin.
And thus S. Augustine was enabled, in answer to the
Pelagian charge of Manicheanism, to appeal to his doctrine
as a safeguard against that system. The facts of the world
drove the Manichean into blasphemy and a denial of the
Divine omnipotence ; but the doctrine of original sin ac
counted for these facts in a way which saved at once the
Divine justice and the Divine power. It attributed evil,
moral and physical, to the wilful act of man ; thus separat
ing it from the essence of his nature, and dislodging it as
a substance in the universe, while it accounted judicially
for the pains of this present life.1 *
III. The main arguments of Pelagianism being stated 2,
it remains to notice the bearing of this system upon the
Catholic doctrines of the Original State of man, the Incar
nation, and the Atonement.
1. Scripture represents the original state of man as
one of innocence and goodness, and as blessed with a cor-
1 Op. Imp. 1. 3. c. 170—177. Pelagian interpreted the texts of
186.; 1. 4. c. 2.; 1. 5. c. 30. 56.; Scripture bearing on the doctrine of
b- c- 7- 9. original sin, see NOTE XIII.
2 -bor the mode in which the
CHAP. in. The Pelagian Controversy. 85
responding happiness. He comes from the hands of his
Maker an upright being, and he is placed in the garden of
Eden, where he is surrounded with all that can please the
senses and satisfy the mind of a creature thus constituted.
And revelation is here confirmed by general tradition. The
legend of the golden age goes back to a primitive state of
our nature, in which it was both good and happy.
Such an original moral disposition of man again involves
a certain measure of stability and strength in the formation
of it ; such a character implies a certain degree of depth,
with which it is stamped upon human nature. Jt may be
said that a being is good till he has sinned ; and that, con
sequently, if he is endowed simply with freewill at his
creation, he is created a good being. But it may be
doubted whether freewill of itself, and prior to its deter
mination to good, can be called goodness1 : at any rate, the
possession of it alone affords no reason for a state of good
ness lasting beyond the first moment of creation ; and
therefore we are evidently intended to regard man's original
state of uprightness as something more than the mere state
of freewill. Man's uprightness, however, being this farther
state, whatever we may call it ; the support and continuance
of this state depended upon freewill in a being not yet per
fected but on his trial. It thus became an object of atten
tion in Catholic theology to define, under this balance of
considerations, with as much accuracy as the subject ad
mitted of, what was the condition of Adam before the fall,
in respect of goodness on the one side, and liability to sin
on the other.
On the one hand, then, it was determined that Adam
could not have concupiscence or lust, i.e. the direct inclina
tion to evil ; that positive appetite and craving for corrupt
pleasure which is now the incentive to sin in our nature ;
for this would be to make no difference between man un-
fallen and fallen. There was no positive contrariety as yet
between the flesh and the spirit ; and the inward struggle,
which is now the normal condition of man, was alien to a
1 An rectus erat non habens bilitatem ? — Op. Imp. 5. 57. See
vvoluntatem bonam sed ejus possi- NOTE XIV.
86 The Pelagian Controversy. CHAP. in.
nature made harmonious and at peace with itself.1 On the
other hand, Adam must have had a tendency of some kind
toward evil, in order to be in a state of trial at all.2 There
remained, then, the conclusion, of an indirect or distant
tendency to evil in Adam. A regular and formed virtuous
habit of mind, or, as S. Augustine calls it, a goodivill,im-
planted in him to begin with by God, intervened between
him and sin, and stood as a barrier against any strong and
disturbing force of temptation. Suppose a tendency to
evil in man, with simply freewill to resist it, and that
tendency is at once a strong power and force in his nature ;
but suppose, together with that tendency to evil, and coeval
with it, a formed and set habit and disposition of the whole
soul to good — suppose, in short (allowing for necessary dis
tinctions), a character equal to a virtuous character which
it has taken time and effort to acquire, existing in man as
the gift of Grod, at the moment of his creation3, and it is
at once evident that the evil tendency in his nature is at a
very great disadvantage ; because it starts with a loss of
position, and opposes an antedated strength, a created pre
cedence, and an implanted growth of goodness. Evil thus
begins its course under a righteous oppression, which con
fines its movements and keeps it at a distance from the
centre of human life and feeling ; its invitations are faintly
heard from the extremities of nature, a solid intervening
formation of good intercepting them before they arrive
at a forcible and exciting stage ; and sin, yet unknown to
conscience, accompanies human nature, like a dream, with
languid and remote temptations, while good occupies the
active and waking man. Such a state may be partially
understood from the ordinary case of any one who has
acquired virtuous habits of any kind. These habits do not
1 ' Haec discordia carnis et spiri- semper, sed ex ilia se in malam nullo
tus in paradise, si nemo peccasset, cogente mutaret, sicut et factum
absit ut esse potuerit.' — Op. Imp. est.'— Op. Imp. 1. 5. c. 61.
1. 4. c. 37. s « Ilia itaque perfectio naturae
2 ' Quasi non potuerit Deus ho- quam non dabant anni sed sola
minem facere voluntatis bonse, in manus Dei, non potuit nisi habere
qua eum tamen permanere non co- voluntatem aliquam, eamque non
geret sed in ejus esset arbitrio sive malam.' — Op. Imp. 1. 5. c. 61.
in ea semper esse vellet, sive non
CHAP. nr. The Pelagian Controversy. 87
exclude a man from trial, for, however firmly rooted, they
have still to be sustained by the effort of the will. Still, in
the case of confirmed virtuous habits, this effort is an easy
and unconscious one, not anxious or laborious ; the person,
though not out of the reach of evil, is separated at a con
siderable interval from it, and, under the safeguard of his
habit, a serene precaution has to defend him from distant
danger, rather than positive fear from a near and immediate
one. Jn the same way, only more perfectly than in any case
of habit of which we have experience, the first man was pro
tected from sin by an implanted holy disposition of mind,
and habitual inclination to good imparted to him at his
creation. His trial lay in having to sustain a divinely be
stowed defence against sin, rather than engage in direct
conflict with it ; and a tranquil precaution, not inconsistent
with the happiness of paradise, against a remote issue on
the side of evil, had it been adequately maintained, would
have effectually preserved him.1 He had by his created
disposition a pleasure in goodness ; and that pleasure natu
rally preserved him in obedience without the need of
express effort. But though thus held to obedience by the
persuasive tie of an adequate pleasure and delight, man was
not without an indefinite principle of desire in his nature,
which tended to pass beyond the bounds of present happi
ness in quest of more. Thus, in common life, persons happy
after a human measure in their present situation and re
sources, still carry about with them a general sense of a
capacity for greater happiness, which is without much
difficulty kept under and controlled, by the mind simply
sustaining a proper estimate of the resources in its posses
sion and applying a just attention to the enjoyment of
them ; but which may be allowed to expand unduly, till it
impels the man to a trial of new and dangerous sources of
pleasure. Happy within the limits of obedience, Adam
was still not out of the reach of a remote class of invita
tions to advance beyond the precincts of a sacred sufficiency
and make trial of the unknown. But the happiness with
''Pcense illius devitandse qua quilla erat cautio non turbulenta
fuerat [secutura peccatum, tran- formido.' — Op. Imp. 1. 6. c. 14.
88 The Pelagian Controversy. CHAP. in.
which Grod had connected his duty could have easily, with
the aid of an unpainful caution of his own, mastered the
temptation.1 Thus, in some calm interval, produced by
sight or sound, or by some cheering or tranquillising news,
or arising in the mind he knows not how, a man enjoys,
amid the business, anxiety, and turmoil of the world, a
brief repose and happiness within ; which does not, however,
while it removes to the distant horizon for the time the
evils and the pains of life, altogether put them out of sight.
Behind him are the sorrows and misfortunes of the past,
before him those of the future. He is not unconscious of
either ; but they yield to the reign of the present hour,
which disables and unsubstantiates, though it does not
suppress them. The fulness of present peace occupies the
mind, excluding the power of realising anything which is
not in harmony with it ; and evil is only seen as a distant
shadow, hovering on the outside of things, a feeble and
inert phantom belonging to another world than our own,
which cannot come near enough to hurt, or penetrate
within the sphere of solid things. So, from some inland
scene is heard the distant roar of the sea, or from some
quiet country spot the noise of the neighbouring city ; the
sounds are heard, but they affect the mind altogether
differently than if they were near. They do not over
whelm or distract, but rather mingle with the serenity of
the scene before us.
This implanted rectitude or good habit it was which
made the first sin of man so heinous, and caused that dis
tinction between it and all the other sins which have been
committed in the world. For the first sin was the only sin
which was committed against and in spite of a settled bias
of nature toward good ; all the sins which have been com
mitted since have been committed in accordance with a
natural bias toward evil. There was therefore a perversity
in the first sin altogether peculiar to it, and such as made
it a sin sui generis. S. Augustine is accordingly exact in
1 ' Bonse igitur voluntatis factus piens, quod sine ulla quamdiu vellet
oft homo, paratus ad obediendum difficultate servaret.' — Op. Imp. 1. 5.
Deo, et prseceptum obedienter acci- c. 61.
CHAP. in. The Pelagian Controversy. 89
distinguishing the motive to the first sin as being a depraved
will as contrasted with concupiscence or lust ; by a depraved
will meaning a perverse opposition to the good will estab
lished in the first man, a voluntary abandonment of the
high ground on which he stood by nature, a violation of
his own created inclination to good.1 A kind of horror
attaches to the falls of saints, when those who have main
tained a high and consistent course of holiness commit
some deep sin. Such sins are like unaccountable convul
sions in nature, and our moral instincts immediately draw
a distinction between them and common sins. The pecu
liarity, however, of the sin of Adam, exceeded that of any
sin of fallen man, in that it was the sin of man unfallen.
It may be added, that such an inspired good habit or
disposition of man as first created is part of the tradition of
the golden age. A certain disposition is described in that
legend as being that of the whole human race at the com
mencement of its existence — an original moral formation,
like the creation of the race itself, — -and it is described
as continuing some time ; — a disposition involving general
goodness and uprightness, love, gentleness, serenity, content.
So suitable has it seemed even to the unenlightened human
mind that the morning of a world of moral beings should
arise in light and purity, — that the creation fresh from the
Divine hands should shine with the reflection of the Divine
goodness, and bear the stamp of a proximity to Grod, — that
the will of man as first created should not be neutral or
indeterminate, but disposed to good. Nor have the defini
tions of Catholic theology, however elaborate and subtle in
form, diverged in substance from the ground of general
tradition and natural ideas.
Scripture and common tradition thus assert a paradisal
life as the original state of man. But the Pelagian, in
denying the fall, rejected Paradise ; as he would not admit
1 ' Prsecessit mala voluntas, et vitiatem venenosa persuasione ser-
secuta est mala concupiscentia . . . pentis, ut oriretur cupiditas quse
•Voluntas cupiditatem, non cupiditas sequeretur potius voluntatem quam
voluntatem duxit.' — Op. Imp. 1. 1. resisteret voluntati.' — Ibid. 1. 6.
c. 71. ' Voluntatem ejus prius fuisse c. 14.
90 The Pelagian Controversy. CHAP. m.
original sin, he could fall back on no antecedent state of
innocence. He robbed human nature of the glory, the
freshness, and the beauty of its first creation, reduced the
primitive to the level of all that succeeded it, and fixed the
present facts of the world as the standard of our nature.
He made this existing state of sin and pain coeval with the
commencement of things ; and S. Augustine taunted his
opponents with the ' Pelagian Paradise.' * Human nature
in the midst of trials looks back with consolation to the
paradisal state as a sign that pain is the accident and
happiness the law of our being ; and were the rest of the
Old Testament silent, a future state was still preached to
the Jew in the first chapter of Genesis ; but the Pelagian
cut off both the retrospect and the pledge. The paradisal
age was to him nothing more than the first age of the world,
when science, art, and the refinements of life had not yet
arisen, and man was simpler than he was afterwards, only
because he was more rude. He took the same view of it
that a human philosopher would take who pictures to him
self the primitive state of man simply as a state anterior
to civilisation2, and contrasts it with the law, system, and
social growth of a more advanced age.
And, together with the paradisal life in general, the
created goodness of the first man fell to the ground. The
idea of created virtue jarred with the Pelagian theory of
freewill, according to which virtue was no virtue at all,
unless a man acquired it for himself. An original gift
of righteousness was thus dismissed as a contradiction, and
1 ' Naturara humanam a Deo ceret irrisorem. Veruntamen eorum
bono conditam bonam magno in- qui nos noverunt, nemo miraretur,
obedientise peccato fuisse vitiatam, si adderetur nomen restrum adtitu-
Catholica fides dicit. Sed yos qui hoc lum, et scriberetur. Paradisus Pela-
negatis, quaeso, paulisper Paradisum gianorum.' — Op. Imp. 1. 3. c. 154.
cogitate. Placetne vobis ut ponamus Vide 1. 3. c. 95. 147. ; 1. 6. c. 25.
. . . innumerabiles morbos, orbi- 27. 28.
tates, luctus, etc. Certe si talis 2 ' Homines fuisse primitus nu-
paradisus pingeretur nullus diceret dos,quia ad solertisehumanseoperam
esse paradisum, nee si supra legisset ut se tegerent pertinebat, quae non-
hoc nomen conscriptum : nee diceret dum in illis fuit.' — Contra Jul. Pel.
erasse pectorem, sed plane agnos- 1. 4. n. 81.
CHAP. in. The Pelagian Controversy. 91
Adam at his creation was considered to be in the same
condition as every other man that has been born, and to
have had the same straggle of the flesh and spirit.1
2. The Pelagian doctrine had an important bearing on
the doctrine of the Incarnation, in regard to the manner in
which our Lord was, according to that economy, subject to
temptation and trial, and exposed to the approaches of sin.
Scripture says that our Lord was in all points tempted like
as we are. But the Church has not considered it consistent
with piety to interpret this text to mean that our Lord had
the same direct propension to sin that we have, or that
which is called by divines concupiscence.2 Such direct
appetite for what is sinful is the characteristic of our fallen
and corrupt nature ; and our Lord did not assume a corrupt,
but a sound humanity. Indeed, concupiscence, even prior
to and independent of its gratification, has of itself the
nature of sin3 ; and, therefore, could not belong to a perfect
Being. Our Lord had all the passions and affections that
legitimately belong to man ; which passions and affections,
tending as they do in their own nature to become inordi
nate, constituted of themselves a state of trial ; but the
Church has regarded our Lord's trial in the flesh as con
sisting in preserving ordinate affections from becoming
inordinate, rather than in restraining desire proximate to
sin from gratification. So mysterious a subject precludes
1 ' Quod miserrimum bellum in- est, in paradise futuram esse, si nemo
troducere conaris in illius beatissimse peccasset, talemque in illo fuisse et
pacis et libertatis locum.' — Op. Imp. priusquam peccaret ; addis ejus con-
1. 5. c. 8. ' Nos autem dicimus tarn ditioni et istam miseriam per carnis
beatum fuisse ilium hominem ante spiritusque discordiam.' — C. 16.
peccatum, tamque liberse voluntatis, 2 ' Christus ergo nulla illicita
ut Dei praeceptum magnis viribus concupivit, quia discordiam carnis et
mentis observans, resistentem sibi spiritus, quse in hominis naturam ex
carnem nullo certamine pateretur, prsevaricatione primi hominis vertit,
nee aliquid omnino ex aliqua cupi- prorsus ille non habuit, qui de
ditate sentiret, quod nollet.' — L. 6. Spiritu et Virgine non per concupis-
c. 14. 'Addo ad bonitatem con- centiam carnis est natus.' — Op. Imp.
ditionis Adse quod in eo caro adver- 1. 4. c. 57.
sus spiritum non concupiscebat ante 3 Malum esse quamvis mente non
peccatum : tu autem qui talem dicis consentiente, vel carne tamen talia
carnis concupiscentiam qualis nunc concupiscere. — Op. Imp. 1. 5. c. 59.
92 The Pelagian Controversy. CHAP. nr.
all exactness of definition ; yet the Church expressed a
substantial truth of morals, as well as one of faith and
piety, when she guarded the person of our Lord from the
too near approaches of sin. Desire discloses, on a nearer
examination, different moral complexions, and at a certain
stage is seen to be no longer a neutral thing. Our Lord,
therefore, had not the whole of desire assigned to Him, but
only that earlier stage of it which is consistent with a sound
nature ; and, together with a true trial, a true sinlessness
was provided for.
But S. Augustine had to contest this whole question
with the Pelagian in the instance of our Lord, as he had
contested it before in the instance of Adam. The Pelagian
who attached concupiscence to man in Paradise, saw no
reason against attaching it to the humanity assumed by
our Lord. Intent on effort exclusively as the test of good
ness, he argued that it was this very strength of desire
which constituted the force of trial ; and that, therefore,
the great merit of our Lord's obedience was destroyed by
supposing Him to have been without it.1 Moreover, He
was our Model, as having been subjected to the same trials ;
but if His desires were weaker than ours, His temptation
had been less, and the force of His example was less with
it.2 But, it was replied, that a state of mind which kept
off the approach of sin was a higher one than that which
resisted it near ; that the merit of our Lord's obedience
1 Julian: ' Non qui virtute judicii blasphemous conclusion in the case
delicta vitasset ; sed qui felicitate of our Lord. ' Ecce quod Christo
carnis a nostrissensibus sequestra tse, conaris importare insane
cupiditatem vitiorum sentire nequi- Tanto quippe in eo continentia spiri-
visset.' Augustine objects to this tus major est, quantomajorem carnis
mode of stating the Catholic posi- concupiscentinm coerceret.' — C. 52.
tion. ' Sensissetenim si habuisset ; 2 ' Nunquam commemorationem
non enim sensus ei defuit quo earn fecisset exempli : quern enim ho-
sentiret, sed voluntas adfuit qua minibus ostenderet imitandum, si
non haberet.' — Op. Imp. 1. 4. c. 48. ilium externse carnis natura discre-
And he observes that if, according visset. . . Quanto ei rectius diceret
to Julian's argument, the merit of segritudo peccantium et securitas
virtue lay in conquest, it would coactorum ; " cum valemus omnes
follow that where the virtue was recta consilia prsebemus segrotis ;
greatest, the passions must be tu si sic esses, aliter longe longeque
strongest ; which would lead to a sentires." ' — Op. Imp. 1. 4. c. 86, 87.
CHAP. in. The Pelagian Controversy. 93
was the perfect one of a triumphantly sustained distance
from evil ! ; and that the force of example did not depend
on the identity of trial, but on the goodness of the example
itself, as was evident from the injunction in Scripture to
imitate God.2 It must, indeed, be remarked, on this reply,
that Scripture rests the force of our Lord's example ex
pressly on the ground that His trial was like our own. The
Pelagian, therefore, was right in insisting on this similarity.
But he proceeded to argue from it upon the principles
of ordinary logic, and his conclusion degraded our Lord's
humanity, and endangered that balance of truths on which
the doctrine of the Incarnation rested. The doctrine of
our Lord's Divinity modifies the truths connected with His
humanity in this way, that He who was both God and man
cannot be thought of even as man exactly the same as if
He were not God. And the truth of our Lord's trial and
temptation, among others, is in this sense a modified one.
To carry out, therefore, the conception of a human trial
to the full in the instance of our Lord, without respect to
other truth, was to trench on his Divinity. To the idea of
trial, and of example on the ground of trial, pursued ex
clusively, the next idea is that of peccability, and the next
that of simple manhood. It was consistent with such ten-
1 ' Dicimus eum perfectione car- tur ut iraitemur te ? Nunquid nos
nis, et non per carnis conciipiscen- cle Spiritu Sancto et Virgine Maria
tiam procreata carne. cupiditatem nati sumus? Postremo nunquid
non habuisse vitiorum. . . . Illius tantanobis esse virtus potest quanta,
virtus haec erat earn non liabere ; tibi est, qui ita homo es, ut etiam
nostra virtus est ei non consentire.' Deussis? Ideone non debuitsicnasci
— Op. Imp. 1. 4. c. 48. ' Sic igitur ut hominibus eum nolentibus imitari
Christus abstinuit a peccato, ut ab- talis excusatio daretur ? Sicut nobis
stineret etiam ab omni cupiditate ipse Patrem proposuit imitandum,
peccati : non ut ei existenti resis- qui certe homo fuit Nee
teret, sed ut ilia nunquam prorsus dicunt ei,Tuproptereahoc potesquia
existeret.' — C. 58. Deus es. . . Non itaque ideo debuit
* ' Neque negare debemus ejus natus de Spiritu Sancto et Virgine
excellentiam, neque propter hanc Maria habere concupiscentiam, qua
excellentiam nos excusare, ut non cuperet mala, etsi ei resistendo non
eum pro modo nostro studeamus faceret, ne dicerent ei homines,
imitari.' — Op. Imp. 1. 4. c. 89. Habeto prius cupiditates malas, et
' Quid enim, homo multum lo- eas vince, si potes, ut te imitari nos-
quens et parum sapiens, si dicerent tras vincendo possimus.' — Op. Imp.
homines Christo, Quare nobis jube- 1. 4. c. 87.
94 The Pelagian Controversy. CHAP. in.
dencies in Pelagianism that our Lord did not stand forth
as the one sole example of perfect obedience in that system ;
but only one, though the principal one, of a succession of
perfect men that had appeared in the world — extending
from Abel and Enoch to Simeon and Joseph, the husband
of Mary.1 An extreme idea of freewill and human perfecti
bility was in truth inconsistent with a sound doctrine of
the Incarnation, not admitting of such a singularity in our
Lord's life and character as that doctrine involved.
The Pelagian, indeed, in retaliation for the charge of
degrading our Lord's humanity, charged his opponents with
unsubstantiating it, and threw back upon them the name
of Apollinarists, as, with a difference of temptation, not as
signing to our Lord the same humanity which other men
have, and so denying His true assumption of our nature.
But it was replied that our Lord took on Him the nature,
but not the sin of man. He even charged his opponents
with Manicheanism, as denying that Christ had assumed
our flesh ; but the same answer was made, that the flesh
was assumed, but not the corruption. He discovered,
again, in the Catholic representation of our Lord's trial in
the flesh, a combination of both heresies modified — a semi-
Apollinarism in a soul imperfectly connected with the flesh,
a semi-Manicheanism in a flesh imperfectly connected with
the soul of our Lord. But it was replied, as before, that
the soul of Christ had perfect connection with the flesh,
but not with its corruption.2
1 De Natura et Gratia, n. 42. deri, pro anima vero ipsam fuisse
' Incarnatio Christi justitiae fuit deitatem. Quod posteaquam coepit
forma non prima sed maxima, quia tarn rationis quam evangelii attesta-
et antequam Verbum caro fieret, et tione convelli . . excogitavit aliud
in Prophetis et in multis aliis sane- unde ejus hseresis, quae perdurat
tis fulsere virtutes.'— Op. Imp. 1. 2. hactenus, nasceretur ; et dixit ani-
c- 188. mam quidem humanam in Christo
2 Julian : ' Hie igitur ut adsit fuisse sed sensus in eo corporis non
toto animo lector admoneo : videbit fuisse, atque impassibilem eum pro-
enim Apollinaristarum haeresim, sed nuntiavit universis extitisse pecca-
eam Manichaei per te adjectione re- tis.' — Op, Imp. 1. 4. c. 47.
parari. Apollinaris primo talem ' Certe hanc vim in disputando
mcarnationem, Christi induxisse Apostolus non haberet si secundum
iertur, ut diceret solum corpus de Manichseos et eorum discipulos
numana substantia assumptum vi- Traducianos, carnem Christi a na-
CHAP. in. The Pelagian Controversy. 95
3. Pelagianism was fundamentally opposed to the doc
trine of the atonement ; for no atonement was wanted if
there had been no fall. And this was the chief obstacle
between the Pelagian and a sound doctrine of the Incar
nation. The design of the Incarnation was to remedy the
effects of the fall ; apart from which object, it could only
be held as an isolated fact, and, without place or signifi-
cancy, had no root in the system.
The Pelagian, however, in superseding the atonement
fundamentally, retained some scattered fragments of the
doctrine. The relation of Christ, as Kedeemer, to the
whole race of man, was abandoned in that doctrine of free
will which represented all men as able to fulfil, and some
as having fulfilled, the whole law, without any other aids
than such as were attached to the system of nature. This
position was a contradiction to a universal atonement. But
though the Pelagians did not regard the assisting grace,
which that event procured, as necessary for everybody, or
the pardoning grace as wanted by all, they attached an
advantage and benefit to the one, and maintained a general
need of the other. The grace of which Christ was the
source rendered the fulfilment of the law, though possible
without it, easier, and was a valuable, though not a neces
sary assistance ; while the great mass of mankind stood in
need of the atonement for the pardon of actual, though
not of original sin. But the force of the Christian atone
ment lies in its interest to mankind as one corporate whole,
and that interest being one of absolute need. To deny
the universal necessity of the atonement, therefore, was to
give up the doctrine. As advantageous to any, essential
to some, the grace of Christ was a Pelagian fiction, accom
modated to a theory opposed to it, and maintained as a
turae nostrae communione distin- qui carnem Christi a naturae nostrae
gueret.' — Op. Imp. 1. 6. c. 33. communione distinguunt, sed qui
Augustine, in reply, distinguishes nullam carnem Christum habuisse
between the Apollinarist statement, contendunt. . . . Dimitte illos . . .
Christum non habuisse corporis sensus, quia nobiscum carnem Christi etsi
and his own, that those senses non dissimiliter confiteris. Nee nos enim
contra Spiritum concupisse (1. 4. c. earn a naturae atque substantiae
47.); and as against the Mani- carnis nostrae,sed a vitii communione
cheans, he says, ' Manichaei non sunt, distinguimus.' — Op. Imp. 1. 6. c. 33.
96 The Pelagian Controversy. CHAP. in.
feeble show of orthodoxy. The separation of renovating
from pardoning grace, again, was a blow at the integrity
of Grospel grace. Pardoning grace was necessary for any
one who had sinned, because the sin was a past fact which
could not be undone ; but the renovating or assisting grace
of Christ was not necessary, however advantageous to him,
because the future sin could be avoided by nature alone.
These two graces go together in the Divine scheme, and
belong to the same act of the Divine mercy.
Out of one extreme statement at the commencement,
Pelagianism thus expanded into a large body of thought,
incomplete indeed, but having one general stamp, and
developing more and more, as it came out, the original
difference from Catholic truth ; passing from the human
will to higher mysteries, and upon the basis of exalted
nature threatening the truth of the Incarnation.
The philosophical fault of Pelagianism was, that it went
upon ideas without considering facts — in the case both of
freewill and the Divine justice. The abstract idea of free
will is that of a power to do anything that it is physically
possible for us to do. As man had freewill, then, the Pela
gian argued that he had this power ; and that any man,
therefore, could fulfil the whole law and be perfect. But
what we have to consider in this question, is not what is
the abstract idea of freewill, but what is the freewill which
we really and actually have. This actual freewill, we find,
is not a simple but a complex thing ; exhibiting opposi
tions and inconsistencies ; appearing on the one side to be
a power of doing anything to which there is no physical
hindrance, on the other side to be a restricted faculty. It
is that will which S. Paul describes, when, appealing to
the facts of human nature (the account of which, as referred
to the sin of Adam, is a matter of faith, but which are
themselves matters of experience), he describes a state of
divided consciousness, and a sense of power and weakness.
But the Pelagian did not possess himself properly of the
facts of human nature, and, committing the same fault in
morals that the mediaeval philosophers did in science, he
argued upon an abstract idea, instead of examining what
CHAP. in. The Pelagian Controversy. 97
the faculty, as we experienced it, really is ; and an abso
lute freewill, which was a simple conception of the mind,
displaced the incomprehensible actual will, the enigma of
human nature, the mystery of fact.
The Pelagian's argument respecting the Divine justice
proceeded in the same way upon an idea without consider
ing facts. It was founded indeed upon the true natural
idea of justice in our minds ; and so far no fault is to
be found with it. Nor was this a mere abstract idea.
But he did not take into consideration with it the facts of
the existing constitution of things. We find a severe law
of suffering in operation in this world previous to the
existence of the individual; which law, therefore, can
hardly be said to be, in a comprehensible sense, a just
one. Our moral nature, then, and the existing constitu
tion of things, being at variance on the question of the
Divine justice, we arrive at the conclusion that the Divine
justice is incomprehensible. But the Pelagian attended
simply to the idea of justice in his own mind, and ignored
the facts on the other side. The doctrine of original sin,
then, which is in truth nothing but an account, though a
revealed one, of these facts, was not wanted by him. He
did not attend to the difficulty, and therefore wanted no
solution. This doctrine was therefore, in his eyes, a mere
gratuitous theory, which needlessly and wantonly contra
dicted the truth of the Divine justice.
But the primary fault of Pelagianism was the sin against
piety contained in its fundamental assertion, as explained
at the commencement of this chapter, of an ultimate move
ment of the natural will to good, unassisted by Grod.
However logical a result of the admission of the freedom
of the will, the absolute assertion of this position was
false, because its premiss was an imperfect one ; and it
was contrary to piety, the religious mind feeling an insnr-
mountable check and prohibition against calling any good
movement purely its own, and appropriating it to the
exclusion of Grod. But the Pelagian ventured on this act
of appropriation.
Kaised upon a basis thus philosophically and religiously
gg The Pelagian Controversy. CHAP. m.
at fault, Pelagianism was first an artificial system, and next
of a low moral tendency.
It wanted reality, and was artificial in assigning to man
what was opposed to his consciousness and to what he felt
to be the truth about himself. The absolute power of man
to act without sin and be morally perfect was evidently a
fiction, based on an abstract idea and not on the expe
rienced faculty of freewill. And when he followed with a
list of men who had actually been perfect moral beings,
Abel, Enoch, Melchisedek, and others, he simply trifled ;
and showed how fantastic, absurd, and unsubstantial his
position was. Human nature is too seriously alive to the
law of sin under which it at present acts, not to feel the
mockery of such assertions.
The system, again, had a low moral tendency. First,
it dulled the sense of sin. Prior to and independent of
action there exists a state of desire which the refined con
science mourns over ; but which is part of the existing
nature as distinguished from being the choice of the man.
Hence the true sense in which the saints have ever grieved,
not only over their acts, but over their nature : for, how
ever incomprehensible, they have felt something to be
sinful within them which was yet coeval with them. But
the Pelagian, not admitting any sin but that of direct
choice, would not see in concupiscence anything but a
legitimate desire, which might be abused, but was in itself
innocent. In disallowing the mystery of evil he thus im
paired his perception of it ; he only saw nature in that to
which the acute conscience attached sin1 ; and gave him-
1 ' Naturalem esse omnium sen- ing and conscience. ' Quod vero
suum voluptatem, testimonio univer- posuisti, legem quidem peccati esse
sitatis docemus . . . Concupiscentia in membris nostris, sed tune habere
cum intra limitem concessorum te- peccat urn quando consentimus ; tune
netur affectio naturalis et innocuus vero solum prcelium suscitare quan-
est.' — Op. Imp. 1. 1. c. 71. do non consentimus, et indicere
The particular difficulty attach- miseriam pace turbata ; quis non
ing to concupiscence as sin, and yet prudens pugnare perspiciat ? Nam
unavoidable, Julian exposes with si lex peccati, id est, peccatum, et
logical acuteness, which does not, necessitas peccati membris est in-
however, still answer the real argu- serta natural] ter, quid prodest non
ment upon which this sort of sin ei prsebere consensum, cum propter
rests, which is that of inward feel- hoc ipsum quod est, necesse sit
CTTAP. in. The Pelagian Controversy. 99
self credit for a sound and practical standard of morals,
as opposed to a morbid and too sensitive one. The doc
trine of perfectibility encouraged the same tendency in
the system, demanding a lower moral standard for its
verification.
And the same narrowness of moral basis which dulled
the sense of sin, depressed the standard of virtue. The
Pelagian denied virtue as an inspiration and gift of God,
confining his idea of it entirely to human effort and direct-
choice. But the former conception of the source of virtue
was necessary to a high standard of virtue itself. If we
are to rely on what general feeling and practical experi
ence say on this subject, virtue needs for its own support
the religious rationale, i.e. the idea of itself as something
imparted. There must be that image and representation
of it in men's minds, which present it less as a human
work than as an impulse from above, possessing itself of
the man he knows not how ; a holy passion, and a spark
kindled from the heavenly fire. It is this conception of
it as an inspiration that has excited the sacred ambition
of the human mind, which longs for union with Grod, or a
participation of the Divine life, and sees in this inspiration
this union. Virtue has thus risen from a social and civil
to a sublime and intrinsic standard, and presented itself as
that which raised man above the world, and not simply
moulded and trained him for it. This conception has
accordingly approved itself to the great poets of the world,
who have in their ideal of man greatly leaned to the in
spired kind of virtue. So congenial to the better instincts
even of the unenlightened human mind is the Christian
doctrine of grace, while, disconnected with this ennobling
conception, morality has sunk down to a political and
secular level. Nor is there any justice surer than that by
which the self-sufficient will is punished by the exposure
of its own feebleness, and rejected grace avenged in a
barren and impoverished form of virtue. Those schools
subire supplicium ? Aut si est lex (si dici permittat absurditas) cogit
quidem peccati, sed quando ei non ipsum non peccare peccatum.' — Op.
consentio non pecco, inestimabilis Imp. 1. 1. c. 71.
potentia voluntatis human se, quse
H 2
ioo Different Interpretations CHAP. iv.
that have seen in the doctrine of grace only an unsound
enthusiasm, and have aimed at fortifying the ground of
morals by releasing it from this connection, have not im
proved their moral standard, but greatly lowered and
relaxed it. With a dulled sense of sin, a depressed stan
dard of virtue, Pelagianism thus tended to the moral tone
of Socinianism, and the religion which denies the Incar
nation. The asceticism of its first promulgators and
disciples could not neutralize the tendencies of a system
opposed to mystery and to grace, and therefore hostile
at once to the doctrinal and the moral standard of Chris
tianity.
The triumphant overthrow of such a school was the
service which S. Augustine performed to the Church, and
for which, under God, we still owe him gratitude. With
all the excess to which he pushed the truth which he de
fended, he defended a vital truth, without which Chris
tianity must have sunk to an inferior religion, against a
strong and formidable attack. He sustained that idea of
virtue as an inspiration to which the lofty thought of even
heathen times ever clung, which the Gospel formally
expressed in the doctrine of grace, and which is necessary
to uphold the attributes of God and the moral standard
of man.
CHAPTEE IV.
DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF ORIGINAL SIN.
THE doctrine of the fall of man has been always held as a
fundamental doctrine in the Church; and all Catholic
writers have witnessed to the truth, that the first man
came from the hands of God an upright creature, that he
fell from that uprightness by voluntary transgression, and
that he involved in his fall the whole of his posterity.
But the different ways in which this doctrine has been held
CHAP. iv. of Original Sin. 101
involve a discussion of some length and difficulty, to which
I shall devote this chapter.
The language in which the primitive Church expresses
this doctrine distinctly asserts two things. The early
fathers, in the first place, clearly held that the sin of
Adam did not stop with itself; they speak of the race and
not of the individual only, with reference to it ; and the
universal terms of 'man,' 'mankind,' 'the soul,' leave no
doubt as to their belief that human nature was in some
way or other affected by that sin.1 Secondly, when we
examine what this universal consequence was, we find
that it is called apostacy, captivity, corruption, and death.3
These are metaphorical expressions, indeed, and convey
no precise and accurate meaning, but they plainly signify
something more than a privation of higher good, and
something more than a mere tendency to positive evil.
This tendency existed before the fall, and no mere increase
of it could have brought it up to the natural meaning of
these terms ; which must therefore be taken to signify
positive moral evil, and to indicate, as the doctrine of the
early fathers, the positive sinfulness of the whole human
race in consequence of the sin of Adam, that is to say, the
doctrine of original sin.
But as Scripture reveals this consequence of the sin of
Adam, so natural reason certifies, on the other hand, that
nobody can sin but by his own personal act, and that one
1 Justin Martyr : Tb yevos rStv irettra TOV Kara fyvaiv. — Horn. Deus
avOpdwdsv 6 anb TOV 'ASayu. virb Odva- non Auctor Mali, s. 6.
TOV *tal ir\avt}v TT\V TOV o<f>ios eireir- Of the same generic sort are the
Tiijcet. — Dial, cum Tryph. c. 88. expressions, TJ irpwTi) yfvfffis (Justin.
Irenseus: Hominem (the race) ab- Apol. 1. 61.), fi ira\aia y4i/e<ris (Ta-
sorberi magno ceto. — Adv. Hoer. 3. tian, contra Grsec. c. 11.).
22. 2 Dominabatur nobis apostasia. —
Tatian : irTfpwffis jap rr)s tyvxns Irenseus, Adv. Hoer. 5. 1 ,
rb TTt/eOjua rb re\f lov, Zirep airopptyaffa Quos in eadem captivitate (Adam)
8«et TTfV apapTiav eVrrj &o-irep vfoffffbs, generavit. — 3. 34.
Kal xajuaiirer^s e^eVcro. — Ad Grsec. Per priorem generationem mortem
c. 20. hsereditavimus. — 5. 1.
Athanasius : 'H I^UY^ airoffTao-a Vitium originis. Naturae cor-
TTJJ irpbs TO Ka\k 6ewpias. — Contra ruptio. — Tertullian, De Anima, c. 41.
Gentes, 4. Nativitatis sordes. — Origen, Horn.
Basil: 'E*caKe607j f) 4/ux^ ira.pa.Tpa.- 14. in Luc.
IO2 Different Interpretations CHAP. iv.
man's guilt cannot be transferred to another. This truth
of natural reason mingled intimately in the statements of
the early fathers with the truth of revelation ; so inti
mately indeed, that often no definite meaning can be ex
tracted from them. Two opposite truths are expressed
together, and side by side.1 The consequence is, that
persons accustomed to the later theological statements of
this doctrine have been often dissatisfied, when they have
gone to examine the earlier one, and have set down the
writers as not full believers in it. But the truth is, such
mixed and double statements more faithfully express the
truth than single-sided ones drawn out in either direction
would, because they express the whole truth, and not a
part of it. What appears to be ambiguity is comprehen
siveness, and is a merit and perfection, and not a defect.
Nor, on the same grounds on which the early fathers are
charged with a disbelief in this doctrine, could Scripture
itself be acquitted.
But it was not in accordance with the nature of the
human mind to allow these great, truths respecting the
moral condition of man to go on thus mixed and united.
Theology began soon to draw out each separately ; and this
mixture parted into two great doctrinal views or schemes,
of which the earlier took the side of the natural truth,
the later of the revealed, The earlier fathers, without
negativing their witness to the true doctrine of original
sin as expressed in Scripture, and handed down in the
Church, wrote as theologians with a strong bias in favour
of the natural truth; and gave it, in their scheme of
philosophy and doctrine, a disproportionate expansion.
Instead of leaving the truth of revelation in its original
mystery and contradiction to human reason, as individual
thinkers they modified and limited it, so as to be consistent
with reason ; while a later school went to the other ex
treme, and developed the revealed truth at the expense of
the natural.
But an account of the doctrine of the fall will require
1 NOTE XV.
CHAP. iv. of Original Sin. 103
as an introduction some account of the state from which
this was a fall, i.e. of man's original righteousness.
The original righteousness of man, then, is universally
described in ancient writers as partly natural, partly super
natural. It was natural in this respect, that it proceeded
from the exercise of a natural freewill and power of choice.
It was supernatural in this respect, that certain supernatural
gifts, in addition to freewill, were required for it. These
gifts could not produce righteousness unless his natural will
first consented to use them ; nor could his will, however
sound, without the inspiring assistance of these gifts ; and
grace was necessary for the righteousness of man upright
as well as of man fallen.
Such a doctrine, however, requires some explanation
with respect to two points. P"irst, how could it be main
tained with a consistent meaning that supernatural assist
ance was necessary towards fulfilling the Divine precepts,
if man had naturally freewill ? For we mean by freewill,
it may be said, the power, supposing the opportunity, of
doing or abstaining from any actions whatever ; and there
fore, whatever impulse and facility might be given to right
action by supernatural assistance, the poiver to act would
not depend upon it. But to this objection it may be replied
that, however we may define freewill in words as such a
power, we do not mean that it is such a power abstracted
from all stimulus or motive supplied to our nature from
other quarters. Thus, in the sphere of common life, a man
with freewill has the power to do his duty to his parents,
relations, and friends ; but he has not this power indepen
dently of certain affections implanted in his nature over
and above his will. Such questions as these cannot be
treated satisfactorily, on account of the great defects and
obscurity both in our conceptions of our own nature and
the language in which we express them. But, upon the most
correct idea we can form of what the will is, and what the
affections are, it would seem that neither of them could,
without the other, enable us to fulfil our duties in common
life. The benevolent affections incline us indeed to bene
volent acts ; but, unless supported by the will, they yield
] O4 Different Interpretations CHAP. iv.
to selfish considerations, and produce no fruits. The will,
in like manner, does not enable us to perform laborious
services in our neighbour's behalf without the stimulus of
the affections. Nor, did it even enable us to perform the
external acts, could it therefore enable us to perform our
whole duty ; such duty involving something of love and
affection in the very performance of it.
There is, then, something defective in the will as a
source of action ; and this defect existed in the will of the
first man, however sound and perfect that will might be ;
because it is a defect inherent in the will itself, and not
attaching to it as a weak and corrupted will only. As
therefore, for fulfilling the relations of common life we re
quire the help of certain natural gifts, such as the natural
affections plainly are, being received from Grod at our crea
tion ; in the same way the first man, to enable him to per
form the spiritual relations assigned to him, required the
aid of certain gifts supernatural, or such gifts as come
under the head of grace.
But, in the second place, granting that these gifts were
necessary for the first man, it may still be asked, why call
them supernatural ? They were not supernatural as being
Divine gifts ; for in that case our natural affections would
be supernatural gifts. Nor were they supernatural as being
additions to his created state ; though, had they been, they
would not have been supernatural, because they were thus
additional. Is not this, then, it may be asked, an arbi
trary distinction ? How can the nature of a man be defined
but as that assemblage of faculties and affections, higher or
lower, with which God endows him ? and how can we there
fore, out of this whole assemblage, single out some as natu
ral, others as supernatural ?
In answer to this objection, it may be enough to say,
that when the fathers speak of these gifts as supernatural,
they do not seem to mean that they were above human
nature itself, that nature being whatever it might please
(rod by His various gifts to make it, but above human
nature as adapted to that order of things in which it is at
present placed — this visible order of things or the world.
CHAP. iv. of Original Sin. 1 05
A world is below or on a level with any pet of affections,
according as it manifests or does not manifest the final
objects of them. The world in which we are manifests or
presents to our sight the final object of the social affections,
viz. man ; this world, therefore, is not below, but on a level
with the social affections. But the final object of the spiri
tual affections is not man, but (rod ; and this world, though
it proves to the understanding the existence of, does not
manifest or present to our sight, (rod. This world is, there
fore, below the spiritual affections ; i.e. the spiritual affec
tions are above this world. The heavenly world cannot be
carried on without these ; for in heaven is what divines call
the Visio Dei, the sight of God ; and therefore the supreme
visible Inhabitant of that world, and omnipresent as He is
supreme, would want attention and regard without 4hem.
But, though absolutely needing the social affections for its
maintenance, this world can be carried on and its affairs
conducted without the aid of the spiritual ; which, as being
more than necessary for its maintenance, are therefore above
it ; that is to say, are above nature, or supernatural.1
Such being the composition of man's original righteous
ness, the earlier fathers held that the fall deprived him of
these supernatural gifts, but left him a fundamentally sound
nature, while Augustine maintained, together with the loss
of these supernatural gifts, an entire corruption of his nature
as the consequence of the fall.
To account for the rise of a particular school of thought
is a superfluous task, when all that we are concerned with
is the school itself; and a task often more perplexing than
1 Man may be considered in a spiritual and celestial life ; and of
double order or relation. 1. In this life the Spirit of God is the
relation to the natural, animal, or principle ; for man's natural powers
earthly life. And so he is a perfect and faculties, even as they were
man that hath only a reasonable before the fall, entire, were not suf-
soul and a body adapted thereunto ; ficient of themselves to reach such a
for the powers and faculties of these supernatural end, but needed the
are sufficient to the exercise of the power of the Divine Spirit to
functions and operations belonging strengthen, elevate, and raise them
to such a life. But, 2. Man may be thereunto. — Bull, ' On the State of
considered in order to a super- Man before the Fall/ vol. ii. p. 87,
natural end, and as designed to a
io6 Different Interpretations CHAP. iv.
useful. Some reasons, however, are perhaps discernible in
hhe circumstances of the early Church for the supremacy
of a milder interpretation of the doctrine of original sin.
The writers of that age were, in the first place, more imbued
with gentile thought than those of a later era ; and the
Church, on its first entrance into the world, was both more
dependent on and less suspicious of the world's philosophers.
It was more dependent on them, because it was as yet with
out an established literature of its own ; it was less suspi
cious of them, because it did not stand in so strong an
antagonistic relation to the world without, as it subse
quently did when that world had been longer tried, and
had shown — that portion of it which remained without —
greater obstinacy in rejecting the Gospel. Earlier Chris
tianity regarded the gentile world more as a field of pro
mise ; and saw in it the future harvest rather than the
present foe. Nor is it to be forgotten, that the principal
writers of that age themselves, Justin Martyr, Clement of
Alexandria, and others, came from the ranks of gentile
philosophy, and retained in their conversion the intellectual
tastes of their former life. The early Church thus adopted
a friendly tone toward gentile philosophy, and acknowledged
sympathies with it. But such sympathies could not but
raise the estimate of the natural state of man; for they were
themselves a tribute of respect to the fruits of human
thought and feeling in that state.
Another reason for the milder interpretation of original
sin in the early Church was the great prominence then
given to the doctrine of the Logos, i.e. to the contempla
tion of our Lord as the wisdom or reason of the Father, and
as such the source of wisdom and enlightenment to the
human mind ; — the aspect in which he is set forth in the
opening of St. John's gospel. The early fathers, partly
from a peculiar sympathy with it as philosophers, — partly
from an acquaintance with the Platonic doctrine of a Logos,
which bore some resemblance to and appeared to be a hea
then anticipation of the true one, — and partly to fortify a
controversial position against the Gnostics, whose boast of
a peculiar inward illumination imparted by their philosophy
CHAP. iv. of Original Sin. 107
was thus met on its own ground, gave a conspicuous place
to this character of our Lord. The result was, without any
intention on their part, some loss of pre-eminence to our
Lord's office of Victim and Expiator. The doctrine of the
Logos divided a theological attention, which was afterward
given more wholly to the doctrine of the atonement. And
this position of the atonement would naturally affect the
position of the doctrine of original sin.
But, whatever were the reasons, an earlier school repre
sented man's nature as continuing fundamentally sound
after the fall, and laid down, as the consequence of that
event, a state of defect and loss of perfection as distin
guished from a state of positive corruption. Man was
deprived of impulses which elevated his moral nature; but
still that moral nature remained entire and able to produce
fruits pleasing in their measure to God. And though it
was admitted that all mankind were, as a matter of fact,
positive sinners, such positive sin was not regarded as the
necessary consequence of original, but referred to the free
will of each individual, who could have avoided it, had he
chosen -,1 all that original sin had entailed as of necessity
and beyond the power of man to avoid, being a state of
defect.2
Such an estimate of the effects of the fall, as it was
partly produced by, in its turn produced, a more favourable
view of the moral condition of that large proportion of
1 Tb avdaiperov rf/s avQpcaTrivrjs arbitrio factus et suse potestatis,
tyvxris— rb avre£ov<ri6v — rb avdai- ipse sibi causa est, ut aliquando
perov aSouXwroj/ irpbs ^^oyyv fiiov quidem frumentum, aliquando autem
— a'lpfffis MCTajBoA.?}? curia — irpoat- palea fiat. — Irenseus, 1. 4. c. 9. Id
peats tXevOepa — rb c<p' vjfuv — a</>' quod erat semper liberum in homine
tavrov e\6/*fvos rb ayaOov — euro- et suse potestatis. — C. 29. I give
Kparr)s. — These expressions occur- below Tertullian's elaborate state-
ring in the early fathers (Justin ment of man's freewill. No dis-
Martyr, Irenaeus, 'Clement of Alex- tinction, as regards the will, appears
andria, Athenagoras, Tatian, Cyril) to have been made between man
are applied to man fallen as well as fallen and unfallen, but man as such
unfallen. ' All the Greek fathers,' is spoken of as having it.
says Hagenbach, ' maintain the 2 Bull, ' On the State of Man
avretyvffiov of the human soul.' before the Fall,' describes the loss
The early westerns are no less ex- of the supernatural gifts as the
plicit : Homo vero rationabilis et consequence which the early fathers
secundum hoc similis Deo, liber in annexed to the fall.
io8 Different Interpretations CHAP. iv.
mankind which had been in no way relieved from them,—
the heathen world. It may be considered doubtful to what
precise extent S. Clement of Alexandria, the earlier schools'
great exponent on this question, represents the sentiments
of the actual early Church at large upon it. He acknow
ledges in his writings the existence, and answers the objec
tions, of a part of the Church that did not agree with him.1
But it is difficult to j tidge of the size or importance of this
part ; and a great writer is in later ages legitimately sup
posed, in the absence of express evidence to the contrary,
and if tradition has attached authority to his name, to
represent the mind of his age.
Clement of Alexandria, then, on this subject, takes what
may be called the natural view of the facts which meet his
eye. He acknowledges the noble affections, the moral
virtues, even the religious acts, of the heathen as real and
genuine, only as not reaching so high a standard as those
of the Christian. The authority of Scripture is claimed,
and the Apostle is cited as saying that ' the uncircurncision
kept the righteousness of the law.' 2 There was a first puri
fication of the soul, which resulted in abstaining from evil ;
a second, which advanced to positive goodness.3 Attention
is drawn to the moral lessons of heathen poets, to the
labours of lawgivers,4 to the ascetic fruits of the Buddhist
and Brahman religions,5 to the worship which Athens igno-
rantly paid to the true God.
But the philosophy of the heathen, as the highest effort
of their moral as well as intellectual faculties, their dis
cipline of life and school of perfection as well as guide to
^ Oi TroAAoi Se, Ka.Qa.Trep ol TratSes TOVTOW TO yevos, ol fjikv ~2,apfj.dvai.
ra noppoXfaia OVTWS oeoiaffi T^V avTwi/, ol 8e Bpax/J-dvai KaKov^voi •
'EAArj/cV ^i\o(TO(piav, (f>o§ov/j.evoi ^ teal T&V 'Zap/j.avwv ol 'A\\6§ioi irpoffa-
airaydyr) aurovs. — Potter's ed. v. ii. •yopeuo'/iej/oi, oure ir6\eis OIKOVCTIV,
p. 780. No! fafflv yeypd^eai, irdvres otfre (Treyas ^Xovff^, HevSpuv 5e
oi Trpb TTJS Trapovffias TOV Kvpiov, a.^i4vvvvra.i <p\oiois, KCU a.Kp68pva
KAeTrrai etVt Kal \7jo-Tat. — Vol. i. p. crtTovvrai, Kal vSoopTOis -^^VKivov-
oiv, ov yd/j.ov, ov irai8otro(a.v tcraffiv,
Strom. 1. 1. c. 19. &o"irfp ol vvi/'EyKparyTdi Ka\ov/Afvoi.
Ibid. 1. 6. c. 7. Elffl Se T£>V 'IvSuv ol rots E6vrra
Ibid. 1. 1. c. 14, 15. Trei06fj.ei/oi irapayyc\iji.ao-ivbv St' virep-
'Ivouv re of IVroo-ocJuo-Tai, ^A\oi 6o\^v o-e^TTjros els ®eov
re <S>i\o<r6$oi Qdpfapoi. Airrbv 8e Kacrt.— Strom. 1. 1. c. 15.
CHAP. IV.
of Original Sin.
109
truth, was the great fact which influenced Clement on this
question, and whicli elicited his greatest admissions, both
as to the reality and the source of heathen goodness.
Heathen philosophy, then, was, in his view, a reaching
forward to Divine truth and a reflection of it. It only
taught, indeed, comprehensible and not mysterious truth ;
but the one prepared the way for the other. Heathen
philosophy was the forerunner of the Grospel,1 and, as being
so excellent a thing, it could have no other source than a
Divine one. Philosophy was the great gift of God to the
gentile world ; and the less perfect law and the more perfect
law came both from the same Fountain Head.2 And though
some called its truths stolen ones, or attributed them to
the devil, or to nature as their teacher ; still philosophy, if
it had stolen its truths, had them ; the devil, if he taught
1 'Ope'-yerai T
ouSeVco 8e rvyxdvfi. — Strom. 1. 6. C.
7. The true Gnostic or Christian
alone attained this knowledge: 'O
Se (Kftvos, TCI So/coGt/ra
eli/ai TO?S $AArus, avrbs
KaTaAa/j.€dv(i ' Tncrreuo'as STI ouSer/
aKaTaATjTTTpr/ T<£ vtV ToG 0eoG. — L. 6.
c. 8. But the heathen philosophy
supplied the elements of the Divine :
Aib Kal (rroix€tc«>TaT'*/ T^s effriv T\
i\o<ro<>ia TT)S reAe/as
TTfpl TO VOTJTO, KO.I 6Ti TOUTO)!/ TO
Trvtvp.ariK(aTfpa avaff'rpftyofj.tvTis. — c.
8. npo/caTarTKeua£et rV 68bv rfj
PaffiXiKurdrr) 8i$a<TKa\ta. — L. 1. c.
16* 'AA\a ffv\Xa/j,€dverai ye T(JU
\oyiit£>s eTrixetpeTv ffftrovSaK^r. avQa-
iTT6ff0ot yvdffews. — c. 20. Kairoi eV
iro\Ao?s TO ^oi/cdra eTrt^f ^pet Kal iriQa-
i/ctJerai QiXoffotyla ' aAXd ray atpe-
<rejs ^Trt^air^et. — c. 19. Kal /car'
$lJL<l>a<Tiv Se Kal Sidtyaffiv ol aKpi€cas
irapa "E\Arj<rt <f>jAo(ro<p7j(ra>'Tes Sto-
pSxri rbv. ®e6v. — c. 19. IlaGAos eV
TOIS e7rt(TToAo?? ov <pL\o(ro<t>iav Sta-
ov It6ff/j.ov
Ttva ofiffav, Kal irpoffiraififiav rr/s
oATjflefas. — Strom. 1. 6. c. 8,
—Strom. 1. 1. c. 2. 'Aywybv Se rb
epaarbi' irpbs T^V eauroG Sewpiav, irav-
Tbs rov o\ov eavrdv ry TT)? yv<i><r«as
aydirri eVtfie&ATjKoros rrj dfcapia. Aib
Kal TOS fVToXas as eSco/fev, ray TC
irpoTfpas rds re Seure'pas e'/c fj.ias
apvT'r6^vos irriyiris 6 Kvpios, K. T. A.
— L. 7. c. 2.
"EffTi yap rcf ovri ^)iAo<ro</)ia /j.eyi-
ffrov Krri/j.a, Kal rip-Ltararov ©ecU. —
Justin Martyr, Dial. c. 2. Though
in the Cohortatio ad Gr&cos, he dis
parages Pagan philosophy, while he
acknowledges its possession of some
truths, such as the unity of the
Deity as taught by Plato ; which, as
well as his doctrine of ideas, how
ever, he considers him to have got
from the Scriptures which he saw in
Egypt ; the latter from the mention
of the pattern shown to Moses on the
mount. — Ad Grsec. c. 21. et seq.
Ea quidem quse ad sapientes se-
culi deveritatis scientia pervenerunt,
Deorevelantepervenerunt; seddum
aut vanse gloriae student, aut adu-
lantur erroribus vetustis, aut metu
principum refrenantur, damnationis
suse ipsi judices fiunt. — Origen, in
Kom. i. 18., vol. 4. p. 471.
1 10 Different Interpretations CHAP. iv.
them, had taught the truth ; and there was but one Author
of nature, i.e. God.1
But gentile philosophy is not only referred to Divine
inspiration generally as its source, but especially to our
Lord as the Logos ; being a fragment of that truth which
afterwards issued from the Incarnate Word as an harmo
nious whole.2 The estimate of the heathen world thus
gained another important step ; and natural goodness, once
admitted to belong to it, did not rest simply such, but rose
above nature and claimed affinity with grace. The dispen
sation of Paganism, so far as it contained truth, was but a
lower part of one large dispensation, which our Lord, as
the Divine Reason, had instituted and carried on for the
enlightenment of the human race, and of which the Gros-
pel was the consummation ; heathens and Christians were,
though in a different measure, still alike partakers of that
one ' Light that lighteth every man that cometh into the
world ; ' and all mankind, as brought into union and fellow
ship by that common participation, formed one religious
society and communion — one Church.3
1 Ou roivvv ^euSrys r] (/>iAorro</Ha, KOI ol fj.fv o>? (pi\oi, ol Se &s o'lKerai
aav 6 KAeVrrjs, Kal 6 tyevffrT)* Kara Tricrroi • ol Se o>s a7rA.a)s oiKtrai ' 6
jueTaa'XTjjUaTia'iU&j' eVepyeuis TO d\7j- SiSaa/caAos ovros 6 TraiSetWi' /j.varT]-
07? Ae'yr?. — Strom. 1. 6. C. 8. 'O KAfTr- plots /J.fV rbv yviaffriKOV, f \irio~t Se
TTjy o?rep vq>£X6fj.tvo<i exei a\7)6cas exet> ayada'is rbv iricrrbv, Kal TratSem rfj
KO.V -%9vff'iov ri,Kai> apyvpos, K$,V \6yos, eiravopQwTiKfj Si' at(T07jTi/C7js eVc/j-
K&V S6jfji.a. — Strom. 1. I.e. 20. fit yeias rbi/ aK\i\poKap§iov. . . . ovr6s
Se (6 SidSo^os), ws ^^eAns (^COT^S eVrtj/ 6 SiSous Kal TO?S "EAArjtn rfyv
Trpo<pr]revet, aA7]0r) apa 'pe?. — L. 6. tyiXoaofyiav, Sia rtav virfp8ee(TT€pcav
c. 8. E?T' av fyvviK^v tvvoiav eVx^J- ayyeXav. . . . "Uroiyap ov (ppovTifa
Kfvai TOUS "EAArj//as Ae*yot, rbi/ rr/s -rravrcov av9pa>Tr<av 6 Kvptos ' Kal TOVTO,
(pvffecas S-n/u-Lovpybv ej/a yivuffKopev. fy rep p.}] SvvaaQai iraQoi av • ttirep ov
— L. 1. c. 19. 6efj.ir6v • avOeveias yap <r7j/ueTo»' • ^
2 OuTw? ovv 7} re j8ap§apos, ^ re rf ^ /3ouAea-0at twdfievos, OVK aya-
'EAATji/i/c^j ^tAoo-ocpia rrjv a'iSiav aArj- 6bv Se rb TrdOos. TI K^Serat TU>V
Qfiav ffirapaypov rtva, ov rrjs Aiovu- (Jv/j.Trdvr<av • '6irep Kal KaO^Kfi r<$
ffov fj.v6o\oyias, TT)$ 5e rov Adyov Kvpicp Travrav y evolve? • ffwrrip ydp
rov ovros ael ©eoAoyias TreTroirjrai' 6 Se eV-ni/ • ov^l TWV /j.cv, riav 5' o(/. —
Ta§ir)priij.€vao-vv6fls av6i.s,Kal€voTroL-f)- Strom. 1, 7. c. 2.
jas, Te'Aejoi/ rbv i\6yov aKivSvvws ev 'Hs ovv (rvyKivftrai Kal jLUKpOT^TTf
to-0' '6n Karotyerai, ryv aX^fiav. — ffiSijpow juolpa r$ TTJS 'UpaK\etas \i0ov
Strom. 1, 1. c. 13. Tn/eu^ari, 810 TTO\\UV ra>v ffiSr}pwv
^ 3 noi/res auroO of aj/0pa>7rot • aA\' e/cretj/o^eVT? SaKrvXiwv, ovrca Kal rep
01 /lev war' MyvoHnv, ol Se ouSeVw • ayiv Ttvevpari Ix^evoi, ol per tvd-
CHAP. iv. of Original Sin. 1 1 1
The interpretation of original sin, again, as a privation
of higher good rather than a positive state of sin, affected
the punishment which was assigned to it. The penalty of
the fall was exclusion from Paradise, and with it exclusion
from that state of blessedness for which the life in Paradise
was a preparation.1 Had man kept the commandment
given to him, he would have been allowed to continue in
a state of earthly felicity till his obedience had been tried ;
he would then have migrated by no process repugnant to
nature, but by an easy and painless one, provided by God
for this purpose, from an earthly to a heavenly Paradise.
His disobedience excluded him from both these states. But
both the earthly Paradise and the heavenly one were states
of higher good ; one of lower good was still left open to
him, as the reward of such virtue as he was still capable
of reaching.
The distinction between the natural and supernatural
life, it is to be remembered, is a distinction between the
two states themselves, and not between the dates of them,
whether now or in futurity. It is one drawn from their
respective inherent characteristics, which are not affected
by the order of time. Christian association indeed iden
tifies the supernatural with future life, the natural with
present ; because the future life at which, as Christians,
we aim is a supernatural one ; but the two ideas are
not identical. The future eternal world of the Pagan, the
Mahometan, and the savage is a natural order of things,
and even an inferior one of that rank. A much higher and
more moral eternity may be conceived, which would still
be, according to the distinction which has been laid down
on this subject2, a natural one. Such an eternity was,
according to early theology, open to man in a state of ori-
pfToi, o'lKfiovvrai -rrj irpdrri ^6vri, sent by God to the Jews having
tyftfs 8' &\\oi fJ.fXPl TV* T€\€vraias. been sent for their sake as well.
— L. 7. c. 2. ' Tatian, Ad Graec. c. 20. i&pi-
Athanasius (De Incarn. c. 12) ap- (r64)(ra.v ol irpcaToir^affral airb TT)S 7775
pears to speak of the heathen as in p*v, aAA.' ot/« e« TOVTTJS, KpEtrroi/os Se
a certain sense under the same dis- TTJS evravQa SiaKcff^irecas. See Bull,
pensation as the Jews ; as having On the State of Man before the Fall,
the power irarpbs \6yov yv&vai from p. 67.
the works of nature ; the prophets 2 P. 105.
112
Different Interpretations CHAP. iv.
ginal sin, though shut out from a supernatural or heavenly
one ; the penalty of which sin was therefore, as regards a
future life, made a privation only, and not a positive pun
ishment. As regards the present life, the exchange of
pain, labour, and sorrow for the happiness of Paradise was
indeed in itself positive punishment. But if transient
pain leads to an eternity of happiness, even of the natural
kind, the existence of the creature is on the whole a good
to him, not an evil. And therefore, however it may have
pleased God to lighten the state of trial in the first
instance, and even to make it painless and happy, a pain
ful trial is, as the means to so valuable an end, not other
wise than a good.
The assignment of such a punishment to original sin
was in substance the doctrine of a middle state ; and early
theology may be considered as having pointed to such a
state as the final condition of the heathen and unbaptized.
In saying this, however, I give what theology before the
time of S. Augustine upon this subject as a whole comes
to, rather than any definite doctrine that was held. If we
examine the particulars of the early Church's view, or what
was said at different successive times on this subject, these
will appear mainly under the three following heads : —
I. The statements of the three first centuries bearing
on the question are principally confined to a general ac
knowledgment of real goodness existing among the heathen;
such an acknowledgment as immediately suggests future
reward as the necessary result, under (rod's moral govern
ment, of such goodness ; but without any reference, express
or implicit, to such a result. These statements, however,
assume occasionally a greater significance in this direction,
and appear to include without expressly mentioning, a
future state of reward. The Logos or Son of God is,
according to Clement, not only the Teacher and Light of
all mankind in different degrees, but the Saviour of all ;
dispensing His bounty, in proportion to their fitness for it ;
to the Greeks and barbarians a lesser, to the faithful and
elect a greater share ; to all, according to the measure
in which He has dispensed His gifts, and the use made
CHA.P. rv. of Original Sin. 113
of them, awarding a higher or a lower rank in the uni
verse.1 And an express allusion to a future life is made
in the application to the heathen of the passage in Hermas
relating to the salvation of just men before the law, be
stowed by means of a baptism after death.2 But while a
proportionate eternal reward, in the case of the heathen,
is pointed to, no positive line is as yet drawn between the
heathen and the Christian states in eternity. One state
with different ranks in it is rather suggested, and all good
men considered Christians in their degree are admitted
to one common, though variously arranged, kingdom of
heaven.3
II. But, secondly, the concession to the heathen of
some state of happiness after death not being abandoned,
we find, in course of time, the opinion established in the
Church, that original sin did exclude from that place of
supernatural happiness which was called the kingdom of
God, or the kingdom of heaven. Origen, while he pointedly
claims for heathen goodness some eternal reward, and so
applies the text ' Glory, honour, and peace to every man
that worketh good, to the Jew first, and also to the Gen
tile,' at the same time excludes the heathen, as being still
under original sin, from the kingdom of heaven.4 The
Pelagians, with a doctrine which did not support, or rather
opposed such a conclusion, deferred to an established dis
tinction, and excluded the unbaptized, whom the Church
at large regarded as under the guilt of original sin, though
they themselves acknowledged no such sin in the first
1 BeA/riora aTroAOjU.jSaj'etj/ eV ry 4 ' Quod (Rom. ii. 10) de Judaeis
irai/rl T^I/ Ta|«/.— Strom. 1. 7. c. 2. et Gentibus dicit, utrisque nondum
2 'fls "AjSeA., a>s Nwe, a>s el TLS credentibus. Potest enim fieri . .
erepos 8i'/coios. — Strom. 1. 2. c. 9. ut Grsecus, i.e. Gentilis justitiam
8 Tbv Xptffrbv. . . . \6yov ovra, ov teneat. . . . Iste licet alienus a vita
irav yevos avdpwirwv /tereVxe • Kal ot videatur aeterna, quia non credit in
fiera \6yov pidxravTfs xpumavol elcri, Christo, et intrare non possit in
Kav adeoi evo(j.i(T6i)(rav • ailov iv "E\- regnum ccelorum, quia renatus non
\i}<Tt n.ev SttKpcd-rjs KOI * Hpa/cAeiTos, est ex aqua et Spiritu,videtur tamen
Kal ol 8fj.oioi avTois • cV |8aj8j8apots Se quod per haec quae dicuntur ab
'Appaan Kal 'Avai/ios, Kal 'A^apias, Apostolo, bonorum operum gloriam,
Kal Murafa, Kal 'ITAfov, KO! &\\oi et honorem, et pacem perdere pe-
iro\\oi. — Justin, Apol. 1. 46., Ben. nitus non possit.' — In Eom. ii. 10.,
ed. vol. iv. p. 484.
CHA.P. IV.
1 1 4 Different Interpretations
instance from which such guilt could arise, from this state
of happiness. The text, ' Except a man be born of water
and of the Spirit, he cannot enter into the Kingdom of
God,' was, indeed, considered to settle this question, and
that in two ways : first, as deciding that no one in a state
of nature could enter into the Kingdom of God ; secondly,
as deciding that the only means by which the penalty of
nature was removed was the rite of baptism. An exception
was made in favour of those who died accidentally, before
partaking of this sacrament, having shown faith and re
pentance ; and especially in favour of martyrs. But no
supposition of a subsequent extraordinary Divine mercy,
and extraordinary means, was allowed in favour of the
rest, who were all, heathen and unbaptized infants alike,
considered as cut off for ever from the remission of original
sin, and so as excluded eternally from the kingdom of
heaven.1
III. A state of happiness after death, which is not the
highest state, is by implication a middle state. But,
thirdly, a definite idea of a middle state subsequently grew
up. Two distinguished fathers of the Eastern Church,
Gregory Nazianzen, and Gregory of Nyssa, leaned to it ; 2
and the Pelagians seem to have held it unchallenged till
Augustine — who himself, in his earlier theological life,
inclined to it — rebuked them. But this state was intro
duced only to meet the case of infants, not of heathens ;
though on the same principle in which the former were
admissible into it, the latter were also ; for those who have
made the most of inferior opportunities are in no worse
case than those who have had none. But the early Church
stopped short of any large application of the doctrine of a
middle state ; checked by the absence of any allusion to it
1 Augustine appeals to this estab- licus. (De Anima, 1. 3. c. ix.) This
lished opinion in the case of infants is opposed to the most fundamental
in his controversy with Vincentius Catholic faith — contra Catholicam
Victor :— ' Never believe, or say, or fundatissimam fidem.'— De Anima,
teach that infants dying before they 1. 2. c. xii. See Wall on ' Infant
are baptized can attain to the re- Baptism,' part 1. c. 15 ; part 2. c. 6.
mission of original sin, if you wish 2 NOTE XVI.
to be a Catholic— si vis esse Catho-
CHAP. iv. of Original Sin. 1 1 5
in Scripture, and reluctant to give substance, shape, and
expansion to an idea in which Christians had no practical
concern, for the aim assigned to them was no middle one,
but the highest.
But while we have before us as the view on the whole
of the early Church before Augustine's time, with respect
to the virtuous heathen and unbaptized infants, partly
implied and partly expressed, a middle state, it is in
different to the question before us whether this state was
a distinct one or only a lower rank of one and the same
heavenly state ; the only point important to observe being,
that the penalty of original sin was a privation, not a
positive evil.
The doctrine of original sin, thus explained and modi
fied, was not inconsistent with natural reason and justice.
It did not contradict the truth of common sense, that one
man is not responsible for another man's acts, because it
did not attach any such judicial consequences to the sin
of Adam, as required such a responsibility to justify them.
The penalty of original sin was a particular state and con
dition of the human race, which would not have been
unjustly ordained, had there been no original sin at all.
The infliction of positive evil and pain as a punishment is
wholly contrary, indeed, to natural justice, except on the
ground of personal guilt ; but every one must admit, that
the Author of nature has a perfect right to allot different
degrees of good to His creatures, according to His sovereign
will and pleasure ; and that He is not bound in justice to
give either the highest moral capacities, or their accom
paniment, the highest capacities for happiness to all,
because He is able to bestow these when it pleases Him.
We see, in the order of nature, and in the constitution of
the world around us, the greatest variety en this head ;
and on the same principle on which God has created dif
ferent kinds of beings He may also create the same kind
with higher or lower faculties. A lower capacity, then,
for virtue and happiness in the human race, was no injus
tice as a consequence of the sin of Adam ; because it was
no injustice had it been no consequence of anything, but
i 2
1 1 6 Different Interpretations CHAP. iv.
been assigned to man originally at his creation, as that
measure of good which it pleased God to appoint for him.
For, though the fall was the occasion and cause of this
measure being assigned, it is not unjust to do that for a
particular reason which you have a right to do without a
reason ; the agreement of the act itself with justice being
supposed, no great importance, at any rate, will attach to
such a further question. Nor is temporary pain, again, an
injustice, if it is designed to lead to ultimate happiness ;
but might have been justly imposed by Grod on mankind
at the creation, and independently of the sin of Adam,
for that end.
From such a limited and modified doctrine of original
sin let us turn to the doctrine of a later school.
The Western Church has, as a whole, entered more
deeply into the mysteries of the inner man than the Eastern
has, into that mixed sense of spiritual weakness and desire,
of a void which no efforts can fill, and of a struggle end
less upon all natural principles. This disposition has
characterised her great schools ; has largely hinged her
great conflicts and divisions ; the portions which the Re
formation separated from the main body have retained it :
the Roman and Protestant churches meet in it ; and the
West has been the providential exponent of the doctrine
of S. Paul. Tertullian first set the example of strength
and copiousness in laying down the nature and effects of
original sin; he was followed by Cyprian and Ambrose.
But language did not as yet advance out of the meta
phorical stage ; and apostacy, captivity, death, in a word,
the corruption of human nature, was all that was yet
asserted. But language could not ultimately rest in a
stage in which, however strong and significant, it did not
state what definite thing had happened to human nature
in consequence of the fall, and just stopped short of ex
pressing what, 'upon a real examination, it meant. If a
man is able to do a right action, and does a wrong one, he
is personally guilty indeed, but it cannot be said that his
nature is corrupt. The passions and affections may be
inconveniently strong, and so the nature be at a disad-
CHAP. iv. of (Original Sin. 1 1 7
vantage ; but no mere strength of the passions and affec
tions shows the nature corrupt so long as the will retains
its power. On the contrary, the nature is proved to be
fundamentally sound, by the very fact of its being equal
to the performance of the right act. The test of a sound
or corrupt nature, then, is an able or an impotent will ; and
if a corruption of nature means anything at all, it means
the loss of freewill. This was the legitimate advance which
was wanted to complete the expression of the doctrine ; and
this complement it was left to S. Augustine to give.
S. Augustine's position respecting freewill had its com
mencement at a date in the history of man earlier than the
corruption of his nature, viz. at his creation. Philosophy
raises an insuperable difficulty to the freedom of any created
will ; for freedom of the will implies an original source of
action in the being who has it, original not relatively only,
in the way in which any cause, however secondary, is
original as compared with its effect, but absolutely ; and
to be an original cause of anything is contrary to the very
essence of a being who is not original. Tertullian had a
distinct philosophical conception of this difficulty, and
met it by the only answer open to a believer in freewill ;
an assertion of the truth together with an acknowledgment
of the difficulty. Originality is the highest form of being ;
and everything which does not move itself, whatever be its
grandeur or sublimity as a spectacle, is intrinsically despic
able, in comparison with that which does. The Divine
Power, then, resolving upon its own highest exertion, chose
originality itself as a subject of creation, and made a being
which, when made, was in its turn truly creative, the
author and cause of its own motions and acts. And
whereas the creature would, as such, have possessed nothing
of his own, God by an incomprehensible act of liberality,
alienated good from Himself in order that the creature
might be the true proprietor of it, and exhibit a goodness
of which His own will was the sole cause.1 And this re-
1 ' Sola nune bonitas deputetur, bonus natura Deus solus. . . .
quae tantum homini largita sit, id Homo autem qui totus ex institu-
est arbitrii libertatem. . . . Nam tione est, habens initium, cum in-
1 1 8 Different Interpretations CHAP. iv.
dounded ultimately to God's glory, for the worthiest and
noblest creature must know Him best. Tertullian, then,
distinctly and philosophically recognised a created will
which was yet an original cause in nature. But 8. Augus
tine, while on the ground of Scripture he assigned freewill
to man before the fall, never recognised philosophically an
original source of good in the creature. As a philosopher
he argued wholly upon the Divine attribute of power, or
the operation of a First Cause, to which he simply referred
and subordinated all motion in the universe ; and laid
down in his dicta on this subject the foundation of scho
lastic necessitarianism.1
Thus philosophically predisposed, the mind of S. Au
gustine took up the doctrine of original sin as handed
down by the voice of the Church and by a succession of
writers, and brought the whole mass of language which
three centuries had produced, and which up to his time
had advanced in copiousness and illustration, rather than
in strength of meaning, to a point. He explained the
corruption of human nature to mean the loss of freewill ;
and this statement was the fundamental barrier which
.divided the later from the earlier scheme and rationale
of original sin. The will, according to the earlier school,
was not substantially affected by the fall. Its circum
stances, its means and appliances, were altered, not itself;
and endowed with spiritual aids in Paradise ; deprived of
them at the fall ; re-endowed with them under the Gospel,
it retained throughout these alterations one and the same
unchanged essential power, in that power of choice whereby
it was, in every successive state of higher or lower means,
able to use and avail itself of whatever. means it had. But
in Augustine's scheme the will itself was disabled at the
fall, and not only certain impulses to it withdrawn, its
itio sortitus est formam qua esset, boni in homine et quodammodo
atque ita non natura in bonum dis- natura, de institutions ascripta--est
positus est, sed institutione ; non illi quasi libripens emancipati a
suum habens bonus esse sed insti- Deo boni, libertas et potestas arbi
tutione. . . . Ut ergo bonum jam trii, quse efficeret bonum ut pro
suum haberet homo, emancipatum prium.' — Adv. Marc. 1. 2. c. 6.
*ibi a Deo, et fieret proprietas jam J See p. 4.
CHAP. rr. of Original Sin. 1 1 9
power of choice was gone, and man was unable not only
to rise above a defective goodness, but to avoid positive
sin. He was thenceforth, prior to the operation of grace,
in a state of necessity on the side of evil, a slave to the
devil and to his own inordinate lusts.
Such a difference in the explanation of original sin
necessarily produced a corresponding difference in. the
estimation of heathen morals. Augustine and Clement
both regard the heathen character as faulty ; but there are
two distinct types of a faulty character. It is a rule in
morals, that the morality of the man must precede the
morality of the action, that some general condition must
be fulfilled in the agent's character before any particular
act can be pronounced good in him ; this morality of the
man, the fulfilment of this general condition, is the founda
tion. One type, then, of a faulty character is that of a
character good at the foundation, and only failing in de
gree ; another is that of a character bad at the foundation.
The fruits of the former are solid, as far as they go ; but
the apparently good fruits of a fundamentally corrupt
character are hollow, and are not real virtues. Such a
character may display, for example, affection to individuals,
generosity upon occasions, or courage, or industry ; but
upon such a foundation these are not virtues. This is the
distinction between the faultiness which Clement and the
faultiness which Augustine attributes to heathen morality.
Clement allows the foundation to exist — this general con
dition to be fulfilled in a degree — in the heathen, because
he considers nature able in a degree to supply it; he
therefore regards heathen morality as real and solid, as
far as it goes, though imperfect. But Augustine does not
admit the power of nature to supply such a foundation in
any degree whatever ; for constituting which he requires
a certain state of mind, which he considers to be only pos
sible under grace, viz. faith, so interpreting the texts,
4 Without faith it is impossible to please Grod,' and ' what
soever is not of faith is sin.' J He therefore regards heathen
1 ' Sed absit ut sit in aliquo vera autem ut sit Justus vere, nisi yivat
rirtus, nisi fuerit Justus. Absit ex fide: " Justus enim ex fide vivit."
I2O
Different Interpretations
CHAP. IV.
morality as bad at the foundation, and therefore as a hollow,
false, and only seeming morality itself. Nor does he admit
the existence of a good heathen, though he admits that
the heathen did actions which in Christians would be good
ones.1 And though he allows that the Divine image in
which man was created did not wholly disappear at the fall,
a remainder (to preserve man's identity in the two states)
of a rational nature is alone admitted. He extends this view
to heathen philosophy. Acknowledging in some systems a
greater likeness to Christian truth than in others, he speaks
of heathen philosophy as a whole with coldness, distrust, and
hostility, warning the Christian against it. He looks on
the truth it promulgates as external to Christian truth and
not mingling with it, and sees a barrier between the two
where the earlier fathers only saw a gradual ascent.2
But, though no goodness in the heathen is admitted,
he allows different degrees in evil, and that some men in
a state of nature have been less sinful than others, such as
Quis porro eorum qui se Christianos
haberi volant, nisi soli Pelagiani,
aut in ipsis etiam forte tu solus,
justum dixerit infidelem, justum
dixerit impium, justum dixerit dia-
bolo mancipatum ? Sit licet ille
Fabricius, sit licet Fabius, sit licet
Scipio, sit licet Kegulus, quorum
me nominibus, tanquam in antiqua
Curia Romana loqueremur, putasti
esse terrendum.'— Contra Julianum,
Pelag. 1. 4. n. 17. ; see, too, Contra
Duas, Ep. 1. 3. n. 14. 23.
' Hi qui naturaliter quse legis
sunt faciunt, nondum sunt habendi
in numero eorum quos Christi jxisti-
ficat gratia ; sed in eorum potius
quorum etiam impiorum nee Deum
verum veraciter justeque colentium,
qufedam tamen facta vel legimus
vel novimus vel audimus, quae se-
cundum justitise regulam non solum
vituperare non possumus, verum
etiam merito recteque laudamus ;
quanquam si discutiantur quo fine
fiant, vix inveniuntur quse justitiae
aebitam laudem defensionemve me-
reantur.' — De Spirit, et Lit. 1. 1. n.48.
2 Eosque (Platonists, Pythago
reans, &c.) nobis propinquiores
fatemxir.— De Civit. Dei, 1. 8. c. 9.
' Gavet (Christianus) eos qui se-
cundum elementa hujus mundi phi-
losophantur, non secundum Deum,
a quo ipse factus est mundus. Ad-
monetur enim prsecepto Apostolico :
" Cavete ne quis vos decipiat," ' &c.
(Col. ii. 8.)— De Civit. Dei, 1. 8. c. 10.
It is worthy of remark, that
while Clement sees in the 'rudi
ments of the world ' which S. Paul
speaks of, the objects of intellectual
apprehension, as distinct from, but
subsidiary to, those of faith (Strom.
1. 6. c. 8.), Augustine sees in them
carnal and corrupt ideas only. The
latter interpretation agrees more
with the text, in which, however,
S. Paul is speaking only of a certain
portion of heathen philosophy, not
the whole of it : but the difference
in the interpretation of the Apostle
shows the different feeling of the
two writers on this subject.
CHAP. iv. of Original Sin. 1 2 1
Socrates and Fabricius ; but it is difficult to say whether
he allows, in this admission, any relaxation in the servitude
of the natural will, any kind or degree of liberty of choice
as still left in it, or whether he only means that the evil
passions are less strong in some natural constitutions than
in others. Indeed, if it be asked to what extent Augus
tine's law of peccatum poena peccati operated, — whether
that relation of necessary effect in which actual sin stood
to original applied to all the actual sin of man in a state
of nature, — whether the want of power to avoid sin involved
in original sin was a want of power to avoid every ex
cess of sin which, as a matter of fact, had been committed
in the world, — and so whether the whole of that mass of
depravity and crime which the history of mankind pre
sented went back, according to his doctrine, to original
sin, as the necessary development of that one seed, — it
must be replied, that his language varies on this subject.
He sometimes represents the whole of this ma?s of actual
sin as the necessary effect of original, and accounts for the
different degrees in it by supposing different degrees of
original sin ; that is to say, by supposing, the impotence of
the will remaining the same in all, different degrees of
strength in the evil passions and inclinations. Sometimes
he only represents a part of it as such, and the rest as
added by the man himself.1 But the language in which
this modification of the effect of original sin is expressed is
obscure and uncertain ; nor is it easy to see whether those
additions are only additions, as effects or additions to a
cause, or whether they are additions man himself has made
in the use of a lower kind of freewill still left in his nature.
Thus much is certain, however, that such a liberty of choice,
if it is allowed by Augustine, is not the liberty to choose
good, but only lesser evil, and therefore is not properly
freewill ; though whether a will which can do the one and
not the other is a tenable conception, is a question into
which we need not enter.
Original sin was thus represented, in its nature and
effects, by Augustine, as positive sin, and not as, according
1 NOTE XVII.
122 Different Interpretations CHAP. iv.
to the earlier interpretation, a loss of higher goodness only;
and this difference was followed by a corresponding differ
ence in the punishment attached to it. S. Augustine held
a state of positive evil and pain, and not a privation of
higher happiness only, as the punishment of original sin.
Inclined, at an earlier stage of his theological life, to the
position of a middle state for unbaptized infants, as a con
venient solution of a difficulty, a stronger subsequent view
of the guilt of original sin rejected it ; and in the contro
versy with the Pelagians he not only attacked that position,
but made an argumentative use of the contrary one as
proved from Scripture. The Pelagians adopted the posi
tion of a middle state as fitting in with their own scheme,
which they had constructed upon a mixed ground of their
own peculiar doctrine, and of deference to the general
belief of the Church. Denying original sin altogether, they
could not admit any positive punishment as due to unbap
tized infants, much less a punishment in hell ; while defer
ence to general belief prevented the assignment of heaven.
A middle place, therefore, between heaven and hell, exactly
served their purpose ; neither punishing the innocent being
nor exalting the unbaptized one. But Augustine attacked
this position energetically as one which in effect abolished
original sin itself; arguing forcibly, that only two places
were mentioned in Scripture, heaven and hell, and that,
therefore, a third place, which was neither the one nor the
other, was an unauthorised invention of man. He then
used the scriptural position of only two places as a positive
argument in support of his doctrine of original sin. For
if there were only two places, and those guilty of original
sin were excluded by the general belief of the Church from
heaven, hell only remained for them ; and a punishment in
hell necessarily implied a positive original guilt to deserve it.1
The position of a middle state then rejected, Augustine
1 Istara nescio quam medietatem renatos ? Dicite ergo hujus infeli-
quam conantur quidam parvulis citatis meritum, verbosi et conten-
non baptizatis tribuere.'— De Pecc. tiosi, qui negatis originale pec-
-M-erit. et Rem. 1. 28. ' An tandem catum.'— Op. Imp. 2. 113. 'Qui
aliquando extra regnum Dei infe- velut defensione justitise Dei niteris,
lices futures fatemini parvulos non ut evertas quod de parvulorum non
CHAP. iv. of Original Sin. 123
assigned a punishment in hell to original sin, and, allowing
differences in degree, still left some degree or other of that
punishment necessary for that sin. The heathen who had
not sinned against the light had a milder punishment in
hell than those who had ; but ignorance was only allowed
to procure a mitigation of it, not a release from it. Those
who knew our Lord's will and did it not, were beaten with
many stripes ; those who knew it not and did it not, with
few stripes.1 With respect to unbaptized infants, his lan
guage varies in strength. The severest consigns them to
the flames of hell ; the most lenient to such a punishment
as left existence under it better than deprivation of being ;
— a limitation which might appear to leave no room for
positive punishment at all, as it might be said that it
would be better not to exist than to exist eternally in any
degree of pain ; but such refinements are hardly worth
pursuing. A middle language consigns them to the mildest
punishment which there is in hell. On the whole, some
true punishment in hell is assigned to unbaptized infants.2
This whole doctrine of original sin, its effects and its
punishment, we must observe, is but the legitimate draw
ing out, in statement and consequence, of the true and
scriptural doctrine of original sin. The corruption of
human nature followed deservedly, according to that
regeneratorum damnatione tota sen- Deum." ' — De Grat. et Lib. Arb. c. iii.
tit ecclesia, nunquam dicturus es ' Sicut enim non impediunt a vita
grave jugum super parvulos unde eterna justum qusedam peccata veni-
sit justum, si non trahant originale alia sinequibus hsec vita non duci-
peccatum.' — 2. 117- See NOTE tur: sic ad salutem aeternam nihil
XVIII. prosunt impio aliqua bona opera,
1 ' Sed et ilia ignorantia quae sine quibus difficillime vita cujus-
non est eorum qui scire nolunt, libet pessimi hominis invenitur.
sed eorum qui tanquam simpliciter Veruntamen sicut in regno Dei velut
nesciunt, neminem sic excusat ut stella ab stella in gloria different
sempiterno igne non ardeat, si sancti ; sic et in damnatione poense
propterea non credidit, quia non sempiternse tolerabilius erit Sodomae
audivit omnino quod crederet ; sed quam alteri civitati : et erunt qui-
fortasse ut mitius ardeat. Non dam duplo amplius quibusdam ge-
enim sine causa dictum est " Effunde hennae filii : ita nee illud in judicio
iram tuam in gentes quse te non Dei vacabit, quod in ipsa impietate
noverunt ; " et illud quod ait Apos- damnabili magis alius alio minusve
tolus, " Cum venerit in flamma ignis peccaverit.' — De Sp. et Lit. 1. I.e. 28.
dare vindictam in eos qui ignorant 2 NOTE XVIII.
T 24 Different Interpretations CHAP. IT.
doctrine, upon the sin of Adam. But the corruption of
human nature can only be adequately defined as the loss
of freewill or necessary sinfulness ; and sin deserves eternal
punishment, and deserving it will, according to the Divine
justice, infallibly obtain it, unless it is forgiven. The con
signment, therefore, of heathens and unbaptized infants to
the punishment of hell, extreme result as it was, was but
the result of the true doctrine ; because, in the absence of
the only authorised sign of Divine forgiveness, these lay
under the full guilt of a sin which deserved such punish
ment. There was no authority, indeed, for the positive
assertion of the fact of such punishment ; for the fact im
plies that no forgiveness by any other means has been
obtained, and nobody can know whether Grod may not
choose to employ other means to this end besides those of
which He has informed us ; and if an exception to the
necessity of baptism is allowed in certain cases, it can not
be arbitrarily limited ; nor does the doctrine of original sin
itself at all restrict the means by which its guilt may be
removed. In asserting the fact, then, Augustine plainly
exceeded the premiss which the true doctrine supplied; but,
so far as he left all, who lay under the guilt of original sin,
under desert of eternal punishment, he no more than drew
out the true scriptural and Catholic doctrine. But, while
he interpreted the revealed doctrine on the whole legiti
mately and faithfully, he failed in not seeing or not allow
ing a place to the counter-truth of natural reason. As
Scripture declares the nature of every man to be corrupt
in consequence of Adam's sin, and from that corruption
sinfulness necessarily follows, and from that sinfulness
desert of eternal punishment, — so Scripture and reason
alike declare, that one man is not responsible for another
man's sins ; and from that position it follows that the pos
terity of Adam are not as such sinful ; and from that, that
they do not as such deserve eternal punishment. It was
wrong, then, to draw out a string of consequences from the
doctrine of original sin, and state them as absolute truths,
when they were contradicted at every step by a set of
parallel consequences from another truth, which was equally
CHAP. iv. of Original Sin. 125
certain, and to which Scripture itself bore equal testimony.
It was quite true that the doctrine of original sin, did it
stand alone, withdrew from the heathen the whole founda
tion of virtue, and so represented a good heathen as im
possible. But this was only one aspect of his state ; there
was also another, in which he came before us as capable of
virtue ; and, under the check of a mystery, the plain and
natural facts of the case might be acknowledged. And the
same may be said, with respect to the heathen, on the
question of future punishment. These were truths, then,
to be held with a special understanding in accordance with
the partial premiss from which they were derived ; they
were not to be stated as absolute truths, such as are drawn
from ascertained data, like the truths of natural philosophy.
It was incorrect to deduce conclusions of the same certainty
from an incomprehensible relationship, which would be
drawn from ordinary and known ones, and to argue in the
same way from a mysterious Divine wrath, as if it were
the same affection with which we are cognisant in ourselves
and in common life. The doctrine of original sin ought
not to be understated or curtailed because it leads to ex
treme conclusions on one side of truth ; and Augustine,
who is not deterred by such results from the full statement
of it, is, so far, a more faithful interpreter of it than an
earlier school. But those who draw out this doctrine to
the full, and do not balance it by other truths, give it force
at the expense of tenableness and justice.
From the Augustinian statements relating to original
sin two inferences remain to be drawn. First, the doctrine
of original sin itself was a sufficient premiss for a doctrine
of predestination. The latter consigns a certain portion of
mankind, antecedently to actual sin, to eternal punishment;
but if antecedently they deserve such punishment, the con
signment to it is a natural consequence of such desert, and
is no injustice. But, secondly, Augustine says more than
that persons under the guilt of original sin deserve eternal
punishment; for he asserts that they are punished eter
nally. But such actual punishment is more than a premiss
for, for it is itself an instance of, predestination. It evi-
126 Augustinian Doctrine CHAP. v.
dently does not depend on a man's conduct in what part of
the world he is born, whether in a Christian part or a
heathen ; or in what state as an infant he dies, whether
with baptism or without it, These are arrangements of
God's providence entirely. If such arrangements, then,
involve eternal punishment, the Divine will consigns to
such punishment antecedently to all action— which is the
doctrine of predestination. A true predestination, then,
is seen in full operation in his theology, before we come to
the specific doctrine ; arid we have substantially at an earlier
stage all that can be maintained at a later.
CHAPTER V.
AUGUSTINIAN DOCTRINE OF PREDESTINATION.
FROM S. Augustine's doctrine of original sin, I proceed
to his statements on the subject of predestination. S.
Augustine, then, held the existence of an eternal Divine
decree, separating, antecedently to any difference of desert,
one portion of the human race from another ; and ordaining
one to everlasting life and the other to everlasting misery.
This doctrine occurs frequently in many of his treatises ;
wholly pervades some, and forms the basis of his whole
teaching in the latter portion of his theological life. It
will be impossible, therefore, by one or two extracts to
represent duly the position which this doctrine has in his
writings ; but the following may be taken as samples of a
general language on this subject.1
1 The dates of the four following about so and alternates and oecil-
ertracts are,— of the first A.D. 426, lates so long between one conclusion
of the second, A.D. 428, of the third, and another, that it is with some
A.D. 421, of the fourth, A.D. 417. difficulty that we ascertain what his
But the Liber ad Simplicianum, real conclusion is. He ends, how-
written A.D. 394, contains substan- ever, in adopting the strong inter-
tially the same doctrine, though pretation of S. Paul : and his argu-
being written just as he was cross- ment, which is to reconcile the text,
ing the boundary line, and passing ' Many are called but few chosen,'
from one system to another, it winds with an effectual call — effectrix vo-
CHAP. v. of Predestination. 127
'Whoever, therefore, are separated by Divine grace
from that original damnation, we doubt not but that there
is procured for them the hearing of the Gospel, that when
they hear they believe, and that in that faith which worketh
by love they continue unto the end ; that even if they go
astray they are corrected, and, being corrected, grow better ;
or that if they are not corrected by man, they still return
into the path they left, some being taken away from the
dangers of this life by a speedy death. All these things
in them He worketh whose handiwork they are, and who
made them vessels of mercy ; He who chose them in His
Son before the foundation of the world according to the
election of grace ; " and if of grace, then no more of works,
otherwise grace is no more grace." Of such the Apostle
saith, " We know that all things work together for good to
them that love God, who are called according to His pur
pose." Of them none perish because all are elect; and they
are elect because they are called according to the purpose;
and that purpose not their own, but God's ; of which He
elsewhere saith, " That the purpose of God according to
election might stand, not of works but of Him that calleth.
If any of these perish, God is deceived, but none
doth perish, for God is not deceived. If any of these
perish, God is overcome by man's corruption ; but none
doth perish, for God is conquered by nothing. They are
chosen to reign with Christ, not as Judas was chosen, of
whom our Lord said, " Have I not chosen you twelve, and
one of you is a devil," but chosen in mercy as He was in
judgment, chosen to obtain the kingdom as He was to spill
catio — runs thus : Is it that they are modo vocati accommodare fidei volun-
called and that the call is not effec- tat em 1 He decides in favour of this
tual, because they do not will to interpretation, on the ground that it
obey it ? This does not agree with agrees with the text, ' Not of him
the text, 'Not of him that willeth,' that willeth,' &c. ; while the contrary
&c. ; for the contrary, not of God cannot be said of it, because the
that giveth mercy, but of him that effectual call thus defined depends
willeth, would then be true as well. not on man's will but on God's,
Is it, then, because God calls some who would have given it to others
in a way which He knows will be besides those to whom He has given
effectual, and gives this call to some it. if He had pleased. Quia si veUet
and not to others. So that of the etiam ipsorum misereri, posset ita
latter it might be said, possent alio vocare, quomodo eis aptum, esset.
I28 Augustinian Doctrine CHAP, v.
his own blood These it is who are signified to
Timothy, where, after saying that Hymenseus and Philetus
were subverting the faith of some, the Apostle adds,
" Nevertheless, the foundation of God standeth sure, having
this seal, the Lord knoweth them that are His."
Their faith, which worketh by love, either never faileth,
or, if it does, is repaired before life is ended ; and, all inter
vening iniquity blotted out, perseverance unto the end is
imputed to them. But those who are not about to perse
vere are not, even at the time when they live piously, to
l)e reckoned among that number; because they are not
separated from that mass of perdition by the Divine fore
knowledge and predestination ; and therefore are not called
according to His purpose, and therefore not chosen.' — De
Correptione et Gratia, c. vii.
Again : ' Such is the predestination of the saints, the
foreknowledge that is, and preparation of the Divine acts
of grace, by which every one is infallibly saved who is saved.
But for the rest, where are they but in that mass of perdi
tion where the Divine justice most justly leaves them?
Where the Tyrians are, and the Sidonians are, who would
have been able to believe if they had seen the miracles of
Christ ; but who, inasmuch as faith was not destined for
them, were denied the means of faith as well. Whence it
is evident that some have a Divine gift of intelligence im
planted in their natures, designed for exciting them to
faith, provided they see or hear preaching or miracles
which appeal to that gift ; and yet being, according to some
deeper judgment of Grod, not included within the predesti
nation of grace, and separated from the mass of perdition
by it, have not those Divine words and those Divine acts
brought before them, and so are not enabled to believe.1
\ Ex quo apparet habere quosdam ipsa eis adhibentur vel dicta divina
in ipso ingenio divinum naturaliter vel facta, per quse possent credere,
munus intelligentise, quo moveantur si audirent utique talia vel viderent.
ad fidem, si congrua suis mentibus In eadem perditionis massa relicti
vel audiant verba, vel signa conspi- sunt etiam Judsei qui non potuerunt
ciant : et tamen si Dei altiore ju- credere factis in conspectu suo tarn
dicio, a perditionis massa non sunt magnis clarisque virtutibus.
gratise prsedestinatione discreti, nee
CHAP. v. of Predestination. 129
The Jews who would not believe our Lord's miracles were
left in the mass of perdition, and why ? The Evangelist
tells us, " That the saying of Esaias the prophet might be
fulfilled which he spake, Lord, who hath believed our report,
and to whom hath the arm of the Lord been revealed?
Therefore they could not believe, because that Esaias said
again, He hath blinded their eyes and hardened their
hearts, that they should not see with their eyes and under
stand with their hearts, and be converted, and I should
heal them." But the hearts of the Tyrians and Sidonians
were not thus hardened, for they would have believed if
they had seen such miracles. That they were able to
believe, however, was of no service to them, when they
were not predestinated by Him whose judgments are un
searchable and His ways past finding out ; any more than
their not being able to believe would have been of disser
vice to them if they had been thus predestinated by God
to the illumination of their blindness and the taking away
of their heart of stone.1 With respect to the Tyrians and
Sidonians, indeed, there may be possibly some other inter
pretation of the passage ; but that no one comes to Christ
except it be given him, and that this is given only to those
who are elected in Him before the foundation of the world,
this must beyond all question be admitted by every one
whose heart is not deaf to, while his ear hears, the Divine
oracles.' — De Dono Per sever antice, c. xiv.
Again : ' The Lord knows those that are His. All
things work together for good for those alone who are
called according to His purpose ; the called according to
His purpose, not the called simply, not the many called,
but the few chosen. For whom He did foreknow He also
did predestinate to be conformed to the image of His Son,
that he might be the firstborn among many brethren ; and
whom He did predestinate them also He called ; and whom
He called them also He justified ; and whom He justified
1 Sed nee illis profuit quod pote- istis obfuisset quod non poterant
rant credere, quia prsedestinati non credere, si ita prjedestinati essent,
sunt ab eo cujus inscrutabilia sunt ut cos csecos Deus illuminaret, et in-
judicia, et investigabiles vise ; nee duratis cor lapideum vellet anferre.
Augustinian Doctrine
CHAP. v.
them He also glorified. All things work together for
good to those who were chosen before the foundation of
the world by Him who calleth those things which be not
as though they were ; to the elect according to the elec
tion of grace, who were chosen before the foundation of
the world freely and not on account of any good works
foreseen. Within that number of the elect and the pre
destinated, even those who have led the worst lives are by
the goodness of (rod led to repentance .... Of these
our Lord spoke when He said, " This is the Father's will
which hath sent me, that of all He hath given I should
lose nothing." But the rest of mankind who are not of
this number, but who, out of the same lump of which
they are, are made vessels of wrath, are brought into the
world for the advantage of the elect. Grod does not create
any of them indeed without a purpose. He knows what
good to work out of them : He works good in the very
fact of creating them human beings, and carrying on by
means of them this visible system of things.1 But none
of them does He lead to a wholesome and spiritual re
pentance. All indeed do, as far as themselves are con
cerned, out of the same original mass of perdition treasure
up unto themselves after their hardness and impenitent
heart, wrath against the day of wrath ; but out of that
mass Grod leads some in mercy to repentance, and others
in judgment does not lead.' — Contra Julianum Pelay,
1. v. n. 14.
Again : ' There is a certain defined number of saints
in Grod's foreknowledge (Dei prccscientia definitus nume-
rus sanctorum) who love Grod because God hath given
them His Holy Spirit shed abroad in their hearts, and to
whom all things work together for good ; who are called
according to His purpose ..... There are others, too,
1 Cseteri autem mortales qui ex cum et hoc ipso bonum operetur,
isto numero non sunt, et ex eadem quod in eis humanam creat naturam.
quidem ex qua et isti, sed vasa irse et ex eis ordinem praesentis sseculi
facta sunt, ad utilitatem nascuntur exornat. Istorum neminem adducit
istorum. Non enim quenquam eorum ad pcenitentiam salubrem et spiri-
Deus temere ac fortuito creat, aut tualem.
quid de illis boni operetur ignorat;
CHAP. v. of Predestination. 137
called, but not chosen ; and, therefore, not called accord
ing to His purpose. The former are the children of
promise, the elect, who are saved according to the election
of grace, as it is written, " But if of grace, then no more
of works, otherwise grace is no more grace." These are
the vessels of mercy, in whom Grod even by means of
the vessels of wrath makes known the riches of His
glory But the rest of mankind — who do not
pertain to this society, but whose soul and body, never
theless, Grod hath made, together with whatever also
belongs to their nature apart from its corruption — are
created by a foreknowing (rod on this account, that by
them He may show how little the freewill of fallen man
can do without His grace ; and that by their just and due
punishment the vessels of mercy, who are separated from
the original mass not by their own works, but by the free
grace of Grod, may know how great a gift has been be
stowed upon them, that every mouth may be stopped, and
that he that glorieth may glory in the Lord.'1 — Epist.
186, c. vii.
The general conclusion to which these passages point,
is that S. Augustine held the predestinarian doctrine ;
viz. that God by an eternal decree prior to any difference
of desert, separated one portion of mankind from another,
ordaining one to eternal life and the other to eternal
punishment.2 But it will be proper to enter into some
distinctions which are drawn on this subject in order to
separate S. Augustine's doctrine from another and a dif
ferent doctrine of predestination.
A certain limited and qualified doctrine of predesti
nation is held by some schools of divines opposed to the
predestinarians, who maintain the doctrine to be a sound
and scriptural one, but maintain the predestination to be
first to privileges and means of grace^not to final happi
ness ; or, secondly, if to final happiness, to be a predesti-
1 Ut in his ostenderet liberum gratia sunt ab ilia concretione dis-
arbitrium sine sua gratia quid va- creta, quid sibi collatum esset addis-
leret ; ut in eorum justis et debitis cerent.
poenis vasa misericordiae, quse non 2 See Hooker's Statements of S,
suorum meritis, sed gratuita Dei Augustine's Doctrine. NOTE XIX.
K 2
Augustinian Doctrine
CHAP. T.
nation in consequence of foreseen virtue and holiness in
the individuals predestinated. A third modification, which
rests upon a distinction between individuals and the body,
and allowing predestination to be to final glory, applies it
to the Church as a whole, and not to individuals, is evi
dently only the second in another form. For, as no one
can mean to say that the whole of the visible Church is
predestinated to eternal glory, by the Church as a body
must be meant the truly virtuous and pious members of
the Church whom God predestinates to glory in conse
quence of foreseeing this piety and virtue in them. Now,
had S. Augustine only held predestination in this sense,
that God determined from all eternity to admit a certain
portion of mankind to certain religious privileges and to
reward the pious and virtuous with eternal glory, he would
only have held what no Christian, or even believer in
natural religion, can deny. It is evident that Grod has
admitted a certain portion of mankind to certain religious
privileges to which He has not admitted others ; and, as
He has done this, it is certain that He has eternally de
creed to do it. And it is certain that God will finally
reward men according to their works ; and, as this will be
His act, and this the reason of it, it is certain He has
eternally decreed the one and foreseen the other. Such
a doctrine of predestination as this, then, is no more than
what everybody must hold. But the passages which have
been quoted contain very clearly a different doctrine of
predestination from this. And this difference will appear
the more decisively, the more we enter into the particulars
of S. Augustine's view.
In the first place, we find S. Augustine always speak
ing of predestination as a mystery, a dark and perplexing
doctrine, contradictory to our natural ideas of the Divine
justice, and requiring the profoundest submission of human
reason in order to its acceptance. For example, he says,
in the text (John vi. 45) : ' Every one that hath heard and
hath learned of the Father cometh unto me.'
' Very far removed from our fleshly senses is that
school in which God is heard and teaches — valde remota
CHAP. v. of Predestination. 133
est a sensibus carnis hcec schola in qua Pater auditur
et docet. We see many come to the Son, because we see
many believe in Christ : but where and how they heard
and learned this of the Father we see not. Too secret is
that grace ; but that it is grace who can doubt ? This
grace thus secretly imparted is rejected by no heart, how
ever hard.1 Indeed, it is given for that purpose, viz. that
this hardness of heart may be removed. When the Father
is heard, and teaches the man within to come to the Son,
He takes away the stony heart and gives the heart of flesh,
thus making sons of promise and vessels of mercy prepared
for glory. But why does He not teach all to come to
Christ ? Because those whom He teaches He teaches in
mercy, and those whom He teaches not He teaches not in
judgment. " For He hath mercy on whom He will have
mercy, and whom He will He hardeneth." And
to him who objects why doth He yet complain, for who
hath resisted His will ? the Apostle answers, not by deny
ing the objection, but urging submission under it : 0 man,
who art thou that repliest against God ? " 2
Again : ( Why, when both alike hear, and, supposing
a miracle, both alike see, one believes and another does
not believe, lies in the abyss of the riches of the wisdom
and knowledge of Grod, whose judgments are unsearchable,
and who, without iniquity, has mercy upon whom He
will have mercy, and whom He will, hardeneth. For
His decrees are not unjust, because they are incompre
hensible.' 3
Again : ' It displeases him (the objector in Rom. c. ix.)
that Grod complains of sinners whom, as it appears to him,
He hardens. But Grod does not harden sinners by obliging
them to sin, but by withholding grace, such grace being
withheld from those from whom it is withheld, according
to an occult justice, infinitely removed from human per
ceptions.' 4
1 Nimium gratia ista secreta est, 2 De Prsed. Sanct. c. viii.
gratiam vero esse quis ambigat ? s Epist. 194. c. iii.
Haec itaque gratia, quse occulte hu- 4 De Div. Quaest. ad Simplic. 1. i.
manis cordibus divina largitate tri- Q. 2. n. 16.
buitur, a nullo duro corde respuitur.
134 Augustinian Doctrine CHAP. v.
Again : ' Why He wills to convert some, and to punish
others for being unconverted (quare illos velit converters,
illos ve.ro pro aversione punire), let none presume to ask
as if to blame God for the law of His ^ secret
justice rests with Him alone (consilium occultioris jus-
titice penes ipsum est).' l
S. Augustine, then, regarded predestination as a per
plexing mystery, — a doctrine which disagreed with our
natural ideas of God's justice, and which could only be de
fended by a reference to His inscrutable and sovereign will.
I will single out the term c hidden justice — occulta
justitiaj as expressing in a summary and convenient
form this characteristic of the doctrine held by him. S.
Augustine asserts, as every one who believes in the
existence of a God must do, that God is just, and there
fore that the decree of predestination and reprobation
which He has from all eternity made is just ; but he adds,
that this justice is of a nature not addressed to our natural
faculties and perceptions, or discernible by them. Natural
justice — the rule of rewarding and punishing according to
desert — is justice, and is also a justice cognisable by our
natural faculties ; predestinating justice is as real justice
as natural, but is not thus cognisable. The one is justice
and also apparent justice ; the other is justice, but not
apparent justice — i.e. apparent mjustice.
But such language as this is very inapplicable to a
doctrine of predestination, which is no more than the as-
i sertion that God has determined from all eternity to admit
some portions of mankind and not others to certain privi
leges and means of grace ; or, that God has determined to
reward or punish those respectively who He sees will be
virtuous or vicious. There is nothing mysterious in the
doctrine of predestination as thus explained, nothing
from which natural feeling or reason shrinks, nothing
which requires any deep submission of the intellect to
accept. That God should reward the virtuous and punish
the wicked is the simple rule of justice, and that He should
1 De Pecc. Merit, et Kern. 1. 2. c. xviii.
CHAP. v. of Predestination. 135
give privileges to some which He does not give to others,
is no injustice.
It may be said, indeed, that the admission of one
portion of mankind to peculiar religious privileges and
advantages not enjoyed by the rest is a mystery; that
there is something inexplicable in that great inequality
of God's administration in this respect which we see in
the world, especially the remarkable one of one part of
the world only having been admitted into the Christian
Church, while far the larger part has been left in pagan
darkness and ignorance : but it cannot be said, that this
is a mystery in the sense of being a scandal or offence to
our reason. It is a mystery, in the first place, as being a
fact which we are obliged to refer simply to the Divine
will and pleasure ; but in this sense many of the commonest
events which take place in the world are mysteries. It is
one thing to be uninformed, and another to be scandalised ;
one thing not to have curiosity satisfied, and another to
have reason perplexed. It is a mystery also in a sense
somewhat stronger than this ; for without imposing as
obligatory, our moral nature yet favours the rule of equal
dealing, and its bias is in that direction ; so that excep
tions to it are not in themselves acceptable to us. But
neither in this sense is it a difficulty or scandal ; being only
the violation of a rule which is not obligatory. Indeed,
this bias of our minds is one which easily submits, on the
first due consideration, that there may be good reasons for
the inequality we see in the Divine dispensing of religious
privileges. And, on the whole, provided the great rule of
justice be kept to, that men are rewarded and punished
according to their use of the means given them, the gene
ral sense of mankind allows the Almighty the right to
apportion the means themselves as He thinks fit, and give
some higher, and some lower, without making any diffi
culty of the matter. Particular persons, indeed, have
embraced so rigid and importunate an idea of justice, that
they have not been able so to satisfy themselves, but have
insisted on an absolute equality of spiritual condition for
all. And truly the idea of justice, like other ideas, may
Augustinian Doctrine
CHAP. T.
be unduly nourished ; and persons, by brooding narrowly
upon it, may get themselves to regard many things as
grievances, both in human society and the system of Pro
vidence, which they would not otherwise have done. But
such an idea of justice is not supported by the general
feeling of mankind, which has adopted a larger and more
liberal one.
Inequality, then, in the dispensing of religious privi
leges, is not a difficulty to reason or contrary to justice ;
but S. Augustine speaks of predestination as a difficulty,
and contrary to our instinctive ideas of justice ; and there
fore must have included something more than this kind of
inequality in his idea of what predestination was.
Indeed, the very circumstances of the argument which
S. Augustine is carrying on, if any one will consider them,
will be found to involve something more than this as his
meaning of predestination ; for, had he meant no more
than this, there would have been no occasion for this de
fence of the doctrine at all. In arguing with an infidel he
might have had to answer the objection of these inequali
ties in the Divine dispensation ; but he is defending the
doctrine of predestination not against an infidel, but against
a Christian objector — i.e. an objector who at the very
outset admits such inequalities, and therefore would not
object to, or call out a defence of that doctrine on that
ground. Indeed, S. Augustine's opponent is not only a
Christian, but sometimes even a Catholic Christian, he
having to defend this doctrine not only against Pelagians
but against opponents within the Church.1 But it is
absurd to suppose such an opponent taking, against a
particular doctrine, a ground only suitable to an infidel
arguing against revelation altogether, just as it would be
absurd, on the other hand, to suppose S. Augustine not
giving the ready and obvious answer to such an objection
if brought. He answers his opponent by referring him to
God's secret and inscrutable will ; but had mere inequality
1 The Church of Marseilles, which, book De Co-rreptione et Gratia, and
through Prosper and Hilary, pro- were answered by the book De
tested against the doctrine of the Prcedestinatione Sanctorum.
CHAP. v. of Predestination. 137
been his opponent's ground of objection, he would have
answered him much more decisively by referring him to
the broad and evident fact of the inequality in the Divine
dispensing of means of grace involved in the very existence
of Christianity, not to say in the very order of God's natural
providence.
But the general admission of mystery, darkness, and
apparent contrariety to justice which S. Augustine makes
with respect to predestination, is only a preliminary, how
ever decisive an answer, to such an interpretation of his
doctrine as would reduce it to the qualified doctrine of
predestination above referred to. The qualified doctrine
drew distinctions, according as it wanted them, between
individuals and the body as the subjects of predestination,
between the means of grace and final happiness as the gift
in it, and between foreseen merits and arbitrary choice as
the reason and ground of it. But none of these distinc
tions appear in the Augustinian statements of the doctrine,
which quite plainly and simultaneously assign to predes
tination individuals as its subjects, final glory as its gift,
and a sovereign and inscrutable choice on the part of God,
as distinguished from foreseen merits in the predestinated
person, as its reason and ground.
He applies, in the first place, predestination to indi
viduals, speaking of the subjects of it as 'these' and
'those' (illi, isti), and 'many' (multi, plurimi}. The
question put by the objector to the doctrine, and met by
him with the answer of God's inscrutable will, is, ' Why
God liberates this man rather than that — cur istum potius
quam ilium liberet.'' ! And the predestinated are considered
as amounting to a certain definite number of persons. ' I
speak,' he says, eof those who are predestinated to the
kingdom of God, of whom the number is so certain that
no one can be added to them or taken from them.' 2
It is evident, in the next place, that S. Augustine is
speaking of the predestination of these individuals to final
glory, and not to means of grace only ; asserting, as he
does, that by predestination ' every one is infallibly saved
1 Prsed. Sanct. c. viii. 2 De Corr. et Grat. c. xiii.
Augustinian Doctrine
CHAP. v.
who is saved — eertissime liberantur qiiicumque liberan-
turj and that ' of the elect none perish,' l and everywhere
speaking of predestination as predestination to eternal life.
It is equally evident that he does not mean that these
individuals are predestinated to eternal life on account of
foreseen goodness in them. This was the ground on which
predestination was placed by some maintainers of a quali
fied doctrine on this subject in S. Augustine's time ; but
it met not with his agreement but strong condemnation ;
and those who held it are argued with as opponents not
so far gone as the Pelagians, but still labouring under
formidable error. The distinction of foreseen merits was
a regular and known distinction in the controversy on this
question at that day, and was thus disposed of. Thus,
commenting on the text, ' Ye have not chosen Me, but I
have chosen you' (John xv. 16), he says, 'This, then, is
the immoveable truth of predestination. The Apostle
says, " He hath elected us in Him before the foundation
of the world." If this is interpreted, then, to mean that
Grod elects men because He foresees they will believe, and
not because He is about to make them believing, against
such a foreknowledge as this the Son speaks, saying, " Ye
have not chosen Me, but I have chosen you," for upon this
interpretation Grod would rather have foreseen that they
would choose Him, and so deserve to be chosen by Him.
They are chosen therefore before the foundation of the
world by that predestination by which God foresees his
own future work ; and they are chosen out of the world
by that calling by which Grod fulfils what He predestines.' 2
Again, on the text (Eph. i. 4) ' According as He hath
chosen us in Him before the foundation of the world, that
we should be holy and without blame before Him in love.'
" He foreknew," says the Pelagian, « who were about to
be holy and without blame by the exercise of their free
will, and therefore chose them before the foundation of
the world in His foreknowledge, because He foreknew that
2 S! S°n° Pers* c> xiv> stitutionem ea praedestinatione in
Lte Freed. Sanct. c. xvii.— Quod qua Deus sua futura facta praescivit :
•recto si i propterea dictum est quia electi sunt autem de mundo ea voca-
prascmt Deus credituros esse ---- tione, qua Deus id, quod prsedes-
Mecti sunt autem ante mundi con- tinavit impleyit
CHAP. v. of Predestination. 139
they would be such." But the Apostle says, " Chose not
because we were, but that we might be holy and with
out blame." They were to be such, then, because He
elected them and predestinated them to be such by His
grace.' l
The text, again (Rom. ix. 11), respecting Jacob and
Esau, c For the children being not yet born, neither having
done any good or evil, that the purpose of God according
to election might stand, not of works, but of Him that
calleth,' is strongly insisted upon as obviously, and at first
sight disproving the conditional ground attributed by some
to predestination ; and the explanation by which this
natural inference from the passage is met, viz. — that the
election of Jacob in preference to Esau, though not caused
by any difference of conduct between them at the time,
inasmuch as they were not yet born, was yet caused by
the difference which was to be and which God foresaw, is
rejected, as depending on a distinction wholly irrelevant ;
it making no difference to works as a cause of election,
whether they operate thus as present or as foreseen works.
' Jacob was not loved because he was of such a character,
or because he was to be ; but he was made of such a
character because he was loved — non ideo quia tails erat,
vel talis futurus erat dilectum, sed talem, quia dilectus
est, factum. The Apostle does not lie. Jacob was not
loved on account of works, for if of works, then no more
of grace ; but he was loved on account of grace, which
grace made him to abound in works.' 2 — ' " It is not of
him that willeth, or of him that runneth, but of God that
showeth mercy ? " God had not mercy on Jacob, there
fore, because Jacob willed and ran ; but Jacob willed and
ran because God had mercy. For the will is prepared by
the Lord.' 3— < " Jacob have I loved, but Esau have I hated."
The Apostle speaks of an election, where God does not find
something done by another for Him to choose, but some
thing to choose which He Himself does — " ubi Deus non
ab olio factum quod eligat invenit, sed quod inveniat
ipse facit" As he says of the remnant of Israel, " There
1 De Prsed. Sanct. c. xviii. * Ibid. c. 141.
2 Op. Imp., Contra Jul. 1. 1. c. 133.
140 Augustinian Doctrine ^CHAP. v.
is a remnant according to the election of grace ; and if by
grace, then is it no more of works, otherwise grace is no
more grace." T Wherefore ye are foolish who, when the
truth says, " Not of works, but of Him that calleth," say,
on account of future works which God foresaw that Jacob
would do, and therefore loved him; contradicting the
Apostle's own words. As if the Apostle would not have
said, not on account of present, but of future works, if he
had meant this — " quasi non posset dicere, non ex prcesen-
tibus sed ex futuris operibus" ' 2
The ground of foreseen merits is thus expressly rejected
by S. Augustine as the ground of predestination, which is
referred, instead, to an absolute and inscrutable Divine
choice. Though one distinction must be here made. The
most rigid predestinarian must in one sense allow that
God predestinates the elect to eternal life in consequence
of goodness foreseen in them. For, however absolutely
(rod may predestinate particular persons to eternal life in
the sense of certainty, He plainly does not do it absolutely
in the sense of requiring no qualifications. His predeter
mination, then, to give them eternal life must suppose
the foresight of these qualifications for it in them, though
it is the foresight of qualifications which He Himself has
determined to give them by the operation of efficacious
grace. ' (rod foresees His own future work.' He has
decreed from all eternity to make, and therefore foresees
that He will make, Jacob of such a character. But this
is predestination in consequence of foreseen goodness, in
quite a different sense from that which is intended in the
modification of the doctrine above referred to. The effect
of that modification is to make the whole of predestination
conditional, — God predestinating persons to eternal life in
consequence of something which by virtue of the Divine
attribute of foreknowledge He certainly foresees, but which
is in itself contingent, depending on the will and efforts
of the persons themselves. But of the distinction now
spoken of this is not the effect. For though, according
to it, God predestinates the elect to their final reward
1 Horn. xi. 5, 6. 2 Contra Dua8j Ep. Pel. 1. 2. n. 15.
CJTAP. v. of Predestination. 141
relatively to their qualifications for it, He predestinates
them absolutely to those qualifications ; so that, though
one part of predestination is dependent upon another, the
whole is unconditional.1
It is indeed observable that, when S. Augustine is
charged by the Pelagians with fatalism, he does not dis
own the certainty and necessity, but only the popular
superstitions and impieties of that system. He rejects the
appeal to the stars as absurd, and distinguishes between
the operation of fate which is for good and evil alike, and
that of Divine grace which is for good only ; sin and its
punishment being referable wholly to man. But he does
not disown a Divine predestination, upon which the future
happiness and misery of mankind depend.2
Such being S. Augustine's doctrine of predestination,
the ground on which the justice of such a doctrine is
defended has already appeared in so many of the extracts
given, that it is hardly necessary to recur to it. Had
mankind continued in the state in which they were ori
ginally created, the consignment of any portion of them
antecedently to all action to eternal punishment, would
have been unjust. But all mankind having fallen from
that state by their sin in Adam, and become one guilty
mass, eternal punishment is antecedently due to all ; and
therefore none have any right to complain if they are
consigned antecedently to it ; while those who are spared
should thank God's gratuitous mercy.
To this mass of perdition, this apostate root, we are
referred for the defence of the justice of predestination.
4 Those who are not freed by grace, whether they have not
had the opportunity of hearing, or whether they have
heard and refused to obey, or whether they have not lived
1 ' Effectum prsedestinationis con- Theol. P. 1. Quaest. 23. Art. 5.
siderare possuraus dupliciter : uno 2 ' Fatumquiaffirmantdesiderum
modo in particular!, et sic nihil pro- positions, ad tempus quo concipitur
hibet aliquem effectum prsedestina- quisque vel nascitur, actus et eventa
tionis esse causam alterius .... pendere contendunt : Dei vero gratia
Alio modo in communi ; et sic impos- omnia sidera progreditur . . . .
sibile est quod totus prsedestinationis Deinde fati assertores et bona et
effectus in communi habeat aliquam mala hominum fato tribuunt.' —
causam ex parte nostra.' — Sum. Contra Duas, Ep. 1. 2, n. 12.
Augustinian Doctrine
CHAP. v.
to be old enough to hear, but died before receiving the
washing of regeneration to save them, are all justly con
demned ; inasmuch as they are none of them without sin,
original or actual. For all have sinned, either in Adam
or in themselves, and come short of the glory of God.
The whole mass, therefore, deserves punishment ; and were
this punishment inflicted upon all, it would be inflicted
beyond all doubt justly.' *— < It is unjust, say they, that
when both are in one and the same evil case, this man
should be liberated and that man punished. But it were
just that both should be punished. Who can deny this ?
Let us give thanks, then, to the Saviour, for that He does
not repay to us what, by the damnation of others like us,
we know to be our clue. Were every man liberated, it
would not be seen what sin deserved ; were no man, what
grace could bestow .... But the whole lump deserving
condemnation, justice repays the due shame, grace bestows
the unmerited honour.'2 — 'Forasmuch as that one man
in whom all have sinned is also in each individual pun
ished.' 3 — ' Grace alone separates the redeemed from the
lost, alone divides those whom a common original sin
formed into one mass of perdition ..... The whole
human mass was so justly condemned in the apostate root,
that, were none rescued from that damnation, none could
blame Grod's justice. Those who are rescued are rescued
gratuitously ; those who are not, only show what the whole
lump deserved, even the rescued themselves, had not un
deserved mercy succoured them.' 4 — ' Divine Scripture
calleth those inexcusable whom it convicts of sinning
knowingly. But neither does the just judgment of Grod
spare them who have not heard : " for as many as have
sinned without law shall also perish without law." And
however they may appear to excuse themselves, He admits
not this excuse who knows that He at first made man
upright, and gave him the commandment to obey ; and
that sin has not passed to his posterity but by his misuse
of freewill. Men are not condemned without having
1 De Nat. et Grat. c. iv. 8 Ep. 186. c. 4.
2 Ep. 194. c. 2. * Enchiridion, c. 99.
CHAP. v. of Predestination. 143
sinned, inasmuch as sin hath passed to all from one, in
whom, previous to their separate individual sins, all have
sinned in common. And on this account every sinner is
inexcusable, either by the guilt of his origin or the addi
tion of his own will, whether he knows or whether he is
ignorant; for ignorance itself is sin beyond question in
those who are unwilling to learn, and in those who are not
able is the punishment of sin. So that of both the excuse
is unjust, the damnation just What did He love
in Jacob but the free gift of His own mercy, what did He
hate in Esau but original sin ? ' l
One peculiar argument for predestination drawn from
the Incarnation should be added to the general body of
statement which we meet with in S. Augustine on this
subject — an argument which is remarkable as showing how
intimately the doctrine of predestination is connected with
the fundamental truths of Christianity. Original sin is
its main basis ; but an oblique proof of it is here drawn
from the assumption of the Man Jesus into unity of person
with God.2
' The most eminent instance of predestination and grace
is the Saviour Himself, the Mediator of God and man, the
Man Christ Jesus ; for by what preceding merits of its
own, either of works .or faith, did that human nature which
was in Him earn this ? Answer : How did the Man Jesus
merit to be, as assumed into unity of person with the co-
eternal Word, the only begotten Son of God ? What
good in him preceded? What did he do, believe, ask,
antecedently, that he should attain to this ineffable dignity?
Was not this Man, by virtue of his assumption by the
Word, from the first moment that He was Man, the Son
of God ? Was it not as the only Son of God that, that
woman full of grace conceived him ? Was he not born
the only Son of God of the Holy Ghost and the Virgin
Mary by a singular dispensation ? Was there any fear
1 Ep. 194. c. 6. 8. acts of the will of the human soul
2 Edwards, in his book ' On the of Jesus Christ, necessarily holy,
Freedom of the Will,' uses the same yet truly virtuous, praiseworthy,
argument in the chapter on ' the rewardable,' &c.
J44 Augustiriian Doctrine CHAP. v.
then, that, on coming to mature age, that man should sin
in the exercise of freewill ? Or, had he not freewill on
that account ; nay, a will on that very account, and because
He could not serve sin, all the more free? All these
singular and wonderful privileges human nature in him
received, without any preceding merits of its own. And
will any man dare to say to God, " Why was not I so
privileged? Why, when nature is common, is
grace so different ? Why is there respecting of persons
with God ? " What, I will not say, Christian, but sane
man would say this.' From the case of Him, then, who
is our Head, we may understand the operation of grace ;
how from the Head it diffuses itself, according to the
measure of each, through all the members. By what
grace that Man was made from the beginning Christ, by
that grace is every man who is such made from the be
ginning of his faith a Christian : reborn of the spirit of
which he was born ; forgiven his sins by the same Spirit
by whom he was made to have none. This is the predes
tination of saints, which shone chiefly in him who is the
Saint of saints. In so far as he was Man, the Lord of
glory was Himself predestinated — predestinated to be the
Son of God Jesus was predestinated to be of the
seed of David according to the flesh, and according to the
Spirit of holiness the Son of God with power As,
then, that one Man was predestinated to be our Head, so
are we many predestinated to be his members. Let human
merits, which perished in Adam, be silent, and let grace
reign. Whoever finds in our Head preceding merits to
cause his singular generation, may find in his members
the same to cause their regeneration. But as that gene
ration was not a reward, but a free gift to Christ, so is our
regeneration no reward, but a free gift to us He
makes us believe in Christ, who made him that Christ in
whom we believe.1
Again : ' God therefore took the nature of man, i.e.
the rational soul and flesh of the Man Christ, by a singu-
1 De Prsed. Sanct, c. xv. See De Dono Perseverantise, c. xxiv., Op.
Imp. 1. 1. c. 138.
CHAP. v. of Predestination. 145
larly wonderful and wonderfully singular adoption ; so that,
without any preceding merits, that Man was from the
beginning of his human life the Son of God, even as he
was one Person with the Word, which is without beginning.
For no one is so blindly ignorant as to dare to say that,
born of the Holy Spirit and the Virgin Mary, the Son of
Man, he obtained, by the merit of a sinless life and the
good use of freewill, the Divine Sonship ;— to say this in
the face of the text : " The Word was made flesh.'' For
where did this take place but in the Virgin's womb, where
the Man Christ began to be That gratuitous nati
vity joined in unity of person man with God, the flesh with
the Word. Good works then followed that nativity, and
did not merit it. There was no risk, when human nature
was thus ineffably taken into unity of Person by the Word
of God, that it should sin in the exercise of freewill: — that
nature being so assumed by God that it admitted of no
evil motion of the will. As, therefore, this Mediator was,
by reason of his assumption, never evil but always good ;
so those whom God redeems by his blood are made by him
eternally good out of evil.' l
This is an argument, however, for predestination which
admits of much the same answer which was given to the
argument drawn from original sin. The sinless life of the
Man Jesus was undoubtedly an infallible consequence of
the Incarnation ; for He could not be one with God and
be capable of sinning. His goodness was therefore a ne
cessary goodness ; and one Man, in being predestinated
from all eternity to a union with God, was predestinated
to a perfect holiness. The Incarnation is thus a premiss
for a doctrine of predestination. But it should be remem
bered what kind of premiss this is, that it is not a truth of
nature or reason which we comprehend, but a mysterious
and incomprehensible truth ; and therefore that the infer
ence drawn from it is alike a mystery and not an ascer
tained and complete truth, like a logical consequence from
a known premiss.
The conclusion, then, to which S. Augustine's general
1 De Corr. et Grat. c. xi.
L
Augustinian Doctrine
CHAP. V.
statements, given at the commencement of this chapter,
of the doctrine of predestination, naturally led, has only
obtained confirmation and accuracy from further examina
tion and the subsequent particulars into which we have
entered. The characteristic of S. Augustine's doctrine,
compared with the scriptural one is, that it is a definite
and absolute doctrine. Scripture, as a whole, as has been
said,1 only informs us of a mystery on the subject ; that
is to say, while it informs us that there is a truth on the
subject, it makes no consistent statement of it, but asserts
contrary truths, counterbalancing those passages which
convey the predestinarian doctrine by passages as plain the
other way ; but S. Augustine makes predestinarian state
ments and does not balance them by contrary ones. Kather
he endeavours to explain away those contrary statements
in Scripture. Thus he evades the natural force of the
text that ' G-od would have all men to be saved,' by sup
posing that it only means that no man is saved except
through the will of Grod ; 2 or that ' all ' means not all men,
but some out of all classes and ranks of men : on the same
rule on which we understand the phrase ' ye tithe all herb,'3
as meaning not that the Pharisees gave literally a tenth
of all the herbs in the world, but only of all kinds of
herbs.4
1 Chapter II. is no difference, all deserving eon-
2 Enchiridion, c. ciii. ; Contra demnation. Upon this ground S.
Jwl. Pelag. 1. 4. c. viii. ; Ep. 217. Augustine rejects his opponent's
c. vi. application of this text altogether
3 Luke ii. 42. as incorrect : ' Nee ulla est acceptio
4 ' Neque enim Phariscei omnia personarum, in duobus debitoribus
olera decimabant. . . . Ita et illic sequaliter reis, si alteri dimittitur
omnes homines, omne hominum alteri exigitur, quod pariter ab
genus intelligere possumus.' — En- utroque debetur.' — Contra Duas, Ep.
chiridion, c. ciii. 1. 2. c. 7. ' Cur ergo in regnum
The text that God is no respecter coelorum, non accepto regenerationis
of persons is, in its general spirit, a lavacro, parvulus nullus intrabit?
counter text to the predestinarian Nunquidnam ipse sibi parentes infi-
ones. But its opposition is not deles Arel negligentes, de quibus nas-
exact, because it supposes a differ- ceretur elegit ? Quid dicam de ino-
ence of rank, or other advantages, pinatiset repentinis innumerabilibus
in the individuals, which is not re- mortibus, quibus ssepe etiam religio-
spected ; whereas predestination ap- sorum Christianorum prsesumuntiir,
plies to those between whom there et baptismo praeripiuntur infantes;
CHAP. v. of Predestination. 147
S. Augustine then takes that further step which Scrip
ture avoids taking, and asserts a determinate doctrine of
predestination. He erects those passages of Scripture
which are suggestive of predestination into a system, ex
plaining away the opposite ones ; and converts the obscurity
and inconsistency of Scripture language into that clearness
and consistency by which a definite truth is stated. His
was the error of those who follow without due consideration
that strong first impression which the human mind enter
tains, that there must be some definite truth to be arrived
at on the question under consideration, whatever it may
be : and who therefore imagine that they cannot but be
doing service, if they only add to what is defective enough
to make it complete, or take away from what is ambiguous
enough to make it decisive. Assuming arrival at some
determinate truth necessary, he gave an exclusive develop
ment to those parts of Scripture which he had previously
fixed on as containing, in distinction to any apparently
opposite ones, its real meaning. But the assumption itself
was gratuitous. There is no reason why Scripture should
not designedly limit itself, and stop short of expressing
definite truth ; though whether it does so or not is a ques
tion of fact. If Revelation as a whole does not state a
truth of predestination, that stopping short is as much a
designed stopping short, as a statement would have been
a designed statement. Nor are we to be discontented
with the former issue, when the comparison of one part of
(rod's word with another fairly leads to it ; to suppose that
an indeterminate conclusion must be a wrong one, and to
proceed to obtain by forced interpretation what we had
failed to do by natural. If Revelation as a whole does not
speak explicitly, Revelation did not intend to do so : and to
impose a definite truth upon it, when it designedly stops
short of one, is as real an error of interpretation as to deny
a truth which it expresses.
cum e contrario sacrilegorum et tent, ista considerent, hie audeant
inimicorum. Christi aliquo modo in dicere Deum vel acceptorem in sua
Christianorum manus venientes, ex gratia personarum, vel remunera-
hac vita non sine sacramento rege- torem meritorum.' — Ep. 194. n. 32.
nerationis emigrent. . . . Ista cogi-
r. 2
148 Angus finian CHAP. vr.
CHAPTER VI.
AUGUSTINIAN DOCTRINE OF GRACE.
THE doctrine of absolute predestination implies the doctrine
of efficacious or irresistible grace, for the end implies the
means ; and therefore, if eternal life is ensured, the ne
cessary qualifications for that life, which are holiness and
virtue, must be earned also. But these can only be en
sured by such a Divine influence as does not depend for
its effect on the contingency of man's will; i.e. by what
divines call irresistible or efficacious grace — a grace which
S. Augustine accordingly maintains.
The language which the Church has always used for
expressing the relation in which grace stands to the human
will has been that grace assists the will ; and such a term
implies in its natural meaning an original power in our
selves, to which this assistance was given, and by which it
must be used — an assistance, in short, which is no more
than assistance. S. Augustine, however, in adopting the
authorised expression, and speaking of grace as assistance,
is obliged by his system to use the term in a meaning
exceeding this natural and obvious one, viz. not as assist
ance, but as control ; though he arrives at his definition
of such a controlling grace only gradually, after long
familiarity with the subject, and when controversy has
strengthened and sharpened his ideas.
S. Augustine early in his theological life commits him
self to an idea of the Divine Power as being a power of
creating perfect goodness in the creature, and defends in
his book De Lihero Arbitrio, written against the Mani-
cheans, the act of God in not creating man thus perfect
at once, but only with the power of becoming so ; arguing
that Grocl dispensed different kinds of advantages 1 accord-
1 'Bona quibus male uti mains other goodness itself.— De Lib. Arb.
potest, et quorum esse usus non 1. 2. c. 17., et seq. ; De Pecc. Merit.
potest malus;' the one being free- et Remiss. 1. 2. c. 18.
will or the power of being good, the
CHAP. vi. Doctrine of Grace. \ 49
ing to His own sovereign will, and that a lesser good is
not to be undervalued because it is not a higher one. The
passage, however, expressing as it does the fitness of both
kinds of goods to be Divine gifts, he appeals to in his
' Retractions ' to prove how, even in an early work, and
before his mind had expanded on the subject of grace, he
had laid down the principles of his subsequent teaching.1
The first regular attempt, however, at a definition of
the characteristic power of Grospel grace, occurs in the
treatise ' De Gratia Christi, in which he calls it ' the
assistance of will and action — adjutorium voluntatis et
actionis.' 2 It will of course be evident at first sight that
this definition does not of itself describe an irresistible
grace, but would apply to a simply assisting one as well.
But, considered in connection with the context, and taken
in the meaning which its opposition to another definition
of grace fastens upon it, it will be found to imply the
former. It was asserted by the Pelagians that, inasmuch
as the power of willing and acting in one way or another
(possibilitas utriusque partis) was inseparable from
human nature, human nature had of itself the power to
will and act aright ; but that this power needed to be
assisted by grace (ut possibilitas semper gratia adjuvetur
auxilio).3 To this Augustine replied, that not only the
power to will and act was assisted by grace, but that will
and action itself were ; and therefore to the Pelagian defi
nition of grace, as the ' assistance of power ' (adjutorium
possibilitatis), he opposed his own, ' the assistance of will
and action' (adjutorium voluntatis et actionis). Now,
by assisting will and action we should naturally and ordi
narily understand assisting the power to will and act,
taking the words will and action loosely to signify the
faculties ; for acts themselves are not susceptible of assist
ance, being already done. Nor, therefore, should we na
turally see any difference at all of meaning in these two
expressions, assistance of power and assistance of action.
1 Retraot. 1. I.e. 9. tatem et actioncm.
2 I give the Jansenist turn to the 3 De Grrat. Christi, c. iii.
phrase gratia qua adjuvat volun-
Augitstinian
CHAP. YI.
Bat if this ordinary meaning is disclaimed for the expres
sion assistance of action, and, instead of being identified
with, the latter is contrasted to, the assistance of the
power to will and act, it must follow that by assistance
of action a grace of a stronger kind is meant than that
which assists the power to act ; and what can that grace
be but one which causes action itself — i.e. irresistible
grace ?
Indeed, this absolute sense is fastened on the word
adjutorium in this, Augustine's, definition of grace, by
the mode in which the same word is used in the rival and
opposing definition. For the word carries to the phrase
adjutorium voluntatis et actionis the same meaning that
it bore in the phrase adjutorium possibilitatis (for the
two sides differ not about the meaning of assistance, but
about what is assisted). But in the latter phrase it bears
the sense of causing as well as of assisting ; for the Pe
lagians said this power (possibilitas) was given by Grod
in the first instance as well as assisted when had. The
word therefore bears the same sense in the phrase ' adju
torium voluntatis et act ion is J and implies the gift or
ca.usation of will and action, and not only the assistance
of it.
But the meaning of this definition of grace, which is
evident hitherto with some difficulty, and only by a close
and exact process of comparison, is abundantly clear and
manifest when we come to S. Augustine's own explanation
and exposition of it. He says : ' Pelagius in his first book
on Freewill thus speaks : " We have," he says, " a power
of taking either side — possibilitatem utriusque partis —
implanted in us by God, as a fruitful and productive root,
to produce and bring forth according to men's different
wills ; and either shine with the flower of virtue, or bristle
with the thorns of vice, according to the choice of the
cultivator." In which passage, not perceiving what he
says, he establishes one and the same root of good and evil
men, against evangelical truth and apostolical teaching.
For our Lord says, that a good tree cannot bring forth
evil fruit, nor an evil tree good fruit. And the Apostle
CHAP. vr. Doctrine of Grace. 151
Paul, when he says that cupidity is the root of all evil,
intimates also that love is the root of all good. If, there
fore, the two trees good and evil are two men good and
evil, what is the good man but the man of a good will ;
that is, the tree of a good root ? And what is the evil
man, bat the man of an evil will ; that is, the tree of an
evil root? And the fruits of these two trees are acts,
words, thoughts; which if good proceed from a good will,
and if evil from an evil will It is not true, then,
as Pelagius says, that there is one and the same root of
good and evil men : for there is one root of good men,
viz. love ; and another root of evil men, viz. cupidity :
although it is true that that power is capable of both roots
— ilia possibilitas utriusque radicis est capax — because
a man is able not only to have love but also to have
cupidity.' *
He proceeds to say that love, which is the root of good
actions, is a free gift of (rod, and not given according to
our merits.
Now this passage evidently contains a different doctrine,
as to the source of our actions, from the doctrine of free
will. The doctrine of freewill is that we do possess a
power of taking both sides, and act well or ill according
as we use it ; that therefore good and evil acts may both
arise out of one root or one and the same moral condition
of the agent. But Augustine denies the residence in man
of a power to act either way, on the logical or speculative
ground of the absurdity of supposing, that both virtue and
vice can come out of the same moral condition of the
agent, as this neutral state of power would be ; and main
tains that human actions proceed either out of a moral
condition which necessarily produces right action, or out
of a moral condition which necessarily produces wrong.
He denies therefore the doctrine of freewill. He admits,
indeed, that man is capable of either moral condition —
or, to use his own language, capable of either root ; but
this is not the doctrine of freewill, which is, that the same
moral condition, or the same root, is capable of either
1 De Grat. Christi, c. xviii.
Augustinian CHAP.
fruit. The former is only the admission of the obvious
fact, that man has a capacity, in the first instance, both
for good and evil ; an admission which is quite consistent
with the subsequent necessity of either in him ; just as a
material is capable, in the first instance, of any one out of
many different forms; but when it lias once received a
particular form, is necessarily of that form which it has
received.
The whole of the book, however, De Gratia Ckristi, is
one comment on the adjutorium voluntcitis ei actionis, a,s
involving the sense of irresistible grace, as the following
passage on illuminating grace will exemplify: ' Our Lord
saith, " Every man that bath heard and hath learned of
the Father, cometh unto Me.'' Whosoever therefore doth
not come, of him it is not right to say, " He hath heard
arid learned, indeed, that he should come, but he does not
will to do what he has learned." That is not rightly said,
it' we speak of that mode of teaching which (rod employs
through grace. For if, as the truth saith. " Every man
that hath learned, cometh,'' if any man hath not come,
neither hath he learned. It is true, indeed, a man comes
or does not come, according to the choice of his will. But
this choice is alone if he does not come ; it cannot but be
assisted if he does come ; and so assisted as that he not
only knows what he should do, but also does what he
knows. Wherefore, when God teaches not by the letter
of the law, but by the grace of the spirit, He so teaches as
that what a man learns he not only perceives by knowing
it, but also pursues by willing it, and accomplishes by
doing it. By that Divine mode of teaching will itself and
action itself, not only the natural power of willing and
acting, are assisted. For, were our poiver alone assisted
by this grace, our Lord would have said, " Every man
that hath heard or hath learned of the Father is able, to
come to Me." But He has not said this, but " Every man
that hath heard and hath learned of the Father cometh
unto Me." Every man that hath learned of the
Father is not only able to come, but comes ; wherein not
CHAP. vr. Doctrine of Grace. 153
only the proficiency of the power, but the affection of the
will, and the effect of action is included.' l
The grace, then, to which Augustine gives the name
or description of ' adjutorium voluntatis et actionisj wo
find, on examining his own account and explanation of it,
to be endowed with the effect of action ; to be a grace,
not only given in order that such and such actions may be
done, but also causing those actions to be done in fact.
But such a phrase as ' adjutorium voluntatis et
actionis ' is obviously a very imperfect and awkward
description of irresistible grace ; being, in fact, not of
itself any description of it at all, but depending entirely
on the definition to which it is opposed and on the context
generally, for its meaning. Indeed, hitherto, Augustine
appears rather feeling his way toward some clear and exact
definition of the grace for which he is arguing, than really
defining if. His language as a whole has one evident
meaning ; but it is only as a whole that it has : it efiects
its object by large, varied, and diffuse statement and ex
planation ; but in aiming at point it altogether fails, and
cannot concentrate itself in definition. As his doctrine of
grace, however, obtains a more familiar hold of his- mind,
and perpetual controversy multiplies thought and language
about it, and the subject by being turned over repeatedly
is seen in every aspect, his ideas become more exact and
his choice of terms greater ; and out of the accumulation
of statements he is at last able to fix on one to serve as a,
complete definition of this grace.
In the book ' De Correptione et Gratia' he draws a
clear distinction between two different kinds of grace,
which he calls respectively ' an assistance without which a
thing cannot be done,' and ' an assistance by which a thing
is done' (adjutorium sine quo aliquid nonfit, and adju
torium quo aliquid fit). He first draws a strong dis
tinction between the wants of man before and man after
the fall, and then gives this as the corresponding distinction
in the nature of the grace by which these respective wants
are supplied. Man even beifore the fall, upright and per-
1 De Grat. Christi, c. xiv.
T54 Augitstinian CHAP. vi.
feet being as he was, and possessed of freewill, stood in
need of grace to enable him to act aright ; nor could he
do anything acceptable to Grod by his own natural strength.
But as an upright being and possessed of freewill he only
stood in need of assisting grace, he was strong enough to
have the ultimate choice of good and evil thrown upon
him, and only wanted grace to advance and aid the choice
when made. So great a burden might be placed upon him,
because he was able to bear it, and was no penalty, but the
sign of strength and perfection. To man, then, before
the fall 'an assistance without which a thing is not done'
was given ; that is to say, an assistance which he could not
do without, but which did not effect anything unless he
added the exercise of his own original choice to it, — that
which is commonly called assisting grace. But at the fall
this whole state of things ceased. The fall deprived man
of freewill, and inclined his nature irresistibly to evil. In
this state he was too weak to bear the ultimate choice of
good and evil being thrown upon him, and must perish if
it was. The grace, therefore, which is given to man after
the fall is not the assistance ' without which a thing is not
done,' but that ' with which a thing is done ; ' that is to
say, an assistance, upon which being given, the effect of a
renewed heart and renewed will follows certainly. A grace
is now given him suited to an entirely impotent nature,
wholly controlling choice and action, and leading irre
sistibly to good.
Augustine explains at length the difference between
these two kinds of grace, and" the reason for it: 'Adam
was in the midst of good which be had received from the
goodness of his Creator ; but the saints in this life are in
the midst of evil, out of which they cry aloud to Grod,
" Deliver us from evil." He amidst that good needed not
the death of Christ ; them from guilt, hereditary and per
sonal, the blood of that Lamb absolveth. He had not need
of that assistance which they implore, saying, " I see an
other law in my members warring against the law of my
mind, and bringing me into captivity to the law of sin
which is in my members." In them the flesh lusteth against
CHAP. YI. Doctrine of Grace. 155
the spirit, and the spirit against the flesh ; and in this
struggle, labouring and endangered, they ask for strength
through Christ's grace to fight and conquer. He, tried
and harassed by no such conflict, enjoyed in that place of
bliss internal peace.' l
c The first man, therefore, had an assistance, which he
could desert if he willed, and in which he would abide if
he willed ; not one by which he was made to will. This is
the first grace which was given to the first Adam : but a
stronger than this is given in the second Adam. For the
first is a grace of which the effect is, that a man may have
righteousness if he ivills : the second is a more powerful
one, of which the effect is, that he wills, and wills so
strongly and loves so ardently, that the will of the flesh is
conquered by the contrary will of the spirit. Nor was that
a small assistance by which the power of a concurrent free
will was acknowledged ; being so great, as that he could
not remain in good without it, though if he willed he could
desert it. But this is so much the greater, as that it is
not enough to say that lost freewill is repaired by it, not
enough to say that a man cannot attain to or abide in good
without it, but with it can if he will : except we add also,
that it makes him to wills'*
' For we must distinguish between one kind of assist
ance and another. There is one assistance, without which
something is not done, and another by which something
is done. For example, food is a thing without which we
cannot live ; but we have it and die. And therefore food
is an assistance without which it is not effected, not an
assistance by which it is effected, that we live. On the
other hand, if happiness be given to a man he is forthwith
happy. Happiness, therefore, is an assistance by which
something is, not an assistance without which something
is not, effected. The first man received the gift of being
able not to sin, able not to die, able not to desert good :
that assistance of perseverance was given him without
which he could not be, not an assistance by which he was
persevering. On the other hand, to the saints, who by
1 De Corr. et Grat. n. 29. 2 Ibid. n. 31.
156 Augustinian CHAP.
grace are predestinated to the kingdom of God, not such
an assistance of perseverance as this is given, but such an
assistance as that perseverance itself is given — tale ut eis
perseverantia ipsa donetur • not only a gift of perseve
rance, without which they cannot be, but a gift by which
they cannot but be persevering — non solum ut sine isto
dono perseverantes esse non possint? verum etiam ut per
hoc donurti non nisi perseverantes sint.1 .
' In truth, a greater freedom, and one fortified and con
firmed by the gift of perseverance, is necessary against so
many and so great temptations, such as there were not in
Paradise ; that, with all its affections, terrors, errors, the
world be conquered. This the martyrdom of the saints
has shown. For Adam, yielding to no terror, but rather
using his freewill against the command of a terrible God,
stood not firm in so great felicity, and so great facility of
avoiding sin : but they, against a world not terrible only
but raging, stood firm in the faith : though he saw those
present advantages which he was about to leave, and they
saw not the future ones which they were about to gain.
Whence this, but by His gift from' whom they obtained
mercy, that they might be faithful.2 ....
' Perseverance, then, was not given to Adam as a Divine
gift, but the choice of persevering or not was left to him
self, because his will, created as it was without sin and
without concupiscence, was furnished with such strength,
that it was worthy of such a choice being committed to
it; so great goodness and facility of living well was his.
But now, after that great freedom has been lost by sin, it
remains that human infirmity be assisted with greater
gifts.3 .... God not wishing His saints to glory in
their own strength, but in Him, gives them more than
that assistance which He gave to the first man ; for inas
much as they will not persevere except they both can and
will, He gives them by an act of free grace the power and
the will both. For if their own will were left in such a
way as that if they willed they would persevere, without it
1 De Corr. et Grat. n. 34. 2 Ibid. n. 35. 3 Ibid. n. 36,
CHAP. vr. Doctrine of Grace. 157
being provided that they should will, their will must suc
cumb amid so many infirmities, and persevere they coidd
not. Therefore such a succour is afforded to the infirmity
of their will as that by Divine grace action takes place,
without it being possible to fall away or be overcome.1
Thus, weak though it is, this will fails not and is not
conquered. The feeble will of man, through the Divine
strength, perseveres in a yet imperfect goodness, when the
strong and sound will of the first man did not in its more
perfect. The strength of freewill failed, because, through
that assistance of God without which a man cannot, if he
wills, persevere, was not wanting, such assistance as that
by which God works in a man to will, was. God left it
to the strong man to do, if he willed ; to the weak He has
reserved, as a gift from Himself, to will unconquerably
what is good and unconquerably persevere in it.' 2
Such is the distinction between the two kinds of grace
by which the spiritual wants of man before the fall and
after are respectively supplied, — the grace of the paradisal,
and the grace of the gospel dispensation. Under the former
dispensation grace was weak, because nature was strong ;
under the latter, grace is absolute, because nature is im
potent. Human nature is too corrupt and weak now to
have anything left to itself to do ; and it must be treated
as such, and be taken in hand with the understanding
that everything must be done for it. It is past all but the
strongest remedy, a self-acting one. The distinction rests
upon the doctrine of the fall of man and the change it in
troduced into his nature. The doctrine of the fall of man
asserts an essential change in the powers of his moral nature
to have followed from that event, in consequence of which
he cannot will or do anything aright now of his own natural
strength. But if man in natural state has not the power
to will aright, he has not, Augustine says, freewill. Ac
cordingly it is assumed in this argument that this is the
difference between man before, and man after the fall ; that
1 ' Ut divina gratia indeclina- though some editions have ' inse-
biliter et insuperabiliter ageretur.' parabiliter.'
The acknowledged MS. reading, * De Corr. et Grat. n. 38.
T-3 Augustinian CHAP. YI.
before he had a will which exerted a power of its own1, and
after has not ; and Augustine comes to the question of the
nature of Christian grace, with the understanding that
grace has now to deal with a being who has not freewill.
But what kind of grace, he then naturally argues^ is to
restore and reclaim such a being, to raise him to spiritual
life, and make him persevere in it, but an over-mastering
and controlling grace? Less power in the grace would
suffice if there were some in the being ; for if there is any
power in nature, the complement of it only is needed from
grace; but if there is none, grace must supply the whole.
Had man freewill, grace, to be suited to his condition, must
recognise it, leave it to act, and suspend its own effect upon
its action. But when man has freewill no longer, to leave
the effect of grace dependent upon his freewill is a mockery.
If he is to be reclaimed at all, he must then be reclaimed
by an absolute act of power, and grace must either do every
thing for him or do nothing.
Here there is a clear and express definition of irresis
tible or efficacious grace, — the assistance with which a
thing is done — adjutorium quo aliquid fit, — as distin
guished from assisting grace — adjutorium sine quo ali
quid non fit ; or, as abbreviated by the Jansenist divines,
the adjutorium quo, as distinguished from the adjutorium
sine quo non. According to this definition, if the grace
defined is given, the effect takes place — aliquid fit; the
renewal and conversion of the man follows in fact. By
this definition, then, the effect is made the test, whether
the grace is given or not ; and a grace, of which the bestowal
is thus tested, is by the very terms an irresistible and effi
cacious one.
But, while preceding statements are at last embodied
in a definition, the definition does no more than embody
and give point to them ; for a grace, of the bestowal of
which the effect is the test, has been described all along.
4 If every man that hath learned cometh unto Christ, if
any man hath not come, neither hath he learned.' 2 — ' If
1 Potentia liberi arbitrii.— De 2 De Grat. Christi, c. xiv.
Corr. et Grat. c. xi.
CHAP. YJ. Doctrine of Grace. 159
every one that hath heard and learned of the Father
cometh, whoever hath not come hath not heard or learned
of the Father. For if he had heard or learned, he would
have come. For there is no one that hath heard or learned,
and cometh not ; but every one, as saith the truth, that
hath heard and learned of the Father cometh.' l Here the
test of grace, whether it is given or not, is the effect. Tf
a man is admitted to hearing and learning, i.e. to illumi
nating grace, the effect of a new life or corning to Christ
follows : if this effect does not follow, he has not been ad
mitted to this gTace. We do indeed sometimes use the
words hearing and learning in the sense of a man's own act
of attending to what is told him, and profiting by what is
taught him ; and in this sense the words would express
here, not the enlightening grace of (rod, but a man's own
use of that grace ; and therefore not the giving of a grace,
but a man's own use of it, would be the thing tested here
by the effect. But the obvious sense of this passage, and
the whole nature of the discussion, to which it belongs,
exclude such a meaning of the words hearing and learning
here, which mean the fact of being told and being taught, or
the act of another telling or teaching. A certain teaching
of God, tHen2, that is to say, a grace, is the thing of which
the bestowal is in these passages tested by the effect ; and to
this purpose Augustine criticises the common saying, that
' God's mercy to us is in vain if we do not will,' remarking,
' I do not know how this can be said, for if God has mercy
we also will — si Deus miseretur etiam volumus : God has
mercy on no man in vain — nullius Deus frustra miseretur?*
This is to adopt the test of the effect. The saying ' Agis si
agaris — thou actest if thou art acted on 4 ' does the same,
its force lying in the contrast and inseparableness at the
same time of an influence on the man and an act of him.
The saying ' Grace gives merit, when it is given itself—
gratia dat rnerita cum donatur5^ the term merit meaning
1 DePrsed. c. viii. n. 12, 13.
2 Iste docendi modus quo per 4 Semi. 128. c. 7.
gratiatn docet Deus. 5 Ep. ad Vitalem, 217. n. 5.
8 De Div. QuKst. ad Simp. 1. 1.
Augustinian
CHAP. vr.
in Augustine's use of it right action, does the same. Again,
6 Grace is given, that the faults both of nature and will
may be conquered; for that which is impossible with man
is easy to God. But those to whom the grace of God is
not given become sinners, unrighteous men. Though these
too live for the advantage of the children of mercy, that
the sight of them may subdue their pride ; reminding them
that what has been given to them is God's free gift, and
not of their own deserving.'1 The test of the effect is
clearly adopted here ; the conquest of sin and continuance
in it being respectively attached to the bestowal of grace
and the withholding of it.2
A general body of language to the same effect must be
noticed, in which a holy disposition and conduct is put for
ward as a Divine gift and a Divine creation. It is certain
from revelation, that God is the Giver of every good thing ;
and this truth is applied absolutely by Augustine to the
subject of human action, which, when good, is described
as being a Divine gift. Conversion is a Divine gift —
donurn Dei etiam ipsa ad Deum nostra conversion : so is
obedience — donum obedientice ; a good life — bene vivere
donum divinum; merit or deserving action — Dei dona
sunt, et Dei gratia conferuntur universa merita justo-
rum4 ; perseverance — donum Dei perseverantia5 ; faith
in its beginning — 4 gratuito munere nobis datur6 ;' even
the very beginning, ' when men begin to have faith which
they had not — incipiunt habere fidem quam non habe-
bc/nt7 ;' faith in its increase — augmentum, incrementum,
supplement-urn fidei donum Dei.8
1 Op. Imp., Contra Jul. 1. iv. c. dicatur gratiam tanquam causam,
129. et operationem voluntatis bonam
- 'Nulla omnino medicinalis relut effectum, esse, tit philosophi
Christi gratia effectu suo caret ; sed loquuntur, convertibiles, et a se
omnis efficit ut voluntas velit, et mutuo inseparabiles.' — Jansen. De
a.liquid operetur. . . . Primo igitur Gratia Christi Salvatoris, 1. 2. c. 25.
hoe probat, quod apud Augustinum De Grat. et Lib. Arb. c. v.
gratia et opus bonum ita recipro- De Dono Pers. c. ii.
centur, ut quemadmodum ex gratia Ibid. c. i.
data mox effectum operis conse- Ep. 194. n. 12.
cutum inferre solet; ita vice versa, Ibid. 217. n. 29.
ex defoctu operis gratiam non esse 8 De Prsed. c. ii.
datam. Quo ratiocinandi modo in-
CHAP. vi. Doctrine of Grace. 1 6 1
Again, it is certain from revelation that God is the
Creator of every thing visible and invisible ; and this truth
is also applied absolutely by Augustine to the subject of
human action; which, when good, is described as being a
Divine creation. And if a reason is asked for this limita
tion, inasmuch as, according to the argument, God would
be the Creator of all action, good as well as bad, the an
swer is ready, that bad action, or sin, is not a thing , but
only a negation. Sin is c nothing,' according to Augustine.
The faculties of mind and body which are used in a sinful
action, are indeed things, and are the creatures of God:
but the sin itself is not a thing, and is consequently not a
creature. God is indeed the Author of all that is, of every
substance ; but sin is not a substance, and is not. It is a
declination from substance and from being, and not a part
of it ; true being and true substance being necessarily
good, and ' is good,' and ' is ' being convertible proposi
tions. It is unnecessary to enter at large here into this
distinction. It is obvious that some explanation or other
is wanted in order to prevent the conclusion that God is
the Author of evil ; and it is enough to say that this diffi
culty is seen and is in some way disposed of.
This idea of human virtue and piety, as a Divine crea
tion, is indeed, in itself, a scriptural one ; a point which
deserves consideration. The attribute of God as Creator,
in the strict sense of the word, is a truth almost peculiar
to the Bible ; for though this truth may be considered a
part of natural religion, it has not practically been brought
out under that dispensation ; the more general notion
having been, that God was the Former of the world, and
put it into shape, but was not the Maker of its substance.
The human mind appears to have had great difficulty in
reaching the idea of positive causation of existence, making
substance out of nothing ; such a power appearing even to
those who entertained a system of religion, and admitted
the existence of a Deity and our duties to Him, incredible,
fictitious, and monstrous. A material was accordingly
provided for the great Architect, ready at hand for Him
to work upon and put into shape ; and matter was made
M
Augustinian
CHAP. YI.
a co-eternal substance with the Deity. The timidity or
fastidiousness of philosophy thus weakened essentially the
great idea of God's omnipotence ; but the Bible sustains it
in a remarkable way upon this head. Exemplifying the
rule, that ' the foolishness of God is wiser than men, and
the weakness of God is stronger than men,' Scripture puts
forward prominently, and as a fundamental truth, that
very idea which appeared thus monstrous and untenable to
the philosopher, viz. that God is the true Creator of the
world, and made substance out of nothing.
This difference between the Bible and ancient philo
sophy is specially important as regards one division of the
creation, viz. the world invisible. Philosophy did not
speak of the intelligent soul as being a created substance,
but rather as being an emanation of the Divine mind ;
thus making it part of the Deity Himself, and forestalling
the peculiar subjection which it derives from creation. But
the Bible teaches that the intelligent soul is a created
substance, as truly as matter is. The subjection which
belongs to the creature thus attaches to the soul in the
system of the Bible ; the susceptibility to and need of in
fluence, the capacity for being moulded and controlled by
that Being by whom it was originally made, and depen
dence upon this moulding and controlling Power. The
Divine power in Scripture thus extends from the first act
of creating the substance of the soul to the kindred one of
creating it morally ; of forming and fashioning the inner
man, inspiring holy acts, imparting holy dispositions, and
confirming and sustaining them afterwards. This absolute
dominion over men and irresistible power over their hearts
is illustrated by the similitude of a potter, who makes what
he pleases of his clay ; now forming it and then breaking
it, now preserving it and then rejecting it.1 The New
Testament both interprets and sustains the language of
the Old ; appealing to this similitude and describing re
newed hearts as a Divine creation. ' Shall the thing formed
say to Him that formed it, why hast Thou made me
thus ? ' 2 'If any man be in Christ, he is a new creature.' 3
1 Isaiah, xxix. 16 ; xlv. 9 ; Ixiv. 2 Rom. ix. 20."
8 ; Jeremiah, xviii. 6. 3 2 Cor. v. 17.
CHAP. vi. Doctrine of Grace. 163
' In Christ Jesus neither circumcision availeth anything,
nor uncircumcision, but a new creature.' 1 ' We are His
workmanship, created in Christ Jesus unto good works,
which (rod hath before ordained, that we should walk in
them.' 2
This language, however, receives in Scripture a limita
tion of meaning from the general doctrine of man's freewill
which Scripture inculcates. But Augustine uses this
language absolutely, and adds to its strength and definite-
ness. Thus, ' (rod makes men good in order that they
may do good acts — ipse ergo illos bonos facit ut bona
faciant' 3 God ' makes faith— fidem gentium facit' 4
' He makes men believers — facit credentes' h God ' makes
men to persevere in good.' 6 ' God calls whom He vouch
safes to call, and makes whom He will religious — Deus
quos dignatur vocat, et quern vult religiosum facit : ' a
saying of S. Cyprian's, often quoted, on which he affixes a
literal meaning. ' Man never does good things which God
does not make him do — qua3 non facit Deus ut faciat
homo.' 7 ' The Holy Spirit not only assists good minds,
but makes them good — non solum mentes bonas adjuvat,
verum etiam bonas eas facit.' 8 ' There is a creation, not
that by which we were made men, but that of which a man
already created spoke, " create a clean heart in me ; " and
that of which speaks the Apostle, " If any man be in Christ,
he is a new creature." We are therefore fashioned and
created in good works, which we have not ourselves pre
pared, but God, that we should walk in them.' 9
Nor is this language used by S. Augustine in a qualified
sense, simply to express vividly the power of God's assisting
grace, as if giving and creating were meant by Him to be
conditional upon, and supplemental to, a certain exertion
of man's own freewill, understood though not expressed ;
for he distinctly disclaims this qualification, making a
difference in this very respect between the gift of obedience
1 Gal. vi. 15. 6 De Corr. et Grat c. xii.
2 Eph. ii. 10. 7 Contra Duas, Ep. 1. 2. c. xxi.
1 De Corr. et Grat. c. xii. 8 Ibid. 1. 4. c. vii.
4 De Prsed. c. ii. 9 De Grat. et Lib. Arb. c. 8.
* Ibid. c. xvii.
Augustinian
CHAP. vi.
or holiness and the ultimate gift of eternal life. Eternal
life is the gift of God, but it is given according to merit ;
that is, it is a gift upon certain conditions, viz. the con
ditions of obedience and holiness in the persons to whom
it is awarded. But the conditions themselves of obedience
and holiness are not given according to merit, but are gifts
unconditional and gratuitous. The gift of eternal life is a
reward, and not a gift only ; but that for which it is a reward
is not itself a reward, or given upon condition of endeavours
and exercise of will by the man himself, but is a free gift
— dona sua coronat Deus, non merita tua} — God crowns
His gifts and not thy merits. ' Eternal life is the recom
pense of preceding merits ; but those merits of which it is
the recompence are not prepared through our own suffi
ciency, but are made in us by grace ; it is given to merits,
but the merits to which it is given are themselves given
— data sunt et ipsa merita quibus daturS 2 God at the
last judgment has respect to His own gifts in those who
appear before Him, not distributing eternal life to this
person or that, according to His own sovereign will and
pleasure only, but according to a rule ; that is to say, ac
cording as persons show the possession of certain previous
gifts of His own to them ; but those gifts themselves are
not to be divested of their proper character of gifts because
a reward is based upon them, — :the second gift is indeed
upon the basis of the first, but the first gift is upon no
basis at all but the Divine will and pleasure. Here, then,
is a contrast which establishes the sense of the term gift
as used of the qualifications for eternal life, as the more
simple and natural one of a gift absolute, for so used it is
opposed to the gift conditional.
Thus he handles the text ' Turn unto Me, and I will
turn unto you3 ;' a text of which the natural meaning is,
that if a man does his part according to the power of free
agency which he possesses, God will do His in the way of
pardon and reward. ' They, the Pelagians, gather from
this text, that the grace wherewith God turns to us is given
as a reward for our own turning of ourselves to God ; not
1 See Note, p. 8. 2 Ep. 134. n. 19. 3 Zech. i. 3.
CHAP. vi. Doctrine of Grace. 165
considering that unless this very conversion to God were
the gift of God, it would not have been said, " Turn us,
Thou God of Hosts,"1 and '* wilt Thou not turn again and
quicken us," and " Turn us then, 0 God our Saviour,"2
and the like. What else is coming to Christ but turning
to Him by faith ? and yet He saith, " No man can come
unto Me except it were given him of my Father." '3 All
that this passage asserts is, that obedience is a gift of God
as well as salvation. But obedience is next made a gift
of God in distinction to salvation. ' When the Pelagians
say, that that grace which is given at the end — i.e. eternal
life, is awarded according to preceding merits, — I reply,
true, if they understand these merits themselves to be gifts
of God.' 4 'But how could the just Judge award the crown,
if the merciful Father had not given the grace ? How
could there be the crown of righteousness, if the righteous
ness by grace had not preceded ? How could this final
reward be given to merit, if the merit itself had not been
given as a free gift?'5 Here the qualified sense of gift, viz. as
a gift according to merit or upon the fulfilment of certain
conditions, is allowed of the ul'timate gift of eternal life,
only on the understanding that it is denied of the prepara
tory gift of the righteousness which qualifies for it. The
crown of righteousness is a reward, but the righteousness
itself is not a reward ; i.e. anything given in consideration
of preceding endeavours of man's own will. And the gift
of obedience is described as a gift residing in the indi
vidual previous to action of his own ; for Augustine lays
it down as the object of the institution of preaching, that
those who have this gift may be instructed as to the appli
cation of it — c ui qui haberent donum obedientice., quibus
jussis obediendum esset audirent?*
1 Ps. Ixxx. 7. gratia est: et ipsa enim gratis datur,
2 Ps. Ixxxv. 4. 6. quia gratis data est ilia cui datur.
3 John, vi. 65 ; De Grat. et Lib. Sed ilia cui datur tantummodo
Arb. c. v. gratia est: lisec autem quae illi datur,
4 Ibid. c. vi. quoniam praemium ejus est, gratia
5 Again : ' Itaque, charissimi, si est pro gratia, tanquam merces pro
vita bona nostra nihil aliud est justitia.' — C. viii.
quam Dei gratia, sine dubio et vita 6 De Dono Pers. c. xix.
seterna quse bonee vitae redditur, Dei
Augustinian CHAP.
There is another evidence of the sense in which Augus
tine uses the term gift, as applied to a holy life and conduct,
in an argument in constant use with him, drawn from the
fact of prayer. We pray, he says, not only for external
good things, but for spiritual dispositions and habits ; for
virtue, holiness, obedience, both for ourselves and others.
But a request implies that we suppose the thing asked for
to be in the gift of him from whom we ask it, and that he
is able to bestow it or not, according to his will and plea
sure, otherwise there is no reason to account for our asking.
If we ask God for holiness then, and obedience, it follows
that we suppose holiness and obedience to be properly in
His gift.1 ' If God so prepared and worked a good will in
a man as only to apply His law and teaching to his freewill,
and did not by a deep and occult vocation so act upon his
mind, that he complied with that law and teaching, beyond
a doubt it would be enough to expound and preach to that
man, and there would be no necessity to pray that God
would convert him or give him perseverance when con
verted. If these things are to be prayed for then, and you
cannot deny that they are to be, what remains, but that
you confess that these things are gifts ? for you must ask
God for what He gives.'2
It is evident that this argument defines an absolute
gift of holiness and obedience, for the force of the argu
ment lies in pushing the act of prayer to its extreme con
sequences ; and this is the logical consequence of prayer,
as a request for holiness and obedience from God, It is
undoubtedly of the very nature of prayer to suppose the
subject of its request to be simply in God's gift ; so far as
a thing is not in God's power to give, so far it is not the
1 ' Frequentationibus autem ora- a Deo non ostendit dandum esse
tionum simpliciter apparebat Dei nisi a Deo, cum poscendum ostendit
gratia quid valeret : non enim pos- a Deo. Qui enim non infertur in
cerentur de Deo quae prsecipit fieri, tentationem non discedit a Deo.'
nisi ab illo donarentur, ut fierent.'— ' Ecclesia orat ut increduli credant.
De Prsed. Sanct. c. xiv. Deus ergo convertit ad Mem. Orat
'Si alia documenta non essent, ut credentes perseverent : Deus ergo
dominica oratio nobis ad causam dat perseverantiam in finem.' — De
gratise quam defendimus sola sum- Dono Pers. c. vii.
ceret. Siquidem ut non discedamus 2 Ep. 217. ad Vitalem, n. 5.
CHAP. vr. Doctrine of Grace. 167
subject of prayer. If the act of prayer, then, in the case
of asking for goodness from God, is to be pushed to its
logical consequences, it must follow from it that goodness
is God's absolute gift. Upon the doctrine of freewill,
when the act of prayer extends to such requests as these,
it is understood in such a sense as to forestall this conse
quence of it ; but Augustine embraces himself, and presses
upon others the extreme consequences of prayer.
He adds that which is necessary to make this view a
consistent one, that prayer itself also is the gift of God ;
for it would be evidently inconsistent to make other
spiritual habits the gift of God, if that habit which was
a means to those was not a gift of God too.1
Another convincing proof of the sense in which Augus
tine uses the terms gift and creation, as applied to a holy
life, is his express connection of this gift with predesti
nation, and the referring of it to God's secret and myste
rious will. Had he simply meant by these terms that God
crowned man's own endeavours, and gave the increase if
man make a beginning, such a doctrine would have ap
proved itself naturally to our sense of justice, and would
not have needed any reference to mystery for its defence.
But Augustine bases this gift of holiness and obedience
upon mystery. ' Deaf as thou art, hear the apostle thank
ing God that they have obeyed the doctrine from the
heart; not that they have heard the doctrine preached,
but that they have obeyed it. For all have not obeyed
the Gospel, but those to whom it is given to obey ; just as
to know the mysteries of the kingdom of God is given to
some, but to others is not given.' 2
Again ; ' As begun and as perfected, faith is alike the
gift of God ; and that this gift is given to some and not
to others cannot be doubted without opposing the plainest
declarations of Scripture. Nor should this disturb any
believer who knows that from one man all went into justest
condemnation ; so that, were none rescued, God could not
be blamed, the real deserts even of those who are rescued
being the same with those of the damned. It belongs to
1 De Dono Pers. e. xxiii. ; Ep. 194. c. iv. 2 Op. Imp. 1. 2. c. 230.
[68 Augustinian CHAP. vi.
God's unsearchable judgments, and His ways past finding
out, why He rescues one man and not another. 0 man,
who art thou that repliest against God ? Bow to the re
buke, rather than speak as if thou knowest that which
God who wills nothing unjust has yet willed to be secret.' l
Again : ' God converts to faith. God gives perseverance.
God foreknew that He would do this. This is the predes
tination of the saints whom He elected in Christ before
the foundation of the world, that they should be holy and
without blame before Him in love, having predestinated us
unto the adoption of children by Christ Jesus to Himself,
according to the good pleasure of His will ; in whom we
have obtained an inheritance, being predestinated accord
ing to the purpose of Him who worketh all things after
the counsel of His own will But why is not the
grace of God given according to merit ? I reply, because
God is merciful. And why is He not merciful to all ? I
reply, because He is just. His justice on some shows how
freely His grace is given to others. Let us not then be
ungrateful, because according to the pleasure of His will,
and the praise of His glory, the merciful God frees so
many from a just perdition when He would not be unjust
if He freed nobody. From one man have all gone, not
into any unjust condemnation, but a just one. Whoever
is freed then, let him love the grace ; whoever is not freed,
let him acknowledge the justice. God's goodness is seen
in remitting, His equity in exacting, His injustice in
nothing.' 2 Again on the text ' It is He that made us and
not we ourselves.' ' He therefore makes sheep — facit
oves. ..... Why dost thou cast freewill in my teeth,
which will not free for righteousness except thou be a
sheep ? He it is who makes men sheep, who frees human
wills for works of piety. But why, when there is with
Him no respect of persons, He makes some men sheep,
and not others, is, according to the Apostle, a question
more curious than becoming. 0 man ! who art thou that
repliest against God ? Shall the thing formed say to Him
that formed it, Why hast Thou made me thus ? This ques-
1 De Praed. c. viii. 2 De Dono perg c yii ^^
- ... t '• . 'l
4rtne of\
CHAP. vi. Doctrine of Grace. 169
tion belongs to that abyss from which the Apostle shrank
with dread, exclaiming, u 0 the depth of the riches both
of the wisdom and knowledge of God ! " ^Thy
this man receives, and that man does not receive, when
neither deserves to receive, measuring thy strength, examine
not ; enough that we know that there is no iniquity with
Grod The vessels of mercy understand how en
tirely in their own case mercy is gratuitous, when those,
with whom they share one common lump of perdition,
receive their just punishment.' 1
In these passages the gift of obedience, the gift of
faith, the gift of perseverance., the creation of the holy
and good man, or sheep as he is called, are treated as the
effects of the Divine predestination, and are accounted for
on a mysterious principle. It is, therefore, a proper gift
and creation of which he is speaking, and not a mere
crowning of human endeavours after holiness, for which
such an account would be both superfluous and unsuitable.
For there could be no occasion to go to mystery for the
explanation of a proceeding of which so very natural and
intelligible account could be given, as of (rod's giving the
advancing and perfecting grace in proportion as man
exerts his own faculties and will.
To sum up briefly, then, the evidences, as far as we
have gone, of the Augustinian doctrine of grace ; there is
first an express definition of the nature of grace, under
the Gospel dispensation, arrived at after much thought
and effort, and much handling and discussing of the sub
ject; a definition according to which the grace of the
Gospel is an assistance productive of that effect upon
man's life and conduct for which it is given — adjutorium
cum quo fit. And this definition is sustained by a general
body of language describing goodness and holiness as a
Divine gift and a Divine creation, not in a secondary and
qualified but a natural and proper sense of the terms, as
shown by the caution annexed,, that this gift is not given
according to merit— i. e. according to any conditions which
man himself previously fulfils ; by the argument from
1 Contra Duas, Ep. Pel. 1. 4. c. 6.
I ' \
170 Augustmian CHAP. vi.
prayer, and by the express referring of this gift and this
creation to the mystery of the Divine predestination. But
a grace which is always productive of the effect upon, life
and conduct for which it is given — a grace which gives and
creates goodness absolutely is an effective or irresistible
grace.
This rationale is, then, confirmed by examples from
Scripture. 4 1 wish,' says S. Augustine to the Pelagian
who accounted for change of heart from bad to good by
self-discipline and self-mortification on the part of man,
which Divine grace seconded, ' I wish you would tell me
whether that Assyrian king whose bed the holy Esther
abhorred, when he sat on the throne of his kingdom, clad
in glorious apparel, and covered with gold and precious
stones, and was very dreadful, and looked at her with a
countenance inflamed with indignation, so that the queen
fainted with fear — whether that king had already " run
to the Lord, and desired to be led by Him, and suspended
his will upon His will, and by cleaving constantly to Him
had been made one spirit with Him " (he quotes the
Pelagian statement), "by the power of his freewill ; whether
he had given himself up to God, and mortified all his will,
and put his heart in God's hand." It would be madness
to think so ; and yet God converted him, and changed his
fury to mildness. But who does not see that it is a much
greater thing to convert an opposite indignation into mild
ness, than to convert a heart pre-occupied with neither
the one nor the other affection, but midway between the
two? Eead then, and understand, behold and confess,
that not by law and teaching from without, but by a mar
vellous and ineffable power within, God produces in the
hearts of men, not only true revelations, but also good
wills.'1
The particular conclusion from this passage is, that, in
the change from a bad to a good state of mind in the case
of Ahasuerus, Divine grace could not have waited for any
motive of the will ; his will having been up to the very
instant of that effect taking place violently opposed to such
1 De Gratia Christi, n. 25.
**rine of ,
CHAP. TI. Doctrine^ of Grace. 171
a change ; the general one is, that if grace alone turned
the raging and hostile will of that monarch, it can certainly
do the same with other wills in a more neutral state.
The conversion of S. Paul is appealed to as another in
stance of the operation of such a grace. ' I pardon you,'
he says to his Pelagian opponent Julian, ' that on a very
deep matter you are mistaken, as a man may be — ignos-
cendum est quia in re in multum abditd, ut homofalleris.
God forbid that the intention of the omnipotent and all-
foreseeing One should be frustrated by man. Little do
they think about, or small power have they of thinking
out a weighty matter, who suppose that God omnipotent
wills anything, and through weak man's resistance cannot
do it If, as you say, men are not recalled by any
necessity from their own evil intentions, how was the
Apostle Paul, yet Saul, breathing slaughter and thirsting
for blood, recalled from his most wicked intention by the
stroke of blindness and the terrible voice from heaven,
and from the prostrate persecutor, raised to be a preacher
and the most laborious one of all ? Acknowledge the work
of grace. But God calls one man in this way, and another
in that, whomever He prefers to call, and the wind bloweth
where it listeth.' * That is, acknowledge the work of God,
not only in this particular instance, but in all cases of con
version from a wicked to a holy life. The operation of a
grace absolutely determining the will of man comes, as it
were, visibly before us, as in the case of S. Paul. But
God calls one man in this way, and another in that —
alium sic, alium autem sic. Because He does not call
all those whom He calls in the same striking and visible
manner in which He called S. Paul, do not infer any differ
ence of principle upon which His calls are conducted ; for
the laws of God's spiritual dealings are uniform, and He
makes one saint in the same way fundamentally in which
He makes another. In the gentlest and most gradual
conversions, then, acknowledge the operation of the same
power which operates in that of S. Paul.
S. Peter is brought forward as another instance of the
1 Op. Imp. 1. i. c. 93.
172 Augffi&inian CHAP. vr.
operation of such a grace upon the will ; or of grace alone
and by itself determining it or causing the particular will
of the man to be the will which it is. ' What will you
oppose to the text " I have prayed for thee, Peter, that thy
faith fail not ? " * Will you dare to say that even the prayer
of Christ could not have procured indefectible faith for
Peter, had Peter wished that it should fail ; that is, had
been unwilling to persevere ? As if Peter could possibly
will anything else but what Christ had prayed that he
should will ! True, indeed, Peter's faith would have failed,
if Peter's will to be faithful had failed. But the will is
prepared by the Lord, and therefore Christ's prayer for him
could not be ineffectual.'2 This passage is clear. Peter's
faith would have failed if Peter's will had ; but Peter's will
would not be anything else but what God had determined
it to be, and (rod had determined that it should be faith
ful.
It remains now to inquire whether anything is said of
the nature or quality of this grace in itself— itself, I mean,
as distinguished from its effects, by which alone it has
hitherto been described. And to this question the answer
is, that Augustine identifies this grace with the disposi
tion of love.
Christian love is a general affection toward God and
man, productive of all the virtues and the whole of obe
dience. ' Love is the fulfilling of the law.' 3 « If we love
one another, God dwelleth in us and His love is perfected
in us.'4 But this love is, according to the doctrine of free
will, a result, an ultimate habit, gained by the endeavours
of the man himself assisted by Divine grace. But in the
system of Augustine it appears as a primary disposition
imparted to the soul by an act of free grace ; not the reward
and effect of, but a gift preceding and producing, a good
course of life. That which is the infallible root of general
obedience is implanted in the man at the outset. The
grace of love is infused into his heart. In consequence of
the indwelling of this gift, he cannot but take pleasure in
1 Luke, xxii. 32. » Rom. xiii. 10.
De Corr. et Grat. c. viii. 4 1 John, iv. 12.
CHAP. vi. Doctrine of Grace. 1 73
God's law, obeying it not out of servile fear and in the
spirit of bondage, but in the freedom of a renewed and
converted inclination. The gift of love makes that sweet
to him which before was difficult, nay impossible. Not
that those who have the gift enjoy the full virtue of it all
at once, and immediately find a holy life pleasant to them ;
but in proportion as the virtue of it comes out, they do find
this result ; and the gift ultimately, by means of this power
inherent in it of accommodating the human will to the
Divine, inclination to law, does produce a saving and
acceptable obedience.
Thus, in a passage which has been quoted, Augustine
lays down one root of good men, viz. love, and another root
of evil men, viz. cupidity ; adding, ' The virtue of love is
from God, and not from ourselves, for Scripture says, " Love
is God, and every one that loveth is born of God and
knoweth God ;" and " Whosoever is born of God doth not
commit sin," and that because " he cannot sin." Nor have
our preceding merits caused this love to be given us ; for
what good merits were we able to have at the time when
we did not love God ? That we might have that love, we
were loved before we had it ; as the Apostle John saith,
" Not that we loved God, but that He loved us," and " We
love Him because He first loved us." For what good could
we do if we did not love, or, how can we not do good if
we do love 1 1 '
Here love, which is described as a necessary root of good
action, or involving a good life in the individual who has
it, is also made an original and primary gift of God to
man. ' Who hath it in his power to secure, either that
something delighting should come across him, or that it
should delight him when it does ? When a holy life delights
us then, this delight is inspired and given by the grace of
God, and not gained by our own will, or endeavours, or
works ; this very will, these very endeavours, and these very
works, being His gifts.' 2
Again : ' When we ask assistance from Him to work
righteousness, what ask we but that He should open what
1 De Grat. Christi, c. xxi.^ seq. 2 De Div. Qwest, ad Simpl. 1. 1. n. 21.
AugMstinian CHAP.
was hid, and make sweet what was unpleasant ? .....
There precedes in the will of man a certain appetite for its
own power, so that it "becomes disobedient through pride.
Were this appetite away, nothing would be difficult, and
man, as he now seeks his own will, would quite as easily
not have sought it. But there has come upon him, as a
just punishment, such a corruption of nature, that it is now
disagreeable to him to obey the Divine law. And unless
this corruption is overcome by assisting grace, no one is
converted to obedience ; unless healed by the operation of
grace, no one enjoys the peace of obedience. But by whose
grace is he conquered and healed, but by His to whom it
is said, " Turn us, then, 0 God our Saviour, and let Thine
anger cease from us "? which, if He does to any, He does
to them in mercy ; while to those to whom He does it not
He does it not in judgment. And who shall say to Him
(whose mercy and judgment all pious minds celebrate),
what doest Thou ? Wherefore even His saints and faithful
servants He heals slowly in some faults, so that good de
lights them less than is sufficient for fulfilling the whole
law ; in order that, tried by the perfect rule of His truth, no
flesh may be justified in His sight. Nor is such imperfec
tion intended for our condemnation, but only our humbling,
and to remind us of our dependenca on this same grace ;
lest, attaining facility in everything, we think that our own
which is His ..... Let us be wise, and understand that
Grod sometimes does not give even to his saints, with respect
to any work, either a certain knowledge, or a victorious
delight — victricem delectationem — in order that they may
know that not from themselves but from Him is that light
by which their darkness is illuminated, and that sweetness
by which their land yields her fruit.' 1
Love, which he calls delight and sweetness, is described
in this passage as a ' conquering ' or irresistible grace ; upon
the bestowal of which certain effects of life and conduct
follow naturally, though not always in a full measure, but
only in proportion to the amount imparted of the gift
1 De Pecc. Mer. et Eem. 1. 2. c. xix.
CHAP. vi. Doctrine of Grace. 175
itself. And being such a gift, it is described as a free gift ;
not half given by God, half attained by man, or given in
proportion to our natural striving after it. For why it is
given to one more than another he treats as a mystery, or
a question belonging to the secret counsels of God ; whereas,
on the latter supposition there would have been no diffi
culty to account for. Moreover, the gift is described
throughout as preceding and producing action, and not
following it.
Again : ( The appetite for good is from God ; the most
high, unchangeable good ; which appetite is love, of which
John saith, " Love is of God." Not that its beginning is
of us, and its perfecting of God, but that the whole of love
is from God. For God avert such madness as to make
ourselves prior in His gifts and Him posterior ; seeing, it
is said, " Thou preventest him with the blessings of sweet
ness." For what can be meant here but that appetite for
good of which we speak. For good begins to be desired
as soon as it begins to be sweet. But when good is done
through fear of punishment, and not through love, good is
not done well. It is done in the act, but not in the heart,
when a man would not do it if he could refuse with im
punity. The blessing of sweetness is therefore given as
a grace whereby that which is commanded delights us, and
is desired and loved.'1 Again : ' If grace co-operates with
a previously existing good will, and does not prevent and
produce that will, how is it truly said that " God worketh
in us to will," and that the will is prepared by the Lord,
and that " Love is of God," love which alone wills beatific
good ? ' 2 Again : ' When the love of God is shed abroad
in our hearts, not that love is meant with which He loves
us, but that love by which He makes us lovers of Him ;
as the righteousness of God is that by which He makes
us righteous of free grace, and the salvation of God that
by which He saves us, and the faith of Jesus Christ that
by which He makes us believers.'3 Again : God alone gives
1 Contra Duas, Ep. 1. 2. c. riii. 8 De Spirit, et Lit. c. xxxii.
2 Op. Imp. 1. I.e. 95.
1 76 Augustinian CHAP. TI.
love; for "Love is of God." This you will not reckon
among your assistances of grace, lest you should concede the
truth, that the very act of obedience is of that grace.'1
Again : ' Thou mentionest many things by which God
assists us, viz. by commanding, blessing, sanctifying, coerc
ing, exciting, illuminating ; and then mentionest not, by
giving love ; whereas John saith " Love is of God," and
adds, " Behold what manner of love the Father hath
bestowed on us, that we should be called the sons of God." '2
Again : ' If among the kinds of grace you refer to you
would place love, which the Scriptures most plainly declare
to be not from ourselves but from God, and to be a gift of
God to His own sons, that love without which no one lives
piously, and with which a man cannot but live piously ;
without which no one has a good will, and with which a
man cannot but have a good will, you would then define a
true freewill, and not inflate a false one.' 3
Throughout these passages the gift of love is described
as a disposition of mind necessarily productive of holy
action, and at the same time it is described as the- gift of
God without any qualification of the simple and natural
sense of that term. And, lastly, this gift is identified ex
pressly with efficacious or irresistible grace, as that grace
was formally defined above ; it being described as a gift
'with which a man cannot but live piously — cum qua
nemo nisi pie vivitj which is a repetition of the language
above — £ adjutorium cum quo aliquid jit ; donum per
quod non nisi perseverantes suntS 4
Having thus shown, what it was the object of this
chapter to show, that Augustine held the doctrine of
efficacious or irresistible grace, I shall conclude with two
observations.
It is evident, then, in the first place, that this doc
trine is no more than a supplemental one to the doctrine
of predestination described in the preceding chapter. If
there be a Divine decree predestinating from all eternity
antecedently to any acts of their own certain individuals
Op. Imp. 1. 3. e. 114. " Op. Imp. 1. 3. e. 122.
Ibid. 1. 3. c. 106. * Pp. 163. 165.
CHAP. vr. Doctrine of Grace. 177
of the human race to everlasting life, there must be an
instrument for putting this decree into effect. The grace
of which the discussion has occupied this chapter is this
instrument. It imparts absolutely to the predestinated
persons those acts and dispositions which are the condi
tions of this final reward. The Divine decree, in ensuring
this end to certain persons, ensures them the means to it ;
but piety and virtue are the necessary means for attaining
this end ; this decree therefore necessarily involves, as its
supplement, a grace which ensures the possession of piety
and virtue.
In the next place I will guard the reader against a
mistake which is not unlikely to arise with respect to
this doctrine. For it may be asked whether the assertion
of an efficacious or irresistible grace involves more than
maintaining that there is such a grace which Gfod chooses
to give to certain select and privileged persons, without
maintaining that it is the only grace by which holiness
and salvation can be obtained ? Whether it cannot be
held that God gives an irresistible grace to some, and also
gives a sufficient grace to the rest? Whether the higher
gift to a select number, which ensures holiness, is not com
patible with the lower one to the rest, which gives them
the power to attain it ?
But, indeed, if we consider the matter, such a question
as this will be seen to proceed from a confusion of thought
on this subject. For upon what ground does any one hold
that there is this irresistible grace, except on the ground
that human nature needs it, and cannot do without it ?
but if human nature cannot do without it, nothing short
of it is sufficient. This is the ground on which Augustine
raises the doctrine, and on which all who do maintain it
do maintain it. Indeed, on what other ground can it be
seriously maintained ? For whether or not it might
attach as a superfluity to a nature able to do without it, its
existence could not be other than a mere conjecture in
such a case. For asserting its existence there must be an
adequate reason given ; and what adequate reason can
be pretended, except that which is given, viz. that it is
N
1 78 Augustinian Doctrine of Grace. CHAP. TI.
necessary ? Were this grace, then, maintained as a super
fluity, there might consistently be maintained together
with it another grace short of it, and only sufficient ; but
it is maintained as remedial to a fatal disease, as supple
mental to an absolute want. The first dispensation did
not provide it because man could do without it ; the second
provides it because he cannot. If an irresistible grace then
is maintained at all, it cannot be maintained as a grace
along with the other or merely assisting one, but must be
maintained as the grace of the Grospel dispensation, — the
grace by the operation of which all the goodness and holi
ness there is in men arises. To endeavour, then, to com
bine it in one system with the other would be to treat it
apart from and in opposition to the very ground on which
we suppose it to exist. The doctrine of an absolute pre
destination cannot combine with any other account of the
origin of human goodness ; it must either be denied alto
gether, or applied to the whole. An antecedent moral
inability in the whole human mass is the very occasion
of that decree, which is made for no other reason than
to provide a remedy for it. It follows, that while those
who are affected by its remedial provisions are endowed
with that certainty of attaining to holiness which they
impart ; those whom the decree does not affect remain in
their original inability ; and therefore, that, besides those
who have an irresistible grace, there are none who have
sufficient.1
1 Bishop Overall appears to have firmity, and that the salvation of
fallen into the error of endeavour- men might be more certain, that
ing to combine irresistible grace to He thought good to add a special
some with sufficient grace to all: grace, more efficacious and abun-
' These two things agree very well dant, to be communicated to whom
together, that God, in the first He pleased, by which they might
place, proposed salvation in Christ not only be able to believe and
to all, if they believed, and common obey, if so inclined, but also actu-
and sufficient grace in the means ally be inclined, believe, obey, and
divinely ordained, if men were not persevere.'— Overall on the Quin-
wanting to the Word of God and quarticular Controversy, quoted by
to the Holy Spirit ; then, secondly, Mr. Goode, ' Effects of Infant Bap-
that He might help human in- tism,' p. 129.
vii. Doctrine of Final Perseverance. T 79
CHAPTER VII.
AUGUSTINIAN DOCTRINE OF FINAL PERSEVERANCE.
IN the preceding chapter it has been shown that the grace
of the Grospel dispensation is, according to the doctrine
of S. Augustine, an efficacious and irresistible one. But
the question still remains in what measure this grace is
given, how much of it is required for accomplishing the
object for which it is designed, viz. the individual's salva
tion. Must it be given to him in perfect fulness, i.e.
every moment and act of his life without exception ? Or
is a less measure of it sufficient ? and if so, what is that
measure ?
The answer to this question is, that the measure of
this grace which is required for salvation is the same as
the measure, whatever it may be, of goodness and holiness
which is required. As this grace is the efficacious cause
of goodne-s, exactly as much is wanted of the cause as is
wanted of the effect. And to ask this question is exactly
the same as to ask, how much goodness is required for
salvation.
If the question, then, be asked, how much goodness is
required for salvation ? while it is plain that no definite
amount can be fixed upon in answer, a certain indefinite
one can be. Disobedience and sin for an indefinite portion
of life are not incompatible with it ; but a man must on
the whole have manifested a good character. And if it be
asked, further, what constitutes such a manifestation, and
what is the test of goodness on the whole ? the answer is,
the end of life — that which the man is at the close of the
state of probation in which he has been placed.
The amount of efficacious grace, then, which is required
in order to salvation, is that which produces this final state
of goodness, i.e. the grace of final perseverance. And
therefore I shall endeavour, in this chapter, to explain the
doctrine of final perseverance ; first as a test, and secondly
as a grace.
H 2
iSo Augustinian Doctrine CHAP. TH.
I. It will be evident, on slight consideration, that the
doctrine of final perseverance, so far as that doctrine is
simply the adoption of a particular test of an acceptable
and saving obedience, is no predestinarian one, but simply
one of morals and religion. Some test is wanted of what
constitutes in the individual goodness on the whole ; and
this doctrine supplies a test, viz. the character of the indi
vidual at the end of life. The doctrine does not, indeed,
in form adopt the end of life, but continuance up to the
end, as this test. But it is evident that in continuance
up to the end, nothing is ruled as to when that course of
goodness which is to be thus continued is to begin. The
literal and absolute end of life is, indeed, excluded as such
a point of commencement ; for there cannot be continuance
up to the end if the end takes place immediately. But,
interpreting the end of life liberally, it is left open in this
test whether such goodness commences at the beginning
of life, or at the middle, or at the end. And though an
obedience which continues up to the end is doubtless more
valuable if it commenced at the beginning of life than if
it commenced at the middle, and if it commenced at the
middle of life than if it commenced at the end, still so
long as it begins in sufficient time to be a fair and sub
stantial continuance in goodness, it fulfils the requirements
of the test.
The principle, then, on which such a test goes, and on
which it recommends itself to adoption, is the obvious and
natural one, embodied in the old maxim rs\os opa, look
to the end, the principle, that the end determines the
character of the whole to which it belongs. This rule
applied to the case of man's moral character leads us to
decide, that if he ends virtuously he is on the whole a good
man ; or, on the other hand, that if he ends immorally, he
is on the whole a bad man. Solon, indeed, applied this
rule to determine the question, not of a man's moral cha
racter, but of his happiness in life ; and here it does not
literally apply. For it cannot be said to be true, that the
happiness of a man's life does depend on the happiness or
misery of its end ; because happiness being a thing of
CHAP. VIT. of Final Perseverance. 181
present sensation, if the sensation has been, there has been
happiness. The fact has already taken place, then, before
the end comes ; and whatever that end may be, it cannot
cause what has taken place not to have. A man therefore
who has had uninterrupted happiness up to the end of his
life, but has then fallen into misfortune, has undoubtedly
had more happiness than one who has been miserable up
to the end of his life, but has then become prosperous.
Solon's assertion applies properly not to the state and con
dition of the persons themselves, but to their position in
the minds of the survivors ; for we naturally think of a
man afterwards as we last knew him. However pros
perous, therefore, a man has been up to the end, if at the
end he falls, then, inasmuch as that is the last we saw of
him, and he disappeared from that time, and was no more
seen, we carry his image in our minds connected with this
fall and adversity. If the melancholy association is the
last in order, it cannot be corrected, but is fixed and un
changing ; and the same is true of the contrary one. It
was a natural law of association, then, which the philoso
pher observed, of which this was the result. When he
said that a man's happiness in life was decided by its end,
that end was imagined as still going on ; it was not the
real termination of life but an ideal continuation of it, and,
as being ideal, unending, for we can always summon the
idea. The two young men who, after their work of piety
in drawing their sacred mother to the temple, fell asleep
in the holy precincts and died, enjoy an eternal rest in
OUT minds. Their sweet and blissful repose still in idea
goes on. And so the other who died in victory fighting
for his country enjoys an eternal transport in our minds.
The image of repose, and the image of glory stay for ever.
Such an ideal end of life, were it real, would indeed be the
test of a man's happiness in life ; because the eternal con
tinuation of a life is the greater portion of it, and the
happiness of the greater portion is the happiness of the life
as a whole. But the literal end of life is no such test.
But a test which is deceptive as applied to the estima
tion of a man's happiness is true as applied to the estimation
Augustinian Doctrine
CHAP. YTI.
of his goodness. For there is a peculiarity in the composi
tion or organisation of moral character which makes it
apply. It might appear, indeed, at first sight, that as
happiness is present sensation, so goodness is present action;
and therefore, that if any portion, large or small, of a man's
life has been conducted well, there has been so much good
ness which cannot be reversed, whatever state of sin may
succeed it. But this is not a true statement of the case.
Present action is certainly present goodness, goodness for
the time ; but goodness for the time is not goodness abso
lutely. Moral character is subject to this law, that change
in it affects not only the individual's present life, but his
relation to his former, disconnecting him with it. The
change from bad to good conduct disconnects him with the
bad ; the change from good to bad disconnects him with
the good, (rood after bad and bad after good, exert each
a rejective power over the past, to his loss and to his relief
respectively. For a man cannot turn from bad to good
conduct sincerely and heartily without such a sense of
aversion, grief, and disgust for his former life as amounts
to a putting it away from him, a severance of it from his
proper self; and in like manner he cannot turn from a good
behaviour to a bad entirely, without such an indifference to
or contempt of virtue as amounts to a disowning and rejec
tion even of his own. Thus he loses his property in one
set of actions as he turns to another. The actions, indeed,
that he has performed remain for ever his in the sense that
he is the person that performed them ; but they cease to be
his in the sense that they affect his character. From this
law, then, it follows necessarily, that the character of the
man is the character which he has at last, inasmuch as he has
no other but that, being dispossessed, by the fact of having
it, of any different one which he may have had before. The
question of property in acts is the whole of the question of
the goodness or badness of the man ; for how can his pre
vious actions, good or bad, affect Mm, except they belong
to him ? This law, then, determines the question of pro
perty in acts, and it determines it by the fact of what come
latest. The man's previous virtue or vice for the time are
CHAP. vii. of Final Perseverance. 183
not his absolutely, unless they are his then ; they wait in
suspense for that final appropriation. The question of
property in the case of happiness or pleasure is perfectly
simple ; for happiness being only a present sensation, can
only belong to the present possessor, but goodness is more
than present action, and therefore wants another proprietor
besides the present agent.
Indeed, one view which is held of change of character
in persons rejects the idea of real or substantial change in
them altogether, and, whatever they become at last, regards
them as having been really of that character from the first.
According to this view, change is interpretative simply and
not actual, as regards the man's substantial temper ; it only
shows that his former character was superficial, and that
he had at the time another underneath it, which was really
his character, in spite of appearances. Thus the end in
terprets the whole of life from its beginning, and we wait
in suspense till it arrives, in order to ascertain not what a
man will on the whole turn out, but what he has been all
along. This view rests for its ground upon a certain pre
sumed necessity for a unity of the moral being. It appears
to be dividing one person into two, to say that he was once
a good man, and is now a bad man ; and the division of
his moral unity is considered to be as much a contradiction
as the division of his personal. The popular aspect, then,
of change of character, as an actual change or division of
it, is used as a convenience, just as a metaphor might be
used which expressed a truth with practical correctness and
perhaps even greater vigour than a literal statement would,
while another and a deeper view is really taken of such
change.
And this explanation of change of character is un
doubtedly a natural and true one, properly understood, and
with a certain limitation. A man who changes his cha
racter cannot indeed be said to have had his later character
before in the same sense in which he has it after, nor can
such a meaning be intended ; at the same time he must
have had this character before in the sense of having its
seed or root, — that out of which it grew. For it is contrary
184 Augustinian Doctrine CHAP. vn.
to experience and common sense to suppose that a change
of character can take place all at once, without previous
preparation and growth ; nor can there be any doubt that
men have even the sure root of alteration in them a longer
or shorter time before they actually alter — i.e. the altered
character itself, before it comes out and manifests itself ;
the substance having existed in the shape of secret habits
of mind, of which the formation may date very far back.
But if the idea of moral unity is pushed further back than
this, and the root which contains the man's subsequent
character be made coeval with the man, this cannot be
done without entrenching upon freewill ; and therefore such
a supposition, though it may be entertained as an approach
to some truth on this subject with which we are unac
quainted, cannot be entertained absolutely. I will add,
that we find in Scripture both aspects of change of charac
ter; the popular aspect of it as real change, and the esoteric
as only external. The prophet Ezekiel uses the former
when he says, ' If the wicked will turn from all his sins
that he hath committed and keep all My statutes, and do
that which is lawful and right, he shall surely live, he shall
not die. All his transgressions that he hath committed
they shall not be mentioned unto him ; in his righteousness
that he hath done he shall live. But when a righteous
man turneth away from his righteousness, and committeth
iniquity, and doeth according to all the abominations that
the wicked doeth, shall he live? All his righteousness
that he hath done shall not be mentioned : in his trespass
that he hath trespassed, and in his sin that he hath sinned,
in them shall he die.' l St. John uses the latter when he
says, ' They went out from us, but they were not of us ;
for if they had been of us they would no doubt have con
tinued with us ; but they went out that they might be made
manifest that they were not all of us.' 2
The doctrine of final perseverance, then, so far as it is
the adoption of a test of saving goodness, is only the doc
trine of trial and probation explained. The doctrine of
trial and probation is, that we are placed in this world in
1 Ezekiel, xviii. 21, 22, 24. z l john} H 19>
CHAP. vir. of Final Perseverance. 185
order to prove by our actions whether we are worthy of
reward or punishment in an eternal world to come. The
doctrine of final perseverance is, that those actions are not
estimated simply with regard to quantity, but also with
regard to order ; that what constitutes a good or bad life
is not the mere aggregate of them, in which case it would
not signify whether they came at the beginning or end of
life, for so long as there was enough of them to satisfy the
Judge, it would be indifferent how the number was made
up ; but their succession, whether prior or posterior in life :
in other words, not the acts themselves, but their relation
to the man, whether they are appropriated by him or not ;
for this is what their order of prior or posterior tests.
And as the doctrine of final perseverance as a test is
only the doctrine of trial and probation explained ; so the
objections to it on the ground of justice are only of the kind
which attaches to the general doctrine of trial and proba
tion. The doctrine indeed that the whole period of trial
must be judged by its termination, prominently suggests
the question, in the case of a bad termination of it, Why
is this period terminated now ? As the end makes all the
difference, why could not that end have been postponed ?
Why could not the period have been extended to sufficient
length to give room for another, and so, by a small addi
tion to its duration, the whole of its effects have been re
moved ? But it is evident that this objection applies to
the end of all trial whatever, and upon whatever rule pro
ceeding, whether that of the order of actions or of the
aggregate simply. In either case a longer period might,
as far as we see, have produced a different issue from that
of a shorter one. The whole doctrine of trial and proba
tion is indeed incomprehensible to us ; for, whereas proba
tion must in the nature of the case be limited, we cannot
understand how a limitation of it can be so arranged as to
be perfectly just and equitable ; how it is that a person at
a particular time is completely tried and proved : notwith
standing which difficulty, the doctrine of trial and proba
tion is a doctrine both of revelation and natural religion.
The test of final perseverance does indeed, in some of
1 86 Augustinian Doctrine CHAP. vn.
its applications, appear to be open, not only to this objec
tion, which applies to all limited probation, that we do not
see its justice, but to a positive charge of injustice. For
in the case of a person who has lived uprightly and reli
giously up to the end of life, but has then yielded to some
temptation and fallen into sin, it does appear unjust that
the end should undo the whole of the life previous, and
deprive him of any advantage from it ; and the rule of final
perseverance seems at first to impose such a result. But
this will be found, upon consideration, not to be the case.
The rule of final perseverance is the rule, that a man must
be judged according to his final character ; but what in a
particular case is the final character it does not and can-
nob determine. Some rules indeed are of such a kind that
they appear when laid down to decide their own applica
tion ; and the rule which identifies a man's character, good
or bad, with his final one, will appear, unless we are on our
guard, to decide the particular fact of his final character,
its goodness or badness ; the change which is presented to
observation in the particular case appearing to be, without
any further reflection, the change which is supposed in the
rule. But it is evident that we should be deceived here
by an apparent connection between two things which are
really separate. No rule can possibly decide its own appli
cation ; it supposes the case to which it applies and does
not discover or select it. On the question, whether such
and such a case is one of change of character, we must take
the best evidence which our own experience and observa
tion can apply, as we would on any other question of fact.
In the case of a man who at the end of a life of steady
virtue falls into sin, we ought certainly to be slow to believe
th;it such sin is a real change of character. His previous
good life, though of no avail as a counterbalance, supposing
a real change from it, is yet legitimate evidence on the
question whether there is such change ; and evidence, as
far as it goes, against it. For there is a difficulty in sup
posing that one who had evinced such steadiness and con
stancy should*fall away really, however he might appear
to do so; and both reason and charity direct us to a
CHAP. VIT. of Final Perseverance. 187
favourable supposition, except something very peculiar in
the case prevents it.1
The rule of final perseverance, then, as a test, is not
itself unjust ; but whether it is unjust or not in its applica
tion depends upon our discrimination and charity in apply
ing it. This rule is not intended to over-ride our natural
ideas of justice, as if because we admitted it, we allowed a
self-applying power to it, to which those ideas must suc
cumb ; but those ideas of justice must be our guide in
applying the rule. We must apply it then in the particular
case, according to the evidence ; and remember that, after
all, we cannot apply it with certainty, because God only
knows the final state of man's heart. There cannot in that
case be any unjust application of the rule^ because its
application will be suspended altogether. Indeed this rule,
when we go to the bottom of it, issues after all in being
substantially no more than the rule that a man must be
judged according to his character ; for by a man's character
we meanhis final character, and no character previous to it.
The rule then is certain, because it is no more than the rule,
that the good are rewarded and the bad punished ; but it
cannot be applied to the individual with certainty, because
we do not know who are the bad, and who are the good.
II. Final perseverance has thus far been treated of as
a testy in which sense the doctrine is no predestinarian one,
but only one of ordinary religion and morality. But it
remains to see what produces, in the Augustinian system,,
this saving obedience of which final perseverance is the
test, that is, to consider final perseverance as a grace.
Final perseverance, then, is maintained by S. Augustine
to be the free gift of God; that is to say, not a gift
bestowed in consideration of the man's previous acts, or as
an assistance to his own efforts, but an absolute gift bestowed
upon certain individuals of the human race, in accordance
1 The following is not a cautious tari potest, si donee moreretur fide-
statement of S. Augustine's, though liter vixit, quam multorum annorum,
it admits of explanation : Potius si exiguum temporis ante mortem a
hanc perseverantiam habuit unius fidei stabilitate defecit. — De Dono
anni fidelis et quantum infra cogi- Perseverantise, c. 1.
1 88 Augmtinian Doctrine CHAP. vn.
with an eternal Divine decree which has predestinated them
to the privilege of it. This is quite evident from the pre
vious chapter, and requires strictly no further proof. For
there is no necessity, after it has been shown that all good
ness under the Christian dispensation is on the Augustinian
doctrine a free and absolute Divine gift, to show that a
particular measure and degree of it is upon the same doc
trine such a gift ; and final perseverance is, as I have shown,
only a particular measure and degree of goodness ; such a
one, viz., as avails for the man's salvation. What is said
of the whole is of course said of the part. Nevertheless,
the grace of final perseverance occupies so prominent a
place in the Augustinian system, that it appears proper to
explain the position of this grace in particular, and to
show that what is said of grace in general is said of this
measure of it.
In the first place, then, S. Augustine says generally that
final perseverance is a gift. ' Will any one dare to assert
that final perseverance is not the gift of Grod ? . . . . We
cannot deny that final perseverance is a great gift of Grod,
coming down from Him of whom it is written, " Every good
gift and every perfect gift is from above, and corneth down
from the Father of lights." ' * ' Perseverance is the gift of
Grod, by virtue of which a man perseveres in Christ unto
the end.' 2 ' We pray that the unbelieving may believe :
faith, therefore, is the gift of Grod. We pray that the
believing may persevere : final perseverance, therefore, is
the gift of Grod.' 3 ' Why is perseverance asked of Grod, if
it is not given by Grod ? It is mocking Him to ask Him
for what you know He does not give, for what you can give
yourself. We pray " Hallowed be Thy name :" that is to
say, we pray that, having been sanctified in baptism, we
may persevere in that beginning. We pray, therefore, for
perseverance in sanctification If we receive that
perseverance, then, we receive it as the gift of God, that
great gift by which His other gifts are preserved.' 4 — ' He
makes men to persevere in good who makes men good. He
1 De Corr. et Grat. c. vi. 3 Ibid. c. iii.
2 De Dono Pers. c. i. * Ibid. c. ii.
CHAP. vii. of Final Perseverance.
gives perseverance who makes men stand. The first man
did not receive this gift of God, perseverance.'1
Final perseverance, then, is, according to S. Augustine,
a Divine gift. And that he uses the word gift here in its
natural sense as a free gift, not a conditional one, depending
on man's own disposition and conduct, is evident from the
following considerations.
First, he makes final perseverance a gift in the same
sense in which the end of life is a gift : but the end of life
is undoubtedly an absolute gift of God ; gift, I say, because
we are supposing a case here in which it is advantageous to
the person, and not the opposite, — it is entirely an arrange
ment of Providence when death takes place.
S. Augustine urges strongly that in certain cases, the
,end of life, that is to say, the circumstance of the end of
life taking place at the time it does, makes final perseve
rance. He takes the case of persons who die young, or when
their characters are unformed, but die while their minds
are as yet innocent and uncorrupted. Such persons, he
says, attain final perseverance, because they do as a fact
continue in goodness up to the end ; but their final
perseverance is evidently made by the occurrence of the
end while they are in a good state of mind, not by their
own stability and constancy. That it is not any stability
of principle in the person which constitutes in such cases
final perseverance is plain, he argues, because final per
severance takes place, even where no principle of stability
exists, but the very reverse ; because it takes place even in
cases where the person, had he lived, would have lapsed :
and he quotes for this assertion the text from the Book of
Wisdom, ' Speedily was he taken away, lest that wickedness
should alter his understanding, or deceit beguile his soul/
Here, he observes, is manifestly a case in which the person's
lapse, had he lived longer, was foreseen, and yet final per
severance takes place ; in which, therefore, it is manifest
that final perseverance takes place not by the stability of the
man, but by the act of God in putting an end to his life at
the time He does, which is purposely fixed so as to prevent
1 De Corr. et Grat. c. xii.
T go Augustinian Doctrine CHAP. vn.
a lapse. And if the want of authority in the Book of
Wisdom, as not being part of the sacred book, is alleged, he
replies that he can do without the text ; because even were
the certainty of a lapse lost to his argument, all that his
argument really wants is the danger of one l ; for that, if
there is the danger of a lapse, it cannot be the man's stability
which constitutes his final perseverance, but the act of God
in forestalling his trial. What makes final perseverance in
such cases then, is, he concludes, the Divine location of the
end of life. And thence he argues immediately that in such
cases final perseverance itself is a Divine gift. ' Consider
how contradictory it is to deny that perseverance up to the
end of this life is the gift of God, when He undoubtedly
gives the end of life whenever He pleases ; and the giving of
the end of life before an impending lapse makes final per
severance.' 2 ' How is not perseverance unto the end of God's
grace, when the end itself of life is in God's power, and
God can confer this benefit even on one who is not about
to persevere ? ' 3
Having proved one kind of final perseverance by this
argument to be a Divine gift, he then infers that all final
perseverance whatever is the same. There may be a wide
interval between the final perseverance of one who is
snatched from impending trial by some sudden illness or
accident, and that of one who has been reserved for trial
and has sustained it without falling ; but if the one kind
is the gift of God, the other is too. ( He who took away
the righteous man by an early death, lest wickedness should
alter his understanding, preserves the righteous man for
the length of a long life, that wickedness does not alter
his understanding.' 4 ' Perseverance amid hindrances and
persecutions is the more difficult ; the other is the easier :
but He to whom nothing is difficult can easily give both.'5
The substance of this argument is, that the power of
resisting temptation is as much a gift of God as the re
moval from temptation. Death can only be effective of
( De Prsed. c. xiv. * De Prsed. c. xiv. (980.)
2 De Dono Pers. c. xvii. 5 De Dono Pers. c. 2.
8 Ep. 217. c. vi.
CHA.P. vii. of Final Perseverance. 191
final perseverance as being a removal for ever from temp
tation. And therefore to say that perseverance, which
consists in sustaining temptation, is as much a gift of God
as that which is caused by the occurrence of death, is only
to say, that the power of sustaining temptation is as much
a gift of God as the removal from temptation. And so
the argument is sometimes put by S. Augustine, the sub
stance being given apart from this particular form of it,
which alludes to the end of life. 'God is able to convert
the averse and adverse wills of men to His faith, and work
in their hearts a sustaining of all adversities and an over
coming of all temptation ; inasmuch as He is able not to
permit them to be tempted at all above that they are able ;'
the resistance to temptation is pronounced to be in the
power of God to give, because the protection from tempta
tion is in His power.1
Such an argument is, indeed, more ingenious than
sound ; for it does not follow that because God spares some
persons on particular occasions the exercise of a certain
power of choice and original agency inherent in their nature,
that therefore such a power does not exist, and would not
have been called into action by another arrangement of
Providence. But the argument itself, which is all that we
are concerned with here, certainly shows the sense in which
S. Augustine uses the term ' gift' of final perseverance. For
there can be no doubt that removal from temptation is an
absolute and free gift of God ; it being entirely an arrange
ment of His providence what temptations we encounter in
the course of our life, and what we do not. If perseve
rance, therefore, in spite of temptation, is as much a gift
of God as the removal from temptation, it is a gift simple
and absolute. And there can be no doubt that the occur
rence of the end of life at a particular time is an arrange
ment solely of God's providence. If all perseverance,
then, is alike the gift of God, while one kind of it is said
to be constituted by the occurrence of the end of life at a
particular time, all perseverance is a gift of God simple
and absolute.
1 De Dono PITS. c. ix.
192 A ugustinian Doctrine CHAP. vn.
Again, he places the gift of perseverance on the same
ground as the gift of baptism, with respect to the principle
or law upon which it is bestowed. Some persons, he ob
serves, have baptism given to them, and others have not ;
and in like manner some have the gift of perseverance
given to them, and others have not.1 Now, it is obvious
that the gift of baptism is a free gift, the bestowal of
which depends solely on Grod's will and pleasure, who gives
it to whom He pleases and from whom He pleases with
holds it. Thus the population of Europe is baptized, the
population of Asia is not ; evidently not because the inha
bitants of Europe have done anything to deserve it which
the inhabitants of Asia have not done, but simply owing
to an arrangement of Providence. We see with our eyes
that a man's baptism results from causes wholly irrespec
tive of his own conduct, such as the part of the world he
was born in, in what communion, from what parents.
There can be no more genuine instance, then, of a free gift
than baptism ; and, therefore, if final perseverance is a gift
in the same way in which baptism is, final perseverance is
a free gift.
It remains to add, that the notes of genuineness which
were observed in the last chapter to attach to the word
4 gift,' as used by S. Augustine, of grace in general, attach
to the word equally as used by him of this particular
measure of grace, final perseverance. These notes were
contained in the caution that grace was not given accord
ing to merit ; in the argument from prayer ; and in the
entire reference of the matter to a ground of mystery, the
bestowal or withholding of grace being attributed wholly
to (rod's secret counsels and sovereign will. All this is
applied in particular by S. Augustine to the grace of final
perseverance. It is not given according to merit; it is
given in the same sense in which other gifts which the act
of prayer assigns to Grod's absolute bounty are given ; and
the reason why it is given to one man and not to another is
altogether a mysterious and incomprehensible one, belong
ing to the secret counsels of Grod. A considerable part of
1 De Dono Pers. cc. ix. x. ; De Corr. et Grat. c. Tiii.
CHAP. vii. of Final Perseverance. 193
the books ' De Dono Perseverantice1 ' and ' De Correptione
et Gratia ' 2 is devoted to proving that the gift of final
perseverance is not given according to merit ; that is to
say, in consideration of any previous acts or efforts of the
man himself. And the whole of the beginning of the
former book is occupied with proving that final perse
verance must be God's gift, inasmuch as we ask God for it,
both in our own behalf and that of others, and what we
ask God for we necessarily confess to be in His power to
give or to withhold.
With respect to the law upon which the gift of perse
verance is given to one man and not to another, he says,
4 If any one asks me why God does not give perseverance
to those who by His grace lead a Christian life and have
love, I reply, that I do not know, I recognise my measure
in that text, " 0 man, who art thou that repliest against
Gol? 0 the depth of the riches botn of the wisdom and
knowledge of God ! How unsearchable are His judgments,
and His ways past finding out." So far as He deigns to
reveal His judgments, let us be thankful; so far as He
hides them, let us not murmur. Say you, who oppose
yourself to Divine grace, you are a Christian, a Catholic,
and boast of being one, do you admit or deny that final
perseverance is the gift of God ? If you allow it to be,
then you and I are alike ignorant why one receives it, and
another does not ; then you and I are alike unable to pene
trate the unsearchable judgments of God.'3 Again: 'Of
two children, why one is taken and the other left (i.e.
baptized and not baptized), of two adults, why one is so
called, that he follows the caller, and the other either not
called at all or not so called, belongs to the inscrutable
judgments of God. Of two pious men, why final perseve
rance is given to one and not to the other, belongs to His
still more inscrutable judgments.' 4 Again : ' It is evident
that both the grace of the beginning and the grace of per
severing to the end is not given according to our merits,
but according to a most secret, most just, most wise, most
1 De Dono Pers. c. viii. et se([. 3 Ibid- c. viii.
2 De Corr. et Grat. c. xii. * De Dono Pers. c. ix.
194 Augustinian Doctrine CFAP. TH.
beneficent will ; inasmuch as whom He hath predestinated
those He hath also called with that call of which it is said,
" The gifts and calling of Grod are without repentance." ' l
Again : 'Wonderful indeed, very wonderful, that to some of
His own sons, whom He has regenerated and to whom He
has given faith, hope, and charity, God does not give per
severance ! that He who oftentimes pardons and adopts the
stranger's (unbeliever's) son, should withhold such a gift
from His own ! Who but must wonder, be astonished, and
amazed at this ! ' 2 Again : ' I am speaking of those who
have not the gift of perseverance, but have turned from
good to evil, and die in that declination ; let them (his
opponents) tell me why Grod did not take such persons out
of this world while they were yet unchanged ? Was it
because He could not ? or was it because He foresaw not
their future wickedness ? They cannot assert either of
these without perversity and madness. Then why did He
do so ? Let them answer this question before they deride
me, when I exclaim, " How unsearchable are His judg
ments, and His ways past finding out!" Either Grod
gives that gift to whom He will, or Scripture lies
Let them confess this truth at once, and why Grod gives
that gift to one and not to another, — condescend without
a murmur to be ignorant with me.' 3
Final perseverance, then, is, upon the Augustinian
doctrine, the true and absolute gift of Grod to certain
members of the human race ; to whom, according to an
eternal decree, He has determined to give it : and it has
that prominent place which it has in the predestinarian
scheme, because it is that measure of Divine grace which
is sufficient for salvation. The predestinarian doctrine is
that certain persons are predestined by Grod from all
eternity to be saved ; but Grod only saves the righteous,
and not the wicked. It must therefore be provided, in
accordance with this doctrine, that those persons shall ex
hibit as much goodness of life as is necessary for the end
to which they are ordained ; and final perseverance is this
measure of goodness. . The gift of final perseverance, then,
1 De Dono Pers. c. xiii. » De Corr. et Grat. c. viii. « Ibid. c. viii.
CFAP. vii. of Final Perseverance. 195
is the great gift which puts into execution God's eternal
decree with respect to the whole body of the elect. He
may predestine some to a higher and others to a lower
place, but He predestines all the elect to a place in the
kingdom of heaven ; and therefore, while He provides that
some shall exhibit higher and others lower degrees of sanc
tity and goodness, He provides that all shall exhibit enough
for admission ; which sufficiency is final perseverance.
CHAPTER VIII.
AUGUSTINIAN DOCTRINE OF FREEWILL.
THE preceding chapters have exhibited a full and sys
tematic scheme of predestinarian doctrine, as held by S.
Augustine, who asserts in the first place an eternal Divine
decree, whereby one part of mankind has been, antece
dently to any moral difference between the two, separated
from the other, and the one ordained to eternal life, and
the other to eternal punishment ; 1 and next supplies a
grace for putting it into effect.2 But while he lays down
this doctrine of predestination and irresistible grace, S.
Augustine at the same time acknowledges the existence of
freewill in man — liberum arbitrium ; an admission, which,
understood in its popular sense, would have been a counter
balance to all the rest of his scheme. The question, how
ever, immediately arises, what he means by freewill;
whether he uses the word in the sense which the ordinary
doctrine of freewill requires, or in another and a different
sense. Persons are apt indeed to suppose, as soon as ever
they hear the word freewill, that the word must involve all
that those who hold the regular doctrine of freewill mean
by it. It remains, however, to see whether this is the case
in S. Augustine's use of the word.
The doctrine of freewill consists of two parts ; one of
1 Chap. V. 2 Chaps. VI. and VII.
o 2
Augustinian Doctrine CHAP. YUI.
which has respect to the existence of the will, and the
other to the mode in which it is moved and determined.
That part which respects the existence of the will, the
doctrine of freewill, and the contrary doctrine, hold in
common. No person in his senses can deny the fact of the
will, that we will to do this, that, and the other thing, that
we act with intention, design, deliberation. We are directly
conscious of all this. No predestinarian, therefore, how
ever rigid, denies it ; and the whole set of sensations which
are connected with willing, or the whole fact of the will, in
its minutest and most subtle particulars, is the common
ground both of him and his opponent. But the fact of the
will admitted, the further question remains, how this will
is determined ; that is, caused to decide on one side or
another, and choose this or that act. The doctrine of
freewill is that the cause of this decision is the will itself,
and that the will has a power of self-determination inhe
rent in it. This appears to the maintainers of this doc
trine the natural inference from that whole fact of willing,
of which they are conscious, so that they could not draw
any other without seeming to themselves to contradict
plain reason. Nobody can assert indeed that he is con
scious distinctly, and after the mode of clear perception,
of a power of determining his own will, for all that he is
distinctly conscious of is his will itself. Nevertheless, the
will as we feel and experience it, acting with struggle,
effort, resolution, summoning up of force, and deliberate
choice of alternatives, has so much the appearance of being
self-determining and original, that when the notion is sug
gested that it is not, such a notion is felt to be contrary
to an idea which we naturally and instinctively have re
specting our will, its originality appearing to be implied
in this kind of motion and operation. Nor is this self-
determining power of the will interfered with by the doc
trine of assisting grace, which is so formed as to admit the
human will as an original agent, co-operating with grace.
The doctrine of freewill, then, is that the will is deter
mined by itself, or is an original agent, as distinguished
from the assertion simply of a will in man, which latter it
CHAP. -mi. of Freewill. 197
holds in common with the rival and opposite doctrine re
specting the will.
The validity indeed of this whole distinction between
the will itself and the will as self-determining, i.e. the
existence of this self-determining power in the will over
and above the fact of willing, is denied by the school of
metaphysicians, who take against the common doctrine of
freewill and favour that of necessity. They maintain free
will to consist in the simple fact of will ; that we act wil
lingly and without constraint ; and they deny that we can
go any further than this, or see anything whatever more
than this fact, however far we may try to look. They say
that in this consists the whole of freewill, that this is all
we mean or can mean by it ; and that if we try to go
any deeper, we involve ourselves in confusion and absurdity.
This position is among others maintained by Locke, whose
great fairness of mind and anxiety to represent faithfully
and exactly the truth respecting the human mind and its
constitution entitle his opinions on this subject to much
consideration, because he does not appear to have started
with any bias one way or another on the examination cf
the question, but to have decided according to what he
thought the plain facts of the case. I cannot but think,
however, that his love of exact truth and the test of actual
perception and apprehension which his philosophy applies,
have been carried too far in this instance, and led him into
a mistake. For this test cannot be applied with absolute
strictness in all cases, as I have often said ; there being
truths of reason, which do not admit of it, truths in their
very nature indeterminate and indistinct ; to which class
belongs the truth now in question, that of the self-deter
mining power of the will.
Locke's elaborate argument on this subject divides
itself into two questions ; one whether the will is free, the
other whether the man or the agent is free to will.
The first question is not really the question at issue
between the two sides ; for what those who maintain the
self-determining power of the will mean by the will being
free, is, that the agent is free to will : nor does their posi-
198 Augustinian Doctrine CHA?. vm.
tion at all necessarily involve the particular expression, —
freedom of the will, which Locke first impugns in his argu
ment, though they use it as a convenient mode of stating
the real truth for which they contend, Locke, however,
first examines this expression, and starts the question in
this particular form, whether the will is free ; and he de
cides against its freedom on the ground that freedom is a
power and the will a power, and that a power cannot be
predicated of a power, power being the attribute of an
:^agent. Freedom, he says, is the power to act as we will.
' So far as a man has power to think or not to think, to
move or not to move, according to the preference or direc
tion of his own mind, so far is a man free The
idea of liberty is the idea of a power in any agent to do or
forbear any particular action, according to the determina
tion or thought of his mind.' * Freedom, then, being the
power to act as we will, assert this power of the will, he
says, and what does it become ? — the power of the will to
act as it wills ; i.e. for this is the only act the will can do,
the power of the will to will as it wills. But this is a
power which is contained in the very act of willing, and
does not go at all beyond the mere fact of will. So that,
he argues, when we would attribute this power — i. e. free
dom — to the will, we find immediately that we are making
no assertion beyond that of the will itself, not advancing
a step farther, but going on like a rocking horse upon the
same ground. Though in a certain incorrect way he allows
this freedom to be asserted of the will, because its exertion
is thus ipso facto freedom. ' If freedom can with any
propriety of speech be applied to power, it may be attri
buted to the power that is in man to produce or forbear
producing, by choice or preference, which is that which
denominates him free, and is freedom itself. But if any
one should ask whether freedom were free, he would be
suspected not to understand well what he said ; and he
should be thought to deserve Midas' ears, who, knowing
that rich was a denomination for the possession of riches,
should demand whether riches themselves were rich.' *
1 Essay, book 2. c. 21. 2 Essay, book 2, c. 21.
CHAP. V1IJ.
of Freewill. 199
But the question whether the will is free being thus
decided, the next follows, whether the man is free to will ;
which is, as has been just said, the real question at issue
between the two sides. On this question, then, he first
decides — and no one will oppose him — that the man is not
free in the case of any proposed action, generally and alto
gether in respect of willing ; but that he must will one
thing or another, either doing the act or abstaining from
it. ' Willing or volition being an action, and freedom
consisting in a power of acting or not acting, a man in
respect of willing or the act of volition, when an action in
his power is once proposed to his thoughts as presently to
be done, cannot be free. The reason whereof is very mani
fest ; for it being unavoidable that the action depending
on his will should exist or not exist, and its existence or
not existence following perfectly the determination and
preference of his will, he cannot avoid willing the existence
or not existence of that action ; it is absolutely necessary
that he will the one or the other This, then, is
evident, that in all proposals of present action, a man is
not at liberty to will or not to will, because he cannot for
bear willing.'
It being decided, then, that the man must will one way
or another — i.e. is not free to will neither way — Locke
comes at last to the question, which is the only real one
between the two sides, and upon which the whole contro
versy turns — Is he free to will either way ? And he settles
it thus summarily. ' Since, then, it is plain that in most
cases a man is not at liberty, whether he will or no, the
next thing demanded is, Whether a man be at liberty to
will which of the two he pleases ? This question carries
the absurdity of it so manifestly in itself, that one might
thereby be sufficiently convinced that liberty concerns not
the will. For to ask whether a man be at liberty to will
either motion or rest, speaking or silence, which he pleases,
is to ask whether a man can will what he wills, or be
pleased with what he is pleased with. A question which,
I think, needs no answer ; and they who can make a ques
tion of it, must suppose one will to determine the acts
2oo Augustinian Doctrine CHAP. vm.
of another, and another to determine that, and so on in
infinitum.'
Upon this ground it is decided that the man or agent
does not determine his own will. But is not this an argu
ment which simply takes advantage of the difficulties of
language, with which questions like these are beset ? The
position that the man determines his own will is stated in
a/orm in which it becomes absurd, and then the charge
of absurdity is brought against the position itself. It is
described as the assertion, that ' the man is at liberty to
will which of the tiuo he pleases? or wills. And certainly
in this form the position is absurd ; for it assumes the
previous existence of a particular decision of the will, as
the condition of the power or liberty of the man to make
it. But though in loose speech the self-determining power
of the will may sometimes be expressed in this way, the
truth really intended and meant does not depend on such
an expression of it. The truth which is meant, is not the
man's power to will as he wills or pleases, but simply his
power to will ; that his will rises ultimately and originally
from himself as the agent or possessor of the will : in other
words, that that whole affair of the man willing is an
original event.
The question of such a self-determining power in the
will may be called « an unreasonable, because unintelligible
question ; ' 1 and the other ground be preferred, as simpler
and more common sense and straightforward, that will is
will, and that that is all that can be said about it. But if
truths are to be rejected because they are indistinct, in
definite, and incapable of consistent statement, we must
reject a large class of most important truths belonging to
our rational nature.2 This self-determining power in the
will cannot be stated accurately, nor can it be apprehended
accurately ; but have we not a perception in this direction ?
Is there not a rational instinct which speaks to our origi
nality as agents, as there is a rational instinct which tells
us of substance, of cause, of infinity ? And does not this
instinct or perception see a certain way, so that we have
1 Essay, book 2. c. 21. s. 14. » See Chap. II.
CHAP. Till.
of Freewill. 201
some sort of idea of the thing in our minds ? Locke's re
jection of this power in the will on such a ground appears
to be inconsistent with his admission of the class of indis
tinct ideas ? * For if we admit such a kind and order of
truths, we are arbitrarily to exclude such a truth as this
from the benefit of it — a truth which is felt and asserted
by the great mass of mankind ? But this is the line which
Locke takes on this question. He sees there is no distinct
idea of originality or self-determination in the human
mind ; and he does not allow such an idea a place as an
indistinct one. He thus rests ultimately in the simple
fact of will, as the whole of the truth of the freedom of
the will. c For how can we think any one freer, than to
have the power to do what he will ? . . . . We can scarce
tell how to imagine any being freer than to be able to do
what he wills.' 2
It must be added, that important results in theology
follow the decision of this question respecting the will, one
way or another. On the supposition of a self-determining
power in the will, and so far as it is a true one, the Divine
justice is freed from all substantial difficulty ; for moral
evil is brought instantly home to the individual, who is
made responsible for it, and so justly subject to punish
ment. But deny this power, and suppose the will to be
moved from without, and the Divine justice is imme
diately challenged, and we are involved in whatever diffi
culty accompanies the depravation of moral beings from a
source external to themselves, and their punishment when
their depravation has proceeded from such a source. I am
speaking of the latter doctrine as held definitely or exclu
sively. It may be said, indeed, that the will which is thus
moved from without is still will, the will of the individual,
— that it has all the properties which we can distinctly
conceive of will ; but these characteristics of will will not
prevent the difficulties which arise from this theory of its
motion or determination,. And this perhaps is worth the
consideration of those who not so much deny the self-
determining power of the will, as set the question aside as
1 NOTE IV. .* Essay, book 2. c. 21. s. 21.
2O2 Augustinian Doctrine CHAP. vin.
unimportant ; as if the acknowledgment of will as a fact
were the only thing of real importance. Of course, if this
is so, it is impossible to be in the wrong on this subject ;
for nobody in his senses can deny the fact of the will.
But the farther question of its determination cannot be
said to be unimportant, both in itself, and as involving
these theological results. It makes a difference in what
way we decide it.
A distinguished writer of the present day, Archbishop
Whately, adopts this line : ' Let, then, necessitarians of all
descriptions but step forth into light, and explain their
own meaning ; and we shall find that their positions are
either obviously untenable, or else perfectly harmless and
nearly insignificant. If in saying that all things are fixed
and necessary, they mean that there is no such thing as
voluntary action, we may appeal from the verbal quibbles
which alone afford a seeming support to such a doctrine to
universal consciousness ; which will authorise even those
who have never entered into such speculations as the fore
going, to decide on the falsity of the conclusion, though
they are perplexed with the subtle fallacies of the argu
ment. But if nothing more be meant than that every event
depends on causes adequate to produce it, that nothing is
in itself contingent, accidental or uncertain, but is called
so only with reference to a person who does not know all
the circumstances on which it depends, — and that it is
absurd to say anything could have happened otherwise than
it did, supposing all the circumstances connected with it
to remain the same, — then the doctrine is undeniably true,
but perfectly harmless, not at all encroaching on free agency
and responsibility, and amounting in fact to little more
than an expansion of the axiom, that it is impossible for
the same thing to be and not to be.' T
Archbishop Whately in this passage more than tolerates
necessitarianism, because he adopts it. He asserts that
* nothing is in itself contingent, accidental, uncertain,' and
that, supposing all the circumstances connected with it to
remain the same, « it is absurd to say anything could have
1 Appendix to Archbp. King, On Predestination, p. 99.
CHAP. viii. of Freewill. 203
happened otherwise than as it did? This is the doctrine
of necessity. Suppose two men under exactly the same
circumstances as regards a particular temptation to which
they are subjected- the same even to the minutest parti
culars. Let the circumstances which are thus identical be
not external only, but internal ones. Let them have the
same amount of inward bias or inclination, and let this
inclination be acted upon from without by a whole, com
plex, manifold and intricate machinery of invitations and
allurements, precisely the same in both cases. Lei- every
thing, in short, which is properly circumstantial — i.e. is
not the very act of the will itself — be by supposition the
same in both cases. Now, the doctrine of freewill is, that
these two agents may, under this entire and absolute iden
tity of circumstances, act differently ; the doctrine of neces
sity is that they must act the same. According to the
doctrine of freewill there is an ultimate power of choice in
the human will, which, however strongly it may be drawn,
or tempted, or attracted to decide one way or another by
external appeals or motives, is not ruled and decided by
such motives, but by the will itself only. This is the self-
determining power of the will, the assertion of which is the
characteristic of that doctrine. Under this identity of cir
cumstances, an original act or motion of the will is said to
take place, which may be different in the two persons, and
be the one single difference in the whole of the two cases.
On the other hand, the necessitarian maintains that where
the circumstances, external and internal, are really and
completely alike, there is not room for this further differ
ence ; but that the issue will be the same in both cases,
and both will act alike. Archbishop Whately's position,
that ' supposing all the circumstances connected with it to
remain the same, it is absurd to say anything could have
happened otherwise than as it did,' is identical with this
necessitarian one. He adds, that this assertion that the
event must always be the same under the same circum
stances, is ' little more than an expansion of the position
that it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to
be.' Of course, supposing it true that the whole of the
2O4 Augustinian Doctrine CHAP. VIH.
circumstances of an act or event amount to and really are
and constitute that act or event itself, it immediately fol
lows, that to say that under the same circumstances the
same event will take place, is an identical assertion. But
that the assertion should be thus identical supposes that
circumstances do constitute the act or event ; i.e. it sets
aside and ignores an original motion of the will under the
circumstances, as if it had no place in the question, and
there were no such thing : which is the necessitarian as
sumption. The Archbishop slightly qualifies his remark
indeed, and only calls the two assertions nearly identical :
the assertion that the same event must take place under
the same circumstances ' amounts to little more than an
expansion of the axiom that it is impossible for the same
thing to be and not to be.' But surely the two assertions
must be either absolutely and completely identical, or not
at all. For if it is not true, wholly and entirely, that
identity of circumstances is the identity of the act, what
is the reason of this defect of truth ? It is — for there can
be no other, — that there is an original motion of the will,
which may be different in spite of the circumstances being
the same. But if there is an original motion of the will in
the case, then the whole position that the same circum
stances will produce the same event or act falls at once to
the ground ; another principle comes in, which altogether
upsets the necessary force of circumstances, and produces
the widest possible differences of acts under circumstances
exactly the same.1
1 A position maintained in ano- longs to them in their primary
ther passage in Archbp. Whately's sense) of compulsion, and of one
Essay, is in tendency and language, person submitting to another ; where-
necessitarian, though it admits of as here they are only used figu-
an explanation. 'But some may ratively, the terms "weak" and
say, have I the power of choosing " strong," when applied to motives,
among several motives at once pre- denoting nothing but their greater
seat to my mind? or must I obey or less tendency to prevail (that is,
the, strongest ? for if so, how can I to operate and' take effect) in prac-
enjoy freewill ? Here, again, is an tice, so that to say " the stronger
entanglement in ambiguous words : motive prevails" is only another
must and "obey "and "strong- form of saying that "that which
est suggest the idea (which be- prevails prevails !" '—P. 95. Now,
CHAP. Till.
of Freewill. 205
The writer, indeed, appears to think that the admission
of the fact of the will, or ' voluntary action,' is itself a
safeguard against necessitarianism ; and that necessitarians
have to be driven by argument into the acknowledgment
of this fact ; the admission of which, when they are forced
to see and confess it, makes them virtually cease to be such.
But all necessitarians acknowledge in limine, and without
any difficulty, the fact of the will ; indeed, every one of
sound mind must.
I will not, however, understand Archbishop Whately in
this passage as more than neutral ; tolerating the necessi
tarian, and treating the question between him and his
opponent, provided the fact of the will is admitted, as one
of no importance. But perhaps even this assertion should
be modified. It is true, indeed, that, so long as men ac
knowledge a will, responsibility, and moral obligations, there
is nothing in necessitarianism to interfere with practical
religion. But still the theory has important consequences
in theology, and largely affects our idea of the Divine
dealings, which it represents under an aspect repulsive to
our natural feeling and sense of justice. And though a
mystery must be acknowledged on this subject, it is a
different thing to hold the predestinarian doctrine, as the
when persons talk of the stronger comes the more strongly felt mo-
motive prevailing, they sometimes tive ; and the man acts on the right
make the assertion in a sense in- side. In this sense, then, there is
volving an original act of the will no doctrine of necessity involved in
itself. A man is drawn by some the position that a man must act
.strong temptation towards a bad upon the strongest motive. For in
act, while conscience dissuades : the every act of choice between good
bad motive is at the first much the and evil, the will either does or does
stronger of the two ; he feels the not create this good stronger mo-
former as almost overwhelming, tive ; in either case it is the man's
while the latter is but feebly felt; will acting well or ill, and not the
but his will now comes in and de- power of externally caused motives,
liberately increases and strengthens which produces the result. But
the conscientious motive, calling up understanding by the term motive
every consideration of present or something simply acting from with-
future interest to outweigh the other, out upon the mind, to say that the
and putting the advantages of the stronger motive must prevail, is to
right side as vividly before the say that the individual's act is de-
mind as possible. Thus in time cided by causes outside of himself,
what was the more feebly felt be- : .
206 Augustinian Doctrine CHAP. TUT.
Church at large does, as a mystery and with a reserve, and
to hold it as a definite and complete doctrine.
The language of S. Augustine respecting the will may
be pat under two heads ; under the first of which it does
not come up to the received doctrine of freewill, and under
the second is opposed to it.
I. First, freewill, as maintained by S. Augustine, does
not mean so much as the freewill above described, or a
self-determining will ; but only a ivill ; his language not
advancing beyond that point up to which the doctrine of
freewill and the opposite doctrine agree.
In examining the language of Augustine on this sub
ject we must take care to distinguish between what he says
of the freewill of man in his former perfect, and that of
man in his present corrupt state. In the book De Libero
Arbitrio, a freewill is indeed described which comes up to
the above definition of it as original and self-determining.
The Manichean there, not content with the fact of the
human will as accounting for moral evil in the world,
demands the cause of that will ; and Augustine replies :
' The will being the cause of sin, you ask the cause of the
will : should I discover it, will you not ask then the cause
of that cause ; and what limit of inquiry can there be, if
you will go deeper than the very root ? . . . . What cause
of will can there be before will ? For either this cause is
will, and we are no nearer the root than we were before ; or
it is not will, and in that case there is no sin.' 1 Here a
will is described which is truly an original agent in nature,
having no cause but itself. But the will thus described is
the will of man in his created, not in his fallen state.' 2 In
some passages, again, quoted in a former chapter, a will
was described which was self-determining and original ; for
it was said that the first man ' had such an assistance given
him as he could use if he willed, and neglect if he willed ;
not one by which it was caused that he did will.' 3 His will,
therefore, had no cause beyond itself, or was self-caused,
1 L. 3. c. xvii. qua homo factus est loquimur. —
2 Cum autem de libera voluntate L. 3. c. 18.
faciendi loquimur, de ilia scilicet in 8 De Corr. et Grat. e. xi.
CHAP. viii. of Freewill. 207
that is to say, self-determined and original : but this, he
expressly says, was the will of the first man in his state of
integrity, and not of man as now existing.
When Augustine comes to describe the will of man as
now existing, he describes it simply by the fact of will or
willing. There are various passages in his works, especially
a passage in the book De Libero Arbitrio, another in the
book De Spiritu et Literd, and another in his Retracta
tions explanatory of a passage in the book De Diversis
Qucestionibus ad Simplicianum, in which it is defined
with much minuteness and labour what the freedom of the
will is, and in what it consists ; and this definition termi
nates in the fact of a will. First, freedom, itself is defined ;
and it is said to consist in power. We are free when it is
in our power to do a thing. But what is power ? for if,
becomes necessary now to say what power is, if there is
anything to be said about it. He proceeds accordingly to
define next what is meant by its being in our power to do
a thing ; and this he defines by saying that it is our having
the power to do it if ^ve will. ' What need for further
question ? we call that power where to the will is joined
the ability to do. That is in a man's power which he does
if he wills , does not do if he does not will — quod si vult ^
facit, si non vult non facit.1 Freedom being thus defined, |7 f ,
it only remains to apply this definition of freedom to the
will, which is a simple and easy process. Freedom is a »
power to do a thing if we will. Freedom of the will,
therefore, is the power to will if we will — a power, he adds,
which unquestionably every man possesses ; for if we will,
we are necessarily not only able to will, but do will : there
is the act itself of willing, and therefore certainly the power
for it.'2 ' It must be that when we will, we will with free
will —necesse est %it cum volumus, libero velimus arbitrio.'*
1 ' Quid igitur ultra quserimus : 2 Nihil tarn in nostra potestate
quandoquidem hanc dicimus potes- quam ipsa voluntas est. Ea enim
tatem, ubi voluntati adjacet facultas prorsus nullo intervallo mox ut vo-
faciendi ? Unde hoc quisque in po- lumus praesto est. — De Lib. Arb. 1.
testate habere dicitur, quod si vult 3. c. 3.
facit, si non vult, non facit.' — De * De Civit. Dei, 1. 5. c. 10.
Spir. et Lit. c. xxxi.
208 Augustinian Doctrine CHAP. Yin.
The definition of freewill thus stops at the fact of will
as the ultimate truth beyond which nothing can be said ;
the basis of this definition of will being a particular defini
tion of power. The question of freedom is first correctly
stated as being a question of power — what it is which
constitutes the power to act in this or that way ; and the
constitution of power is decided by making the will a
necessary element in it. A distinction is acknowledged,
indeed, between power and will ; but a man is still not
allowed to have the whole power to do a thing unless he
has the will also — lit potentate aliquidfiat voluntas aderit;
4 in order that anything may be done by power, there must
be the will ;' and will is a condition of power and a true
ingredient in its composition. Freedom is thus first defined
by power, and power is then condition ated upon will, and
there the definition stops,1 leaving the ultimate test of
freewill, and, as all that is meant by it, simple will. We
have freewill or the power to will if ive will.
It will be seen that this definition of freewill exactly
coincides with Locke's, quoted above. Both writers define
freedom to be the power of doing what we will ; Augus
tine's ubi voluntati adjacet facultas faciendi just tallying
with Locke's ' How can we think any one freer than to
have the power to do what he will ? ' Both writers, applying
this freedom to the will, immediately discover the freedom
of the will to consist in willing as it wills : Augustine say-
m<7, ' Nihil tarn in nostra potestate quam ipsa voluntas
est ; ea enim prorsus nullo intervallo mox ut volumus
prcesto est :' Locke stating freewill as ' the man's liberty
to will which of the two things he pleases^ and challenging
any one to ask ' whether freedom itself were free.'
Augustine meets the difficulty raised against the free
dom of the will from the Divine foreknowledge with the
same answer ; viz. that as a matter of fact we have will, and
that will is as such free. ' Whatever may be the tortuous
1 A dictum of S. Anselm's, ex- The will is the original supposition,
presses the principle of it scientifi- on which the definition of power is
cally — In libcro arbitrio posse non raised.
prcBcedit sed sequitur voluntatem.
CHAP. vin. of Freewill. 209
wrangiings and disputes of philosophers, we, as we acknow
ledge one supreme and true God, so acknowledge His
supreme will, power, and foreknowledge. Nor do we fear
on that account that we do not do with our will what we
do with our will — nee timemus ne ideo non voluntate
faciamus, quod voluntate facimus We say both
that God knows all things before they take place, and that
we act with our will, inasmuch as we feel and know we do
not act except with our will.' [
This, however, being S. Augustine's definition of free
will, it must be admitted that a considerable body of lan
guage, especially his language at the commencement of
the book De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio, and in the two
Epistles 2 relating to the occasion on which that book was
written, appears at first sight to advance upon this defini
tion, and to imply an original and self-determining power
in the will. He argues for freewill as a doctrine of Scrip
ture, and uses the common arguments which the maintainers
of the ordinary doctrine of freewill use ; viz. that Scripture
employs commands, promises, and threats, and speaks to
men as if they had freewill. Such an argument proves that
he — i.e. Scripture as interpreted by him — acknowledges a
will in man which is truly and properly the subject of com
mands, promises, and threats ; and can such a will, it may
be asked, be anything but a self-determining one ? Does
not such a mode of addressing man suppose an original
power of choice in him ? But though this would be sound
and correct as a popular inference from such language, it
is not as a logical one. Logically all that can be inferred
from the use of commands and threats in the Divine deal
ings with man is, that man has a capacity for choosing,
obeying, and acting upon motives 3 ; but these are opera-
1 De Civ. Dei, 1. 5. c. 9. ... Non sic autem Deus. Semper
2 Ep. 214, 215. seque determinate vult. Per meri-
8 Non eodem modo se habent turn innotescit hominibus, dsemoni-
Deus et homo ad reddendum prae- bus, et forsitan Angelis, quale prae-
mium. Homo namque sicut Rex mium quis habebit. . . . Cum dici-
publico edicto promulgat, monetque tur, Deus vult istum propter merita
ipse indifferens et indeterminatus in praemiare, hoc est, Deus vult istum
voluntate sua circa sibi subjectos. praemiare propter merita finaliter
Augustinian Doctrine CHAP. vm.
tions of the will, and are wholly performed, if there is only
a will to perform them, without going into the question
what decides that will. If man has a will, which will is
intended to act in the particular way of choice and obe
dience, he must be addressed in a manner suitable to such
a design ; he must be commanded, in order that he may
obey, and he must have the alternative placed before him
in order that He choose. But such a mode of addressing
him does not necessarily prove any more than that he is
possessed of a will to which those operations belong. While,
therefore, in the case of Scripture we are justified in taking
such language to imply an original and self-determining
will in man, because Scripture is addressed to the popular
understanding, and this is the popular inference to draw
from such language ; in the case of a philosophical writer
like Augustine, — who treats of the human will and the
questions belonging to it in a scientific and subtle way,
and from whose language therefore we are not justified
in inferring more than it logically contains, — we cannot
take it as implying more than the existence of a will in
a man.
Indeed, the fact of a will is all the conclusion which he
himself arrives at by this argument, and all thai^ he presses
upon his readers.1 'These commands would not be given
unless man had a will truly belonging to him with which
to obey them — nisi homo haberet propriam voluntatem,
qua divinis prceceptis obediret.'' — ' To the man who says I
cannot do what is commanded, because he is conquered by
concupiscence, the Apostle says, " Will not to be overcome
of evil, but overcome evil with good ; " will not to be
overcome — noli vinci implying certainly a choice of his
will ; for to will and not to will is of the individual's will
— arbitrium voluntatis ejus sine dubio convenitur, velle
enim et nolle proprice voluntatis est.' — ' Freewill is suffi-
ordinanda, i.e. vult quod tails sit denda. . . . Deusprimovulthomini
finis talium meritorum secundum prsemium et gloriam tanquam finem,
ordinem ab ipso talibus prsesti- et ideo vult sibi et facit merita
tutum, ita quod merita nullo modo congrua.' — Bradwardine, p. 150. et
antecedenter, causaliter, a priori, seq.
monent, determinant, vel actuant ! De Grat. et Lib. Arb. c. ii. et
Yoluntatem divinam ad prsemia red- seq.
CHAP. vnr. of Freewill. 2 1 r
ciently proved by Scripture saying, will not this, and will
not that, and demanding an act of the will in doing or not
doing anything. Let no one then blame God in his heart,
but impute it to himself when he sins. Nor, when he does
anything according to Grod's will, let him alienate it from
his own. For when he does it willingly, then it is a good
work, then a reward attaches to it — quando volens facit
tune dicendum est opus bonum."1 Again on the text
' All men cannot receive this saying, save they to whom it
is given ;' he says, ' Those to whom it is not given either
will not or do not what they will : those to whom it is
given so will that they do what they will. That which is
not received by all, but is received by some, is both the
gift of Grod and also is freewill — et "Dei donum eat, et
liberum arbitrium.' That is to say, it is freewill in him,
because, from whatever source it comes, when he has it, it
is his own will. These explanations all appeal to the fact of
a will in man, as being sufficient to constitute a free agent,
and a proper subject of promises or threats, of reward or
punishment. Indeed, what these arguments are designed
to remove is not any part of the predestinarian doctrine,
but only a false practical inference from it ; for the occa
sion on which this treatise was written was, that certain
persons had begun to argue, that if that doctrine was true,
it did not signify what kind of lives men led, because they
were not responsible for them. Augustine corrects this
inference by reminding them, that the predestinarian doc
trine did not exclude a will in man ; and that if he had a
will, that made him responsible.
Augustine's doctrine of freewill, then, does not come
up to that which is ordinarily understood as that doctrine ;
not advancing beyond that point up to which the doctrine
of freewill and the opposite doctrine agree. He acknow
ledges a will in man, that which makes him act willingly,
as distinguished from acting by compulsion and con
straint ; but this is saying nothing as to how that will is
determined.
II. But, in the second place, we come to the question
p 2
212 Augustinian Doctrine CHAP. TIII.
of the determination of this will, and under this head
Augustine's language is not only less than, but is opposed
to, the common doctrine of freewill.
The doctrine of freewill is, as has been stated, that the
will has a self-determining power, which produces right
acts or wrong, according as it is exercised. On the other
hand, the opponents of the doctrine of freewill object that
this is an absurd and self-contradictory cause to assign to
human actions ; for that, if the power of acting one way or
another be the cause of the distinction in human actions,
— i.e. of the good or bad act which really ensues, — the
same cause can produce opposite effects. The objection
proceeds on the assumption that human actions must have
a cause ; which granted, it follows of course that such a
cause cannot be a neutral or flexible thing, as this freewill
or power of choice is described to be.
Now, there is a passage, which I have already quoted,1
in which the doctrine of freewill, as thus stated, comes
under the notice of Augustine. The doctrine is stated in
this passage thus : that 'We have a power of taking either
side — possibilitas utriusque partis, — implanted in us by
God, as a fruitful and productive root, to produce and
bring forth according to men's different wills, and either
shine with the flower of virtue, or bristle with the thorns
of vice, according to the choice of the cultivator.' This is
a plain statement of the ordinary doctrine of freewill.
There is a power of taking either side inherent in our
nature ; that power determines our wills, and according as
our wills are determined we do good or bad actions. To
this doctrine, then, thus stated, Augustine objects on the
same ground as that which has been just mentioned, viz.,
that it gives an absurd and self-contradictory cause to
human actions. Such a doctrine he says, ' establishes one
and the same root of the good and the bad, — unam
eandemque radicem constituit bonorum et malorum.1
That is, he says, it maintains one and the same ultimate
or original condition of the man, out of which the opposite
lives and actions of the two issue ; to maintain which is to
1 De Gratia Christi, c. 18.
CHAP. VHI.
of Freewill. 2 1 3
give the same cause to opposite effects. Augustine's argu
ment proceeds on the supposition of the necessity of a
cause for human actions, and is substantially the same ar
gument with that used by Edwards, that ' an act of the
will cannot directly and immediately arise out of a state of
indifference ;' because the act implies ' an antecedent choice,'
which choice cannot be simultaneous with indifference ;]—
the assumption in this latter argument being that actions
must have a cause out of which they spring ; which cause
can only be calculated to produce one effect, and not either
one or the other of two effects. The advocates of freewill,
on the other hand, do not admit this assumption, and so
answer the argument which is raised upon it. They allow
that this power of choice is no cause of the determination
of the will, nor do they profess it to be such ; but they
maintain that for a determination of the will one way or
another, it is not necessary to assign a cause, such deter
mination being an original motion of the will. It must be
added, however, that in using such an argument as this,
Augustine is inconsistent, for he admits in the case of the
first man this power, this freewill in the complete sense,
this power of either side ; appealing to it, as throwing the
responsibility of sin upon him, and removing it from God ;
after which admission, he is properly precluded from argu
ing upon abstract grounds against such a, power.
The power of choice, as the account of the evil and
good actions and lives of men, being thus set aside, S.
Augustine proceeds to lay down a rationale of two dif
ferent roots or causes for the two. ' Our Lord says, that a
good tree cannot bring forth evil fruit, nor an evil tree
1 ' If the act springs immediately soul, while it yet remains in a state
out of a state of indifference, then it of perfect indifference, chooses to put
does not arise from antecedent choice itself out of that state and to turn
or preference. But if the act arises itself one way, then the soul ig al-
directly out of a state of indifference, ready come to a choice, and chooses
without any intervening choice to that way. And so the soul is in a
determine it, then the act not being state of. choice, and in a state of
determined by choice is not deter- equilibrium, both at the same time.'
mined by the will.' ... An ante- — On the Freedom of the Will, part
cedent choice, then, he says, must ii. sect. 7.
be granted. But if it is, ' if the
214 Augustinian Doctrine CHAP. Tin.
good fruit. And the Apostle Paul, when he says that
cupidity is the root of all evil, intimates also that love is
the root of all good. If therefore the two trees good and
evil are two men good and evil, what is the good man but
the man of good will ; that is, the tree of good fruit ? And
what is the evil man but the man of an evil will ; that is,
the tree of an evil root ? And the fruits of these two trees
are acts, words, thoughts, which if good proceed from a
good will, and if evil from an evil will. And man makes a
good tree when he receives the grace of God. For he does
not make himself good out of evil by himself ; but of Him,
and through Him, and in Him who is good And
he makes an evil tree, when he makes himself evil, when
he departs from immutable good ; for the origin of an evil
will is that departure.' l In this passage the lives and ac
tions of the good and evil man are referred in the first
place to two immediate or proximate roots, and then to
two ultimate or original ones. The proximate roots of
the two respectively are a good and evil will, which he calls
also love and cupidity. The original roots, or those from
which this good and evil will themselves spring, are grace
and sin. ( Man makes a good tree or root, [tree and root
being synonymous here] when he receives the grace of
God ; for he does not make himself good by himself, but of
1 Habemus autem, inquit, possi- bona et mala sunt, duo homines,
bilitatem utriusque partis a Deo in- bonus et malus, quid est bonus
sitam, velut quandam, ut ita dicam, homo, nisi voluntatis bonse, hoc est
radicem fructiferam atque fecxindam arbor radicis bonse? et quid est
quse ex voluntate hominis diversa homo malus, nisi voluntatis malse,
gignat et pariat, et quse possit ad hsec est arbor radicis malse ? Fruc-
proprii cultoris arbitrium, vel nitere tus autem harum radicum atque
flore virtutum, vel sentibus horrere arborum facta sunt, dicta sunt,
vitiorum. Ubi non intuens quod cogitata sunt, quse bona de bona
loquatur, unam eandemque radicem voluntate procedunt, et mala de
constituit bonorum et malorum, con- mala. Facit autem homo arborem
tra evangelicam veritatem doctri- bonam, quando Dei accipit gratiam.
namque apostolicam. Nam et Do- Non autem se ex malo bonum per
minus nee arborem bonam dicit seipsum facit, sed in illo et per ilium,
posse facere fructus malos, nee ma- et in illo qui semper est bonus. . .
lam bpnos; et Apostolus Paulus Malam vero arborem facit quando
cum dicit radicem malorum omnium seipsum malum facit, quando a
esse cupiditatem, admonet utique bono immutabili deficit. — De Gratia
intelligi radicem bonorum omnium Christi, c. 18, 19.
charitatem. Unde si duae arbores
CHAP. Till.
of Freewill. 2 1 5
Him : ' that is, his own preparation of his will, by which he
makes it a good will, is itself derived from grace ; man is
the immediate, but grace the original agent. On the other
hand, ' Man makes an evil tree or root when he makes
himself evil, and departs from immutable good,' as he did
by his transgression in Paradise, for so the general doctrine
of Augustine interprets this allusion. A rationale of two
different roots or causes of the lives of good and evil men
is thus laid down, in the place of one and the same moral
condition out of which they are supposed to arise on the
doctrine of freewill.
The same argument is repeated in a passage from the
book De Peccatorum Meritis et Remissione : ' It is strange
if the will can stand at a certain point midway, so as to be
neither good nor bad — voluntas mirum si potest in medio
quodam ita consistere, ut nee bona nee mala sit. For
either we love righteousness, and it is good, or we do not
love righteousness, and it is bad ; the bad will not coming
from God, the good one coming from God, and being the
gift whereby we are justified ... a gift which to whomso
ever God gives it, He gives in His mercy, and from whom
soever He withholds it, He withholds it in His judgment
... for the law of His secret justice rests with Him alone.' x
The writer here refuses to comprehend a neutral, and
simply determinable will, and, setting aside such a ra
tionale of human conduct, lays down two separate wills,
good and bad, which have each possession of the agent
prior to all action.
These two distinct wills, or roots or causes of human
action, then, are, as has already appeared, and as the whole
doctrine of Augustine shows, original sin and grace.
I. The will of fallen man is determined to evil by a
cause out of and beyond the personal will or the will of
the individual ; i.e. by the transgression of the first man,
or original sin ; which captive will, however, is, notwith
standing, freewill, for the following reasons.
In the first place, Augustine defends its freedom upon
the simple ground which has been maintained. In reply
1 De Pecc. Merit, et Kern. 1. 2. c. 18.
216 Augustinian Doctrine CHAP, vm,
to the Pelagian, who presses him continually with the con
sequences of his doctrine, and asks how a being, who is
literally unable to turn to good from the moment of his
birth, can be treated as a free agent and responsible for
his acts, he answers simply that he is so, inasmuch as he
has a will. He does what he does with his will, and not
against it. No force has compelled him to act contrary to
his inclination, but he has acted according to his inclina
tion. He has therefore acted as a free agent, and he is
responsible for his acts. What more is wanted for respon
sibility than that a man has acted willingly, and without
constraint? 'Why perplex a very plain subject. He is
free for evil (i.e. a free agent in doing evil) who acts with
an evil will. He is free for good (i.e. a free agent in doing
good) who acts with a good will.' l — 'Men are not forced
by the necessity of the flesh into sin, as if they were un
willing (quasi inviti) ; but if they are of an age to use
their own choice, they are both retained in sin by their will,
and precipitated from one sin to another by their will. For
he who persuades and deceives them does not work anything
in them, but that they sin with their will.2 ' — ' The will is
that with which we sin, and with which we live well —
voluntas est qua et peccatur et recte vivitur.' 3 It is
enough for freedom, according to these statements, if we
sin by or with the consent of our will.
Another answer to this difficulty is more subtle and
intricate. The sin of our nature is voluntary, and men are
responsible for it, because this sin proceeds from a self-
determining human will in the first instance ; the sin of
the first man or the original sin having been committed
1 Quid aperta implicas loquacitate bitrio , et in peccato sua voluntatc
perplexa? Ad malum liber est, qui retinentur, et a peccato in peccatum
voluntate agit mala : ad bonum au- sua voluntate prsecipitantur. Neque
tern liber est qui voluntate agit enim agit in eis qui suadet et decipit,
bona.— Op. Imp. 1. 3. c. 120. nisi ut peccatum voluntate commit-
1 ' Non itaque, sicut dicunt nos tant.' — Contra Duas, Ep. 1. I.e. 3.
quidem dicere, et iste audet insuper ' Liberum arbitrium usque adeo
scribere, " omnes in peccatum, velut in peccatore non periit, ut per illud
inviti, carnis suse necessitate co- peccent, maxime omnes qui cum
guntur:" sed, si jam in ea setate delectatione peccant.' — Ibid. 1. I.e. 2.
guut ut proprise mentis utantur ar- 8 Ketract. 1. I.e. 9.
CHAP. VHl.
of Freewill. 2 1 7
when man had a self-determining will. The root or origin,
therefore, of sin is entirely free, and it must be judged by
its root or origin. Subsequently, indeed, to its origin, sin
becomes not free in this sense, but necessary, and our nature
is captive to it : but this does not undo the freedom of its
origin. ' Sin cannot be without the will, in the same way
in which we say that the fruit cannot be without the root.
. . . Without the will of him (Adam) from whom is the
origin of all that live, the original sin was not committed.
But the contagion of it could pass to others without the
will. It must exist with the will, in order that it might
pass to others without the will, as a tree must have a root
below, in order that it may be above without a root. . . .
Sin is both with the will and without the will : it is with
the will in so far as it must begin to be with it ; it is with
out the will in so far as it remains without it.' * When it
is said in this passage that sin remains without the will, it
is not of course meant that it remains apart from all will
whatever, for some kind of will must go along with a sinful
act to make it the man's act ; but will is here used in the
highest sense as a self-determining will, such a will as the
first man in his perfect state had. The meaning of this
passage, then, is this : that sin began in a self-determining
will ; and that, therefore, though when once existing, it
remains in the human race without such a will, it ever
carries about with it the freedom and responsibility of its
commencement. The human will is viewed as one stream
of will, so to call it, flowing first from a fountain head in
the will of the first man, as he came from the hands of his
Creator, undergoing a change of its powers and condition at
the fall, and with that internal change passing into all the
individual members of the human race, as they are succes-
1 Ego sic dixi peccatum sine vo- alia loca transire sine radicibus
luntate esse non posse, quoraodo possent. . . . Sine voluntate non
dicimus poma vel frumenta sine potest esse, nam sine voluntate non
radicibus esse non posse. . . . Sine potrst existere ut sit ; sine autem
voluntate esse non posset, ut esset voluntate potest esse, quia sine vo-
quod in alios sine voluntate tran- luntate potest manere quod existit.
siret ; sicut frumenta sine radicibus — Op. Imp. 1. 4. cc. 97. 99.
esse non possent, ut essent quae in
218 Augustinian Doctrine CHAP. vnr.
sively born. At its fountain head this will is self-deter
mining and free in the complete sense ; but at the fall
it loses this freedom, and receives into itself an inclination
to evil, which operates necessarily. Thus biassed, it passes
into the successive generations of individual men, as they
are born, constituting them sinful beings, and issuing in
sinful desires and acts. If mankind complain, then, of this
captive condition, and ask why, when their will acts under
a necessity they are treated as free and responsible beings
subject to punishment for their acts, they are told that
their will was originally free and self-determining ; that it
only lost that power by its own fault ; and that a loss which
it has brought upon itself does not give it immunity. An
analogy is instituted between the effect of original sin
upon the will, and the effect of habit or custom. The will
of the man who is born under the influence of original sin
is treated as identical with the will which committed that
sin ; just as the will of an individual who is under the
force of a bad habit is identical with the will which con
tracted that habit. And this view accounts for an apparent
contradiction which we meet with in Augustine, in speaking
of the will. He talks of will as being essentially original
and the cause of itself, or self-determining ; being this, as
being will l ; and he also speaks of will as if the fact of a
will, whatever were its cause, made a true and genuine will.
He is first speaking of will as a whole, and secondly of will
in a particular stage. Will as a whole must be original
and self-determining ; that is, there must have been a
time in the history of the will when it was so : otherwise
we make sin simply necessary in the world, and fasten its
authorship on the Deity. But will in a particular stage or
condition may be the conscious fact of willing, and no
more, acting really under a necessity. Such an explanation,
however, is wholly mystical.
II. The will of man is determined to good by grace,
and yet it is freewill ; just as his will, when so determined
by original sin to evil, was free : because it is true will ;
1 P. 206.
CHAP vin. of Freewill. 219
because the man acts willingly and without constraint.
' The human will is not taken away, but is changed from
evil to good by grace — voluntas humana non tollitur, sed
ex mala mutatur in bonamS ! — ' Freewill is one of the
gifts of Grod ; not only itself but the goodness of it — non
tantum ut sit sed etiam ut bonum sit.' 2 — ' It is certain
that when we will, we will ; but it is He who makes us to
will — certum est nos velle cum volumus, sed ille facit ut
velimus bonum. It is certain that when we do we do ;
but He makes us to do, by giving the most effective strength
to the will — cerium est nos facer e cum facimus, sed ille
facit ut faciamus, prcebendo vires efficacissimas volun-
tati.' 3 — ' Some will to believe, others do not ; because the
will of some is prepared by God, the will of others is not
— aliis prceparatur aliis non prceparatur voluntas a
Domino Mercy and justice have been respectively
exerted in the very wills of men — misericordia et judi-
cium in ipsis voluntatibus facia sunt.' 4 That is to say,
the will is moved and determined by Divine grace, but it
is still will, and freewill.
A higher sense, however, than that of freedom from
constraint and force, or simple willingness, though at the
same time including this latter sense, is sometimes given
to the term freewill ; viz., that of freedom from the yoke
and bondage of sin, the dominion of evil inclinations and
passions. The term freedom is raised from its neutrality
and appropriated to a good condition of the will ; such
condition being still, however, not freedom in the sense of
power of choice, but a state of servitude to good, — the
contradictory of servitude to evil.
S. Paul speaks of two bondages, a bondage to righte
ousness and a bondage to sin ; and of two freedoms, a free
dom from righteousness and a freedom from sin. And
S. Augustine, following him, says : ' The will is always free
in us, but not always good; for either it is free from
righteousness, and under bondage to sin, or it is free from
1 De Grati4 et Lib. Arb. n. 41. s De Gratia et Lib. Arb. n. 32.
2 De Pecc. Merit, et Kern. 1. 2. 4 De Prsed. Sanct. c. 6.
c. 6.
220 Augustinian Doctrine CHAP. vm.
sin, and under bondage to righteousness.' l Here the term
free is evidently used not in the sense of free for evil or
good, i.e. with the power of doing either; but as meaning
free from evil, and free from good. There is a state of
mind in which the good principle is dominant and supreme,
and the man in entire subjection to it or under its yoke ;
a state of mind in which the will has reached such a point
of strength on the good side, as that the man could not
act against it, without such a violence as it would be ab
surd to suppose him committing toward himself. There
is a state of mind also in which evil has this dominance
and supremacy. Freewill is here understood as will, which
is either free from this yoke of good, or free from this yoke
of evil. In this sense of the word free, then, the freedom
of the will is inconsistent with a power of choice ; for,
according to this use of the term, a freewill, so far from
having ability to do evil or good, has its very name, be
cause it is either not able to do evil on the one hand, or
not able to do good on the other. It is not a will which
has yet to make its choice, but which is already determined,
and is an acting will on one side or the other. Nor has
such a freewill arisen in the first instance by a power of
choice, because such a freewill there has always been on
the evil side or the good ; ' the will is always free in us,'
i.e. is always in one of these states of freedom or the other.
Were the change from the bondage of evil, of which Angus-
tine speaks, a change from this bondage to evil to a power
of choosing evil or good (and this is what on the common
doctrine of freewill is understood by the freedom of grace
as distinguished from the bondage of nature), a power of
choice in the will would then come in. But this change
is simply an exchange of one bondage for another, — a
1 'Semper est in nobis voluntas Grat. et Lib. Arb. n. 31.
libera, sed non semper est bona, ' Liberum arbitrium et ad malum
Aut enim a justitia libera est, quan- et ad bonum faciendum confitendum
do servit peccato, et tune est mala : est nos habere : sed in malo faciendo
aut a peccato libera est, quando ser- liber est quisque justitige eervusque
vit justitise, et tune est bona. Gratia peccati ; in bono autem liber est
vero Dei semper est bona, et per nullus, nisi fuerit liberatus ab illo.'
hanc fit ut sit homo bonse voluntatis, — De Corr. et Grat. n. 2.
qui prius fait voluntatis malse.'— De
CHAP. viir. of Freewill. 221
bondage to good for a bondage to evil; and, therefore,
there is no room for the introduction of this power.
A state of bondage to righteousness, then, or a state
in which the will is necessarily good, is, according to this
scheme, a state of freewill ; only as yet it has that name
in common with the corresponding state on the side of
evil. S. Paul uses the terms bondage and freedom, instead
of in a respectively favourable and unfavourable sense, in
a neutral one ; and S. Augustine follows him. But the
application of the term is afterwards restricted and appro
priated to the good side ; and the good state of the will is
called the freedom, in contrast with the other, which is
called the slavery of the will.1
It appears, then, upon a general examination of the
language of Augustine respecting freewill, first, that it
does not come up to that which we call the doctrine of
freewill, not going beyond that simple acknowledgment of
a will in which that doctrine and its opposite agree ; and,
secondly, that it is opposed to that doctrine, his language
being that the will has, notwithstanding its freedom, no
&elf-determining power, but is determined to evil and to
good respectively by original sin and by grace.
It is true, indeed, that language of an apparently
opposite kind to this is to be found occasionally in S.
Augustine ; but when such language is examined, it will
be found to be only verbally opposite to, and really in
harmony with, the doctrine which has been exhibited.
S. Augustine uniformly indeed holds a co-operation of
the human will with Divine grace, and co-operation seems
to imply two original agencies meeting and uniting in
the same work ; but on examination we find that the term,
in S. Augustine's use of it, does not imply this. The
co-operation of the human will with Divine grace only
commences, according to S. Augustine, after the human
will has undergone that whole process which has been just
described; that is to say, after it has been moved by
the sole action of Divine grace into a state of efficiency.
1 ' In tantum libera est (voluntas) nante cupiditate).' — Eetract. 1. 1.
in quantum liberata est (a domi- c. 15.
222 Augustinian Doctrine CHAP. vnr.
' He works in us that we will, and that is the beginning,
He co-operates with us when we will, and that is the per
fecting, of the work. Being confident of this very thing,
says the Apostle, that He which hath begun a good work
in you will perfect it until the day of Jesus Christ. That
we will, therefore He works in us without us ; and when
we will, and so will that we do, He co-operates with us—
ut ergo velimus sine nobis operatur, cum autem volumus
et sic volumus ut faciamus, nobiscum operatur. And we
can do no good works of piety without Him first operating
that we will, and then co-operating with us when we will.
Of (rod operating that we will it is said, " It is God that
worketh in us to will." Of (rod co-operating with us when
we will, and so will that we do, it is said, " We know that
all things work together for good to them that love God." ' *
The condition of the human will is here divided into two
stages, in the former of which God simply operates upon
it, in the latter co-operates with it. The former stage
lasts till the will is effective, till we will and so will that
we do ; that point attained the latter stage commences,
and God co-operates with this will, and this will co
operates with Him. It is evident from the very terms of
this division what the nature of this co-operating human
will is ; that it is not an original agent, but a will that has
been made to be what it is by grace wholly. That such
a will co-operates with grace is no more than to say, that
grace co-operates with grace ; for that which the pure
effect does, the cause does really and properly. Grace is
the original, the will is only an instrumental co-operator.
The dictum ' Gratia ipsa meretur auger i, ut aucta merea-
tur perficij expresses the same doctrine, making the simple
bestowal of grace the reason of its farther bestowal, so that
grace is its own augmenter, and increases upon an internal
law of growth.
It is such a mode of co-operation as this which the
following passage describes : c It is plain that human
righteousness, although it is not done without the human
will, is to be attributed to the operation of the Divine,
1 De Grat. et Lib. Arb. c. xvii.
CHAP. VIII.
of Freewill. 22,
which is the reason we cannot deny that the perfection of
that righteousness is possible even in this life ; because all
things are possible to God, both what He does when His
own will solely operates, and what He does when the wills
of His creatures operate with Him — sive qucc facit sola
sua voluntate, swe, quce co-op erantibus creaturce succ
voluntatibus, a se fieri posse constitute? * Here is a co
operation mentioned of the human will with the Divine,
but it is a co-operation subordinated to an absolute power
in the Divine will. Whatever therefore such co-operation
in the human will involves, it does not involve any de
pendence of the issue upon it, inasmuch as such issue is
secured by the absolute power of the Divine will to pro
duce it. The power is on one side, the co-operation on
another; co-operation abstracted from power is instru
mental co-operation.
The same mode of co-operation is described in the
following extract : ' When God wills the salvation of a
man, no will of man resists Him. For to will or not to
will is in the power of the willing or unwilling man in such
sense only that it does not impede the Divine will or frus
trate the Divine power — sic enim velle seu nolle in volen-
tis aut nolentis est potestate., ui Divinam voluntatem non
impediat, nee super et potestatem.' 2 Here it is said that
in a particular sense a man's will is in his own power, and
were the sense in which this were allowed a free and
natural one, nothing more would be wanted for a testimony
on the side of freewill. But we see at once that it is any
thing but a free and natural sense in which this power is
conceded ; for it is conceded under the salvo, that this
power does not interfere with the natural operation of
another power, which other power is absolute. But what
is power which is itself the subject of absolute power?
Had S. Augustine wished to admit a real power in the
human will, there are many plain and simple modes in
which he might have done it, as a common language in
theology, both ancient and modern, on this subject shows.
But he only admits a power which is negatived by an entire
1 De Lit. et Spirit, c. 5 2 De Corr. et Grat. c. xiv.
224 Augustinian Doctrine CHAP. vm.
subordination to another power ; and a will with such a
negatived power over itself is not an original but an in
strumental co-operator with the Divine will.
One passage, however, has attracted remarkable atten
tion, in consequence of one particular phrase, contained
in it, appearing at first to involve very decidedly the posi
tion of a self-determining will : ' If it be said that we must
beware of interpreting the text, " What hast thou which
thou hast not received ? " of the believing will, and assert
ing, because this proceeds from a freewill which was a
Divine gift at our creation, that therefore it is itself a
Divine gift, lest we attribute to God the authorship of sin
as well ; — I say, that a believing will is not to be attributed
to God solely because it proceeds from freewill, but because
it depends upon the Divine persuasion, either external or
internal ; though it belongs to the individual's will to agree
with or dissent from this persuasion. God's mercy always
anticipates us, and He works in man the will to believe ;
but to assent to or dissent from the Divine will belongs to
the individual will. Nor does this at all contradict the
text, " What hast thou which thou hast not received ? "
but rather confirms it. The soul cannot receive these
gifts without consenting ; because, what it has and what
it receives is from God : to have and receive belongs to a
possessor and receiver.' He then decides why this Divine
persuasion, to which this assent of the will is necessary, is
effectual with some, and not with others, and decides it by
a reference to the inscrutable will of God.1
1 ' Si autem respondetur, caven- secus, per evangelicas exhortationes
dum esse ne quisquam Deo tribu- . . sive intresecus, ubinemohabetin
endum putet peccatum, quod admit- potestate quid ei veniat, in mentem,
titur per liberum arbitrium, si in eo sed consentire vel dissentlre propriee
quod dicitur, " Quid habes quod non voluntatisest. His ergo modi squando
accepisti ? " propterea etiam voluntas Deus agit cum anima rationali, ut ei
qua credimus dono Dei tribuitur, credat (neque enim credere potest
quia de libero existit arbitrio, quod quodlibet libero arbitrio si nulla sit
cum crearemur accepimus ; attendat suasio vel vocatio cui credat) profecto
et yideat, non ideo, quia ex libero et ipsum velle credere Deus ope-
arbitrio est, quod nobis naturaliter ratur inhomine, etin omnibus mise-
concreatum est ; verum etiam quod ricordia ejus prsevenit nos : consen-
visorum suasionibus agit Deus, ut tire autem vocationi Dei, vel ab ea
velimus et ut credamus, sive extrin- dissentire, sicut dixi, proprice volun-
CHAP. vni. of Freewill. 225
We have, then, in this passage the expression, < assentire
vel dissentire proprice voluntatis est ; ' and this expres
sion seems at first sight to involve a self-determining will.
But it will be seen, that in the course of the statement it
receives a different explanation. In this passage S. Augus
tine is discussing the question, whether the will to believe
is given by Grod ; and he answers, first, that it is given by
God because it arises out of that freewill which was given
to man at his creation. But then he remarks, that this
answer is not enough, because sin also arises out of free
will, and sin is not the gift of (rod. What is the difference,
then, he asks, in the mode in which they respectively arise,
which makes one the gift of God, and the other not ? He
decides that this difference lies in a certain calling or per
suading on the part of God, which is necessary in order to
produce the believing will — neque enim credere potest
quodlibet libero arbitrio, si nulla sit suasio vel vocatio
cui credat. And to this calling and persuasion the natural
will has to consent, in order for it to be effectual ; for that
'assenting or dissenting belongs to the natural will —
consentire vocationi Dei vel ab ea dissentire proprice
voluntatis est.' The believing will, then, is a Divine gift,
inasmuch as it is the result of a Divine calling with which
the human will agrees. But then the question imme
diately arises, whether this is not a compromise which
really gives up the whole point, and makes the believing
will not a gift which man receives simply, but something
which he acquires by an act of his own. And to that he
replies, that it is not, because consent is only the necessary
mode in which the will receives a gift : consent being, in
fact, nothing but the act itself of receiving ; so that to
say that the will must consent in order to receive, is
tatis est. Quae res non solum non tis est. Jam si ad illam profundi-
infirmat quod dictum est, " Quid tatem scrutandam quisquam nos
habes quod non accepisti ? " verum coarctet, cur illi ita suadeatur ut
etiam confirmat. Accipere quidem persuadeatur illi autem non ita:
et habere anima non potest dona, duo sola occurrunt interim quae
de quibus hoc audit, nisi consenti- respondere mihi placeat " 0 altitude
endo : ac per hoc quid habeat et divitiarum " et " Numquid iniquitas
quid accipiat, Dei est ; accipere au- apud Deum ? " ' — De Spiritu et
tern et habere, accipientis et haben- Litera, 1. 1. n. 60.
226 Augustinian Doctrine CHAP. Yin.
nothing more than to say that the will must receive when
it receives — accipere et habere utique accipientis et haben-
tis est. The believing will thus comes out, after due ex
planation, a simple gift, to which the only consent is one
which is involved in the "mere fact of it being given; viz.
reception and possession. And, lastly, why one man has
this gift, and another not, is explained by a simple appeal
to mystery.
Any one who carefully examines this passage will see
that the explanation here given of it is the only one by
which a consistent meaning is secured for it throughout.
A phrase apparently owning an original power in the
human will to accept or reject the Divine operation upon
it, is admitted ; but as soon as it has been admitted it is
explained in a particular way, and reduced into entire
harmony with a theory of omnipotent grace, resting upon
a basis of mystery.1
To sum up in one distinction the general argument of
this chapter, the Augustinian doctrine of freewill may be
said in a word to describe the nature of freewill as being
a mode of action, not a source of action — taking source in
its proper sense as an original source. The mode of human
1 Jansen (De Gratia Christi, pp. of Augustinian election as ex prce-
220,225, 908, 936,955,980, 989) visis operibus (p. 989) : and his and
properly explains various passages Molini's explanation of gratia effi-
of Augustine from which the Jesuits cax, as efficacious si voluntas cum ca
Bellarmine.Suarez, Molina, Lessius, co-operari velit (p. 936), omitting
and others had extracted a freewill the whole consideration that this
meaning, as applying to the will of consent of the will is itself, accord-
man as created, or simply to will as ing to Augustine the effect of grace,
such. But while such explanation Having excluded Augustinianism
is sometimes required on his own from the pale of tolerated opinion,
side, nothing can be more far-fetched the Church of Kome is obliged to
arid artificial than the Jesuit inter- prove that S. Augustine was not
pretations of the great pervading Augustinian. But the plain language
dicta and fundamental positions of of S. Augustine refutes such inter-
Augustine ; if interpretations de- preters, and forces one of two alter-
serve that name which are obvious natives upon them, either that they
and barefaced contradictions to, tolerate his doctrines, and so keep
rather than explanations of, S. him in communion with their
Augustine's meaning, as Lessius' Church, or anathematise his doc-
interpretation of the Augustinian trines, and confess that S. Augustine
predestination as conditional and does not belong to their commu-
incomplete (pp. 955, 981) his view nion.
CHAP. viir. of Freewill. 227
action is free. We act willingly and without compulsion
whenever we truly act at all ; for action forced upon us is
not our own, but another's, and to act willingly is to act
freely. We act with deliberation, choice, preference, on
certain principles, and to certain ends. But it does not
follow, it is argued, that our mode of action decides any
thing as to the source of action : we act as we will ; but
the question still remains how we come to will. Under
neath all our sensations of original agency, it is maintained,
a deeper cause operates, and that which is not the will pro
duces the movements and acts of the will. ' Men are
acted upon, that they may act, not that they may not act
— aguntur ut agant non ut ipsi nikil agant.' A transla
tion cannot give the point of the original, which is literally
that ' men are acted that they may act ; ' the passive and
the active of the same verb being used to express the more
pointedly the entire sequency of an effect from a cause.
Men act — agunt, that is the effect ; they are acted upon
— aguntur, that is the cause which accounts for the whole
of the effect. The whole cause then, of human acts is
beyond the agent himself. But the agent is not never
theless inert, because he is not a cause ; on the contrary,
he is an agent, he acts. He is not caused to do nothing ;
caused to be idle, passive, motionless; an actor is the very
thing he is caused to be. That is to say, his mode of act
ing, which is wholly free, coexists with a source of action
which is external. — ' When we will we will, but He makes
us to will — cerium est nos velle cum volumus, sed ille
facit ut velimus bonum.' An objector is supposed to say
that he must be the cause of his own acts because he wills
them. But he is told that his mode of action, which is
free, decides nothing as to its source. That a man should
be 'forced to will — cogatur velle,' would be a contradiction;
for, ' if he is forced he does not will, he cannot will unwill
ingly — cum enim cogitur non vult, et quid absurdius
quam ut dicatur nolens velle.''1 But there is no contra
diction in his being made to will, because the will cannot
resist before it exists, and therefore cannot be opposed to
1 Op. Imp. 1. 1. c. 134.
Q 2
228 Augustinian Doctrine CHAP. YIH.
its own formation. It is the same distinction of mode and
source. " You do not understand," Augustine tells the
Pelagian who brings against him the text 2 Tim. ii. 21 :
" If a man, therefore, purge himself,' &c., as proving man
to be the proper source of his own acts, ' you do not under
stand that both assertions are true, that the vessels of glory
prepare themselves, and that God prepares them. For
God makes that man does — ut facial homo facit Deus.' —
' What can be more absurd than your idea that because the
motives of the will are unforced, we are not to inquire
whence they are, as if a cause were contradictory to their
freedom, as forcing them to be? Is a man forced to exist,
because he has an origin ? Before he existed, was there
anything to be forced ? The will has an origin, and yet is
not forced to be ; and if this origin is not to be sought
for, the reason is not that it should not be, but that it
need not, — that it is too manifest. The will is from him
whose the will is ; the angel's will from the angel, the
man's from the man, (rod's from God. God, in working a
good will in man, causes a good will to arise in him whose
the will is — agit ut oriatur ab illo bona voluntas cujus
est voluntas ; just as He causes man to spring from man.'1
No language could indicate more fully the nature of the
will, as an active, living, willing will, internal and truly
our own, than this which goes even the length of claiming
an originality of the will within, and making it arise out
of ourselves. But, on the other hand, this very originality
1 Op.
Quid
Op. Imp. 1. 1. c. 101. cogitur; et si ejus origo quaerenda
autem vauius definitionibus non est, non ideo quaerenda non est
tuis, qui propterea putas non esse quod voluntas alicunde non sit, sed
quserendum unde sit voluntas, quia quia manifestum est unde sit. Ab
motus est animi cogente nullo ? Si illo est enim voluntas cujus est
enim dicatur, ut putas, unde sit ; voluntas ; ab angelo scilicet volun-
non erit verum quod dictum est, tas angeli, ab homine hominis, a
cogente nullo : quia illud unde est Deo Dei, et si operatur Deus in ho-
eam cogit esse ; et ideo non est mine voluntatem bonam, id utique
alicunde, ne cogatur esse. 0 stul- agit, ut oriatur ab illo bona voluntas,
titiam singularem ! Non est ergo cujus est voluntas ; sicut agit ut
alicunde ipse homo, qui non est homo oriatur ab homine ; non enim
coactus esse, quia non erat qui co- quia Deus creat hominem, ideo non
geretur antequam esset. Prorsuset homo ex homine nascitur. — Op.
alicunds est voluntas, et esse non Imp. 1. 5. c. 42.
CHAP. viir. of Freewill. 229
of the will is not original ; this very source within us is
derived from a source without us. This rise of the will
out of ourselves is no more opposed to its true causation
by Divine grace, than the birth of man from man is
opposed to man's creation by Divine power. The will is a
middle cause between (rod and the act, as man is a middle
cause between God and the human birth. It is a cause,
but that very cause is caused ; i.e. the will is an absolutely
free mode of action, but not a true original source of action.
Such a doctrine is not fairly open to the charge commonly
brought against it, that it converts man into a machine,
and degrades him to the level of matter; for it does not
do so. A machine has no will ; but this doctrine expressly
admits in man a will. But it allows a will as a mediate,
and not a first cause, of action.
The Augustinian doctrine of freewill having been thus
stated, it only remains to point out wherein lies its pecu
liarity, in what the true difference between it and the
ordinary doctrine of freewill consists.
The first characteristic, then, that we observe in the
doctrine which we have been considering, is, that it com
bines freewill with necessity. The terms themselves neces
sity and necessary are not indeed in constant use in Augus
tine though he does use them ; maintaining man in a state
of nature to be under ' a necessity to sin— peccati neces-
sitas^ and under grace to be recalled by necessity to a
spiritual life — necessitate revocari.* Not selecting them
for his own use — conveying as they do to ordinary minds
the idea of force — when challenged by his Pelagian
opponent to admit them, he does not refuse ; only securing
a distinction between a co-active and a creative necessity.
But though the word itself is not in constant use, other
words which signify the same thing are ; and therefore
1 Op. Imp. 1. 5. c. 61. cuta est peccantem peccavit habendi
2 Op. Imp. 1. 1. c. 93. 'Necessi- dura necessitas, donee tota sanetur
tatis inerat plenitude.' — L. 5. c. 59. infirmitas . . . ita ut sit etiam
' Attende eum qui dicit, Quod nolo bene vivendi, et nunquam peccandi
malum hoc ago, et responde utrum voluntaria felixque necessitas."
necessitatem non habeat.'— L. 5. c. — De Perfectione Justitise, c. 4.
50. ' Quia vero peccavit voluntas se-
230 Augustinian Doctrine CHAP. vni.
this doctrine may be called, in the first place, a combination
of freewill with necessity.
The peculiarity, however, of the Augustinian doctrine
does not lie in this combination ; for the combination itself
is not, when we examine the matter, open to any substan
tial objection. We are apt, indeed, at first to think that
no will can be in any sense free that acts necessarily ; but
a little reflection will show us that this is a first thought
resulting from not properly knowing our own admissions
on this subject. We attribute to the Supreme Being, the
angels, and saints in their state of reward, a necessity on
the side of goodness ; but we attribute to God, the angels,
and the saints the operation of a genuine will. We attri
bute to the evil spirits and the wicked, in their state of
punishment, a necessity on the side of evil, and together
with it the same genuine will. Necessity indeed only ope
rates in matter in this lower world ; inevitable growth,
inevitable decay, organisation, and disorganisation, are only
seen in the animal, vegetable and mineral bodies ; but in
the eternal world, the intelligent substance acts necessarily,
and that which moves with certainty in the direction of
good or evil is will. The Supreme Will, being essentially
good, cannot contradict itself ; the will of the wicked can
not agree with, the will of the righteous cannot recede
from, the Will Supreme. Indeed, we are conversant with
certain approaches to necessity in human conduct in this
life. It is the essential characteristic of habit, that it
makes acts to be performed by us as a matter of course,
implants a kind of law in our minds, by which we act in
this or that way ; and therefore habit is called a second
nature. But we do not consider that men who have
formed habits, virtuous or the contrary, do not act with
freewill.
Nor, again, does the peculiarity of S. Augustine's doc
trine, as it does not lie in the combination of freewill with
necessity, lie either in the source which he assigns to such
necessity, which is one external to the agent. The doctrine
of an eternal state of reward and punishment, which all
Christians admit, asserts the transference of human wills
CHAP. vin. of Freewill. 231
into a state of necessity, both for evil and good, by an act
of Almighty Power ; that the wills of wicked men are, on
their departure from this life, put by this act into a state
in which they are beyond recovery ; those of the good into
a state in which they are beyond lapse. The power of
choice being, according to the doctrine of freewill, retained
by man so long as he remains in this world, its determina
tion, on his departure to another, is caused not by an act
of his own, but by a Divine act of judgment or of reward,
as it may be. Thus all (rod's moral creatures pass, at a
particular stage of their being, by an act of Divine Power,
from a state in which their wills are indeterminate and
may choose either good or evil, to a state in which they
necessarily choose one or the other. While there is life
there is hope, and there is fear. The most inveterate
habits of vice still leave a power of self-recovery in the
man if he will but exert it ; the most confirmed habits of
virtue still leave the liability to a fall. The resources for
a struggle between good and evil remain up to the time of
departure from life, when a change takes place which no
thought can reach, and by a Divine act the will, remaining
the same in substance, is changed fundamentally in con
dition, and put out of a state of suspense and, in ordinary
language, freedom, into one of necessity.
But the combination of necessity, and that a necessity
communicated to the will from without, with freewill, being
admitted on both sides, the peculiarity of Augustine's doc
trine lies in the application of this principle ; in the reason,
the time, and the manner he assigns to its operation. That
state of the will to which an original power of choice
attaches is upon the doctrine of freewill identical with a
state of trial ; and this consideration gives us the reason
and time of the introduction of necessity, as well as the
manner of its operation according to the doctrine of free
will. The ground of its introduction is final reward and
punishment ; the time of its introduction is after a state of
trial; and the manner of its operation consists in the
absence of struggle, effort, or interruption ; in the entire,
continuous, and natural yielding of the will to the impulses
232 Augustinian Doctrine CHAP. vni.
of good or evil. The strife is over in the mind of man ;
and the will, finally rooted, goes on producing good or evil
acts and motions with the ease and uniformity of physical
law. But in S. Augustine's application of the principle,
the reason, and time of its introduction, and mode of ope
ration, are all different. Necessity is not the reward or
punishment of a previous exercise of liberty of choice, but
the effect of original sin on the one hand, and an eternal
Divine decree of mercy on the other. And with the diffe
rence of reason for, the time of its introduction is also
different. It does not succeed and come after a state of
trial, but is simultaneous with it, and is in full operation
in this life, instead of being reserved for the next. And
the manner of its operation is for the same reason different,
exhibiting the struggle, the variableness, and interruption
incident to this present state of existence. The difference
between the trial, effort, and alternation of the present, and
the peace and serenity of the future life, which is upon the
doctrine of freewill a difference between a state of liberty
and a state of necessity, is, according to the predestinarian,
only a difference between two modes of operation on the
part of the same necessity. That grace from which good
action necessarily follows is not given with uniformity in
this life, sometimes being given and sometimes not, to the
same individual ; whereas, in the eternal world it is either
given wholly or taken away wholly, always given or never ;
so that there the determination of the will is constant for
good or for evil. Its mode of operation, then, in this life
is variable, in the next uniform ; here, with pain and effort
to the man, with trouble and anxiety, the feeling of uncer
tainty, and other feelings exactly like what we should have,
supposing our wills were free and our acts contingent ;
there with ease, security, and bliss ; here preparatory, there
final ; here after the mode of trial, there after the mode of
reward.
Such a difference between two doctrines of necessity, it
will be seen, involves all the difference between a doctrine
of necessity and a doctrine of freewill. The former gives
to freewill that period which is the turning part of man's
CHIP. vm. of Freewill. 233
existence, this life ; to necessity only that future state which
is here decided. The latter gives to necessity both the
future state itself and the decision of it.
CHAPTER IX.
SCHOLASTIC THEORY OF NECESSITY.
THE teaching of S. Augustine had that result which natu
rally follows from the keen perception and mastery of a
particular truth by a vigorous, powerful, and fertile mind ;
endowed with an inexhaustible command and perfect
management of language, which seconded and acted as
the simple instrument of the highest religious ardour and
enthusiasm. Copious and exuberant, and concise and
pointed, at the same time ; bold, ingenious, and brilliant,
yet always earnest and natural, he did not write so much
in vain. As the production of a single mind, the quantity
of the writing had a unity, force, and wholeness which told
with surprising effect upon the Church. The large aggre
gate of thought and statement came in one effective mass
and body. One such writer is in himself a whole age, and
more than an age of authorship ; a complete school, and
more than a school of divinity. He had, moreover, the
advantage of an undoubted and solid ground of Scripture ;
an advantage which his deep and full knowledge of the
sacred text, and wonderful skill and readiness in the appli
cation of it, enabled him to use with the greatest etfect.
He erected on this ground, indeed, more than it could
legitimately bear, and was a one-sided interpreter. Still
he brought out a side of Scripture which had as yet been
much in the shade, and called attention to deep truths
which had comparatively escaped notice in the Church.
He brought to light the full meaning of S. Paul, and did
that which the true interpreter does for his teacher and
master, — fastened the great doctrine of the Apostle, in its
full and complete sense, upon the Church.
234 Scholastic Theory CHAP. ix.
Such an exposition had as great and as permanent
success as could have been anticipated. The doctrine of
S. Augustine reigned in the mediaeval Church, and moulded
its authoritative teaching, till the Reformation produced
a reaction ; and the Eoman Church, apprehensive of the
countenance which it gave to some prominent doctrines of
the Reformers, and repelled by the use — sometimes unfair
and fanatical — made of it, fell back upon a strong doctrine
of freewill. The Thomists took an important part, indeed,
in the Council of Trent, and had sufficient influence to
guard its decrees from any turn unfavourable to themselves.
But they ceased after the Reformation to be a prominent
and ruling school, and gave place to the Jesuits, who, as
the antagonists by position and calling of the Reformation,
formed their theology in express opposition to it, and
abandoned the Augustinian ground. The Jansenists at
tempted a revival of it, to which their enthusiasm and
devotion gave a temporary success, sufficient to alarm the
dominant school : but authority finally suppressed it, and
ejected them, and practically with them the Augustinian
doctrine, from the Roman Church.
The mediaeval Augustinian school presents us with the
names of Peter Lombard, S. Bernard, S. Anselm, Thomas
Aquinas, Bradwardine,1 and others.2 Among these Lombard
and Aquinas occupy the first place as formal and systematic
theologians. The former of these, however, is more of a
compiler and collector of extracts and references, than an
exponent and a constructor. His collection of statements,
indeed, arranged on a plan, and extending over a large
ground, is in itself an exposition, and an able one ; and it
1 I cannot wholly understand, ex- are more like the shadows and
cept as unfavourably characteristic ghosts of reasonings than the reali-
of that age, the great mediaeval re- ties.
putation of Bradwardine, called the 2 The predestinarian controversy
1 profound doctor.' A dull monotony in the Gallican Church, which
characterises his speculations, which arose out of the statements of Grot-
are all spun out of the idea of the Di- teschalcus, in the ninth century,
vine Power, or of Grod as the Univer- does not offer much valuable mate-
sal Cause ; but spun into airy subtle- rial to the theological student. I
ties, which want the substance of give the principal points of it in
solid thought and argument, and NOTE XX.
CHAP. ix. of Necessity. 235
formed the great text book of the Church for centuries.
But it is not an argumentative exposition ; it does not ex
pand and develop by statement and reasoning theological
ideas. Aquinas, however, supplies the deficiencies of Lom
bard, and, taking up the scheme and ground-plan which the
older commentator furnishes, applies the argumentative
and philosophical talent to it, and fills it out with thought ;
enriching it at the same time with large additions from
the stores of heathen philosophy. Aquinas is accordingly
the great representative of mediaeval August inianism — I
might say, of mediaeval theology. He reflects the mind —
he embodies the ideas and sentiments of the mediaeval
Church. In him, as in a mirror, we see the great assump
tions, the ruling arguments of the theological world ; the
mode of inference which was considered legitimate ; the
way of solving difficulties which was thought satisfactory.
In his large and capacious mind we see the collective
theological thought and philosophy of the middle ages.
He fails, indeed, in a power which it was reserved for a
modern age to call forth from the human mind — the
analytical one. He does not turn his mind inward upon
itself to examine its own thoughts and ideas, and compare
received and current truths with the original type from
which they are copied. In this sense he does not appre
hend and realise truths : because he does not put his mind
into that attitude in which it has alone the power of seeing
its own processes, ideas, and modes of entertaining truth
— the attitude of reflection and turning inward of the
mind upon itself. No one can see a thing but by looking
at it ; the mediaeval mind did not look within, or examine
itself ; it could not, therefore, see itself — i.e. get such
knowledge as has been since proved to be attainable of its
own operations and ideas. It was left for a later age to
call attention to this world of internal discovery, and force
the human mind back upon itself ; changing that progres
sive habit, in which it had so long exclusively indulged,
of following up and arguing interminably upon truths,
into the stationary one of examining the truths them
selves. Aquinas accepts the received statements and posi-
236 Scholastic Theory CHAP. ix.
tions, and expands them with argumentative subtlety and
power. And the vast amount of statements and positions
which his mind includes and thus expands and treats argu-
mentatively is surprising ; showing a truly enormous grasp
and capacity, somewhat analogous to that of a great states
man, who, without penetrating far below or aiming at a
deeper understanding of the particular subjects and ques
tions presented to his consideration than he practically
wants, embraces an immense quantity of such particulars ;
all of which he treats argumentatively and is ready to
discuss, and come to a conclusion and decision upon them.
The argumentative edifice, however, of Aquinas, for want
of this later and inward attitude of mind, shows deep
deficiencies ; and especially that great vice of the scholastic
intellect — distinguishing without a difference ; a fault which
arises from accepting the superficial meaning of statements,
or the words themselves, without going into their real
meaning, which would often show that different words really
meant the same thing.
Taking Aquinas, therefore, as the representative of
medieval Augustinianism, I shall endeavour in this and
the following chapter to give an account of his system so
far as it touches on the particular subject of the present
treatise. aThe examination will disclose some forms of
thought and modes of arguing with which a modern mind
will not sympathise, but to which it will rather appeal as
showing how differently the intellect of man reasons in
different ages, and how the received thought of one period
becomes quaint and obsolete in another. The system,
however, will be found as a whole to rest upon some broad
and common assumptions, which have always formed, and
always will form, an important portion of the basis of
human opinion.
The doctrine of predestination, then, in the system of
Aquinas, rests mainly on philosophy, and rises upon the
idea of the Divine Power. This fundamental position was
laid down, this religious axiom stated with jealous exactness
and the most scientific strength of language, and the rest
was deduced by way of logical consequence from it. God
CHAP. rx. of Necessity. 237
was the First Great Cause: His will the source of all
things, the spring of all motions, all events : it could not
be frustrated, it must always be fulfilled : « God hath done
whatsoever He would — omnia qucecunque voluit fecit, in
codo et in terra.' This was contained in the very idea of
Omnipotence ; for no agency can be impeded but by
stronger agency, and none can be stronger than Omnipo
tence : it was contained in the very idea of the Divine
Felicity ; for no one can be perfectly happy whose will is
not fulfilled, and the Supreme Being is perfectly happy.1
Though the Divine Will, then, acted by mediate and
secondary causes, both in the physical and moral world,
these causes were no more than mediate ones, and fell back
upon the First Great Cause, from which they derived all
their efficacy. Nor, because a secondary cause failed of its
effect, was there, therefore, any failure of the power of the
First Cause. One particular cause was impeded in its
operation by another ; the action of fire by that of water,
the digestive functions of the stomach by the coarseness
of the food : but the qualities of the water and the food
were also particular causes, acting under the Universal
Cause as much as those which they impeded. Thus what
seemed to recede from the Divine Will according to one
order, returned to it under another ; and the failure of the
particular cause was the success of the universal.2
1 ' Voluntas Dei causa est omnium speciei, sed etiam quantum ad indi-
quse naturaliter fiunt, vel facta sive vidua principia.' — Summa Theolo-
futura sunt. . . . prima et summa gica, P. 1. Quaest. 22. Art. 2.
causa omnium specierum et moti- ' In hujusmodi autem causis non
©num.' — Lombard. 1. 1. Distinct. 45. est infinitus processus, est ergo
4 Cassari non potest, quia ilia volun- aliqua omnium una prima quse est
tate fecit quaecunque voluit, in ccelo Deus.' — Bradwardine,p.l90. ' Omne
et in terra, cui, teste Apostolo, nihil movens posterius est instrumentum
resistit.' — Distinct. 46. ' Nulla causa primi moventis, alias enim non est
impeditur nisi ab aliquo fortiori posterius naturaliter eo, sed prius
agente, sed nihil est fortius Divina vel etiam coaequum.' — p. 173.
voluntate. . . . Prseterea, diminutio 2 ' Quod si aliqua causa particu-
gaudii si voluntas non impleatur, laris deficiat a suo effectu, hoc est
sed Deus felicissimus.' — Aquinas in propter aliquam aliam causam par-
Lombard. Distinct. 47. ' Causali- ticularem immediantem, quae conti-
tas autem Dei qui estprimum agens, netur sub ordine causae universalis.
se extendit usque ad omnia entia, Unde effectus ordinem causae uni-
non solum quantum ad principia versalis nullo modo potest exire.'
238 Scholastic Theory CHAP. rx.
To the position that the Divine Will was the cause of
things that were, succeeded the further one, that it could
have caused everything that was, without a contradiction
in terms, possible.1 And stated thus indefinitely, this
position also was only a legitimate expansion of the idea
of the Divine Power. We evidently cannot restrict the
Divine Power to the simple causation of the existing world,
without reducing it to a cause acting itself under a neces
sity, or to a kind of fate. If we liberate the First Cause,
however, from this tie, and suppose it to act freely, causing
some effects and not others, according to its own sovereign
will and pleasure, we cannot state its Power less narrowly
than as a Power of causing anything which is, in the
nature of things, possible. But while the scholastic posi
tion was in itself legitimate, it was carried out unsoundly
and hastily. Its maintainers advanced beyond the inde
finite ground that God could cause every thing that was
possible, to state what was possible ; and they determined
that the Supreme Being could, had it pleased Him, have
made the whole universe more perfect than it was, both
by adding to its parts and species, and by making the
existing ones better, and not only better but faultless. The
universe was finite, and what was finite could be added to;
and the scale which ascended from this created world to
infinity had numberless places unoccupied, which the
Creator could have filled up, and successive types of being
which He could have embodied and expressed, had He so
willed, and so increased the ranks and orders of the exist
ing universe. The existing species, too, could have been
— Sum. Theol. P. 1. Q. 19, Art. 6. aliquid contingat prseter ordinem
' Sicut lignum impeditur a com- divinse gubernationis ; sed ex hoc
bustione per actionem aquae.' — ipso quod aliquid ex una parte vi-
Q. 22. Art. 2. ' Sicut indigestio detur exire ab ordine Divinae provi-
contingit prseter ordinem virtutis dentise, quo consideratur secundum
nutritivse ex aliquo impedimento, aliquam particularem causam, ne-
puta ex grossitie cibi, quam necesse cesse est quod in eundem ordinem
est reducere in aliam causam, et relabatur secundum aliam causam.'
sic usque ad causam primamj uni- — Sum. Theol. P. 1. Q,. 103. Art. 7.
versalem. Cum igitur Deus sit * Cum Deus omnia posse dicitur,
prima causa universalis non unius nihil rectius intelligitur quam quod
generis tantum, sed universaliter possit omnia possibilia. — Sum.
totius entis, impossible est quod Theol. P. 1. Q. 25. Art. 3.
CHAP. ix. of Necessity. 239
made better, and even without fault, for God could, had it
pleased Him, have created a universe in which there was
no evil ; and man himself could have been made so that he
neither could nor would even wish to sin.1
The fundamental idea of the Divine power thus laid
down was applied strictly to the motions of the human
will, or to human actions. God was the cause of all the
motions of the human will, but He caused them by means
of the will itself, as a mediate and secondary cause. The
great scheme of Divine Providence contained two great
classes of secondary causes,2 one necessary, the other con
tingent. The course of nature was conducted by means
of necessary causes, or causes acting necessarily ; which
class, again, had two different operations and effects,
according to the difference of the natures to which it was
applied. In fixed and permanent natures, the operation
of necessary causes was unfailing, and they could not by
possibility fall short of their effects ; such was the opera
tion of fixed and unalterable law in the motions of the
heavenly bodies, presenting to us an instance of a world
which was without change, and of which it was said, that
above the sphere of the moon was no evil. In generable
1 'Potest Deus meliorem rem fa- bilis.' — Aquinas, in Lomb. L. 1.
cere.sive etiam rerum universitatem, Dist. 44.
quam fecit.' — Lombard, L. 1. Dist. ' Utrum Deus potuerit facere hu-
44. ' Secundum philosophum albius manitatem Christi meliorem quam
est quod est nigro impermistius: fit.' — ' Quamvis humana natura sit
ergo etiam melius est quod est Divinitati unita in persona, tamen
impermistius malo : sed Deus po- naturae rernanent distantes infini-
tuit facere universum in quo nihil turn, et ex hoc potest esse aliquid
mali esset. . . . Quantum ad melius humana natura in Christo.'
partes ipsas potest intelligi uni- — Aquinas,inLomb. Dist. 44. Art. 3.
versum fieri melius. Sive per ad- ' Talem potuit Deus hominem
ditionempluriumpartium.ut scilicet fecisse qui nee peccare posset nee
crearentur multse aliae species, et vellet ; et si talem fecisset quis
implerentur multi gradus bonitatis dubitet eum meliorem fecisse.' —
qui possunt esse, cum etiam inter Aug. sup. Gen. ad Lit. xi. 7. Quoted
summam creaturam et Deum infi- by Lomb. 1. 1. Dist. 44.
nita distantia sit; et sic Deus melius 2 Causse mediae — proximae — se-
universum facere potuisset. . . Vel cundae. — ' Omnium quse sunt causa
potest intelligi fieri melius quasi est Dei voluntas . . . mediantibus
intensive, quasi mutatis omnibus aliis causis, ut sic etiam causandi
partibus ejus in melius . . . et sic dignitas creaturis communicaretur.'
etiam esset (melioratio) Deo possi- — Aquinas, in Lomb. Dist. 45.
240
Scholastic Theory
CHAP. IX.
and corruptible natures they had a failing operation, and
alternately attained and fell short of their effects: the
Universal Cause, however, being alike effective in either
case, and good alike the result ; for the corruption of one
thing was the generation of another.1 The second class
of causes was contingent or voluntary, operating in those
creatures which had in addition to nature the principle of
will. The effects, then, which took place in the world
took place necessarily, or contingently, according to the
character of those mediate and secondary causes which
were respectively in operation ; but in either case these
causes were but mediate, and fell back upon the First
Great Cause, from which they derived all their virtue as
secondary ones. The Supreme Being fitted like causes to
like effects, necessary to necessary, contingent to contin
gent;2 but His will it was which gave to these causes their
respective natures, and made one necessary and the other
contingent.3 He moved matter, and He moved will by
1 ' In his autem qui consequuntur
finem per principium quod est na-
tura inyenitur quidam gradus, eo
quod quarundam rerum natura
impediri non potest a consecutions
effectus sui, et iste est gradus altior
sicut est in corporibus caelestibus.
Unde in his nihil contingit non
intentum a Deo ex defectu ipsorum ;
et propter hoc Avicenna dicit quod
supra orbem lunse non est malum.
Alius autem gradus naturae est quae
impediri potest et deficere, sicut
natura generabilium et corruptibi-
lium ; et quamvis ista natura sit
inferior in bonitate, tamen bona est.'
— Aquinas, in Lomb. 1. 1. Dist. 39.
2 Quibusdam effectibus praepa-
ravit causas necessarias ut necessario
evenirent; quibusdam vero causas
contingentes, ut evenirent cont n-
genter, secundum conditionem proxi-
marum causarum.' — Sum.* Theol. P.
1. Q. 23. Art. 4.
' Ita omnia movet secundum eorum
conditionem ; ita quod ex causis
necessariis per motionem divinam
sequuntur effectus ex necessitate ;
ex causis autem contingentibus se
quuntur effectus contingentes.' —
lm» 2dae Q. 49. Art. 4.
' Effectus consequitur conditionem
causae suse proximse.' — Aquinas, in
Lomb. 1. 1. Dist, 39.
3 Dicendum est quod hoc contingit
propter efficaciam Divinae voluntatis
. . . Vult enim quaedamDeus neces
sario, qusedam contingenter, ut sit
ordo in rebus ad complementum
universi. Et ideo quibusdam effec
tibus aptavit causas necessarias, ex
quibus effectus ex necessitate pro-
veniant ; quibusdam autem causas
defectibiles, ex quibus effectus con
tingenter proveniant. Non igitur
propterea effectus voliti a Deo eve-
niunt contingenter, quia causae
proximae sunt contingentes ; sed
propterea quia Deus voluit eos
contingenter evenire, contingentes
causas ad eos praeparavit.' — Sum.
Theol. lma Q. 19. Art. 8.
CHAP. ix. of Necessity. 241
causes alike of His own arbitrary arid sovereign creation.
He produced the motions of the physical world by neces
sary, the motions of the human will by voluntary causes ;
but these voluntary causes were set in motion by Himself;
(rod was the cause of the will.1 The aims, the designs,
the deliberations, and the acts of man were subjected to
the Divine Will, as being derived ultimately from it ; and
man's providence was contained under the Divine, as the
particular cause under the universal.2
Such was the logical consequence of the idea of the
Divine power, as regards the human will. Under the no
tion of the will, as a mediate cause, the Augustinian
schoolmen left out no function, action, or characteristic of
will of which the human soul is conscious. They acknow
ledged every internal act and sensation which belongs to
us as having and exercising will ; that which every reason
able man who does not deny the plainest facts must admit.
They brought all these characteristics to a point, and ex
pressed them in one term — self-motion. The will moved
itself, was the cause of its own motion, the mistress of its
own acts ; it was in its power to will or not to will. Man
moved himself to action by his freewill. But this self-
motion was only admitted as an internal impression, and
was not allowed to counteract or modify the dominant
position of one absolute causality. The will was a prin
ciple of motion to itself; but it was not, therefore, the
first principle of such motion, — it did not follow that this
principle of motion was not itself set in motion by some
thing else. The will was the internal principle of its own
motion ; but this self-determining power moved the will
as causa proxima, not as causa prima ; the internal
principle was only a secondary one, succeeding to a first
principle, which was external to the will. The will, though
it moved itself, was moved ab alio to this motion. Nor
1 ' Voluntatis causa nihil aliud 2 ' Providentia hominis conti-
esse potest quam Deus.' — Sum. netur sub providentia Dei sicut
Theol. I™* 2dae Q. 10. Art. 6. 'Deus particularis causa sub causa uni-
est causa prima movens et naturales versali.' — Sum. Theol. I"* Q. 23.
causas et voluntarias.' — lma Q. 83. Art. 2.
Art. 1.
242 Scholastic Theory CHAP. rx.
was the true and genuine voluntariness of its motions at all
effected by their source being external. For the Supreme
Mover did not, by setting natural causes in motion, hinder
the acts in which such causes issued from being natural ;
no more, when He set in motion the voluntary causes, did
He hinder the acts in which they issued from being volun
tary. Rather He Himself caused in these acts their
voluntariness, and their naturalness respectively, working
in each nature according to its peculiarity — inunoquoque
operans secundum ejus proprietatem.1
And this consideration supplied the answer to the ques
tion how our wills could be moved from without, and yet
feel no force, no constraint, but all its motions go on ex
actly as if they originated in ourselves. There were two
kinds of necessity, the necessity of force, and the necessity
of nature or inclination. The necessity of force was vi
termini opposed to inclination, and if it prevailed, pre
vailed in spite of it. and was attended with the sensation
to the man of being forced or obliged to do a thing. But
the necessitv of inclination, or that which made the incli
nation to be what it was, could only be felt as inclination,
not as force. For the inclination itself was to begin with
that which such necessity had made it to be ; it could
have felt nothing contrary to it, nothing violating it, in
1 ' Voluntas domina est sui actus, quin actiones earum sint voluntariae,
et in ipsa est velle et non velle ; sed potius hoc in eis facit ; operatur
quod non esset si non haberet in enim in unoquoque secundum ejus
potestate movere seipsam ad vo- proprietatem.' — Sum. Theol. lm' Q,.
Jendum.'— 1™ 2d»e Q. 9. Art. 3. 83. Art. 1.
' Liberum arbitrium est causa sui ' De ratione voluntarii est quod
motus : quia homo per liberum ar- principium ejus sit intra ; sed non
bitrium seipsum movet ad agendum. oportet quod hoc principium intrin-
Non tamen hoc est necessitate liber- secum sit primum principium non
tatis quod sit prima causa sui id motum ab alio. Unde motus volun-
quod liberum est; sicut nee ad hoc tarius, etsi habeat principium proxi-
quod aliquid sit causa alterius, mum intrinsecum, tamen principium
requiritur quod sit prima causa primum est ab extra; sicut et pri-
ejus. Deus igitur est prima causa mum principium motus naturalis est
movens et naturales causas et vo- ab extra, quod scilicet movet natu-
juntarias. Et sicut naturalibus ram.' — lm» 2lae Q. 9. Art. 3.
causis, movendo eas, non aufert quin ' Ipse actus liberi arbitrii reduci-
actus earum sint naturales, ita mo- tur in Deum sicut in causam.' — lm*
\endo causas voluntarias, non aufert Q. 23. Art. 2.
CHAP. rx. of Necessity. 243
that which was not its combatant, or its coercer, but its
cause.1
Now it is evident that such a scheme as this is necessi
tarian, and is inconsistent with the ordinary doctrine of
freewill; because freewill is here not truly self-moving,
and an original spring of action. It is not a first cause,
but a second cause, subordinated to another above it, which
sets it in motion. But the will, as a link in a chain of
causes and effects, is not freewill, in the common and true
understanding of that term, according to which it means
an original source of action. Freewill is here reconciled
and made consistent with the Divine Power ; brought into
the same scheme and theory. But it is of itself a sufficient
test that a system is necessitarian, that it maintains the
Divine Power in harmony with freewill. The will as an
original spring of action is irreconcilable with the Divine
Power, a second first cause in nature being inconsistent
with there being only one First Cause. To reconcile free
will, then, with the Divine Power is to destroy it ; because
such a reconciliation can only be effected by subordinating
one to the other, in the way just described, as second cause
to first cause, and so depriving the will of that which con
stitutes its freedom, in the common acceptation of the
word, viz. its originality. Freewill to be true freewill
must be inconsistent with the other great truth ; it must
be held as something existing side by side with the Divine
Attribute, but never uniting to our understanding with it.
This inconsistency, this absence of relation, is the only
security for its genuineness ; the removal of which is, there
fore, fatal to it. When, in the place of philosophical dis
agreement, we have philosophical unity, one consistent
scheme and theory, one connection of part with part, one
1 ' Hsecigitur coactionis necessitas dum inclinationem voluntatis. Sicut
omnino repugnat voltmtati. Nam ergo impossibile est quod aliquid
hoc dicimus esse violentum quod est simul sit violentum et naturale ; ita
contra inclinationem rei. Ipseautem impossibile est quod aliquid simpli-
motus voluntatis est inclinatio quae- citer sit coactum, sive vioientum, et
dam in aliquid : et ideo, sicut dicitur voluntarium. Necessitas autem na-
aliquid naturale, quia est secundum turalis non repugnat voluntati.' —
inclinationem naturae ; ita dicitur lm" Q. 82. A. 4.
aliquid voluntarium, quia est secun-
B 2
244. Scholastic Theory CHAP. ix.
harmony of cause with cause, we have, in the place of two
truths, one truth, and the Divine Power is maintained, but
freewill is abandoned.
Such a compact and harmonious theory, however, en
countered in limine one great difficulty. Upon the idea
of the Divine Power, thus singly and determinately carried
out, and made the exclusive rationale of all the facts in
the universe, how were we to account for the origin of
evil ? The existence of evil was a plain fact. Was Grod
the cause of it ? That could not be ; for Grod could not
possibly will evil. Did it exist in spite of Him, and against
His will ? That could not be ; for God could not possibly
be deficient in power. Then how was its existence to be
accounted for ?
Now, evil is sometimes understood in a negative rather
than in a positive sense, — in the sense of a defect and fall
ing short, of lesser as contrasted with greater good ; and
in this sense it was not difficult to account for the existence
of evil in the universe. For if we considered it inconsistent
with the justice and benevolence of Grod, that He should
not make everything the very best, where were we to stop
in our demand ? We could not pause till we reached in
our wishes the very highest point of all, and arrived at the
Uncreated Perfection itself. Wherever we stopped below
this culminating point, the same charge could be urged as
now, that things were not made so good as they could be
made. But a desire that tended straight to the confusion
of the distinction between the creature and Grod, and could
not be satisfied but by a contradiction, was absurd ; and a
charge which would always be made, whatever the Creator
might do, was untenable. The possibility, then, of things
being made better argued no envy in Grod who made them
worse, and the existence of evil, in the sense of lesser good,
was no real difficulty at all.1
1 ' Cuilibet finite possibilis est ad- sibi debetur quam secundum deter-
ditio ; sed cujuslibet creaturae boni- urination em divinse voluntatis, et
tas finita est. Ergo potest sibi fieri ideo nulla invidia in Deo resultat,
additio, sed creatura nunquam po- si rem meliorem facere potuit quam
test attingere ad sequalitatem Dei. fecerit.' — Aquinas, in Lomb. Dist.
Nee alia mensura divinae bonitatis 43. Q. 1. A. 1.
CHAP. ix. of Necessity. 245
But evil existed in the world, not only in the sense of
lesser good, but in that of positive evil ; and this was a
more difficult fact to account for. The explanations of this
fundamental difficulty, then, by the Augustinian school
men may be placed under two heads : under the first
of which the explanation is almost purely verbal, and can
hardly be said to come into contact even with the real
difficulty ; while under the second the difficulty is really
confronted, and an effort of a philosophical kind made to
solve it.
I. The first of these verbal explanations which I will
instance, and which is a rather extreme specimen of its
class, is an attempt to pare down by simple artifices of
language the opposition of the Divine Will to evil, till it
reaches a point at which it substantially ceases, and becomes
a manageable truth to the metaphysician. It is evident
that, so long as the opposition of the Divine Will to evil
remains decided and absolute, there being this evil as a
plain fact in the world, such opposition affects the attri
bute of the Divine Power ; because if (rod does not will
evil, it would appear that evil takes place only because
He has not the power to prevent it. The aim, therefore,
was to reduce by niceties of expression this opposition of
the Divine Will, until that will ceased to disagree with
evil, and, as a consequence, its frustration ceased ; and
with it the danger to the attribute of Power. A distinc
tion was accordingly drawn between ' God not willing evil
— mala velle ' and God not willing that evil should take
place — velle mala non fieri ; and, allowing that God did
not will evil, it was determined that He did will that evil
should take place. Again, those who objected to this posi
tion as being opposed to the goodness of the Divine Will,
made a distinction between ' God not willing that evil
should take place ' and ' God willing that evil should not
take place ; ' accepting the former, but rejecting the latter
formula, the difference being in the situation of the nega
tive adverb in the two statements ; which in the one is
next to « willing,' in the other to ' taking place ;' and these
Scholastic Theory CHAP. IK.
denied accordingly that ' God willed that evil should not
take place.' * Here, then, are two modifications of the
opposition of the Divine will to evil, one professing to be
an improvement on the other. But it is obvious that such
modifications are no more than plays on words, and can
lead to no result ; because in proportion as these state
ments reduce the opposition of the Divine Will to evil,
they cease to be, in their natural meaning, true ; while in
proportion as an artificial interpretation relieves them of
falsehood, it divests them also of use for the purpose for
which they are wanted. They either deny a characteristic
of the Divine Will, and in that case they are false ; or they
admit it, and in that case they fail of their object of re
lieving the attribute of the Divine Power.
Again, a distinction was made between the Divine
Will and the signs of it, — voluntas and signa voluntatis ;
between the will itself of God, and those outward expres
sions of it which were given in accommodation to our
understandings and for the practical purposes of life and
1 'Alii dicunt quod Deus vult mala malum fieri, cum scriptum est, Kom.
esse vel fieri, non tamen vult mala. 9., voluntatiejus quis resistit ? Supra
Alii vero quod nee vult mala esse nee etiam dixit Augustinus quia necesse
fieri. In hoc tamen conveniunt et est fieri si voluerit. Sed vult mala
hi et illi quod utrique fatentur fieri aut non fieri. Si vult non fieri
Deum mala non velle. Utrique vero non fiunt ; fiunt autem, vult ergo
rationibus et auctoritatibus utuntur fieri.
ad muniendam suam assertionem. ' Illi vero qui dicunt Dei voluntate
Qui enim dicunt Deum mala velle mala non fieri vel non esse, inductio-
esse vel fieri suam his modis mu- nibus prsemissis ita respondent, di-
niunt intentionem. Si enim, in- centes Deum nee velle mala fieri,
quiunt, mala non esse vel non fieri nee velle non fieri, vel nolle fieri, sed
vellet, nullo modo essent vel fierent, tantum non velle fieri. Sienim vellet
quia si vult ea non esse vel non ea fieri vel esse, faceret utique ea
fieri, et non potest id efficere, scilicet fieri vel esse, et ita esset auctor
ut non sint vel non fiant, voluntati malorum. . . . Item si nollet mala
ejus et potentise aliquid resistit, et fieri, vel vellet non fieri, et tamen
non est omnipotens, quia non potest fierent, omnipotens non esset. . . .
quod vult, sed impotens est sicut et Ideoque non concedunt Deum velle
nos sumus, qui quod volumus quan- mala fieri ne malorum auctor in-
doque non possumus. Sed quia telligatur, nee concedunt eum velle
omnipotens est et in nullo impotens, mala non fieri, ne impotens esse
certum est non posse fieri mala vel videatur, sed tantum dicunt eum
esse nisi eo volente. Quomodo enim non velle mala fieri' — Lombard, 1. 1.
invito eo et uolente posset ab aliquo Dist. 46.
CHAP. IX.
of Necessity.
247
conduct, — precept, prohibition, permission, and the like —
praceptio, prohibitio^ permissio ; between a real and a
metaphorical will of Grod, — the one being called voluntas
beneplaciti, the other voluntas signi.1 And the object of
this distinction is the same with that of the preceding
ones ; viz. to enable the theologian to refer to a Divine
Will, which was in some way not opposed to evil, and with
which, therefore, evil could co-exist without risk to the
attribute of the Divine Power. That will of Grod which
came into contact with our understandings, which com
manded and which prohibited, was opposed to evil ; and
this will could be violated, neglected, and trodden under
foot by the passion and the pride of man. But that secret
and ulterior will which lay behind this external and ex-
1 ' Aliquando vero secundum quan-
dam figuram dicendi voluntas Dei
vocatur, quod seeundum proprieta-
tem non est voluntas ejus : ut prae-
ceptio, prohibitio, consilium, ideoque
pluraliter aliquando Scriptura vo-
luntates Dei pronuntiat. Unde
Propheta psalm 1 1 0. Magna opera
Domini, exquisita in omnes volun-
tates ejus, cum non sit nisi una vo
luntas Dei quae ipse est. . . . Ideo
autem praeceptio et prohibitio atque
consilium, cum sint tria, dicitur
tamen unumquodque eorum Dei vo
luntas, quia ista sunt signa divinae
voluntatis : quemadmodum et signa
irae dicuntur ira, et dilectionis signa
dilectioappellantur; et dicitur iratus
Deus, et tamen non est ira in eo
flliqua, sed signa tan turn quae foris
fiunt, quibus iratus ostenditur, ira
ipsius nominantur. Et est figura
dicendi, secundum quam non est
falsum quod dicitur, sedverum quod
dicitur sub tropi nubilo obumbratur.
Et secundum hos tropos diversae
voluutates Dei dicuntur, quia di-
versa sunt ilia quae per tropum vo
luntas Dei dicuntur.
' Magna est adhibenda discretio
in cognitione Divinae voluntatis, quia
et beneplacitum Dei est volumas
ejus, et signum beneplaciti ejus dici
tur voluntas ejus. Sed beneplaci-
tum ejus aeternum est, signum vero
beneplaciti ejus non.'— Lombard, 1.
1. Dist. 45.
'Voluntas Dei distinguitur in
voluntatem beneplaciti et voluntatem
signi. . . De Deo quaedam dicuntur
proprie, quaedam metaphorice. Ea
quae proprie de ipso dicuntur, vere
in eo sunt ; sed ea, quae metaphorice
dicuntur de eo, per similitiidinem
proportionabilitatis ad effectum ali-
quem, sicut dicitur ignis Deutero.
4., eo quod sicut ignis se habet ad
consumptionem contrarii, ita Deus
ad consumendam nequitiam. . . .
Deus potest did aliquid velle dupli-
citer ; vel proprie, et sic dicitur velle
Uhid, cujus voluntas vere in eo est,
et hcec est voluntas beneplaciti. Dici
tur etiam aliquid velle metaphorice,
eo quod ad modum volentis se habet,
in quantum prcecipit, vel consulit,
vel aliquid hujusmodi facit. Unde
ea, in qiiibus attenditur similitudo
istius rei ad voluntatem Dei, volun-
tates ejus metaphorice dicuntur, et
quia talia sunt effectus, dicuntur
signa! — Aquinas, in Lomb. 1. 1.
Dist. 45. A. 4.
248 Scholastic Theory CHAP. ix.
pressed one, was not opposed to any, but harmonised with
all facts ; and evil was no rebel against it, but its subject ;
nothing impeded, then, but everything in heaven and earth
fulfilled this eternal, incomprehensible Will, which was of
the essence of God, and which was God.
Now, this distinction is drawn with greater breadth,
boldness, and strength than the preceding ones ; but it is
open to the same answer, viz. that so far as it denies the
disagreement of the Divine Will with evil it is false, so
far as it admits it it is useless for its purpose. This posi
tion of a real will of God which is different from His
expressed will may be interpreted in two ways. It may
be understood as meaning that the real will of God is in
true and actual harmony with evil, the expressed being
only an outside show, which is useful in some way for the
Divine government of mankind in this present state, and
the maintenance of this existing system. And a theory
like this has been put forward in modern times, represent
ing the Divine Will, as expressed in the distinction of good
and evil, as a mere mask, concealing a deeper truth behind
it ; a truth of pure fact, in which good and evil meet and
are united, and each is good. The commands and prohibi
tions, the promises and the terrors of the moral law, are
according to such a theory but a display, which deludes
the mass, but is penetrated by the philosopher. And
understood in such a way this position does indeed get rid
most effectually of the difficulty of the existence of evil
as being against the will of God, and so a sign against
His Power. But then, understood in such a way, this
position is false and impious. We cannot suppose any
difference between the real and the expressed will of God,1
without destroying the basis of all morals and religion.
1 ' Et si ilia dicantur Dei voluntas, fieret, sed ut Abrahse probaretur
ideo quia signa sunt Divinse volun- fides ; et in evangelic prsecepit sa-
tatis, non est tamen intelligendum nato ne cui diceret ; ille autem
Deum omne illud fieri velle quod prsedicavit ubique, intelligens Deum
cuicunque prsecipit, vel non fieri non ideo prohibuisse, quin vellet
quod prohibuit. Prsecepit enim opus suum prsedicari, sed ut daret
Abrahse immolare filium, nee tamen formam homini, laudem humanam
voluit; nee ideo prsecepit ut id declinandi.' — Lomb. 1. 1. Dist. 45.
CHAP. ix. of Necessity. 249
But if tins position does not mean this, as in the minds of
those who maintained it it did not, it is not available for
the object for which it is designed. For all it means to
assert in that case is the incomprehensibility of the Divine
Will, and that there is some mysterious sense in which
everything which takes place agrees with this will ; bub
this is not to explain the difficulty of the co-existence of
evil with that will, but only to state it.
A distinction, again, was drawn between an antecedent
will of Grod — voluntas antecedens, and a posterior will —
voluntas consequens ; the former of which willed a thing
absolutely — simpliciter, the latter conditionally — secun-
dum quid1-, and the former of which was opposed to evil,
the latter not. Thus God willed the salvation of all men
on the one hand absolutely ; and that will, which was
opposed to all evil, to sin and punishment alike, could be
frustrated — imperfectio antecedentis voluntatis. But, on
the other hand, He willed this salvation conditionally — i.e.
on the supposition that men were good ; and this will,
which was not opposed to the evil of punishment if men
were bad, could not be frustrated, being as much fulfilled
in the damnation of men as in their salvation. This dis
tinction, then, had the same aim as the former ; viz., to
establish a Divine Will which was not opposed to evil, and
which therefore the existence of evil did not frustrate, and
so interfere with the Divine Power. But while the diffi
culty which this distinction professes to meet is in the case
of the will antecedent simply confessed instead of solved,
it is only evaded instead of solved in the case of the will
consequent. Grod wills the salvation of men on the con
dition that they are good ; which will, if they are bad, is
1 ' Voluntas Dei duplex, antece- — Aquinas, in Lomb. 1. 1. Dist. 46.
dens et consequens . . . propter Q. 1. A. 1.
diversas conditiones ipsius voliti. Si ' Quicquid vult Deus voluntate
in homine tantum natura ipsius consequent! totum fit, non autem
consideretur, aequaliter bonum est quicquid vult voluntate antecedent! ;
omnem hominem salvari, et hoc quia hoc non simpliciter vult, sed
Deus vult, et hsec est voluntas ante- secundum quid tantum ; nee ista
cedens. . . . Consideratis autem imperfectio est ex parte voluntatis,
circumstantiis, non vult omnem sed ex conditione voliti.' — In Lomb.
. . . non volentem et resistentem.' Dist. 47. Q. 1. A. 1.
250 Scholastic Theory CHAP. ix.
not opposed to the evil of their punishment. The evil of
punishment, then, is here accounted for and made to
agree with the Divine Power, because made to agree with
the Divine Will : but what account is given of the evil of
that sin which is the reason of punishment ? This evil is
passed over altogether. Yet it is a plain evil which takes
place in the universe, and we must either say that the will
of God is opposed to it or not; the former alternative
being apparently inconsistent with the Divine Power, the
latter with the Divine Goodness. The difficulty put off
at one stage thus meets us at another ; and an evil remains
which we cannot without impiety assert not to be opposed
to the Divine Will, and the existence of which therefore is
inconsistent apparently with the Divine Power.
II. To these verbal explanations, however, there suc
ceeded two which were attempts at real explanation. One
of these was the argument of variety, which was put in
two forms ; under the first of which, however, it did not
satisfy its own employers, who used it with evident mis
givings, though they would not deprive themselves of its
aid altogether. Should there not be evil in the world,
that the contrast may heighten the good and set it off to
better advantage ? Would the good be appreciated as it
should be, and its real nature come to light, but for this
evil ? And in this way is not evil of the perfection of the
universe — de perfections universi? The solution was a
tempting one ; but it was resisted, on the ground that the
loss which evil caused was greater than the compensation
it gave for it ; inasmuch as it took away absolute good,
and only gave comparative.1 The solid justice of this
1 ' Illud sine quo universum me- tionale of the existence of evil with
lius esset non confert ad perfecti- approval: ' Dicendum quod ex ipsa
onem universi : sed si malum non bonitate Divina ratio sumi potest
esset universum melius esset, quia prsedestinationis aliquorum et repro-
malum plus tollit uni quam addit bationis aliquorum. . . . Ad com-
alteri, quia ei cujus est tollit boni- pletionem enim universi requiruntur
tatem absolutam, alteri autem ad- diversi gradus rerum, quarum quse-
dit bonitatem comparationis.' — In dam altumetqusedaminfiinum locum
Lomb. 1. 1. Dist. 46. Q. 1. A. 3. teneant in universo.' — Sum. Theol.
Yet Aquinas reverts to this ra- lma Q. 23. A. 5.
OHA?. ix. of Necessity. 251
reply embraces within a short compass all the points of
the case. Variety is a sound explanation indeed of a cer
tain class of evil. The decay and corruption of the vege
table world set off by contrast the birth and growth;
summer is all the more agreeable for winter ; the decay of
autumn heightens the freshness of the spring. And on
the same law rest is all the more pleasant after fatigue,
food after hunger; and much even of the higher and more
intellectual kind of pleasure is relished the more for the
void and dulness alternating with it. But this is only by
a law of our nature in present operation, in consequence
of which change is necessary for us, though at the cost of
pain. Such a law is acknowledged to be a sign of great
imperfection. And, what is more to the purpose, all these
are cases in which ourselves alone and our own enjoyment
are concerned. To inanimate nature it is all the same
whether it decays or endures, lives or dies ; and therefore
we need not take its part in the matter into account.
But when we come to moral evil the case is very different.
It is true the law of comparison or contrast operates even
here, and we are pleased with the virtue which meets us
in the world, all the more for the evil which we see in it.
Indeed, the nature or quality of goodness — the light that
issues from a good character, is so completely seen in the
sense and degree in which we do see it, by means of this
assistance — i.e. by the contrast between this goodness and
a background of average and indifferent character, formed
as an image in our mind from the experience of human
life — that it is difficult to contemplate without some sur
prise and awe the signal and noble use which the wicked
ness of the world answers ; inasmuch as for anything we
see to the contrary, in the present state of our capacities,
in which contrast seems to be so essential to true percep
tion, virtue could not be appreciated as it is without this
contrast, or be the bright light which it is without this
dark background. The light shineth in darkness. But
though moral evil answers this high purpose in the world,
is it a sufficient account of its existence that it does so ?
Is it just that one man should be wicked in order that the
252 Scholastic Theory CHAP. ix.
virtue of another may be set off ? The spectator may de
rive benefit from the contrast, but there is another whose
interests are quite as important as his.
And the same may be said of the use of which the
moral evil in the world is, for the trial, purification, and
confirmation of the good. The wickedness of the bad
portion of mankind is indeed one of the principal means
by which the good portion is educated and disciplined ;
the pride and tyranny of one man serve to produce the
virtue of patience in another; the wrongs of the world
subdue and temper, its corruptions and temptations fortify,
those minds that are disposed to make this use of them.
But though the schoolman appeals to this effect of moral
evil as a j ustification of its existence,1 such an argument
admits of the obvious answer, that it is not just that one
man should be wicked in order that another should be good.
The argument of variety, however, was put in another
form, and another explanation extracted from it. The
principle of variety demanded that there should be differ
ent natures in the universe ; and that, besides such natures
as were subject to necessary laws, there should be other
nobler ones possessing will. But this conceded, moral evil,
it was said, followed. For such natures as the latter must,
as the very condition of this higher good, have the power
of going wrong and receding from the end designed for
them ; and, with the power to do so, the fact would in
some instances take place.2 Now, this is a substantially
' ' Si enim omnia mala impedi- naturam, quod est voluntas, quod
rentur,multabonadeessent universe; quanto vicinius est Deo, tanto a
rion enim esset vita leonis, si non necessitate naturalium causarum
esset occisio animalium ; nee esset magis est liberum. . . . Et ideo
patientia martyrum si non esset per- taliter a Deo instituta est ut deficere
secutio tyrannorum.' — Sum. Theol. posset. ... Si autem inevitabiliter
lma Q. 22. A, 2. in finem tenderet per divinam
' Multa bona tollerentur, si Deus providentiam tolleretur sibi conditio
nullum malum permitteret esse ; suse naturae.' — In Lomb. 1. 1. Dist.
non enim generaretur ignis nisi 39. Q. 2. A. 2.
corrumperetur aer; neque conser- ' Perfectio Universi requirit ut
varetur vita leonis, nisi occideretur sint qusedam quse a bonitate deficere
asinus.' — Q,. 48. A. 2. possint : ad quod sequitur ea inter-
2 'Sed.in nobilioribus creaturis dnm deficere.' — Sum. Theol. I01* Q.
invenitur aliud principium prater 48. A. 2.
ix. of Necessity. 253
different argument from the former, and is perhaps the
nearest approach we can make to an account of the exist
ence of moral evil in the world. But it is in truth no
explanation ; for is this will of the creature to which evil
is referred an original cause or only a secondary one? If
the former, this argument only explains one difficulty by
another as great, the existence of evil by the existence of
an original cause in nature besides God. If the latter,
the existence of moral evil falls back, as before, upon the
First Cause ; the human will in that case being no such
barrier intervening between moral evil and God, as is
wanted for the present purpose.
But the principal explanation which was given of this
difficulty, and that in which Aquinas appears finally to
repose, was borrowed from his master. Every reader of S.
Augustine is familiar with a certain view of the nature of
evil, to which he constantly recurs, and which he seems to
cherish in his mind as a great moral discovery, a funda
mental set-off and answer to the great difficulty of the
existence of evil, and the true and perfect mode of extri
cating the Divine attribute of Power from the responsibility
of permitting it, — the position, viz. that evil is nothing —
nifiil. God was the source ; and as being the source of,
included and comprised, all existence. Evil was a depar
ture from God. Evil, therefore, was a departure from
existence. External to God, it was outside of all being
and substance ; i.e. was no-being or nothing.
Aquinas adopts this position, and improves upon it in
his usual way. Evil was nothing in another sense besides
that of pure negation, which is the common meaning of
nothing, viz., that of privation. Every nature aimed at
good as its perfection or true existence ; evil was a depri
vation of this good or true existence. In the case of evil,
then, there was something in our idea antecedent to it, of
which it was a loss or absence. That which every nature
truly and properly was, was in scholastic language its form,
whence the formal cause of a thing is that which makes a
thing to be what it is. Evil was a privation of form.
There was an end, and there was an action proper to every
254 Scholastic Theory CHAP. ix.
thing in the universe ; evil was inordination to the end, a
defect of action.1 The evil proper to the nature of fire was
cold; the evil proper to the nature of water was drought.
Thus while, in the collision of different natures in the uni
verse, the defect of one was the growth of another, the evil to
each nature was the defect of that nature.2 Everything,
so far as it was, was good — omne ens in quantum hujus-
modi bonum; and evil was no-thing — non-ens, and no
part of the universe.3
And that which was true of evil in general, was true in
particular of moral evil. The act of sin was defined as an
act contrary to the end for which the moral creature is
designed, or, as is expressed in modern language, to the
constitution of man — actus inordinatus ; which consisted,
however, of two separate and distinct parts. The act —
actus peccati — was simply the material, bodily or mental,
employed in the sin, whether outward motion, or inward
passion, feeling, desire ; and this was real substance and
part of the universe of God. A man who committed, for
example, an act of intemperance or anger, sinned with and
by the natural sensation of hunger or thirst, or the natural
passion or resentment, as the internal material of his sin ;
he sinned with the motion of his mouth by which he eat
or drank, or with a motion of his arm by which he struck
a blow, as its external material. All these motions, then,
considered simply as such, whether within or without, were
1 ' Causam formalem nullam absentia boni. — lma Q. 48. A. t.
habet, sed est magis privatio formes : 2 ' Corruptio aeris et aquae est ex
et similiter nee causam finalem, sed perfectione ignis. ... Si sit de-
magis est privatio ordinis adfinem.' fectus in effectu proprio ignis, puta
—Sum. Theol. I™* Q. 49. A. 1. quod deficiat a calefaciendo, hoc est
'Malum quod in defectu actionis propter defectum actionis, sed hoc
consistit, semper causatur ex defectu ipsum quod est esse deficiens accidit
agentis.' — A. 2. bono cui per se competit agere.' —
Cum omnis natura appetat suum lma Q. 49. A. 1.
esse et suam profectionem, necesse 3 Nihil potest esse per suam
est dicere quod et perfectio cujus- essentiam malum. — lma Q. 49. A. 3.
cunque naturae rationem habeat Malum non est pars universi quia
bonitatis. Unde non potest esse neque habet naturam substantiae
quod malum significet quoddam neque accidentis, sed privationis
esse, aut quandam formam, seu tantum.'— In Lorn. 1. 1. Dist. 46. Q.
naturam. Kelinquitur ergo quod 1. A. 3.
nomine mali significetur qusedam
CHAP. TX. of Necessity. 255
substantial ; and the act of sin, as such, existed. But the
inordinateness of the act, or the sin of it — the error in
the use and application of these natural passions, these
bodily organs, was no thing.1 As evil in the case of fire
was a defect of the natural action of fire, so evil in the
case of the will was a defect of the natural action of the
will.
This position, then, was applied as the key to the
solution of the great difficulty of the existence of evil. The
difficulty of the existence of evil respected its cause, how
evil had an existence at all, when the Universal Cause, or
cause of everything, could not have given it. It was a
direct answer, then, to this difficulty, to say that it was a
mistake to begin with, to suppose that evil had existence.
This original mistake removed, all was clear ; for that
which had no existence needed no cause,2 and that which
needed no cause could dispense with the Universal Cause.
A universal cause was necessary ; but this inconvenience
attended it, viz. that it was universal, and thus contracted
responsibilities from which it had rather be relieved. This
rationale exactly relieved it of its inconvenient charge.
Evil was regarded in an aspect in which it ceased to belong
to the domain even of a universal cause. The fact or
phenomenon of evil, emptied of true or logical essence,
had no place in the nature of things ; seen everywhere, it
existed nowhere, a universal nothing attending on sub
stance as a shadow, but no occupant of room, and without
insertion in the system. This unsubstantial presence, this
inane in the midst of things, escaped as such the action
of the First Cause ; unsusceptible, as a pure negative, of
connection or relation, it was in its very nature a breaking
off from the chain of causes and effects in nature, and not a
link of it.3 Had evil a cause, indeed, it could have but
1 ' Peccatum est actus inordina- lam habet. — lm* Q. 49. A. 1.
tus. Ex parte igitur actus potest s ' Effectus causae mediae secundum
habere causam, ex parte autem in- quod exit ordinem causse primae non
ordinationis habet causam eo modo reducitur in causam primam. . . .
quo negatio vel privatio potest ha- Defectus a libero arbitrio non re-
bere causam.' — lma 2dae Q,. 75. A. 1. ducitur in Deum sicut in causam.' —
8 Malum causam formalem mil- lm* 2(1*e Q,. 79. A. l.
256 Scholastic Theory CHAP. ix.
one, viz. God ; but nothing had no cause, and was, there
fore, wholly independent of the Universal Cause.
Such an explanation as this, however, it is hardly
necessary to say, is no real explanation of the difficulty.
It is undoubtedly the first truth of religion that true being
and good are identical. The same argument, which proves
a First Cause at all, proves His goodness ; and if Being in
the Cause must be good, being in the effect must be good
too ; for the effect must follow the nature of the cause.
Nor can we avoid this conclusion but by a scheme of
dualism, which allows an evil first cause of being ; and,
therefore, evil being as its effect. So far the above ra
tionale is true, and is the proper contrary to dualism.
But this first truth of sound religion is, when examined,
no explanation of the mystery of the existence of evil, but
only another mode of stating it. We rightly say that true
being is identical with good ; but how comes there to be
being which is not true being ? On the religious ground,
and as believers in a God, we say, that evil cannot be an
existing thing ; because God is the Author of everything,
and yet not the Author of evil. But plain common sense
tells us clearly enough that evil exists, and exists just as
really as good. A man commits some act of violence under
the influence of strong passion, malignant hatred, revenge,
cupidity ; his state of mind is as intense as possible; there
is the fullest determination and absorption in the act. Is
not this something — something going on and taking place
in his mind ? We may distinguish, indeed, between the
animus and the material of the act, or, in the scholastic
language, between the act and the sin ; but this distinc
tion applies as much to good acts as to bad. The virtue
of a good act is something quite distinct from the feelings
and faculties of mind and body employed in it, of which
it is the direction. If virtue, then, is something, is not
vice something too ?
The real source of these argumentative struggles and
vain solutions was the original position respecting the
Divine Power, which, however true, was laid down without
that reserve which is necessary for this kind of truth. It
CHAP. TX. of Necessity. 257
is evident that the Divine Power is incomprehensible to
us, and that therefore we cannot proceed upon it, as if it
were a known premiss, and argue upon the vague abstract
idea of omnipotence in our minds as if it were the real
truth on this subject. Aquinas himself defines the Divine
Power at the outset with a reserve : it was the power of
doing any thing which was possible — omnia possibilia ;
and the principle he lays down with respect to the sense
in which the Divine attributes are to be understood is
philosophical ; viz. that they are to be understood neither
as wholly the same with (univoce), or wholly different
from, the corresponding attributes in man (cequivoce\ but
as analogous to them — analogice.1 The univocal sense
confounded (rod with the creature ; the equivocal hid God
from the creature, removing and alienating Him altogether
as an object of human thought ; the analogical allowed an
idea of Grod, which was true as far as it went, but imper
fect. But thougli the human mind, under scholasticism,
saw, as it always must do whenever sane, its own ignor
ance, it did not see it so clearly or scientifically as it has
done subsequently, when a later philosophy has thrown it
back upon itself, and forced it to examine its own ideas,
how far they go, and where they stop short. The mediaeval
mind forgot, then, in the conduct of the argument, the
principle it had laid down at its commencement ; and, just
as a boy in learning a problem of Euclid sees some critical
point of the demonstration, but does not see it sufficiently
clearly, or master it enough to carry it with him through
out the proof, the schoolman first saw that he was ignorant,
and then argued as if he knew. Thus, notwithstanding
the preliminary reserve in the definition of the Divine
1 ' Tribus modis contingit aliquid citur alterum, ut quando idem nomen
aliquibus commune esse, velunivoce, duobus hominibus convenit. Cum
vel sequivoce, vel analogice. Univoce igitur per scientiam noBtram deve-
non potest aliquid de Deo et de niatur in cognitionem Divinse sci-
creatura dici . . . et ideo quidam entiae, non potest esse quod sit
dicunt quod quicquid de Deo et omnino aequivocum. Et ideo di-
creatura dicitur, per puram aequi- cendum quod scientia analogice dici-
vocationem dicitur. Sed hoc etiam tur de Deo et creatura ; et simihter
non potest esse quia in his quse sunt omnia hujusmodi.' — Aquinas, in
pure aequivoca ex uno non agnos- Lomb. 1. 1. Dist. 35. Q,. 1. A. 4.
8
258 Scholastic Theory of Necessity. CHAP. ix.
Power, the vague abstract idea of omnipotence prevailed
as if it were a known premiss in the argument, entailing
these struggles with the fact of evil as the consequences
of it ; for with absolute power in God to prevent it, how
could evil exist ? Hence these vain efforts of reason, these
blind explanations ; for it was necessary to reconcile a
known premiss with facts. As an unknown premiss, the
Divine Power is in no contradiction to the fact of evil, for
we must know what a truth is before we see a contra
diction in it to another truth ; and with no contradic
tion, no solution would have been wanted. But the
schoolman vaguely fancied that he knew his premiss, and
therefore involved himself in these elaborate and futile
explanations. We may admire indeed an obstinate intel
lectual energy, which struggles against insuperable diffi
culties, and tries to beat down by force what it cannot
disentangle, and lay down a path which must be stopped
at last. We admire his resolution, as we would that of
some strong animal caught in a net, the thin meshes of
which it would burst any moment with the least part
of that blind force which it exerts, were it not that their
multiplicity and intricacy baffle it. But the resignation
of the philosopher is to be admired more, who has one great
difficulty at starting, and a tranquil path after it, who sees
to begin with the inexplicableness of things, and is saved
by the admission from the trouble of subsequent solution.
The clear perception by the mind of its own ignorance is
the secret of all true success in philosophy ; while explana
tions which assume that the constitution of things can
really be explained, can only be a fruitless waste of strength.
The fault of the schoolman throughout this whole argu
ment is, that he vaguely imagines, that he really can
explain the origin of evil ; that he sets out with that aim ;
that he really fancies himself in a line of discovery while
he argues, and thinks that he has in his conclusion some
thing of the nature of a true solution. He does not actu
ally profess so much, but his general argument betrays
the latent assumption in his mind. His fault then was a
want of a clear and acute perception of his own ignorance ;
CHAP. x. Scholastic Doctrine of Predestination. 259
such a perception as the mind acquires by the long-sus
tained stationary attitude of reflexion upon itself. There
must be a pause, a cessation from active speculation and
inference, from argument, from words, while the reason
looks within, and observes itself. The passive attitude re
quired for this simple act of sight, more difficult really
than all active arguing, requires a lull and a calm, an in
terruption of the busy operations of the mind, a voluntary
suspension of the motion of that whole machinery of active
thought, which is generally going on in intellectual minds,
and constitutes their normal state. But the schoolman
was always busy, always arguing, always in the thick of
words, always constructing upon assumption, and pushing
on to conclusion after conclusion. He could not afford
the time to stop to examine fairly a single assumption on
which he went. He had not the patience to pause, and
look within. He had other work always to do, as he
thought more important. A passive attitude was intoler
able to a mind accustomed exclusively to busy construc
tion ; and thought internal and without words to one, to
whom words were the great machinery by which he thought.
Put him to such a task, and he would feel like a workman
without his accustomed tools, or like a man of practical
talent and energy shut up in a dark room and told to think.
The consequence was, that it was a chance whether his
assumptions were true or false. When he thought as a
man and with mankind at large, they were right ; when
he thought as a philosopher they were too often mistaken,
extreme and unqualified when they should have been limited,
and absolute when they should have been with a condition
and reserve.
CHAPTER X.
SCHOLASTIC DOCTRINE OF PREDESTINATION.
THE last chapter explained the scholastic theory of the
physical predetermination of the will, or the subordination of
8 2
260 Scholastic Doctrine CHAP. x.
the will to the universal cause — a philosophical doctrine of
necessity. To this theory succeeded the proper or Augus-
tinian doctrine of predestination, which went upon the basis
of original sin. All mankind being previously in a state
of ruin owing to original sin, Grod chose to exercise His
mercy upon some of this whole mass, His judgment upon
others ; to bring some to glory, and others to punishment.
Nor was this Divine determination in favour of one, and
against the other portion of the human race, to be attributed
to any foreseen difference of character between the two :
this difference of character being the effect of that deter
mination, instead of the determination the effect of that
difference. On the principle that the end includes the
means, the predestination of the individual to eternal life
included in it the bestowal of all those qualifications of
virtue and piety which were necessary for his admission to
that final state. These qualifications were therefore the
effect, and not the cause of predestination, for which no
cause was to be assigned but (rod's sovereign will and plea
sure.1 Nor had the creature any ground of complaint
against this Divine arrangement. For all deserved eternal
punishment ; and therefore those upon whom the punish
ment was inflicted only got their deserts, while those who
were spared received a favour to which they had in justice
no right, and were indebted to a gratuitous act of mercy,
and an excess of the Divine goodness.2
1 Prsescientia meritorum non est tamen oportet quod ratio electionis
causa vel ratio prsedestinationis. sit merittim ; sed in ipsa electione
. . . Manifestum est quod id quod ratio est divina bonitas : ratio autem
est gratise est prsedestinntionis effec- reprobationis est originate pecca-
tus ; et hoc non potest poni ut ratio turn. — -Aquinas, vol. 8. p. 330.
praedestinationis, cum hoc sub prte- 2 Voluit Deus in hominibus, quan-
destinatione concludatur. Si igirur turn ad aliquos quos prsedestinat,
aliquid aliud ex parte nostra sit suara reprsesentare bonitatem per
ratio prsedestinationis, hoc est prseter modum misericordise parcendo, et
effectum prgedestinationis. Non est quantum ad aliquos quos reprobat,
autem distinctum quod est ex libero per modum justitise puniendo. . . .
arbitrio et ex prsedestinatione, sicut Neque tameu propter hoc est iniqui-
nec est distinctum quod est ex causa tas apud Deum, si insequalia non
secunda et causa prima. — lma Q. 23. insequalibus prseparat. Hoc enim
A. 5. esset contra justitise rationem, si
Electio Dei qua unum eligit et prsedestinationis effectus ex debito
alium reprobat rationabilis est, nee redderetur, et non daretur ex gratia.
CHAP. x. of Predestination. 261
The doctrine of necessity, however, explained in the
last chapter, and the doctrine of predestination, are in sub
stance the same doctrine, and only differ in their ground,
which is in one a ground of philosophy, in the other one of
Scripture. The schoolmen attached indeed to these two
doctrines different functions and operations of the Divine
Power. Under the one, God acted as universal mover ;
under the other as special mover ; under the one He ex
erted a natural power, under the other a spiritual or grace ;
under the one He moved men to a good proportionate to
their nature, under the other to a good exceeding the pro
portions of nature ; * under the one He supported the natural
goodness of man unfallen, under the other He healed man
fallen. And in all acts in which the special power operated,
the general power operated too : so that God acted in both
capacities, in the case of the same act.2 But thus described
as two separate and distinct actions, the universal and
special action were really only the same action, in a higher
and lower degree, of the Divine motive Power over the
human will.
Thus clearly and strongly laid down, however, the
doctrine of Aquinas and the Augustinian schoolmen on
the subject of predestination has been mistaken in a well-
In his enim quae ex gratia dantur, turae, ad quam scilicet homo per-
potest aliquis pro libitu suo dare cui venire potest per principia SUSP na-
vult plus vel minus, dummodo nulii turae : alia autem est beatitude
subtrahat debitum, absque prseju- naturam hominis excedens, ad quam
dicio justitiae. Et hoc est quod dicit homo sola divina virtute perv<-nire
paterfamilias. Matt. 20. 15. 'Tolle potest secundum quandam Divinita-
quod tuum est ec vade; an lion licet tis participationem." — I1™ 2dae Q.
mihi quod volo facere ? '— lnia Q. 62. A. 1.
23. A. 5. 2 Homo in statu naturae integrae
1 Deus movet voluntatem hominis potest operari virtute suae naturae
sicut Universalis motor ad univer- bonum quod est sibi connaturale,
sale objectum voluntatis, quod est absque superadditione gratuiti doni,
bonum ; et sine hac universali moti- licet non absque auxilio Dei moven-
one homo non potest aliquid velle. tis.— 1™ 2dae Q. 109. A. 3.
. . . Sedtameninterdum specialiter Secundum utrumque statumnatura
Deus movet aliquos ad aliquid de- humana indiget Divino auxilio, ad
terminate volendum, quod est bonum, faciendum et volendum quodcunque
sicut inhisquos movet per gratiam.' bonum, sicut primo movente. Vir-
g T. lma 2dae Q,. 10. A. 6. tute gratuita superaddita indiget ad
Est duplex hominis beatitudo; una bonum supernaturale.— Ibid. A. 2.
quidem proportionata humanse na-
262 Scholastic Doctrine CHAP. x.
known treatise, whicL professes to give a resume of the
opinions of the schools on this subject. Archbishop Lau
rence asserts the predestination maintained by the school
men to be, a predestination in consequence of foreseen
good works in the individual. ' Almighty Grod before the
foundations of the world were laid, surveying in His com
prehensive idea, or, as they phrased it, in His prescience
of simple intelligence, the possibilities of all things, before
He determined their actual existence, foresaw, if mankind
were created, although He willed the salvation of all, and
was inclined to all indifferently, yet that some would de
serve eternal happiness, and others eternal misery ; and
that, therefore, He approved and elected the former, but
disapproved or reprobated the latter. Thus grounding
election upon foreknowledge, they contemplated it not as
an arbitrary principle, separating one individual from an
other, under the influence of a blind chance, or an irrational
caprice ; but on the contrary, as a wise and just one, which
presupposes a diversity of nature between those who are
accepted, and those who are rejected. Persuaded that Grod
is the fountain of all good, that from His Divine preordi
nation freely flows the stream of grace, which refreshes and
invigorates the soul, they believed that He has regulated
His predetermination by the quality of the soil through
which His grace passes, and the effects which in any case
it produces, not restricting His favours, but distributing
them with an impartial hand ; equally disposed toward all
men, but, because all are not equally (disposed toward Him,
distinguishing only such as prove deserving of His bounty.
They considered the dignity of the individual as
the meritorious basis of predestination.' 1
The first remark that this passage suggests, is that the
writer confuses all the schoolmen together, and attributes
one common opinion to them on this subject ; whereas
there were different schools amongst them, as among
modern thinkers, some taking the predestinarian side, and
others that of freewill ; though the great names are chiefly
on the former side. The writer, however, treats them all
1 Laurence's Bampton Lectures, pp. 148. 152.
CHAP. x. of Predestination. 263
as one school, and considers the predestination taught by
the Augustinian Aquinas to be of the kind which he here
describes ; i.e. a predestination on the ground of foreseen
good life. Of course if this is so, this is all the difference
between predestinarianism and the doctrine of freewill.
But I cannot understand how he can put this interpreta
tion upon the doctrine of Aquinas, when the latter plainly
and expressly asserts the contrary; viz., that foreseen
merits are not the cause of predestination, — prcvscientia
meritorum non est causa vel ratio predestinationis, but
predestination the cause of these foreseen merits ; these
merits being the effect of grace, and grace the effect of
predestination ; — id quod est gratiw est prcedestinationis
effectus. Archbishop Laurence appears to have been misled
by two classes of expressions in Aquinas, one relating to con
tingency, the other, to human blame and responsibility.
He refers in support of this interpretation of the doc
trine of Aquinas, to the latter's assertion of contingency.
' The mistakes upon this subject of those who have but
partially consulted the speculations of the schools (he is
speaking of those who have interpreted these speculations
in a predestinarian sense) seem to have arisen from the
want of properly comprehending what was meant by the
effect of predestination, an effect always supposed to be
contingent ; the operations of freewill, whether with or
without grace, being considered only as foreknown, and
not necessarily predetermined.' l And he quotes a passage
relating to contingent causes, as distinguished from neces
sary ones — 'Although all things are subject matter of
Providence, all things do not take place necessarily, but
according to the condition of their proximate causes, —
secundum conditionem causarum proximamrnj 2 which
are in some cases not necessary but contingent causes.
Archbishop Laurence understands this assertion of contin
gency as a denial of the doctrine of necessity, and an asser
tion of the received doctrine of freewill. But the system
of Aquinas, as explained in the last chapter, does not verify
1 Bampton Lectures, p. 152. Q. 3. A. 1.; Bampton Lectures, p.
2 Aquinas in Lomb. 1. 1. Dist. 40. 354.
264 Scholastic Doctrine CHAP. x.
such an inference from his « use of the term contingent.
Aquinas divides proximate or mediate or secondary causes
into two classes, necessary and contingent ; but the con
tingent causes are still mediate causes only, not original
ones. They are as in complete subordination to the first
cause, as necessary causes are ; only differing from the
latter in their manner of operation, which is variable and
irregular, instead of fixed and uniform. And the human
will, as a contingent cause, is no more than a mediate one.
(rod is cause of the will — ipse actus liberi arbitrii redu-
citur in Deum sicut in causam. Contingency then in
acts is not, according to the doctrine of Aquinas, opposed
to their ultimate causation from without ; which is the
doctrine of necessity : contingency is a certain mode in
which things take place ; and volition is such a mode in
the case of actions ; but volition is a mode, and not the
cause, in the sense of original cause, of them.
There is another set of expressions in the Augustinian
schoolmen relating to human blame and responsibility, to
which Archbishop Laurence refers. ' To the inquiry why
some are unendowed with grace, their answer was, because
some are not willing to receive it, and not because (rod is
unwilling to give it ; He, they said, offers His light to all :
He is absent from none, but man absents himself from the
present Deity, like one who shuts his eyes against the noon
day blaze.' J The language he refers to is that of Aquinas,
whom again he quotes as saying that there are two reasons
why grace, where it is withheld, is withheld ; one because
the man is not willing to receive it, the other because Grod
does not will to give it ; of which two the latter is posterior
in order to the former — talis est ordo ut secundum non
sit nisi ex suppositione primi.* Understanding the want
of desire for grace, referred to here, to be the opposition of
the individual's free and self-determining will, he takes
these expressions as involving the common doctrine of
freewill, that Grod offers His grace to all, while man rejects
or accepts it according to his own choice. But the fault
1 Bampton Lectures, p. 151.
3 Aquinas inLomb. 1. 1. Dist. 40. Q. 4. A. 2.
CHAP. x. of P rcdtstination. 265
in the human agent here referred to is not one to be con
founded with the fault of individual choice : it is the ori
ginal fault of the whole race. All mankind are to begin
with, according to the doctrine of original sin, disinclined
to grace, and, so far as themselves are concerned, reject it.
Aquinas then can assert that the reason why grace is with
held is man's own fault, without committing himself in
saying so to the common doctrine of freewill. It is the old
position which meets us in S. Augustine. The will of man is
naturally a corrupt and faulty will, but it is so at the same
time necessarily, and as the effect of original sin. Respon
sibility attaches to it as being will ; the voluntary agent is
as such susceptible of praise or blame — ut ei imputetur
aliquid ad culpam vel ad meritum ; * — and legitimately
comes under a dispensation of rewards and punishments.
Such is the sense in which man's fault is said by Aquinas
to be the first cause why grace, where it is withheld, is
withheld. It is the faulty will of the race, not the mere
choice of the person, which is this cause ; which faultiness
is therefore consistent with necessity, and not opposed to
it. It is a further test of such a sense, that the will thus
represented as the original barrier against grace, is next
represented as wholly able to be changed and made a dif
ferent will, by grace. ' Grod is able when, where, and in
whomever He pleases, to convert men's evil wills from
evil to good.' 2 It follows that when man's will is changed
from evil to good, it is by His irresistible power ; and
therefore that the admission into a state of grace takes
place, according to this system, on a ground quite different
from that on which Archbishop Laurence considers it to
do, upon his too hasty and superficial interpretation of the
scholastic language. Indeed, if none are to be considered
necessitarians who make man a responsible being, and lay
his sins and their consequences at his own door, there can
not be a Christian necessitarian ; for we must either do
1 S. T. lma Q. 22. A. 2. converters.'— Augustine, quoted by
2'Quis tarn impie desipiat, ut Lombard, 1. 1. Dist. 47. ' Neque ideo
dicat Deum malas hominum volun- prsecepit omnibus bona, quia vellet
tates quas voluerit, et quando voluerit ab omnibus bona fieri, si enim vellet
et ubi voluerit in bonum non posse utique fierent.' — Ibid.
266
Scholastic Doctrine
CHAP. X.
this, or charge (rod with them — which latter no Christian
can do. The most rigid predestinarian writers impose this
responsibility upon man.1
1 Archbp. Laurence's use of the
following statement iu Aquinas (B.
L. p. 151.) shows the same want of
insight into his system, and the
same contented resting on the ap
parent meaning of particular langu
age, without any consciousness of a
different interpretation, which in a
vast and intricate theological fabric
might be reflected from other quar
ters upon it. 'Dicendum quod elec-
tio divina non praeexigit diversitatem
gratiae, quia haec electionem conse-
quitur ; sed praeexigit diversitatem
naturae in divina cognitioue, et facit
diversitatem gratiae, sicut dispositio
diversitatem naturae facit.' — In
Lomb. 1. 1. Dist.-il. Q. 1. A. 2. He in
fers from this that election is asserted
by Aquinas to be on the ground of
foreseen merits in the individual, — a
diversitas natures in the good man
from that of the bad man. But this
very statement says that this diver
sitas natures is the effect of a divine
arrangement or disposing — dispositio
diversitatem natures facit. And
when we turn to the part of Aquinas'
system which relates to grace, we
find that a certain Divine prepara
tion of the man, while in a state of
nature and previous to a state of
grace, is necessary as a preparation
for grace — pr¶tio voluntatis
humance ad consequendum ipsum
gratiee habitualis donum — auxilium
yratuitum Dei interius animam mo-
vent is. — lraa 2llac Q. 109. A. 6. Gratiae
causa non potest esse actus humanus
per modum meriti, sed dispositio na-
turalis quaedam in quantum per actus
praeparamur ad gratiae susceptionem.
—Aquinas, vol. viii. De Praed. This
is, then, the dispositio natures here
referred to, which is a Divine mould
ing of the natural man to fit him
for grace. The statement, again,
on which Archbp. Laurence relies —
Dicendum quod quamvis Deus, quan
tum in se est, sequaliter se habeat
ad omnes, non tamen aequaliter se
habeant omnes ad ipsum, et ideo
non aequaliter omnibus gratia prae-
paratur (in Lomb. 1. i. Dist. 40. Q.
2. A. 2.) — cannot be reposed in
against a whole interpretative force
of the system explaining it the other
way. In the first stage of original
sin all men do eequaliter se habvnt
ad Deum : but God lifts some out of
this state, and others not, previously,
as we have just seen, to conferring
actual grace upon them. In this
intermediate stage, then, all men do
not eequetliter se habent ad Deum, but
some are and some are not in a
preparatory state for grace : but
this difference is the result of the
Divine will.
Archbp. Laurence relies on Cal
vin's dissatisfaction with Aquinas,
but the instance to which he refers
is no case of substantial disagree
ment between the two, but only of a
difference between a more subtle and
a broader mode of statement. Cal
vin censures the refinement or quib
ble — argutia, of Aquinas in saying
that foreseen human merit, though
not the cause of predestination on
God's part, may be called the cause
of it in a certain way — quodammodo
— on man's part ; because God, hav
ing predestinated men to goodness,
predestinates them to glory because
they are good. Such a statement
makes no difference in the doctrine
of predestination as a whole ; be
cause though one part of it is re
garded as dependent on another,
the whole is made to depend on the
Divine will solely. But Calvin
dislikes the subtlety as interfering
with the breadth of the doctrine:
CHAP. x. of Predestination. 267
To the doctrine of predestination thus laid down by
Aquinas succeeded a corresponding doctrine of grace. If
eternal happiness is ensured to the individual by a Divine
decree, the means to it, i.e. a good life, must be ensured
also ; and this can only be ensured by the operation of a
Divine grace or influence upon him, the effect of which is
not dependent on his own will, but is necessary. Aquinas
accordingly proceeds to lay down the doctrine of effective
or irresistible grace.
And first it must be observed that, without appending
the term efficacious, the use of which was introduced by
the later Thomist^, grace of itself bears in Aquinas the
sense of efficacious, i.e. means something, which simply
by the fact of its being given us by God, and of the man
himself having it, has the effect of making the man good
and acceptable to (rod. The leaning to the side of free
will which has marked church authority for the last three
centuries, has impressed for the most part upon the term
grace the sense of assisting grace; i.e. a Divine influence
which excites, prompts, suggests, and encourages, but which
depends on the human will for its proper and intended
effect, and does not issue in any good act or good and ac
ceptable state of mind, unless the will has by an original
movement of its own converted it to use. And this is
perhaps the sense in which grace is more generally and
popularly understood at the present day. But the Augus-
tinian schoolmen, following their master, do not mean by
grace such an influence as this, but a different one ; one
which, when received, produces of itself its designed effect
— an acceptable and justifying state of the soul. They
divide grace into two great kinds, one which is designed
for the good of the individual, and makes him acceptable
'Ac ne illam quidem Thomse ar- tur Deus praedestinare homini glo-
gutiammoramur,praescientiammeri- riam ex mentis, quia gratiam ei
torum non ex parte quidem actus largiri decrevit qua gloriam merea-
prsedestinatis esse prsedestinationis tur.' — Instit. 1. 3. c. 22. 8.9.
causam; ex parte autem nostra, Between the Augustinian and
quodammodo sic vocari posse, nempe Thomist doctrine of predestination,
secundum particularem prsedestina- and that of Calvin, I can see no
tionis sestimationem ; ut quum dici- substantial difference. NOTE XXI.
268 Scholastic Doctrine
CHAT. X.
to GK>d, — gratia gratum faciens ; the other, which is not
the grace of acceptableness, but only some gift or power
with which the individual is endowed for the benefit of the
church, — gratia gratis data.1 The former grace becomes
when imparted a quality of the soul, a certain graciousness
and goodness belonging to it, as beauty belongs to the body
— nitor animai.2
The question then is how this grace is obtained in the
first place, and how in the next place it is sustained and
preserved. Is it obtained by any merit of the individual
in the first place, i.e. is it the reward of any original exer
tion of the will ? Or, if not obtained in this way, is it
preserved in this way, i.e. by the freewill of the individual
sustaining and guarding it ? In either of these cases such
a grace as this involves no doctrine of efficacious and irre
sistible grace ; because in the former case it is a state of
the mind which the will has in part earned ; in the latter
it is one, which, though the individual is endowed with it,
by an act of (rod, as Adam according to the authorized
doctrine was with a certain good disposition at his creation ;
the individual has to maintain, as Adarn had, by his own
freewill. But if this grace is neither obtained nor preserved
by the freewill of the individual, but is given in the first
instance as a free gift of Grod, and sustained afterwards by
the supporting power of God, exerted gratuitously and
1 Duplex est gratia, una quidam dinat liominem immediate ad con-
per quamipse homo Deo conjungitur, junctionem ultimi finis; gratise au-
quse vocatur gratia gratum faciens ; tern gratis datae ordinant hominem
alia vero per quam unus homo ad qusedam prseparatoria finis nltimi,
cooperatur alteri ad hoc quod ad sicut per prophetiam et miracula.
Deum reducatur : hujusmodi autem Et ideo gratia gratum faciens est
donum vocatur gratia gratis data; multo excellentior quam gratia
quia supra facultatem naturae, et gratis data. — lma 2dae Q. iii. A. 1. 5.
supra meritum personse homini con- Gratia habitus gratus a Deo —
ceditur. Sed quia non datur ad hoc causa efficiens meriti . . . Virtutes
ut homo ipse per earn justificetur, theologicse et supernaturales, non
sed potius ut ad justificationem al- sunt minus efficaces similium actuum
terius cooperetur, ideo non vocatur quam virtutes morales. — Bradwar-
gratum faciens. Et de hac dicit dine, p. 364. et seq.
Apostolus 1. ad Cor. 12. 7. Uni- 2 Gratia est nitor animae sanctum
cuique datur manifestatio spiritus concilians amorem. — lraa 2"ae Q. 110.
ad utilitatem, scilicet, aliorum. A. 2.
Gratia autem gratum faciens or-
CHAP. x. of Predestination. 269
arbitrarily ; it then involves the doctrine of efficacious
grace ; for there is no room at either end for any original
motion of the will, upon which the possession of such grace
depends.
But the latter is, according to the Thomist doctrine,
the mode in which this grace is obtained and preserved.
First, the primary possession of this grace is not owing, in
whole or in part, to any merit or original act of will in the
individual. It was laid down that to a man who prepared
himself as much as possible for grace, grace was still not
necessarily given ; — non necessario data se prceparanti
ad gratiam et facienti quod in se est.} But if a man's
best possible preparation of himself for it was no claim in
the eye of (rod to it, the bestowal of it evidently did not
depend upon any thing in a man himself, but proceeded
upon a different law. And when we are let into the real
meaning of this position, the same conclusion is still more
clear. For when this position comes to be explained, as it
is further on in the argument, it turns out to be only an
other form of the position that nobody can prepare him
self, either in whole or in part, for grace, i.e. have any
original share in this work. The preparation of the human
heart for the reception of grace was a Divine work, in
which God was the mover, and the human will the tiling
moved.
The distinction indeed of operating and co-operating
grace, gratia operans et cooperans, appears at first sight
to imply an original act of the will, with which Divine
grace co-operates, and which is co-ordinate with that grace.
But as explained, it carries no such meaning with it, and
issues in a verbal subtlety. Two acts are attributed to the
will, one interior, the other exterior, the one being the
substance of the act, the other its manifestation ; the one
the real moral act itself, the other that act as expressed in
outward form. Of these two acts then, the former is attri-
1 Homo comparator ad Deum formam a figulo,^ quantumcunque sit
sicut lutum ad figulum, secundum praeparatum. Ergo neque homo re-
illud Jer. 18. 6. Sicut lutum in cipit ex necessitate gratiam a Deo,
manu figuli sic vos in manu mea. quantumcunque se praeparet.— I1"
Sed lutum non ex necessitate accipit 2dae Q. 112. A. 3.
270 Scholastic Doctrine CTTAP. x.
buted to Divine grace alone, — gratia operans, the human
will not co-operating with it, but being simply moved by
it. The latter is allowed to co-operate with Divine grace.
But this is no independent but a wholly moved and dictated
co-operation. The will having being wholly moved to
action by grace, that action is then called a co-operation
with grace.1
The bestowal of justifying grace, then, does not, in the
system ot Aquinas, depend in the first instance upon any
act of man's will ; nor does its continuance depend on it
either. The continuance of this grace depends on the gift
of perseverance, which is a gratuitous gift of God, given
to whom, and withheld from whom He will ; 2 and to which
no life and conduct of man can afford any claim. Suppose
a person in a good present state of mind, leading a good
life, and therefore, for the time being, in a state of accept
ance ; the question is, upon what law does this state of
things last ? Does its permanence depend on the indi
vidual's own original will, which performing its part in the
guard and maintenance of this state, God performs His,
1 ' In illo effectu in quo mens habet a Deo petere perse verantiae
nostra et movet et movetur, operatic donum ; ut scilicet custodiatur a
non solum attribuitur Deo sed etiam malo usque ad finem vitfe. Multis
animse ; et secundum hoc dicitur enim datur gratia quibus non datur
gratia cooperans. Est autem in perseverare in gratia.' — lm* 2dae Q.
nobis duplex actus ; primus quidc.ru 110. A. 10.
interior voluntatis ; et quantum ad ' Omne quod quis meretur a Deo
istum actum voluntas se habet ut consequitur, nisi impediatur per pec-
mota ; Deus autem ut movens ; et catum. Sed multi habent opera
prsesertim cum voluntas incipit bo- meritoria, qui non consequuntur
num velle, quae prius malum volebat ; perseverantiam ; nee potest dici quod
et ideo secundum quod Deus movet hoc fiat propter impedimentum pec-
humanam mentem ad hunc actum, cati, quia hoc ipsum quod est peccare,
dicitur gratia operans. Alius autem opponitur perseverantipe ; ita quod
est actus exterior, qui cum a volun- si aliquis perseverantiam mereretur,
tate imperetur, consequent est quod Deus non permitteret ilium 'cadere
ad hunc actum operatio attribuator in peccatum. Non igitur perse-
voluntati. Et. . . . respectu hujus- verantia cadit sub merito. . . . Per-
modi actus dicitur gratia cooperans.' severantia vise non cadit sub merito,
— }ma 2<*<»e Q. iii. A. 2. quia dependet solum ex motione
2 ' Homo etiam in gratia consti- divina, quae est principium omnis
tutus indiget ut ei perseverantia a meriti. Sed Deus gratis perse-
Deo detur. . . . Postquam aliquis verantice bonum laroitur cuicungue
est justificatus per gratiam, necesse illud largitur? — 1 ma 2dae Q. 1 14. A. 9.
CHAP. x. of Predestination. 271
and supplies the complement ? Not, according to Aquinas.
The continuance of this state of things is, from moment to
moment, a gratuitous act of God's sustaining power, who
keeps up this moral and spiritual fabric, as He does that
of the material world, so long as it suits His sovereign
pleasure, and no longer. The creature cannot conditionate
this Will Supreme, or impose any obligation in justice
upon it, in this matter. Thus, guarded at both ends from
dependence on the human will, given as the free gift of
God in the first instance, and sustained by His absolute
power afterwards, justifying grace — gratia gratumfaciens,
was effective or irresistible grace.
So far, however, theThomist doctrine of grace was only
the Augustinian doctrine, which was a perfectly simple
one, regarding the operation of grace as the action on each
successive occasion of Divine power ; upon which action
the effect of goodness in the soul followed, and upon its
cessation or interruption ceased. But the schoolmen added
to this doctrine a distinction, which, though founded in
reason and nature, ended, in their hands, in greatly bur
dening and perplexing it. Aristotle had laid down the
very natural position, that what constituted a man good,
was not the good act on the particular occasion, but a
habit of mind : this habit was productive, indeed, of acts,
and defined ag such ; but still it was from having this
source of acts in his mind, that a man was good, rather
than from the acts considered in themselves. As grace
was concerned, then, with the production of goodness, the
schoolmen, incorporating the Aristotelian doctrine of habits
with the doctrine of grace, maintained that God imparted
goodness in the shape of habit ; and the result was, the
distinction between habitual and actual grace— gratia
habitualis et actualisl',— a distinction which, in their
1 'Homo ad recte vivendum dunt proportionem naturae: alio
duplicitur auxilio Dei indiget : uno modo indiget homo auxilio gratiae,
quidem modo quantum ad aliquod ut a Deo moveatur ad agendum. . . .
habituate donum, per quod natura et hoc propter duo ; primo quidem
humana corrupta sanetur, et etiam ratione generali, propter hoc quod
sanata elevetur ad operanda opera nulla res create potest in quemcunque
meritoria vitae aeternae, quse exce- actum prodire, nisi virtute motionis
272 Scholastic Doctrine CHAP. x.
mode of carrying it out, produced such a labyrinth of
compartments and network of verbal subtleties, that it
requires some patience in a reader to extricate any mean
ing at all from such confusion, or arrive at the substance
and kernel of the system, amidst such obstructions.
Aquinas then commences with laying down, in general
terms, the doctrine of infused habits, — a doctrine which,
as I have explained in a preceding chapter, is in itself a
natural one, and agreeable to our experience. He asserts,
in the first place, that there are such things as natural
habits1, or dispositions, moral and intellectual, which are
born with men ; though he artificially limits the former to
such as are evidently connected with the bodily tempera
ment, such as temperance. And upon this foundation of
natural truth, he proceeds to erect another, and a more
important class of infused habits, connected with grace.
Besides habits infused by nature, then, there were
habits ' infused by Grod ; ' which differed from the natural
virtues in this, that they were designed for the spiritual
good of man, as the former were for his temporal and
worldly. These were certain imparted holy dispositions,
or spiritual virtues, produced in the soul without any efforts
of its own — quas Deus in nobis sine nobis operatur.*
divinse : secundo ratione special! complexione ad castitatem vel man-
propter conditionem status humanae suetudinem, vel ad aliquid hujus-
naturse ; quae quidem licet per gra- modi.' — lma 2dfte Q. 51. A. 1.
tiani sanetur quantum ad mentem, 2 ' Habitus homini a Deo infun-
remanet, tamen in eo corruptio et duntur. . . . Ratio est quia aliqui
infectio quantum ad carnem . . . et habitus sunt quibus homo bene dis-
ideo necesse est nobis ut a Deo ponitur ad finem excedentem facul-
dirigarnur et protegamur, quia omnia tatem humanae naturae, . . . et quia
movet et omnia potest. . . . Donum habitus oportet esse proportionates
habitualis graticB non ad hoc datur ei ad quod homo disponitur secun-
nobis ut 'per ipsum non indigeamus dum ipsos, ideo necesse est quod
ulterius divino auxilio? — lma 2'Iae Q. etiam habitus ad hujusmodi finem
110. A. 9. disponentes, excedant facultatem
1 ' Sunt in hominibus aliqui habi- humanae naturae. Unde tales habi
tus naturales. ... In appetitivis tus nunquam possunt homini inesse,
autem polentiis non est aliquis habi- nisi ex infusione divina.' — Though
tusnaturalissecunduminchoationem God is also able to infuse common
ex parte ipsius animae. . . Sed ex habits, such as are ordinarily ac-
parte corporis . . . sunt enim qui- quired by acts. — 'Deus potest pro-
dam dispositi ex propria corporis ducere effectus causarum secundarum
CHAP. x. of Predestination. 273
First in order, came the Theological virtues, — Faith, Hope,
and Charity. Then came the gifts — Dona ; which were
seven in number, — Wisdom, Understanding, Knowledge,
Counsel, Piety, Fortitude, and Fear. But, besides these,
were also infused moral virtues — virtutes morales infuscv ;
which were the same in matter with natural or acquired
virtues, but differed in the end or motive, which was a
spiritual one, while that of the former was natural. The
acquired, and the infused, virtue of temperance, for ex
ample, were both expressed by the same acts ; but the one
aimed at bodily health, or an undisturbed exertion of the
intellectual faculties, the other at spiritual discipline.
Now, so far as the schoolman in this scheme simply
asserts that Grod can, and often does, implant holy dispo
sitions and habits in human souls, without previous disci
pline and training on their part; or maintains the principle
of infused habits, as distinguished from habits acquired
by acts, his position is a natural one, and agrees with our
experience, as well as with the doctrine of the early Church.
We mean by a habit, a certain bias or proneness to act in a
particular direction ; and this bias or proneness is obtained
in one way by successive acts. But it would be untrue,
and contrary to the plainest facts of nature, to suppose
that this is the only way in which such a bias of the mind
is ever obtained. God evidently imparts it to men, at
birth, in different moral directions ; for we see them born
with particular dispositions and characters. And as He
imparts it at birth, He appears also sometimes to impart
it on subsequent occasions, by powerful impulses, commu
nicated to the souls of man, either internally, or by the
machinery of his outward providence ; by sudden junctures,
emergencies, in private or public life. We see great
changes produced in men's characters by these exciting
causes, and their minds put, by the force of events, into
particular states and tempers, which they retain afterwards.
ftbsque ipsis causis secundis. . . . tiimen per naturam posset causari ;
Sicut igitur quandoque ad osten- itaetiam quandpqueinfundit hommi
sionem suse yirtutis producit sani- illos habitus qui natural, yirtutepos-
tatem absque causa natural! ; quae sunt causan. —
T
274 Scholastic Doctrine CHAP. x.
That is to say, habits are sometimes imparted to men
at once, and from without, in distinction to being the
result of successive acts. The doctrine of Conversion,
is the application of this truth to the department of
religion : what this doctrine asserts being, that God, by
particular impulses, either wholly internal or connected
with outward events, imparts at once a religious disposi
tion or habit to the mind; so that, from being careless and
indifferent, it immediately becomes serious ; which is un
doubtedly sometimes the case. So far, then, as the school
man simply maintains in this scheme the position of
infused habits, or that habits need not necessarily be
obtained by acts, he maintains a true and natural doctrine.
And this was an important modification of the Aristotelian
doctrine, which rested too exclusively upon acts as the
cause of habits. So acute an observer, indeed, of facts,
as that great philosopher was, could not but see himself
that this cause did not apply in all cases ; — and the obser
vation extracted from him a partial modification of his
own system, in the shape of the admission of natural
virtue — (frvaircr) aoerr). But the addition of infusion,
as a formal and regular cause, in the case of habits, was a
substantial modification of the Aristotelian doctrine. It
was, however, a modification, which naturally followed from
Christianity. The idea of the Divine power, which was
not fully embraced by the Pagan philosopher, was brought
out by the true religion, and applied to the moral, as well
as to the physical world, to the department of will, as well
as that of matter. In other words, it taught a doctrine,
which the pagan philosopher did not hold, that of Divine
Grace ; which immediately became a fresh element in the
argument, and supplied a new cause for the formation of
the habit.
But, while the scheme thns rested upon a basis of
nature and truth, two great causes of confusion were at work
in it. One was an unreal or artificial distinction in the
subject matter of acquired and infused habits. It will be
evident to any one, on reflection, that the distinction be
tween these two kinds of habits, is a distinction simply in
CHAP. x. of Predestination. 275
the mode in which they are formed, and not at all in the
nature or matter of the habits themselves ; the same state
and disposition of mind being formed in the one case by
time, custom, successive acts, and in the other by Divine
power producing it, without the aid of these previous
steps. All habits, as such, then, whatever be their subject
matter, or rank, come alike under both these modes of
formation : an ordinary moral habit, such as honesty or
temperance, is as much a subject of infusion as a spiritual
one, such as faith or charity ; and a spiritual habit, such
as faith or charity, is as much a subject of acquisition, as
a common moral one of temperance or honesty. Infusion
and acquisition apply alike to both. A habit of faith is
acquired by acts of faith, and a habit of love by acts of
love ; and the natural or Aristotelian law of the formation
of habits, is as true of spiritual as of common moral habits.
Again, the commonest moral dispositions are as capable,
as spiritual ones, of being imparted in the other way, '/.«.
without previous acts ; and we see them so imparted often
at birth. But Aquinas artificially appropriates infusion
to spiritual virtues, acquisition to moral ones;1 as if the
former were never acquired by acts, and the latter never
but by them. It depends on the dispensation under which
a person is individually placed, in what way he obtains
either spiritual or moral habits ; whether both are the
simple growth of time and acts in him, or whether he
obtains both in the more immediate way : though we must
not so divide the two modes of formation of character as to
forget that both may go on together in the same person,
and that mankind are all more or less under both systems.
Another cause of confusion was the technical and quaint
division of these habits, followed by the artificial subordi
nation of one division to another, the attempt being to
construct them into one harmonious machinery for the
building up of the human soul,— one set, at the point
where its power failed, being taken up, and its action car
ried on by another. The Theological virtues, Faith, Hope,
and Charity, were infused habits. But though, their
1 He admits natural moral virtue in a limited way. p. 291.
T 2
276 Scholastic Doctrine CHAP. x.
infusion into a pdrticular soul being supposed, these were
true habits or dispositions of that soul ; they were passive
and inert, not producing acts until they were removed from
another quarter to do so. They were habits indeed, but
elementary ones, imperfectly possessed, and rather of the
nature of principles or faculties — principia supernatu-
ralia, corresponding to the natural faculties of man —
principia naturalia.1 While the natural will of man,
then, could put the natural principles into action, because
these were possessed perfectly, it could not, of itself, put
into action the supernatural principles. To put these into
action another spiritual force was necessary.2 To the theo
logical virtues, therefore, succeeded the Dona. Now it is
true that a habit does not move itself to action, but re
quires to be put in motion by a particular act of freewill,
on one theory, by a particular act of grace, on another.
But the Dona were themselves only imparted habits.
Here, then, was one set of habits, which was necessary to
put in motion another. And as the Dona succeeded the
theological virtues, the ' infused moral virtues ' succeeded
the Dona ; being those final and settled spiritual habits to
which the supernatural principles in man, i.e. the theo
logical virtues, tended ; as the acquired habits were the
completion of his natural principles.3 Yet this accumula-
1 Et quia hujusmodi beatitudo dum quas sit dispositus ad hoc
proportionem humanre natime ex- quod divinitus moveatur ; et istfg
cedit, principia naturalia hominis perfcctioncs vocantur dona. — -im»2dae
non sufficiunt ad ordinandum homi- Q. 68. A. 1. The Theological vir-
nem in beatitudinem praedictam ; tues are imperfect agents and cannot
unde oportet quod superadclantur move without the Dona. — Prima
homini divinitus aliqua principia, (naturalis) virtus habeturabhomine
per quse ita ordinetur ad beatitu- quasi plena possessio : secunda
dinem super naturalem, sicut per autem (theologica) habetur quasi
principia naturalia ordinatur ad imperfecta. Sed id quod imperfecte
finem connaturalem : et hujusmodi habet naturam aliquam non habet
principiadicunturmrtutestheologicce: per se operari, nisi ab altero move-
turn quia habent Deum pro objecto, atur. ... Ad finem ultimum natu-
tum quia a solo Deo nobis inftm- ralemadquamratiomovet,secundum
duntur. — lma 2dae Q. 62. A. 1. quod est imperfecte formata per
2 Manifestum est quod virtutes theologicas virtutes, non suffi cit ipsa
humanse proficiunt hominem, secun- motio rationis, nisi desuper adsit
dum quod homo natus est moveri per instinctus Spiritus Sancti. — A. 2.
rationem. Oportet igiuir inesse * Loco naturalium principiorum
homini altiores perfectiones, secun- conferuntur nobis a Deo virtutes
CHAP. x. of Predestination. 277
tion of habits, rising one above another in formal scale'
this whole complex machinery, did not complete the moral
being, who seemed always approaching the terminus of
action, and never attaining it.
For, secondly, habitual grace, with all this multiplicity
of internal construction, could still not put itself in action.
It was still no more than a habit of the mind, imparted
by God : and no habit, as has been just said, can put itself
in action ; for a man does not necessarily do a thing, in
fact, because he has a certain disposition to do it. It be
came then a vital question, what it was which put habitual
grace into action. Was it the freewill of man ? If it was,
then the human will had an original and independent act
assigned to it; a position which was contrary to this whole
scholastic doctrine of grace. It was not freewill, then, but
another and a further grace, which set in motion habitual,
viz. grace actual' — gratia actual-is.1 This was the com
pletion of the system, the key-stone of the arch. Habitual
grace could be admitted without any serious drawback from
the power of the natural will ; for God might impart a cer
tain disposition, or continuous impulse ; while it depended
wholly on the independent motion of the will, whether the
man ac^ed upon it or not. The turning and distinctive
assertion in the system, then, was the assertion of actual
grace, as that which moved habitual : and to this cardinal
position the Thomists, and their successors the Janseuists,
directed their most zealous and anxious attention, repelling
all interference with it as a subversion of the whole Gospel
doctrine of grace. The admission of habitual grace set
aside as one which the Semi-Pelagian or even the Pelagian
could make, without danger in principle to his theory ;
grace actual was defended as the central fort of Christian
truth in this department.2
theologicae. . . . Unde oportet quod ' See p. 290.
his etiam virtutibus theolojdcis pro- 2 Kon est habitus qui facit facere,
portioualiter respondeant alii habi- says Jansen. No habit, he urges, is
tus divinitus causati in nobis, qui the cause of action, but Ititrum
sic sehabentadvirtutestheologicas, arbitrium at the time.— De Gratia
sicut se habent virtutes morales ad Christi, pp. 186, 996. Nee est lux
principia naturalia virtutum. — I"* vel habitus quse velle vel non velle,
2<i»e Q 63 A. 3. videre vel non videre iaciunt, sed
278 Scholastic Doctrine CHAP. x.
As then in the simpler and Augustinian, so in the com
plex and Aristotelian statement of the doctrine of grace,
in which the distinction of habitual and actual is intro
duced, Aquinas maintains, we see, an irresistible or effec
tive grace. Habitual grace is guarded carefully at both
ends from dependence on the human will. It was alike
imparted and applied by an act of Divine Power. Had
the spiritual habit been either obtained in the first instance
by an act of the will, or, when imparted as a free gift, de
pended for its use on the will, a place for freewill would
have been allowed. But if freewill comes in neither at the
beginning nor at the end, neither as obtaining the habit
o o o
in the first instance nor as using it in the next, or causing
it to terminate in act, one operation of an irresistible
Divine influence is maintained throughout.
The Summa Theologica thus lays down a doctrine of
absolute predestination, with its complemental doctrine of
irresistible grace — that the whole world, being by original
sin one mass of perdition, it pleased Grod of His sovereign
mercy to rescue some and to leave others where they were;
to raise some to glory, giving them such grace as neces-
tantunimodo sine quibits actus vo- ground of merit from man. Did he
lendi vel videndi non fit. — p. use habitual grace by his own power
935. And this motion of libcruin of choice, he would have the merit
aibitrium at the time, is produced of his own use of this grace (p. 186.);
by grace at the time — gratia sped- but if this grace is put in action by
alls, actualis — adjutorium gratise another grace, no ground of merit
actualis quod tune datur, quando in the man himself remains. And
act u volumus et operamur. ... in- a distinction is drawn in this re-
spiraus eliam habitualiter justis spect between fallen man and the
velle et operari. — pp. 151. 153. He angels. — -Hinc nascebatur ut neque
adds: Tota disputatio cum Pelagio volitiones neque actiones augelorum
de justorum, hoc est, habitualeru essent specialia Dei dona, hoc est,
gratiam jam habentium fervuit. . . non eis Deus speciali donatione sou
Non ita deliravit Pelagius, ut exis- gratia largiretur. Tantummodo
timaret justitiam habitualem, ad enim donabat ea in radice, quatenus
opera justa suo modo non adjuvare. eis adjutorium quoddam gratise tri-
— p. 153. 'Actualis gratia' thus buebat, sine quo . . . non poterant:
gives the ' completum posse,' which sed ipsum velle, agere, et perseve-
is 'per liberum arbitrium remotior, rare, non eis dabat adjutorium gratiae,
per fidem propinquior, per chari- sed propria voluntas . . . Tune igitur
tatem multo propinquior, per ac- velle et agere bonum non erat spe-
tualem gratiam,' really had. — p. ciale Dei donum, sed tantum gene-
338. This position is maintained rale. — pp. 935, 936.
as the only one which cuts off i.he
CHAP. x. of Predestination. 279
sarily qualified them for it, and abandon the rest, from
whom He withheld such grace, to eternal punishment. But
this formal scheme laid down, the attentive reader of
Aquinas will next observe a certain general leaning and
bias towards a modifying interpretation of it. Having
constructed a system on the strict Augustinian basis, the
mind of the great schoolman appears to have shrunk from
the extreme results which it involved ; and without com
mitting himself to any substantial difference from his
master, he yet uses modes of speaking suggestive of an
other view of the question than that which lie had bor
rowed from him ; and a phraseology, which is not casual,
but set and constant, insinuates a relaxation of the Augus
tinian doctrine.
And first I will make the preliminary remark, that a
difference is to be observed in the general tone of these
two great theological minds, tending more or less to affect
their respective views on this subject. Aquinas is more
of a philosopher than his master, and has greater sympa
thies with the human mind as such, with the natural
intellect, reason, and moral ideas of mankind. His vast
acquaintance with heathen philosophy opens his mind to
the valuable gifts even of unenlightened man, his deep
reflections upon himself, his knowledge of (rod, — true as
far as it goes, — and his advancement in virtue, under the
guidance of reason and conscience. Nor is the deference
which he shows to heathen authority, in philosophical and
moral questions, altogether consistent with the position
which his formal theology, as an Augustinian, assigned to
unconverted human nature, which it represented as in the
depths of sin, and unable to do or to think anything good.
The perplexity, again, with respect to the existence of
evil, appears in a deeper and more sensitive form in the
mind of Aquinas than it does in that of his master. Au
gustine sees as a theologian an inexplicable mystery ; but
Aquinas shows more of that human sentiment, with respect
to the great fact of evil in the world,1 which has rested
1 Bradwardine has less scruple. utilitas electorum, bonum naturae,
— Ecce triplex bonum ex reprobis : seculique ornatua. Ponatur quoque
280 Scholastic Doctrine CHAP. x.
upon so many of the deep and philosophical minds of dif
ferent ages, and especially of modern times, disquieting
some, and sobering and subduing others. His perception
not dulled by the commonness and constancy of the fact,
as inferior ones are, but ever retaining something of a first
surprise, acknowledges, as the eye of a naturalist would
some remarkable law in his department, the prevalence of
moral evil in this lower world — bonum videtur esse ut in
paucioribus ; — a fact which, as he cannot explain, he en
deavours to outweigh, conjecturing some compensation for
it in other parts of the universe, and isolating this sublu
nary world as one exception to a universal law. This
sphere of natural evil, of generation and corruption, was
small in comparison with the world of heavenly bodies,
whose existence was eternal and fixed. This sphere of
moral evil in the majority was small, again, in comparison
with the angelic world, where a different law was in opera
tion ; and the angels who stood were much more in number
than those who fell, and, perhaps, even than the whole
number of the condemned, both men and demons — et forte
etiam multo plures quam omnes damnandi dcemones et
homines.1 Such a line of thought had a bearing upon the
present question, and tended to affect his view upon it ;
because an attempt to reduce the amount of evil in the
universe at large disposed to reducing, as far as might be,
the alarming estimate of it in this world.
The distinction, then, involved in Augustinian predes
tination and reprobation, being a distinction between posi-
secundum pium zelum multorum, veluti contrarietatis extremse con-
licet non secundum scientiam, quod fert justis, tanquam scintillse ful-
totus infernus cum omnibus suis gentibus, et ut stellse. Quis enim
domesticis reprobatis tolleretur de vel cujus ratio prohibuisset Dominum
medio, essetque ccelum tantummodo ab initio, si fuisset placitum coram
cum civibus suis sanctis ; tune se- eo, creasse ccelum plenum electis in
culum esset multum perfectum, et si gloria, et infernum plenum reprobis
Deus sic fecisset multum bene fecis- in poena, ut hoc illi comparate appa-
set. Nunc autem tanto perfectius ruisset gloriosius et fuisset ? Non
et tanto melius fecit Deus, quantum deerunt tamen qui hos humano
perfectionis et bonitatis continent in misererentur affectu, et pia compas-
se illce nobiles creatures damnatce, sione contenderent sic facere non
quantum etiam resplendent iae et debere. — p. 355.
apparent!* purioris ilia comparatio ' InLomb.l. 1. Dist. 39. Q. 2. A. 2.
CHAP. x. of Predestination. 281
tive good and positive evil, goodness and wickedness, and
their consequences, eternal happiness and eternal misery,
to two portions of the world respectively ; there is a ten
dency in the language of Aquinas to reduce this distinc
tion to a distinction between higher and lower good. Two
kinds of happiness are laid down in his system, 4 one of
which is proportioned to human nature, and to which a
man can arrive by this principle of his own nature ; the
other exceeding human nature, and to which a man can
arrive only by Divine virtue and by a participation of the
Divinity, according to the text in 8. Peter, that we are by
Christ made partakers of the Divine Nature.' } Here,
then, are two kinds of happiness, and two kinds of virtues,
which respectively qualify for them. There is one class
of virtues, which tits a rnan for his place in the order of
nature, and makes him a worthy member of the world of
God?s natural providence — secundum quas homo se beue
habet in ordine ad res humanas ; another class, which
fits a man for a place in a supernatural order of things
and a heavenly citizenship — ad hoc quod sint civts sanc
torum et domestici Dei.2 Expressed with scholastic for
mality, here is a very obvious distinction, and one whicli
we cannot avoid observing in the world around us, — one
which is recognised in the common language and writings
of Christians. We see as a plain fact, that there is a kind
of goodness, which, as distinguished from another kind,
must be pronounced to belong to this world, — that men
may be honest, conscientious, and high-principled in their
worldly callings, still having their view conh'ned to this
world. It is a virtuous mould and character of mind, —
that of a man who recognises the world as a true sphere
of moral action, desires to be on the right side, and culti
vates with that view various moral qualities ; who, there-
1 Estautem duplex hominis beati- potest secundum quandam Divini-
tudo ; una quidem proportionate- tatis participationem ; secundum
humanse naturae, ad quam scilicet quod dicitur (2 Pet. i.) quod per
homo pervenlre potest per principia Christum facti sumus consorte* di
suae naturae. Alia autem beatitude vines naturce. — lm* 2<Ue Q. 62. A. 1.
naturam homiais excedens, ad quam 2 1™* 2*1** Q. 63. A. 4.
homo sola divina virtute pervenire
282 Scholastic Doctrine CHAP. x.
fore, so far as the spiritual principle is involved in any
bond fide and honest distinction of good and evil, acknow
ledges a spiritual law in his own nature and the constitu
tion of things, to which he defers, and on which he frames
his life and conduct ; but who lowers this law by his narrow
and confined application of it to present things and visible
relations. This, then, is what Christian moralists call the
virtue of the natural man ; and its defect is in the prin
ciple of faith, which, by opening another world for them,
and so enlarging their scope and field, would have given a
spring and impulse to these moral perceptions, quickening
and strengthening them ; whereas they are now kept down
to a particular level. On the other hand, it is an essential
part of Christian doctrine, that there is a temper of mind
so far in advance of this natural morality, as to seem to
differ from it in kind : in the sense in which everything
seems at its perfection and final point, to be a different
thing from what it was before, as a lens burns at its centre
only. This is the supernatural temper of charity.1
From morals the distinction of natural and supernatural
is then extended by Aquinas to religion. It was obvious
that the natural man had not only moral virtue of some
kind, but religion as well. For, independent of the reli
gious men which Paganism had produced, what is the
obedience which the natural man, in his moral course of
life, pays to his own conscience, but an obedience to God,
whom he virtually recognises as speaking to him by that
internal voice ? And as he will obey that conscience, even
at the cost of his worldly interests, suffering the greatest
inconveniences rather than offend against probity and
1 La distance infinie des corps aux valent pas le moindre mouvement de
esprits figure la distance infiniment charite ; car elle est d'un ordre in-
plus infinie des esprits a la charite ; finiment plus eleve.
ear elle est surnaturelle. De tous les corps ensemble on ne
Tous les corps, le firmament, les saurait tirer la moindre pensee : cela
etoiles, la terre et les roy;iumes ne est impossible, et d'un autre ordre.
valent pas le moindre des esprits ; Tous les corps et les esprits ensemble
car il connait tout cela, et soi- ne sauraient produire un mouve-
meme ; et le corps, rien. Et tous ment de vraie charite : cela est im-
les corps, et tous les esprits ensem- possible, et d'un autre ordre tout
ble, et toutes leurs productions, ne surnaturel. — Pascal.
CHAP. x. of Predestination. 283
honesty, it is plain that in some sense he prefers the
Divine approbation to everything else. It was accord
ingly laid down that the natural man was able to love
God above all things — homo potest diligere Deum super
omnia ex soils naturallbus sine gratia. But the distinc
tion was then applied that he loved (rod naturally, not
supernaturally, ' as the source and end of natural good ;
whereas charity loved Him as the centre of spiritual good
or happiness. Charity had, moreover, a positive commu
nion with (rod, which nature had not ; of which communion
a certain promptitude and delight were the results, which
did not belong to the natural love of God.' !
These two kinds of goodness, then, natural and super
natural, had their respective sources assigned to them, and
the cause or motive power was pronounced, by an abbre
viation, in the one case to be reason, in the other God—
Ratio et Deus : 2 the Divine Power, however, operating
alike in both cases as true and original Cause. The Divine
Power, acting simply as the First or Universal Cause in
nature, moved the freewill of man to natural virtue ; acting
in a special way or by grace, it moved the same freewill
to supernatural virtue.3 ' All things,' says Aquinas, ' are
subject to Providence, and it pertains to Providence to
ordain all things to their end. But the end to which
created things are ordained by God is twofold. One is the
end which exceeds the proportion and faculty of created
nature ; that is to say, the life eternal, which consists in
the Divine vision, — which vision is above the nature of
every creature. Another is the end proportioned to created
nature, and which that nature can attain by the virtue of
that nature. Now, that which cannot arrive at a point by
its own virtue must be transmitted thither by another, as
an arrow is sent by an archer at a mark. Wherefore, pro-
1 'Charitas diligit Deum super quaudam soeietatem spiritualem cum
omnia eminentius quam natura. Deo. Addit etiam charitas super
Natura enim diligit Deum super naturalem dilectionem Dei, prompti-
omnia, prout est principium et finis tudinem quandam et delectationem.'
naturalis boni ; charitas autem, se-
cundum quod est objectum beatitu- ™* 2"* Q. 68. A. 1.
dinis, et secundum quod homo habet ' 1"* 2<u<> Q. 10. A. 6.
284 Scholastic Doctrine CHAP. x.
perly speaking, the rational creature, which is capable of
life eternal, is conducted up to it, or transmitted to it by
G-od. Of which transmission the reason pre-exists in the
mind of God, even as there exists generally the reason of
the ordination of all things whatever to the end. But the
reason of anything being done is a certain pre-existence in
the mind of the doer of the thing itself to be done ; whence
the reason of the transmission of the rational creature to
life eternal is called predestination — nam destinare est
mittere.' 1 While the cause, then, of natural virtue is the
Divine Power acting in its ordinary function, as prede
termining universally the created wills of men, the cause of
supernatural virtue in man is the Divine Power acting in pre
destination, or in the execution of a certain special decree.
' The virtue which qualifies man for good as defined by the
Divine Law, in distinction to reason, cannot be caused by
human acts of which the principle is reason, but is caused
in us by the Divine operation alone.' 2 And this Divine
operation is carried on by means of that machinery of in
fused supernatural virtues above described. For ' as God
provides for His natural creatures in such wise, that He
not only moves them to natural acts, but even endows
them with certain forms and virtues to act as principles
of action and to be in themselves dispositions to such
action ; so into those whom He moves to attain eternal
and supernatural good He infuses certain supernatural
forms or qualities, by which they are sweetly and promptly
disposed to attain that good.' 3 Supernatural virtue is
1 'Ad illud autem, ad quod non sionis creaturae rationalis in finem
potest aliquid virtute suae naturae vitse aeternae praedestinatio nomina-
pervenire, oportet quod abalio trans- tur ; nam destinare est mittere.' —
mittatur, sicut sagitta a sagittante I™ 2dae Q,. 23. A. 1.
mittitur ad signum. Unde proprie 2 ' Virtus vero ordinans hominem
loquendo, rationalis creatura, quse ad bonum secundum quod modinca-
est capax vita; aeternae perducitur tur per legem divinam, et non per
in ipsarn quasi a Deo transmissa. rationem humanam, non potest
Cujus quidem transmissionis ratio causari per actus humanos quorum
in Deo praeexistit, sicut et in eo est principium est ratio ; sed causatur
ratio ordinis omnium in finem. Ratio solum in nobis per operationem
autem alicujus fiendi existens est divinam.' — lma 2dae Q. 63. A. 2.
quaedam praeexistentia rei fiendae in 3 ' Creaturis autem naturalibus sic
eo. Unde ratio praedictae transmis- providet ut non solum moveat eas
CHAP. x. of Predestination. 285
thus an extraordinary, natural an ordinary, gift ; the one
an inspiration, the other a providential endowment.
But while these two kinds of virtue, and the ends to
which they respectively tend, differ in the quality of good
which belongs to them, both have, according to this lan
guage, some ; and the difference between these two states
is one of higher and lower good, and not one of good and
evil. As a disciple of S. Augustine, indeed, Aquinas is
obliged formally to preserve the distinction between the
natural and spiritual man as one of positive good and posi
tive evil, and to use the terms predestination and reproba
tion as involving this difference ; to represent inclusion
within the Divine decree as salvation, exclusion from it as
damnation. The pure Augustinian doctrine admitted of
no medium between these two results ; which it defends
on the ground of an original guilt in the human race,
which meets with its due punishment in one of these, with
a gratuitous pardon in the other. Aquinas, then, formally
adopts the Augustinian scheme, with the established de
fences. But a careful observation of his language will
detect a contest between two different rationales in his
mind ; the Clementine view of human nature struggling
with the Augustinian. Reprobation, maintained on one
side in full severity, is softened down on another, and iden
tified with a lower step in the scale of being ; and the rigid
Augustinian line of defence for the doctrine mixes with
another, which implies a reduced doctrine to be defended.
We are referred, together with an original guilt in human
nature, to a principle of variety in the constitution of
things, which requires that there should be higher and
lower places in the universe, down even to some lowest
place of all, which must be occupied. ' As created things,'
he says, 'cannot attain to the Divine simplicity, it is
necessary that the Divine goodness, which is in itself one
and simple, should be represented multiforinly in them ;
ad actus naturales, sed etiam largi- ale seternnmmfnnditali^uasformas.
tur eis formas et virtutes quasdam seu quaHtates supernaturales, secun-
quae sunt principia actuum. . . . dura quas suaviter et prompte ab ipso
Multo igitur magis illos quos movet moveantur ad bonura seternum con-
ad consequendum bonum supernatur- sequendum.'— 1°" 2<Ue Q. 110. A. 2.
286 Scholastic Doctrine CHAP. x.
and the completeness of the universe requires a difference
of grades, some high and others low in it. And on this
account Grod permits evils to take place, lest good should
be obstructed by its own abundance, and to preserve this
multiformity of grades in the universe. And He deals
with the human race as He does with the universe, — He
represents His goodness with that variety which is neces
sary to such representation, in the shape of mercy to those
whom He spares, of punishment to those whom He repro
bates " Grod willing to show His wrath, and to
make His power known, endured (i.e. permitted) with
much long-suffering the vessels of wrath fitted to destruc
tion, that He might make known the riches of His glory
on the vessels of mercy, which He had afore prepared for
glory ;" and "in a great house there are not only vessels of
gold and silver, but also of wood and earth, and some to
honour and some to dishonour." But why He has elected
these, and reprobated those, there is no reason but the
Divine Will, as Augustine saith, " Why He draws this man,
and not that, do not inquire, if thou wouldest not err."
Just as in natural things, a reason can be assigned, why
out of uniform elemental matter one part is put under the
form of fire, and another under the form of earth, and so
on ; but why this or that part of matter is chosen for this
or that form none can be, except the arbitrary will of the
Creator : and as in the case of a building there is a reason
why some stones or other should be put in particular places,
but why these or those stones are selected to be put in the
places, none — except the arbitrary will of the builder.' !
Two interpretations evidently divide this explanation and
defence of reprobation, one a severer, the other a milder
one. It is spoken of as positive evil, punishment on sin —
1 ' Sicut in rebus naturalibus po- forma, et ilia sub alia, dependet ex
test assignari ratio, cum prima ma- simplici divina voluntate ; sicut ex
teria tota sit in se uniformis, quare simplici voluntate artificis dependet
una pars ejus est sub forma ignis, et quod ille lapis est in ista parte
alia sub forma terrse a Deo in prin- parietis, et ille in alia, quamvis ratio
cipio condita, ut sic sit diversitas artis habeat quod aliqui sint in hac,
specierum in rebus naturalibus; sed et aliqui sint in ilia.' — !"• Q. 23.
quare haec pars materiae est sub ista A. 5.
CHAP. x. of Predestination. 287
vindicta, justitice ; and it is spoken of as lower good, for it
is represented as a lower grade in the scale of being
infimus locus in universo. But, according to Aquinas, evil
is no part of the universe, of which, however varied and
graduated that good may be, the whole is good ; so that a
lower, or the lowest place in it is a place of good and not
of evil. And according as reprobation is regarded in one
light or the other, the appeal in defence of it is made either
to original sin or the principle of variety in nature.
The religious philosophy of Aquinas, then, of which
these are the hints, tends simply to two different moral
creations, a higher and a lower one. The natural man is
created and has the advantages of his creation ; the spiri
tual man is created and has the advantages of his : and
predestination marks for a special glory, and a higher place
in the universe ; but exclusion from it does not involve
positive evil or misery. But it is remarkable that, while
he systematically hints at such a conclusion as this, in one
peculiar remote and isolated case alone does he apply it —
a case outside of the general mass of moral beings which
it so deeply affects, and to which the substantial interest
of any application of it attaches — the case of infants
dying unbaptized or in original sin. Yet the elaborate
and minute care with which he examines this particular
case, with a view to relieving it of the pressure which the
Augustinian doctrine, in its natural meaning, left upon it,
is deserving of attention ; as showing the strength and
firmness of the basis, which, however little built upon, was
formed in the mind of the writer for a general decision on
this subject.
Infants dying, then, in original sin, necessarily came, ac
cording to the pure Augustinian doctrine, under the Divine
wrath which was due to that sin. Being by nature repro
bates, and not being included within the remedial decree of
predestination, they were, in common with all the rest of
mankind who were bom under this curse and were not re
lieved by this decree, subject to the sentence of eternal
punishment ; which sentence was executed upon them. How
ever repugnant, then, to natural reason and natural feeling,
2 88 Scholastic Doctrine CHAP. x.
the Augustinian schoolman could not expressly contradict
this position ; but what he could not contradict he could
explain. Augustine had laid down that the punishment of
such children was the mildest of all punishments in hell —
omnium esse mitisslmam. Taking this as the authorised
definition of the punishment of unbaptized infants, he
proceeded to raise a structure of explanation upon it. First,
was the punishment of such infants sensible punishment
— sensibilis poena ? No ; because then it would not be
mitissima, the mildest of all. Moreover, sensible pain is
a personal thing — personce proprium, and therefore in
appropriate to a kind of sin which is not personal. Nor
could any argument be drawn from the fact, that children
suffered pain in this world ; because this world was not
under the strict law of justice, as the next was. Nor did
this immunity from pain imply in their case any invasion
of the special privilege of the saints ; for they enjoyed no
internal impassibility, but only a freedom from external
causes of suffering. Did the punishment of such infants,
again, involve affliction of soul — animce afflictionem
spiritualem ? No ; for such affliction must arise either
on account of their sin, or of their punishment — de culpa
or de poena. But if it arose on account of their sin, it
would involve despair and the worm of conscience ; in
which case their punishment would not be the mildest one,
and would therefore be opposed to the original supposi
tion. If it arose on account of their punishment, it
would involve an opposition in their will to the will of
God ; in which case, their will would actually be deformed
— actualiter deformis ; which would imply actual sin, and
so be contrary to the original supposition.
The punishment of such children, then, not being pain
either of body or mind, what is it ? Aquinas answers, it is
the want of the Divine Vision, or exclusion from the sight
of Grod — carentia Divince visionis, quce est propria et
sola poena originalis peccati post mortem ; which he
proves by the following argument.
Original sin, he says, is not the corruption of natural
good, but the subtraction of supernatural ; its final punish-
CHAP. x. of Predestination. 289
ment therefore must correspond, and be the exclusion, not
from that end to which the natural, but from that end
only to which the supernatural faculties tend. But the
end of the supernatural faculties is the Divine Vision. It
is the want, then, of this vision which is the punishment
of original sin ; not the want of any good which properly
belongs to nature. ' In the other perfections and goods
to which nature tends upon her own principles, those con
demned for original sin will sustain no detriment.' l
The want of the Divine Vision, however, being thus laid
down as the punishment of unbaptized infants, an argu-
mental obstacle arose from the quarter of the original
definition. For, according to Chrysostom, the exclusion
from the sight of Grod is the severest part of the punish
ment of the damned ; at any rate the want of that which
we wish to have cannot be without affliction, and unbap
tized infants wish to have the sight of (rod — pueri vellent
DivinaJrm visionem habere ; otherwise their wills would be
actually perverse. It would therefore appear, that this
want or loss would be affliction to them ; and therefore,
that, if this were their punishment, their punishment
would not be the mildest of all — mitissima. Nor, adds
Aquinas, is it any answer to this objection to say, that this
exclusion does not arise from their own personal fault ; for
immunity from blame does not diminish, but increase the
pain of punishment : or, again, correct to say, that they
are happy because they do not know what they have lost ;
for the soul freed from the burden of the ^ body must
know whatever reason can discover — et etiam multo
plura.
The general solution, then, of this difficulty, is, that it
is no pain to any one of well-ordered mind not to have
that to which his nature is in no way proportioned, pro
vided the want is not owing to any personal fault of his
own. A man regrets the disappointment of some natural
want, even though he is not to blame for it ; and the
1 ' In aliis autem perfectionibus nullum detriment™ suatmebunt
etbonitatibus quse naturam huma- propeccato originali daninati. —
nam consequuntur ex suis principiis, Lomb. 1. 2. Dist. 33. U. 1. A. 1.
290 Scholastic Doctrine CHAP. x.
exclusion from a good exceeding nature, if he is. But the
combination of blamelessness in himself and excess in the
good protects him. Such a case comes under the rule of
Seneca, that perturbation does not fall on the wise man
for that which is unavoidable ; and children dying under
original sin alone are wise — sed in pueris recta est ratio
nullo actuati peccato obliquata. They will therefore feel
no more pain under the want which attaches to their con
dition, than a reasonable man does because he cannot fly
like a bird, or because he is not a king or an emperor.
Bather they will rejoice in their share of the Divine bounty,
and in the natural perfections they will have attained.1
It will be seen that the whole of this elaborate position
rests upon a particular interpretation of original sin; viz.,
as a privation or loss of perfection, and not a positive evil.
Having constructed his system on the strict Augustinian
sense of original sin, Aquinas falls back on the Clementine
when he comes to an individual case ; and avails himself of
the milder theology of the early fathers. Such a position,
however, when once laid down in the case of infants dying
under original sin, evidently cannot stop short of a much
wider application. Man is the same, as regards his nature,
whether he dies as an infant or grows up to maturity ; and
therefore the whole condition of the natural man, whether
1 Sicut nullus sapiens homo affli- putes at the Council of Trent, in
gitur de hoc quod non potest volare which the majority appear to have
sicut avis, vel quia non est rex vel favoured the position of Aquinas ;
imperator; cum sibi non sit de- but not without distinctions; 'For
bitum. . . . Si ab hoc deficiant (qui the Dominicans said that the chil-
liberum arbitrium habent), maximus dren dead without baptism before
erit dolor eis quia amittunt illucl the use of reason remain after the
quod suum esse possibile fuit. Pueri resurrection in a limbo and darkness
autem nunquam fuerunt proportion- under the earth, but without fire ;
ati ad hoc, quod vitam aeternam the Franciscans say they are to re-
haberent, quae nee eis debebatur ex main upon the earth, and in light,
principiis naturae, nee actus proprios Some affirmed also, that they should
habere potuerunt : et ideo nihil be philosophers, busying themselves
omnino dolebunt de carentia divinse in natural things,- not without that
visionis: immo magis gaudebunt de greatest pleasure which happeneth
hoc quod participabunt multum de when curiosity is satisfied by inven-
divina bonitate, et perfectionibus tion,' — Paul's History of the Council
naturalibus. — In Lomb. A. 2. of Trent.
The question came up in the dis-
CHAP. x. of Predestination. 291
heathen or professedly Christian, is involved in this conclu
sion, and may demand admission to the benefit of that
explanation which the particular case of infants has evoked.
The life which is conducted upon principles of honesty, jus
tice, and reason, though it be not upon that of Christian
faith, — the morality of the conscientious man of the world,
— in a word, the well ordered natural life, though below
the spiritual, may claim not to be condemned. And while
the formal theology of the Augustinian allows no interval
between the child of (rod and the child of the devil, the
faithful and the unbelieving, the spiritual and the carnal
man, and their respective ends, eternal happiness and eter
nal misery ; a modification of the meaning of a term, iu
one particular case, undermines in principle this whole
division ; punishment reduced from its positive to a merely
negative and privative sense, becomes another word for a
lower reward, and admits to a valuable and a substantial,
though not the highest, happiness, both in this life and the
next, that not inconsiderable portion of mankind who are
moral without being spiritual, well disposed without faith,
and reasonable without illumination.
It may be added, that the difficulty involved in these
considerations is one which meets us on either theory, that
of necessity or of freewill. The necessitarianism indeed of
Aquinas marks the natural and the spiritual life alike as
creations of Grod ; but however we may account for them,
the natural life and the spiritual life, in the sense in which
they have been spoken of, exist as facts in the world ; and
we see these two moral classes and types around us. Scrip
ture speaks indeed, speaks only of a way which leadeth to
life, and a way which leadeth to salvation ; and separates
the few who attain to eternal glory from a wicked world.
But it must be confessed that, when we look at the world
around us, the application of the truth of Scripture is not
free from difficulty, and that it depends much on the frame
of mind which we assume, and the point of view which we
adopt, whether society at large most aptly confirms the
scriptural position, or apparently contradicts it. In one
aspect all is mixture and balance in the world of moral lite
u 2
292 Scholastic Doctrine of Predestination. CHAP. x.
around us, — a nicely graduated scale of human character,
division gliding into division, and shade deepening or
softening into shade. Men are such combinations of good
and evil, that we hardly know where to place them ; and a
large portion of the world seems to occupy a middle place,
in opposition to the twofold destination of mankind in
Scripture to glory on the one hand, and misery on the other.
The idea of a middle state has thus always recommended
itself more or less as a conjecture to human thought ; and
a tendency to this doctrine, even where not formally ex
pressed, is observable in all ages of the Church ; nor, so
long as the facts of the world around us remain the same,
will it be otherwise. In another aspect the world presents
itself to our minds in harmony with the scriptural division,
as consisting of the good few and the wicked and depraved
mass ; vice, selfishness, and corruption appearing the gene
ral rule, to which the disinterestedness or genuine goodness
of a select number is the exception. The wickedness of
the world is thus a recognised maxim in the world itself;
and is one of the deepest sentiments of the human mind,
whose universal judgment one wise man of even heathen
times expressed in the great proverb.
In this state of the case it is needless to add, that the
plain statements of Scripture on this subject are to be im
plicitly received, as containing certain and important truth.
One great division of mankind is seen there, that of good
and bad ; one great distinction of eternal lot, that of
heaven and hell. It remains that those who have received
this revelation should act accordingly, and, instead of
forming conjectures about a middle state, live as for the
highest. Those who accept a revelation generally are
bound in consistency to accept its plain assertions in par
ticulars ; nor does this obligation cease because difficulties
may follow. Those who accept a revelation accept in doing
so a limitation to the rights of human reason. There are
great and important differences in the Christian world as to
the point at which such limitation comes in ; but whether
traditional interpretation of Scripture, or a present infal
lible one, or the letter of the Bible itself is the check, a
CHAP. xi. Conclusion. 293
check to private judgment is implied in the very fact of a
revelation, and is the common admission of all who accept
that revelation ; who so far — and a very important and
vital measure of agreement it is — agree with each other.
But when men have accepted the check in general, they
must submit to it in the particular case. There is no
obligation indeed on any one to think any individual either
better or worse than his observation or knowledge of his
character warrants ; rather he is bound not to do so : nor,
because general statements are made in Scripture are we
bound to apply them, and bring particular persons under
one head or another. An impenetrable veil hides the heart
of one man from another, and we see the manifestation,
but not the substance, of the moral creature. In the
application, then, of the scriptural assertion all is mystery
and uncertainty ; but the statement itself is clear and
distinct ; and while that dispensation of ignorance under
which we are placed, in mercy as well as discipline, relieves
us from the difficulties of the individual case, the general
truth is calculated to produce the most salutary effect
upon us.
CHAPTER XL
CONCLUSION.
IT were to be wished that that active penetration and close
and acute attention which mankind have applied to so many
subjects of knowledge, and so successfully, had been applied,
in somewhat greater proportion than it has been, to the due
apprehension of that very important article of knowledge,
their own ignorance. Not that all men have not acknow
ledged, and in some sense perceived, this truth. How,
indeed, could they avoid doing so ? But over and above
thin general and vague confession of ignorance, it might
have been expected, perhaps, that more would have at
tained, than appear to have done, to something like an
294 Conclusion. CHAP. xr.
accurate or philosophical perception of it ; such as arises
from the mind's contemplation and examination of itself,
and its own perceptions ; a scrutiny into its own insight
into truth, and a comparison of the different modes in
which it perceives and entertains truth ; which modes or
kinds of perception widely differ, and being with respect
to some truths, distinct, complete, and absolute, are with
respect to others dim, confused, and imperfect. To judge
from the way in which people in general express themselves
on this subject of human ignorance, they have no very
accurate perception of it ; seldom going out of certain
commonplace phrases and forms of speech,— forms of
speech, indeed, which mean much when used by those who
see their true meaning, but mean much less, though still
perhaps something, when used vaguely and without atten
tion, and because the whole thing is taken for granted
immediately, and then dismissed from the mind. This
general admission and confession of the fact, is all that the
mass of men appear to attain to on this important ques
tion ; and doubtless it is, as far as it goes, a useful and
serviceable conclusion of the mind — especially in the case
of devout persons, whose piety compensates for the want
of clearness in their ideas, and sustains in them a perpetual
practical perception of this truth, together with its natural
fruits of humility, sobriety, and resignation.
But though it is undoubtedly a matter of regret that
more should not have attained, than appear to have done,
to something like an accurate and philosophical perception
of their own ignorance ; the explanation of this fact is
contained in the very statement of it, as just given. For
this deeper perception cannot be gained, but by those
minds that have gone through something of that process
of thought, which has been just referred to. Men must
have reflected upon themselves, and examined to a certain
extent the constitution of their own minds, their percep
tions, or modes of entertaining truth, in order to have
gained it. But this internal department is not one in
which any large proportion of men take much interest ;
and a taste for this kind of inspection is perhaps rarer
CHAP. xi. Conclusion.
295
than any other, — I mean as a taste seriously and regularly
adopted, and made a work of. Many indeed start with
something like a general taste or a fancy for metaphysics,
which they indulge so long as it gives them little trouble,
and merely ministers to pleasing vague sensations of depth,
and love of the unknown and indefinite ; affording a do
main for dreamy and vaporous evolutions of thought, cloudy
connections, and fictitious ascents of the intellect, — reason
ings somewhat akin to what people carry on in sleep, and
pursued as a mere diversion and vent to, rather than an
exercise of, the mind. But the taste is given up as soon
as they have to examine facts, to fasten their ideas upon
real things, — real truths within the actual mind, — for the
purpose of apprehension and knowledge. This internal
field of examination, I say, is not to the taste of any
large proportion of minds ; because it requires a more
patient sort of attention, a more enduring and passive
attitude of the whole mind, than is ordinarily congenial
to the human temper. The act necessary here is an act
of simple internal observation, which, while it is a very
difficult one in this particular department, owing to the
obscurity and subtlety of its subject matter, is at the same
time a quiet one ; for quiet is essential to secure correct
ness of observation in metaphysics as in nature. But
this combination is a distasteful one to most minds. In
life, practical or intellectual, the general compensation for
difficulty is the pleasure of action ; for passiveness, that
of repose. The energetic man delights in obstacles which
summon forth all his powers and put them into active
operation ; the labour is forgotten in the satisfaction of
exertion, and the legitimate play and excitement of the
whole system carry off the task, and convert it into a
pleasure. The natural activity of the human mind, again,
so opposed to the passive attitude ordinarily, puts up with
it at certain intervals, for the sake of rest, and enjoys it.
But difficulty with passiveness, is uncongenial. We want
always, when we are at work, to feel ourselves in progress,
in action, advancing step after step ; and the attitude of
standing still in thought, though it be for an important
\
296 Conclusion. CHAP. xr.
result, though it be consciously only a waiting in readiness
to catch some idea when it may turn up, is, for the time
that it is such a waiting, and previous to its reward, a
painful void and hollowness of the mind. But such is
the attitude which is required for true analytical thought,
or the mind's examination of itself. For the ideas which
are the contents of that inward world, wandering in and
out of darkness, emerging for an instant and then lost
again, and carried about to and fro in the vast obscure,
are too subtle and elusive to be subject matter of regular
and active pursuit ; but must be waited and watched for,
with strength suspended and sustained in readiness to catch
and fasten on them when they come within reach ; but the
exertion being that of suspended and sustained, rather than
of active and employed, strength. And if this line of
thought in general is opposed to the tastes of the mass, so
that even a moderate degree of application to it is too
much for them, and even that lower insight into this de
partment of truth, which minds of average ability may
gain, is a part of knowledge into which they are not
admitted, — by what a wide and immeasurable interval are
they separated from the great analytical minds which have
appeared in the world, who, with unwearied patience and
keen exertion of the intellectual eye, have caught sharp
glimpses of the great ideas and processes of the human
reason, — quick and momentary sights, which, impressed
by their vividness upon the memory, and thence transferred
to paper, have enabled them in a certain sense to bring
the human mind to light, to mark its main outlines, and
distinguish its different perceptions or ideas; by which
genuine and authentic originals they have then tested
current popular and second-hand truths.
This, then, is the reason why more have not attained
than have to an accurate perception of their own ignorance
as human creatures. For this correcter and truer percep
tion of ignorance is the correlative of a correcter and
truer knowledge. Of the human mind there is a luminous
and there is a dark side. The luminous side is that on
which it clearly perceives and apprehends truths, either by
CHAP. xi. Conclusion. 297
simple apprehension, or by demonstrative reasoning : the
dark side is that on which it does not perceive in either
of these two ways ; but either does not see at all, and has
a blank before it, or has only an incipient and indistinct
sight, not amounting to perception or apprehension.1 In
proportion, then, to the acuteness with which the mind
perceives truth, either by apprehension or by demonstra
tion, on its luminous side, in that proportion it sees the
defect of perception on its dark side. The clearness of
knowledge, where it is had, reveals and exposes by the
contrast its absence, where it is not had ; and the transi
tion from light heightens the obscurity. Each successive
step of demonstrative reasoning, by which a problem in
mathematics is proved, from the first up to the conclusion,
is accomplished by means of a certain light contained
within it — an overpowering light, to which the mind suc
cumbs, unable to resist its penetrating force, but pierced
through by it, as by lightning. Even that elementary and
primary piece of demonstrative reasoning which is called
an axiom, — that first inference or extraction of one truth
from another, which, in the department of demonstration,
we are called upon to make, — is accomplished by means
of such a vivid and penetrating light contained within it ;
so that the perception of the simplest axiom, where such
perception is a true and not a formal one, is, by reason of
this perfection of light in it, an illumination for the time
of the whole intellect, and may be regarded as a kind of
natural inspiration, answering to passion or emotion in
moral life. In proportion, then, to the keenness with which
this process goes on, is the reaction from it ; after the clear
ness of sight the change is all the greater to its dimness
and indistinctness ; and the reason turning, while full of
penetrating light from one side, upon the darkness of the
other, receives, as it were, a shock, by the violence of the
contrast. The difference between seeing truth and not
seeing it, between knowledge and ignorance, is felt in a
degree and manner in which those who have not attained
such sight or knowledge, cannot feel it. The analytical
1 See Chapter II.
298 Conclusion. CHAP. XT,
class of intellects that, not satisfied with the vague first-
sight impressions and notions of things, follow them up to
that ultimate point at which they are plainly seen to be
either true or false, — that draw the contents of the mind
from their obscurity to the test of an actual examination,
—that see clearly the truth they do see, whether as simply
apprehended, or as extracted from other truth ; — these
minds, in proportion to the keenness with which they are
conscious of perceiving truth, when they do perceive it,
know that they have got hold of it, and that no power can
wrest it from them, — in proportion, i.e.* to the measure in
which, in the department of knowledge, they are filled
with the light of clear apprehension or demonstrative rea
soning, — see the distinction between this mode of percep
tion and that which awaits them when they leave the
scientific ground, and turn from the truths of knowledge
to those of faith and of religion. They see, in consequence
of their appreciation of final truth, so much the more
clearly the defect of that which is not final ; and that
which has come to a point contrasts the more strongly,
with that which comes to none, but which vanishes and is
gone before it reaches a conclusion ; ever beginning, ever
tending to some goal, but never attaining it ; stopping
short, as it does, at its very starting, and, in the very act
of progress, absorbed in the atmosphere of obscurity, which
limits our mental view. Then, under the influence of such
a contrast, it is, that, the reason pauses, stops to consider,
to reflect, and then says to itself — this is ignorance.
And these considerations, while they serve to explain
why more have not attained to an accurate knowledge of
their own ignorance, as human creatures, than appear to
have done, serve, also, to temper our regret at such a
deficiency ; for it must be seen, on the bare description of
such a deep and peculiar perception of ignorance as I am
now referring to, that it is a state of mind not unattended
by danger. No perception of ignorance, indeed, however
strong, can be charged with any legitimate tendency to
produce unbelief; for it does not follow that, because we
see some truths clearly and others obscurely, some finally
CHAP. xi. Conclusion.
299
and others incompletely and but in commencement, that
therefore we may not hold these latter truths so far, how
ever little way that may be, as we do perceive them, and
accept and use them in that sense and manner in which
we find our minds able to entertain them. And thus the
truths of natural and revealed religion, incomprehensible
as they are, are proper subject matter of belief. Our
minds are constituted in such a way, as that we can enter
tain this class of truths, which are not subject matter of
knowledge, and yet fall under some indistinct sort of per
ception, which we feel properly to belong to us. To reject
them, then, because they are seen imperfectly and obscurely,
and because we have the light of clear apprehension and
demonstration in one department, to claim it, and be con
tent with nothing else in another, would be simply unreason
able. The deeper sense of ignorance, then, has no legiti
mate tendency to lessen belief in the truths of natural
and revealed religion : more than this, it has legitimately
even a direct tendency to strengthen it ; because the sense
of ignorance tends properly to produce humility, to subdue,
chasten, and temper the mind. The natural result of see
ing how poor and imperfect creatures we are, and how
small and limited our capacities, is to lower our idea of
ourselves, and so to put us into a frame, in which we are
the more ready to accept and use whatever measure and
kind of truth we may possess in this department. But it
must also, on the other side, be admitted, that there is a
natural tendency, in such a strong contrast as that which
has been described, to overwhelm that class of truths
which has the disadvantage in it ; and that minds which
turn, full of the clear light of apprehension and reasoning,
upon the obscurity of the truths of faith, will be apt to
suppose that they see nothing because they do not see
clearly, and that they have a simple blank before them.
And the natural impatience of the human temper will
much aid such a conclusion ; for men are apt to see every
thing in extremes, and when they have less than what they
want, are instantly inclined to think that they have nothing.
In this temper, then, men set down the ideas belonging to
:oo Conclusion.
CHAP. XI.
religion, as not only indistinct, but as no ideas at all, but
mere void ; and urge that persons are under a mistake in
supposing that they have anything really in their minds
when they profess to entertain these truths, — not having,
as it is asserted, any idea of them. In this way, then,
the deeper perception of ignorance tends to lessen belief
in the truths of religion ; inclining persons to set them
aside altogether as truths from which our understandings
are entirely separated by an impassable barrier, and with
which, therefore, as lying whoDy outside of us, we have no
concern.1
Such being, then, the two arguments from human
ignorance, the two modes of using and applying the fact,
the question is, supposing the mass of men had that dis
tinct and clear perception of their ignorance which analy
tical minds acquire, how would they use it ? Would they
use it for the purpose of deepening their humility, chas
tising their curiosity, subduing their impatience ? Would
they frame themselves upon a pattern of intellectual sub
mission and be grateful for such a measure of insight into
religious truths as Grod had given them ? or would they
use and apply it in the other way, and, struck simply by
the force of the contrast between their knowledge in one
department and their ignorance in another, draw from it
the impatient inference, that because they did not see these
truths clearly, they did not see them at all, and were
rationally disconnected with them? It is to be feared
that the natural impatience of the human mind would, in
the majority of instances, lean to the latter inference. It is
indeed true, and it is a cheering and consolatory fact, that
we see a broad division among the great analytical minds
on this head ; and that while some have drawn the argument
for unbelief from the fact of human ignorance, others have
drawn from it the argument for faith ; that to Hume and
Hobbes on the one side we may oppose Butler and Pascal
on the other. But could we expect that the generality of
men would exert that intellectual self-discipline which
1 This appears to have been Hume's state of mind with respect to
religious truths.
CHAP. xr. Conclusion. 301
these devout and reverential minds did ? Would not
natural impatience rather prevail, and the more immediate
and obvious effect of a contrast be yielded to. And if so,
are not the generality of men spared a severe trial, with
probably an unfavourable issue, in not having in the first
instance this deeper sense of ignorance at all ? Is not
their ignorance veiled in mercy from them by a kind Pro
vidence ; so that, with respect to these truths, they go on
for their whole lives, thinking they know a great deal more
than they do ? Nor does this apply to the uninstructed
and uncultivated part of mankind only, but perhaps even
more strongly to the learned and controversial class. For,
certainly, to hear the way in which some of this class
argue, and draw inferences from the incomprehensible
truths of revelation, carrying them, as they say, into their
consequences and logical results, upon which, however
remote and far-fetched, they yet insist, as if they were of
the very substance of the primary truth itself; — to judge,
I say, from the long and fine trains of inferences drawn by
some theologians from mysterious doctrines, — endless dis
tinctions spun one out of the other in succession, and issu
ing in subtleties which baffle all comprehension, and are,
in short, mere words and nothing more, but for which, so
long as at each successive step there has been an inference
(or something which to the controversially wound-up intel
lect or fancy at the time appeared such), — these persons
claim the most absolute deference ; as if some subtlest con
ception of the argumentative brain, some needle's point so
inconceivably minute, that not one man in ten thousand
could even see it once if he tried for his whole life, were of
the very foundation of the faith ;— to judge, I say, from
such a mode of arguing from religious truths, one cannot
avoid two reflections ; one, that such persons do not know
their own ignorance ; the other, that it is probably a mercy
to them that they do not. They do not know their own
ignorance with respect to these truths ; for if they did,
they would see that such incomprehensible truths were not
known premisses, and could not be argued upon as such,
or made foundation of unlimited inference : and that they
3<D2 Conclusion. CHAP. XT.
do not know it is probably a mercy to them ; for the very
same hasty and audacious temper of the intellect which
leads them to build so much upon assumptions, the nature
of which they have never examined, would, had they
examined it, and so arrived at a real perception of their
unknown nature, have inclined them to reject such truths.
Thus, in compassion to the infirmity of man, a merciful
Providence hides his ignorance from him ; and by a kind
deceit, such as parents use to their children, allows him to
suppose that he knows what he does not know. He is thus
saved from unbelief, and only falls into a well-meaning,
though foolish and presumptuous, dogmatism.
And now, to bring these remarks to bear on the subject
of this treatise, the question of Divine grace is a question
of Divine Power. Grace is power. That power whereby
Grod works in nature is called power. That power whereby
He works in the wills of His reasonable creatures is called
grace.
With respect, then, to the attribute of the Divine
Power, S. Augustine and his school took up, in the first
instance, a hasty and ill-considered position, which, once
adopted, committed them to extreme and repulsive results.
And the reason of their adopting such a position was, that
they were insufficiently acquainted with the limits of
human reason. For it must be evident to any person of
reflection, that a want of discernment on this subject is not
only an error in itself, but can hardly fail to be the source
of other errors ; because persons who entertain a certain
idea with respect to their knowledge, naturally proceed to
act upon it and to make assertions ; and it must be a chance
whether assertions made under such circumstances are
correct. I would not be understood, however, to cast any
blame upon these writers. The limits of human reason
are not easy to discern. It is not easy, as I have said, to
judge our own pretensions, and distinguish between one
part and another of that whole body of ideas and assump
tions which we find within our minds. Some philosophers
have settled the question summarily, by saying that we
know nothing ; others have extended the range of human
CHAP. xi. Conclusion. 30^
\j j
knowledge indefinitely, and given it a right to decide upon
the possibilities of things, and to judge the scheme of Pro
vidence. To draw the mean between these two extremes
is the work of an acute and original judgment, and requires
a peculiar constitution of mind. The tendency of even
deep and able minds generally is so immediately to fasten
on any assumption, especially any one relating to divine
things, which appears at first sight a natural one to them,
that their very power becomes a snare, and before they have
reflected upon an idea they are committed to it ; so that
to return to the preliminary question of its truth would be
in the highest degree difficult to them, as being so offen
sive to an already formed bias. Indeed, some minds of
great pretensions appear to labour under a moral inability
in this respect ; their intellect, strong in pursuing an idea,
is so utterly unable to stop itself for the purpose of judg
ment, that in reference to that particular function it may
be said to have almost the imperfection of a mere instinct,
rather than to operate as the true faculty of reason. This
mixture of singular weakness with singular power it is
which makes the task of estimating authorities so difficult;
opinions of the greatest value on details and collateral
points being sometimes of the very least on fundamental
questions, or those concerned with the soundness or un-
soundness of original assumptions. Yet assumptions and
particular dicta, laid down in the first instance by minds
of this latter class, have had great weight and a long reign
in the world ; one writer taking them up after another ;
till some person of original powers of judgment has risen
up who, on comparing an assertion carefully with his own
knowledge, has discovered a want of connection between
the two. He has not seen such truth included within that
field of apprehended truth, set out and divided from that
of conjecture, in his mind ; and this negative discovery once
made, has, like other discoveries, approved itself to the
world, people seeing it when it was pointed out to them.
Such a judgment passed upon any important set of assump
tions is a discovery in philosophy; and in this respect
modern philosophy has improved much upon the ancient.
304 Conclusion. CHAP. xi.
It has given us an acquaintance with the limits of human
reason which we had not before, and has enabled us to
distinguish more accurately what we know from what we
do not know, what we can say from what we cannot, on
some important questions ; it has tested the correctness of
many important assumptions : but it does not follow that
those are particularly to blame who wrote before such im
provement in the acquaintance with the limits of human
reason took place.
On this definite basis, then, and with the great dis
advantage of a less accurate knowledge of the limits of
human reason than has been attained in more recent times,
S. Augustine and his school proceeded to the general ques
tion of the Divine Omnipotence. And they commenced
with an assumption, which no modern philosopher would
allow, that the Divine Power must be an absolutely un
limited thing. That the Divine Power is not liable to any
foreign control is a principle which every one must admit
who believes properly in a Deity ; but that there is no
intrinsic limit to it in the possibilities of things would not
be admitted, in the present state of philosophy, in which
this whole subject is properly understood to be out of the
range of human reason. The Divine Omnipotence must
be admitted practically and in every sense which can be
wanted for the purpose of religion ; but we have not facul
ties for speculation upon its real nature. These writers,
however, insisted on an unlimited omnipotence, arguing
logically upon the simple word or abstract idea, that if
omnipotence was limited, it was not omnipotence. And
upon this assumption they went on to assert that God could,
had He pleased, have created a better universe than He
has ; a universe without evil and without sin ; and that,
sin existing in the world, He could by His simple power
have removed it, and have changed the wills of all wicked
men from evil to good. Upon such an idea of the Divine
Power, these writers were indeed somewhat perplexed for
an answer to the objection which naturally arose to the
Divine Goodness. A limit supposed to the possibilities of
things is indeed an impregnable defence to the theologian
CFAP. xi. Conclusion. 305
on this question ; for no one can be blamed for not doing
that which is impossible. But if this limit is not allowed,
and if God could have created a universe with all the ad
vantages of the present one and none of its evils, and if,
when moral evil had begun, He could have removed it ; it
is certainly very difficult to answer the question why He
did not ; for we necessarily attribute consummate benevo
lence to the Deity. The explanation of such a difficulty
on the principle of variety, that evil and good together,
with their respective reward and punishment, redound to
the glory of God more than good alone of itself would do,
is futile and puerile. Variety is, ccvteris paribus, an ad
vantage; and we praise God's natural creation, not only
because it is good, but because that good is various. Nor
would it be reasonable to object to different degrees of
good in the created universe ; to complain because the
earth was not as beautiful all over as it is at its most
beautiful part, or because all the birds of the air have not
the colours of the tropical birds ; or even, in moral life,
because all have not the same moral capabilities or power
of attaining the same goodness. But when it comes to a
comparison, not of like good with varied, or of higher
good with lower, but of good with evil, the case is very
different.
Upon this abstract idea, then, of the Divine Power, as
an unlimited power, rose up the Augustinian doctrine of
Predestination and grace ; while upon the abstract idea of
free-will, as an unlimited faculty, rose up the Pelagian
theory. Had men perceived, indeed, more clearly and
really than they have done, their ignorance as human
creatures, and the relation in which the human reason
stands to the great truths involved in this question, they
might have saved themselves the trouble of this whole
controversy. They would have seen that this question can
not be determined absolutely, one way or another ; that it
lies between two great contradictory truths, neither <
which can be set aside, or made to give way to the other
two opposing tendencies of thought, inherent in the human
mind, which go on side by side, and are able to be hel<
x
306 Conclusion. CHAP. xi.
and maintained together, although thus opposite to each
other, because they are only incipient, and not final and
complete truths ; — the great truths, I mean, of the Divine
Power on the one side, and man's freewill, or his originality,
as an agent, on the other. And this is, in fact, the mode
in which this question is settled by the practical common
sense of mankind. For what do the common phrases em
ployed in ordinary conversation and writing upon this
question — the popular and received modes of deciding it,
whenever it incidentally turns up — amount to but this
solution ? Such phrases, I mean, as that we must hold
man's freewill together with God's foreknowledge and pre
destination, although we do not see how they agree ; and
other like formulae. Such forms of language for deciding
the question evidently proceed upon the acknowledgment
of two contradictory truths on this subject, which can not
be reconciled, but must be held together in inconsistency.
They imply that the doctrine of predestination and the
doctrine of freewill are both true, and that one who would
hold the truth must hold both. The plain natural reason
of mankind is thus always large and comprehensive ; not
afraid of inconsistency, but admitting all truth which
presents itself to its notice. It is only when minds begin
to philosophise that they grow narrow, — that there begins
to be felt the appeal to consistency, and with it the tempta
tion to exclude truths. Then begins the pride of argument,
the ingenuity of construction, the ' carrying out ' of ideas
and principles into successive consequences ; which, as they
oecome more and more remote, and leave the original truth
at a distance, also carry the mind of the reasoner himself
away from the first and natural aspect of that truth, as
imperfect and partial, to an artificial aspect of it as whole
and exclusive. While the judgment, however, of man's
plain and natural reason on this question is a comprehen
sive one, men have, on this as on other subjects, left the
ground of plain and simple reason for argument and philo
sophy ; and in this stage of things they have adopted man's
freewill or the Divine Power as favourite and exclusive
truths, and have erected systems upon them. The Pelagian
CHAP. xr. Conclusion.
307
and Augustinian systems are thus both at fault, as arising
upon narrow, partial, and exclusive bases. But while both
systems are at fault, they are at fault in very different
degrees and manners ; and while the Augustinian is only
guilty of an excess in carrying out certain religious ideas,
the Pelagian offends against the first principles of religion,
and places itself outside of the great religious ideas and
instincts of the human race.
I. The predestinarian is at fault in assuming either
the Divine Power, or original sin, as singly and of itself a
legitimate basis of a system, — in not allowing side by side
with these premisses a counter premiss of freewill and
original power of choice. While he properly regards the
created will as an effect, he is wrong in not also regarding
it as a first cause in nature. But while this is a decided
error, and an error which has dangerous moral tendencies
when adopted by undisciplined minds, it is not in itself an
offence against morals or piety, The predestinarian, while
he insists on the will's determination from without, still
allows a will ; he does not regard man as an inanimate
machine, but as a living, willing, and choosing creature.
And as he admits a will, he assigns in every respect the
same moral nature to man that his opponent does ; he im
poses the same moral obligations, the same duty to God
and our neighbours ; he inculcates the same affections, he
maintains exactly the same standard in morals and reli
gion that his opponent maintains. It is true his theory,
as taken up by the careless unthinking mass, tends to
immorality ; for the mass will not see distinctions, and
confound the predestination of the individual, as holy and
virtuous, with the predestination of the individual as suck,
to eternal life; and because the end is assured, suppose it
to be assured without the necessary means and qualifica
tions for it. And such a practical tendency in the doctrine,
however justly it may be charged to a misapprehension
and mistake in some who adopt it, is still a reflection upon
the doctrine itself; showing how truth cannot be tampered
with without bad practical effects ; and that exclusive and
x 2
308 Conchtsion. CHAP. xi.
one-sided theories are a stumbling block to ordinary minds,
tending to confuse their reason and moral perceptions.
Still, regarding the error of the predestinarian apart from
those consequences which it tends practically to produce
in the minds of the vulgar, but which are not legitimately
deducible from it, it cannot perhaps be called much more
than a metaphysical mistake, — an overlooking of a truth
in human nature ; a truth indistinctly perceived indeed,
but still perceived in that sense and mode in which many
other recognised truths are perceived. The predestinarian
passes over the incomplete perception we have of our ori
ginality as agents, because his mind is preoccupied with a
rival truth. But this cannot in itself be called an offence
against piety : rather it is occasioned by a well-intended
though excessive regard to a great maxim of piety. He is
unreasonably jealous for the Divine Attribute, and afraid
that any original power assigned to man will endanger the
Divine. He thus allows the will of man no original part
in good action, but throws all goodness back upon the
Deity, as the sole Source and Creator of it, forming and
fashioning the human soul as the potter moulds the clay.
It may be said, indeed, that his doctrine, in attributing
injustice to the Deity, is inconsistent with piety : but he
does not attribute injustice to the Deity; but only a
mode of acting, which, as conceived and understood by
us, is unjust ; or which we cannot explain in consistency
with justice.
II. Pelagianism, on the other hand, offends against the
first principles of piety, and opposes the great religious
instincts and ideas of mankind. It first tampers with the
sense of sin. The sense of sin as actually entertained by
the human mind ; that sense of it which we perceive, ob
serve, and are conscious of, as a great religious fact — a part
of our moral nature whenever sufficiently enlightened — is
not a simple, but a mysterious and a complex sense ; not
confined to positive action, as the occasion of it, but going
further back and attaching itself to desire ; nor attaching
itself to desire only as the effect of free choice, but to
CHAP. xi. Conclusion. 309
desire as in some sense necessary in us, belonging to our
present condition as human beings, and such as we cannot
imagine ourselves, in our present state, in some degree or
other not having. Mankind know and feel that sin is
necessary in this world, and cannot be avoided ; yet simul
taneously with this sense of its necessity they mourn over
it, and feel themselves blameworthy. A sense of such a
peculiar kind as this, of moral evil, is indeed mysterious
and incomprehensible, but it is a fact ; it is a part of a whole
nature which cannot be explained, made up as it is of appa
rent inconsistencies and contradictions. But the Pelagian
would only allow so much of this whole sense of sin in
human nature as he could rationally and intelligibly account
for : he could understand voluntary but not necessary sin,
how man's acts, but not how his nature should humble him.
He therefore rejected the doctrine of original sin. And as
he tampered with the sense of moral evil, so he rejected
the sense of moral weakness. He could not understand
that discord and opposition in the will which the Apostle
expresses in the text, ' To will is present with me, but
how to perform that which is good I know not ; for the
good that I would I do not, but the evil which I would
not that I do ;' and he therefore thrust it aside for a
mere abstract conception of freewill, pronounced man
to have a power of doing anything to which there was
no physical hindrance, and placed an absolute origin
and source of good in human nature. The principle of
humility in human nature which leads it to eject the
source of good from itself, and place it wholly in God, was
thus disowned ; and with it the earnest craving of human
nature for an atonement for sin ; for if mankind had the
power to avoid sin, and if some, as he maintained, had
actually lived without it, mankind did not in their corpo
rate capacity want a Saviour ; and the sense of this vital
need did not belong to human nature.
And in disowning these doctrines the Pelagian at the
same time opposed himself to facts. The doctrine of the
Fall, the doctrine of Grace, and the doctrine of the Atone
ment are grounded in the instincts of mankind. It is true
i o Conclusion.
CHAP. XI.
we receive these truths by revelation, and should not other
wise have possessed them in anything like the fulness in
which we do. But when revealed they are seen to lie deep
in the human conscience. The doctrine of original sin
lies deep in the human heart, which has never truly and
earnestly perceived its guilt at all,, without coupling with
it the idea of a mysterious alloy and taint antecedent to
action, and coeval with its own life. And in like manner
man has in all ages craved an atonement for sin ; he has
always ejected the source of good from himself, and referred
it to Grod. These are religious feelings and instincts be
longing to human nature, and which can never be eradi
cated so long as that nature remains itself. The Pelagian,
then, in rejecting these doctrines, opposed himself to facts,
he separated himself from that whole actual body of senti
ment, instinct, and feeling which constitutes the religious
life of mankind, and placed himself outside of human
nature. A true system of religion must represent these
facts ; these large, these deep, these powerful, these pene
trating, and marvellous instincts : and it is the glory of
Catholic Christianity that it does this, that it expounds
faithfully the creed of the human heart, that nothing in
human nature is left unrepresented in it ; but that in its
vast and intricate fabric of doctrine is reflected, as in a
mirror, every vague perception of our nature, every inex
plicable fear and desire, grief and joy ; every internal
discord, unfinished thought, beginning of unknown truth ;
all that in the religious conscience, will, and affections can
or cannot be understood. But the Pelagian discarded the
religion of human nature and of fact, for an idea of his own
mind ; because his own idea was simple and intelligible,
and the religion of human nature was mysterious and com
plex ; as if, when facts were mysterious, it were anything
in favour of the truth of a religion that it was not.
Rather as if such an absence of mystery did not prove that
the system was a fiction and a fancy ; the artificial produc
tion of human thought, instead of a true revelation from
the Author of nature, who makes all things double one of
another, and who adapts His revelations to that human
CHAP. xr. Conclusion. 311
nature which He has made. Nature and revelation, as
having the same source, are both expressions of the same
truth, and must correspond with each other. If a religion
is true, then, it must harmonise with that whole complex
and intricate body of feelings and ideas, of which human
nature is really and actually composed. The Pelagian,
then, or — to take the stronger instance — the Socinian, may
appeal to the simplicity and plainness of his system, that
it contains no obscure and incomplete, no discordant and
irreconcilable ideas ; but if he does, he boasts of a religion
which is self-convicted of falsehood and delusion, and is
proved on its own showing to be a dream. Such a religion
may satisfy a mind that has thought out a belief for itself,
and has allowed a particular line of thought to lead it out
of the great circle of human feelings and instincts, but it
cannot satisfy the natural wants of the human heart ; it
may please and amuse in comfort and tranquillity, but it
will not support in distress ; it may be argued for, but
it cannot be loved ; and it may be the creed of a philo
sopher, but it is not the religion of man.
In this state of the case the Church has made a wise
and just distinction, in its treatment of the respective
errors of the Pelagian and the predestinarian ; and while it
has cast Pelagianism out of its communion, as a system
fundamentally opposed to Christian belief, it has tolerated
predestinarianism ; regarding it as a system which only
carries some religious ideas to an excess, and does not err
in principle, or offend against piety or morals. The seven
teenth article of our Church has accordingly allowed a
place for a predestinarian school among ourselves ; and such
a school has long existed, and still exists among us. This
article indeed admits of two interpretations, and may be
held and subscribed to in two ways, one suiting the believer
in freewill, the other the predestinarian. It may be held
as containing one side of the whole truth respecting grace
and freewill— the side, viz., of grace or the Divine Power ;
but not at all as interfering with any one's belief m a
counter truth of man's freewill and originality as an agent.
And in this sense it only excludes a Pelagian, and not such
312 Conclusion. CHAP. xi.
as are content to hold a mystery on this subject, and main
tain the Divine Power in conjunction with man's freewill.
Or, again, this article may be held as containing a complete
and whole truth; i.e. in a definitely predestinarian sense.
But as it would be unfair in the predestinarian to prohibit
the qualified, so it would be unfair in the advocate of free
will not to allow the extreme mode of holding this article,
or to disallow it as permitting and giving room for a pure
predestinarian school within our Church. This wise and
just liberty has indeed at times offended those whom the
excesses of this school have roused to hostility, or whom
insufficient reflection and the philosophical bias of the day
have made too exclusive and dogmatic in their opinions
concerning freewill ; and at the close of the last century a
proposal was made by a Divine who became afterwards a dis
tinguished prelate of our Church, to ecclesiastical authority,
that the terms of the seventeenth article should be altered
and so framed as to give no further license to predesti-
narianism.1 But a wise caution, if not a profound theology,
1 About this time a circumstance Article on Predestination and Elec-
occurred. which then excited con- tion more clear and perspicuous,
siderable interest, and in which the and less liable to be wrested by our
part that Dr. Porteous took has been adversaries to a Oalvinistic sense,
much misinterpreted and misunder- which has been so unjustly affixed
stood. The following statement in to it On these grounds we
his own words will place the fact in applied in a private and respectful
its true point of view : 'At the close manner to Archbishop Cornwallis,
of the year 1772, and the beginning requesting him to signify our wishes
of the next, an attempt was made (which we conceived to be the wishes
by myself, and a few other clergy- of a very large proportion, both of
men, among whom were Mr. Fran- the clergy and laity) to the rest of
cisWollaston, Dr. Percy, now Bishop the bishops, that everything might
of Dromore, and Dr. Yorke, now be done which could be prudently
Bishop of Ely, to induce the bishops and safely done, to promote these
to promote a review of the Liturgy important and salutary purposes.'
and Articles ; in order to amend in ' The answer given by the Arch-
both, but particularly in the latter, bishop, February 11, 1773, was in
those parts which all reasonable these words : "I have consulted
persons agreed stood in need of severally my brethren the bishops,
amendment. This plan was meant and it is the opinion of the Bench in
to strengthen and confirm the eccle- general, that nothing can in pru-
siastical establishment; to repel the dence be done in the matter which
attacks which were at that time has been submitted to our considera-
continually made upon it by its tion.'" — Works of Bishop Porteous,
avowed enemies ; to render the 1 7th vol. i. p. 38.
CHAP. XI.
Conclusion. $ 1 3
in the rulers of the Church at that time rejected it. And
this liberty still remains a great advantage to the Church,
and a signal proof at once of judgment and discretion, and
of a correct and enlarged theology. It would indeed have
been a fatal mistake to have excluded from our pale an as
pect of Christian truth, which simply erred in a pardonable
obliquity, such as is incident to minds of the highest order,
to the strongest intellect, to the deepest devotion. Such
an exclusion would have shown also great ignorance of
antiquity and the history of Christian doctrine : for with
out attaching more than undue importance to a single
name, it will be allowed perhaps that what S. Augustine
held is at any rate a tolerable opinion, and no sufficient
ground for separation either from the communion or the
ministry of the Church. He is, however, only the first of
a succession of authorities that from his own age to the
present have maintained and taught predestinarianism
within the Church. Such a proposal with respect to the
seventeenth article, from the person who made it, only
shows how apt minds are to be confined to the prevailing
notions of their day, and to suppose that there is no room
for any other truth than what happens to have been familiar
to themselves. And it should operate as a warning against
similar attempts, showing, as it does, what great mistakes
may be made when we trust too confidently one apparent
truth ; forgetting how much it might be modified, were we
in possession of the whole system to which it belongs ;
and how easily we may be ignorant and uninformed upon
those further points upon which this modification would
follow.
The formularies of our own Church, following Catholic
precedent, accordingly allow predestinarianism; and this is
the decision of common sense and common reason on this
subject. For, so long as a man thinks nothing which is
inconsistent with piety, what great difference can it make,
provided his actions are good, on what particular rationale
of causation he supposes them to be done? whether he
thinks them done wholly by Divine grace, or partly by an
original motion of his own will coinciding with grace?
314 Conclusion. CHAP. XL
The latter is the more large and reasonable view; but
whichever of the two opinions he adopts, if he only does
his duty, that is the great thing. The object for which
this present life is given us, is not philosophy and reasoning,
and the arrival at speculative truth respecting even our
own wills, and how they are moved ; but it is self-discipline
and moral action, growth in piety and virtue. So long as
this practical object is attained, mistakes of mere specula
tion may well be passed over. Those who give these mis
takes a practical direction, indeed, and from thinking
erroneously proceed to act viciously, are responsible for
such an application of a speculative tenet ; but those who
do not so apply it, are not so responsible. Numbers of
pious and earnest Christians who have laboured for the
welfare and salvation of their brethren, enduring thank
fully fatigue and pain, and despising the riches and honours
of the world, have thought that they did all this by an irre
sistible Divine influence in con sequence of which they could
not act otherwise than they did. And what if they did
think so ? They took a one-sided view ; but if we wait
till men are perfectly fair, clear, and large in their judg
ment before we acknowledge them as brethren, in the
case of the great majority of mankind we may wait for
ever.
Such is the imperfection even of the human mind, that,
under Providence, a certain narrowness of judgment often
works for good, and seems to favour practical energy and
zeal. How universal is that disposition in men of religious
ardour, enthusiasm, and activity, to over-value some one or
two particular tenets, which are either true, or which they
suppose to be true ; appearing to think almost more about
them than they do about the whole of the rest of their
religious creed, containing all the broad and fundamental
truths of the religion they profess I How do they cherish
and foster this tendency in their minds, as if it were the
most sacred and highest characteristic of their religious
life ! How do they idolise these special tenets, as if to
part with them were to bid farewell altogether to piety
and religion ! And doubtless in their particular case this
CHAP. xi. Conclusion. 315
even might be the result. For if minds have accustomed
themselves to cling with this exclusive force to particular
points, and identify religion as a whole with them, who can
tell the effect of the revulsion which would take place,
could they be brought to doubt the truth of these ? For
men go from one extreme to another, and from reposing
the most absolute faith upon articles resting on small
evidence, rush into disbelief of those which rest upon the
strongest. And if so, who would in all cases wish to try
the experiment of a change ? Who but a philosopher with
out knowledge of mankind would, for the chance of a possible
advantage, endeavour in all cases to disturb even a cherished
error of the minor and pardonable class ? As if minor
errors were not sometimes even a safeguard against greater
ones; and as if an obstinate propensity of the human mind,
checked in one direction, would not run out in another ;
like a stream which, if you dam it up in one part, breaks
its bank elsewhere, and perhaps floods a whole district.
Nor is this propensity to over-estimate particular truths
or supposed truths confined to any one communion ; the
Eoman Catholic and the Protestant shows it alike ; most
sects and divisions of the Christian world have their favourite
tenets, which individuals identify with religion as a whole,
and associate intimately and fundamentally with their
whole Christian prospects, as if their spiritual life and
sanctification were essentially bound up with them. They
seem to see in such special tenets the source of all their
strength, their stay, encouragement, and consolation.
The history of the human mind, I say, shows this great
imperfection in it, that it is so much more able to appre
ciate smaller and particular truths, real or supposed, than
larger and fundamental ones. There is in the first place an
advantage in this respect, belonging to the former, in the
very circumstance that they are smaller ; they are more
easily grasped, and the whole heart embraces them, and
winds itself about them more completely. There is in the
next place the stimulus of rivalry and contradiction, which
surrounds a peculiar and distinctive, and as such, an op
posed tenet, with a halo of its own, and invests it with an
3 1 ^ Conclusion. CHAP. xr.
interest which does not attach to undisputed truths. The
broad doctrines of revelation are defective in this appeal
to our interest, because they are so broad ; and truths which
all hold are thought little of comparatively, because all
hold them. What merit is there in believing what every
body else believes ? We are thrown in the case of such
truths upon the intrinsic gravity and importance of the
truths themselves, to the exclusion of that adventitious
interest which accrues from the really irrelevant and im
pertinent consideration of who hold them — that we main
tain and accept them in distinction to others who do not.
Men thus glory in a privilege while they pass over coldly
and slightingly a common benefit. In the case of the
distinctive tenet they feel themselves champions ; the be-
frienders of truth, and not its disciples only; its patrons,
rather than its sons. Stripped of this foreign, and thrown
back on its own intrinsic interest, truth is apt to be a some
what cold and insipid thing to the majority of men — at
least in their average state of mind ; though sickness or
adversity will sometimes reveal to them this truth, this
solid, this really sublime and native interest belonging to
it. Ordinarily, they are too apt to be little interested in
it, unless supported by some external aid of this kind.
There is again another and a better reason than either of
those which have been given for the disproportionate esti
mate of particular tenets ; viz. that they really suit, assist,
and support particular mental, as strong medicines do par
ticular bodily, constitutions. But whatever be the reasons
for this disposition, all sects and communions more or less
exhibit it ; and men, and serious and earnest men, come
forward and tell us, that they could not conduct their
spiritual progress without the aid of one or other special
tenet, which they assert, and really imagine to be, the
spring of their energies, and the mainstay of their hopes.
And among the rest, the predestinarian comes forward and
says this. He says that he could not, as a spiritual being,
go on without this doctrine ; that he finds it essential to
him ; that without it the universe would be a chaos, and
the Divine dispensations a delusion ; that he reposes in it
CHAP. xi. Conclusion. 317
as the only true mode of asserting the Divine Love and
Power ; and, therefore, his only support in this life, his
only security for a better life to come. He says all this ;
he says it from his heart ; he feels it ; he believes it. Then
what are we to say ? What, but that, however such a result
may be owing to an imperfection in his mind, this doctrine
is certainly to him, under this imperfection, a strength and
a consolation ; and that an error and an obliquity is over
ruled by Providence for good ? !
Whether the time, indeed, will ever come when men
in general will see that on this and some other questions
truth is twofold, and is not confined to either side singly —
that our perceptions are indistinct and contradictory, and
therefore, do not justify any one definite position — remains
to be seen. Philosophers have from time to time prophe
sied a day when a better understanding would commence
of man with himself, and of man with man. They have
risen up from the survey of the past with the idea that it
is impossible that mankind can go on for ever repeating
1 ' As the workings of the heart am persuaded there are) who differ
of man, and of the Spirit of God, are from me more or less in those points
in general the same in all who are which are called Calvinistic, appear
the subjects of grace, I hope most desirous that the Calvinists should,
of these hymns, being the fruit and for their sakes, studiously avoid
expression of my own experience, every expression which they cannot
will coincide with the views of real approve. Yet few of them, I be-
Christians of all denominations. lieve, impose a like restraint upon
But I cannot expect that every themselves, but think the import-
sentiment I have advanced will be ance of what they deem to be truth
universally approved. However, I justifies them in speaking their sen-
am not conscious of having written timents plainly and strongly. May
a single line with an intention either I not plead for an equal liberty?
to flatter or offend any party or The views I have received of the
person upon earth. I have simply doctrines of grace are essential to
declared my own views and feelings. my peace : I could not live comfort-
.... I am a friend of peace; and ably a day or an hour without them,
being deeply convinced that no one I likewise believe, yea, as far as my
can profitably understand the great poor attainments warrant me to
truths and doctrines of the Gospel speak, I know them to be friendly
any further than he is taught by God, to holiness, and to have a direct in-
I have not a wish to obtrude my own fluence in producing and mam-
tenets npon others in a way of con- taining a Gospel conversation ; and
troversy yet I do not think myself therefore I must not be ashamed of
bound to conceal them. Many them.'— Newton's Preface to the
gracious persons (for many such I Olney Hymns.
Conclusion.
CHAP. XT.
the same mistakes ; that they must one day see the limits
of human reason, distinguish what they know from what
they do not know, and draw the necessary conclusion, that
on some questions they cannot insist on any one absolute
truth, and condemn each other accordingly. But the vision
does not approach at present any very clear fulfilment.
The limits of human reason are perhaps better understood
in the world now than they ever were before ; and such a
knowledge has evidently an effect upon controversy, to a
certain extent modifying and chastening it. Those who
remind men of their ignorance use an argument which,
however it may fall short of striking with its full philoso
phical strength, and producing its due effect, appeals to an
undeniable truth, before which all human souls must bow.
And the most ardent minds, in the very heat of contro
versy, have an indistinct suspicion that a strong ground
has been established in this quarter. On the other hand,
this knowledge of the limits of human reason is not, and
perhaps never will be, for reasons which I have given, very
acute or accurate in the minds of the mass ; while the
tendency to one-sided views and to hasty assumption is
strong, and is aided by passion and self-love, as well as by
better feeling misapplied. On the whole, therefore, while
improved philosophy has perhaps entirely destroyed some
great false assumptions which have reigned in the world,
so that these will never rise up again, it cannot subdue the
temper and spirit which make such assumptions. It is
able occasionally to check and qualify, but it cannot be
expected that it will ever habitually regulate, theological
thought and controversy. It will from time to time step
in as a monitor, and take advantage of a pause and quiet
interval to impress its lesson upon mankind, to bring them
back to reflection when they have been carried too far, and
convert for the time a sense of error into a more cautious
view of truth ; but it will never perhaps do more than this.
Unable to balance and settle, it will give a useful oscillation
to the human mind, an alternation of enthusiasm and judg
ment, of excitement and repose.
In the meantime it only remains that those who differ
CHAP. XT.
Conclusion.
from each other on points which can never be settled abso
lutely, in the present state of our capacities, should re
member that they may differ, not in holding truth and
error, but only in holding different sides of the same truth.
And with this reflection I will conclude the present trea
tise. After long consideration of the subject, I must profess
myself unable to see on what strictly argumentative ground
the two great parties in the English Church can, on the
question which has occupied this treatise — viz. the opera
tion of Divine grace, and on other questions connected
with it — imagine themselves to be so fundamentally op
posed to each other. All differences of opinion, indeed,
even those which are obviously of a secondary and not a
fundamental kind, tend to create division and separation ;
for all difference in its degree is apt to be a sign of some
general difference of mental mould and religious temper,
and men naturally consort together according to their
general sympathies and turn of mind ; and for men to
consort with some as distinct from others, is in itself a sort
of division in the body ; a division, too, which, when once
begun, is apt to deepen. Such an existence of preference
is suggestive of positive controversy ; and men once
brought together upon such an understanding, and formed
into groups by special sympathies, are liable to become by
this very position antagonistic parties, schools, and sides.
Yet the differences of opinion in our Church, on the ques
tion of grace, and on some further questions connected
with it, do not appear to be sufficient to justify either
party in supposing that it differs from the other funda
mentally, or so as to interfere with Christian fellowship.
If the question of grace is one which, depending on irre
concilable but equally true tendencies of thought in man,
cannot be settled absolutely either way, it seems to follow
that a difference upon it should not occasion a distance or
separation. And this remark will apply to such further
and more particular questions as are connected with this
general question, and are necessarily affected by the view
we take upon, and the mode in which we decide the general
question. Such, for example, is the doctrine of baptismal
32O Conclusion. CHAP. xi.
regeneration. A slight consideration will be enough to
show how intimately this doctrine is connected with the
general doctrine of grace ; and that one who holds an ex
treme, and one who holds a modified doctrine of grace in
general, cannot hold the doctrine of baptismal regeneration
in the same sense. If a latitude of opinion, then, may be
allowed on the general question, it seems to follow that an
equal latitude may be allowed on this further and more
particular one ; and that if an extreme predestinarian, and
a maintainer of freewill can maintain and teach their re
spective doctrines within the same communion, they need
not exclude each other when they come to give to their
respective doctrines their necessary and legitimate appli
cation in a particular case. I cannot, therefore, but think,
that further reflection will, on this and other questions,
modify the opposition of the two parties in our Church to
each other, and show that their disagreement is not so great
as in the heat of controversy they supposed it to be. Dif
ferences of opinion there will always be in every religious
communion, so long as the human mind is as variously
constituted as it is, and so long as proper liberty is allowed
it to express and unfold this variety. But it depends on
the discretion and temper of religious men to what extent
they will allow these differences to carry them ; whether
they will retain them upon a common basis of Christian
communion and fellowship, or raise them into an occasion
of separation and mutual exclusion.
NOTES.
NOTE I. p. 4.
TOPLADT says, ' If God had not willed tlie fall, He could
and no doubt would have prevented it ; but He did not.
prevent it, ergo He willed it; and if He willed it, He
certainly decreed it.' — Vol. v. p. 242. This is a philoso
phical argument proceeding upon the attribute of the
Divine Power; as is the following appeal to our intellectual
consistency as believers in a (rod : ' He alone is entitled
to the name of true (rod who governs all things, and
without whose will (either efficient or permissive) nothing
is or can be done. And such is the God of the Scriptures,
against whose will not a sparrow can die, nor a hair fall
from our heads. Now, what is predestination but the
determining will of God? I defy the subtlest Semi-
Pelagian in the world to form or convey a just and worthy
notion of the Supreme Being without admitting Him to
be the Great Cause of all causes ; also Himself dependent
on none ; who willed from eternity how He should act in
time, and settled a regular, determinate scheme of what
He would do and permit to be done, from the beginning
to the consummation of the world. A contrary view of
the Deity is as inconsistent with reason itself, and with
the very religion of nature, as it is with the decisions of
revelation Without predestination to plan, and
without Providence to put that plan in execution, what
becomes of God's omnipotence ? It vanishes into air ; it
becomes a mere nonentity. For what sort of Omnipotence
is that which is baffled or defeated by the very creatures
it has m&de.'-^Topladyy vol. v. p. 293.
Y
Note II.
NOTE II. p. 7.
J ACKSON quotes a predestinarian statement, ' That Grod's
irresistible decree for the absolute election of some, and
the absolute reprobation of others, is immediately termi
nated to the individual natures, substances, or entities of
men, without any logical respect or reference to their
qualifications ; ' a position to which lie attaches the fol
lowing consequences: 'This principle being once granted,,
what breach of Grod's moral law is there whereon men
will not boldly adventure, either through desperation or
presumption, either openly or secretly ? For seeing God's
will, which in their divinity is the only cause why the one
sort are destinated to death, the other to life, is most
immutable and most irresistible, — and seeing the indi
vidual entities or natures of men, unto which this irresis
tible decree is respectively terminated, are immutable, —
let the one sort do what they can, pray for themselves,
and beseech others to pray for them, they shall be damned
because their entities or individual substances are unalter
able : let the other sort live as they list, they shall be
saved, because no corruption of manners, no change of
morality finds any mutability or change in their individual
natures or entities, unto which Grod's immutable decree is
immediately terminated. Whatsoever becomes of good
life or good manners, so the individual nature or entity
fail not, or be not annihilated, salvation is tied unto it by
a necessity more indissoluble than any chains of adamant/
-Vol. ix. p. 370.
This is perhaps a misinterpretation of the predestinarian
statement quoted. The Divine decree, it is true, is, ac
cording to that statement, ' terminated to the entities of
men,' and has ' no respect to their qualifications,' as the
cause or reason of such decree; but it may still have
respect to such qualifications as the effects of such decree.
But, whatever may be said of this particular statement,
such an interpretation of it, if meant for a representation
of the doctrine of predestination, is very incorrect.
Note III. 323
NOTE III. p. 10.
AQUINAS argues for the righteousness of Adam before the
fall as supernatural, or the effect of grace, on this ground :
' Manifestum est quod ilia subjectio 'corporis ad animam,
et inferiorum virium ad rationem, non erat naturalis ;
alioquin post peccatum mansisset, cum etiam in doemoni-
bus data naturalia post peccatum permanserint.' — Sum.
Theol. lma Q. 95. Art. 1.
This necessity of grace, however, before the fall is
explained by Aquinas with various distinctions, the sub
stance of which is, that grace is wanted for supernatural
virtue only by man in his upright state, but for natural
as well in his corrupt ; while the assistance of God as
Prime Mover, which he distinguishes from grace, is neces
sary for all acts in both states. ' Homo in statu nature
integrae potest operari virtute suae naturae bonum quod est
sibi connaturale absque superadditione gratuiti doni, licet
nonabsqueauxilio Dei moventis.'— lma 2dat' Q. 109. Art. 3.
4 Secundum utrumque statum (corrupt-urn etintegrum)
natura humana indiget Divino auxilio ad faciendum vel
volendum quodcunque bonum, sicut primo movente. Sed
in statu naturae integrae poterat homo per sua naturalia
velle et operari bonum suae naturae proportionatum, quale
est bonum virtutis acquisitae ; non autem bonum super-
excedens, quale est bonum virtutis infusae. Sed in statu
naturae corruptse etiam deficit homo ab hoc quod secundum
suam naturam potest, ut non possit totum hujusmodi
bonum implere per sua naturalia. Quia tamen natura
humana per peccatum non est totaliter corruptum, potest
quidem etiam in statu naturae corrupts per virtutem suae
naturae aliquod bonum particulare agere, sicut aedificare
domos,' &c. .
6 Virtute gratuita superaddita virtuti naturae indige
homo in statu nature integrae quantum ad unum, scilicet
ad operandum et volendum bonum supernaturale ; sed m
statu naturae corruptae quantum ad duo scil. ut sanetur, et
ulterius ut bonum supernaturale virtutis operetur.-
2dae Q. 109. Art. 2.
T 2
324 Note IV.
NOTE IV. p. 21.
LOCKE'S theory that facts, of sense or reflexion, are the
sole source of our ideas, places him in a difficulty with
respect to this indistinct class of ideas. He is committed
to the necessity of deriving them from this source, and
tries in a roundabout way to extract them from it. ' They
are ultimately grounded on and derived from ideas which
come in by sensation or reflexion, and so may be said to
come in by sensation or reflexion.' — First Letter to Bishop
of Worcester. But though he is in a difficulty as to their
origin, and cannot combine them with his theory, he
acknowledges as a fact this class of indistinct ideas. Thus
the idea of substance ' is the obscure and indistinct vague
idea of something which has the relation of support or
substratum to modes or accidents.' — Ibid. 'The idea
of substance is but a supposed I know not what to sup
port those ideas we call accidents. We talk like chil
dren who, being questioned what such a thing is which
they know not, readily give this satisfactory answer, that
it is something.' — Essay, b. ii. c. 23. ' The being of
substance would not be at all shaken by my saying we had
but an obscure imperfect idea of it ; or indeed if I should
say we had no idea of substance at all. For a great many
things may be, and are granted to have being, and to be
in nature, of which we have no ideas. For example, it
cannot be doubted but there are distinct species of
separate spirits of which yet we have no distinct ideas at
all.' And as he acknowledges an idea of substance which
is yet no true or adequate idea, so he does of infinity.
' The addition of finite things suggests the idea of infinite
by a power we find of still increasing the same. But in
endeavouring to make it infinite, it being always enlarging,
always advancing, the idea is still imperfect and incom
plete.' — Essay ) b. ii. c. 17.
Though Stillingfleet then presses him hard upon the
origin of such ideas, it is evident that with respect to the
nature of the ideas themselves Locke has greatly the
Note IV. 325
advantage in the argument ; that his opponent claims a
distinctness for them which mental analysis rejects, and
in his alarm, as if the foundations of truth were shaken
when these great ideas were discovered to be incomplete
and obscure, shows a radical misapprehension as to the
nature of the fundamental truths, on which much of
philosophy and the whole of religion rests. No error can
be greater than that of supposing that, when ideas are
obscure, they are not rational ones, and then to add, as
Stillingfleet does, 'if we cannot come at the rational idea'
of a thing, ' we can have no principle of certainty to go
upon.' Religion rests upon a set of truths which exactly
miss the condition of rational truth here laid down. To
disprove this condition, then, to lay down the consistency
of a rational character with an obscure and indistinct one
in ideas, is not to overthrow religion, but support it on
the most essential head. So surely do we find that no
discoveries in philosophy, metaphysical or natural, really
turns out to the injury of the faith.
Hume, as Locke, acknowledges virtually this class of
indistinct ideas, though not definitely and as a class.
Thus, while showing with such extreme acuteness that we
have no idea of a cause, he allows the thing ; asserting
strongly the necessity of attributing the existence of the
world to a cause. 'When our contemplation is so far
enlarged as to contemplate the first rise of this visible
system, we must adopt with the strongest conviction the
idea of some intelligent cause.' — Natural History of
Religion, sect. xv. But we could not lay it down that a
cause was necessary unless we had some idea of one.
What is this then but to say, that we have some idea, but
not a true one, of a cause, — an obscure, incipient idea.
The very acuteness with which the philosopher has proved
that we have ' no idea ' of a cause thus turns to the estab
lishment of this kind of truth that I am speaking of,
obscure, incipient, or mysterious truth. Hume acknow
ledges too the existence of <a vulgar, inaccurate idea of
power.'— Enquiry concerning the Human Understand
ing, sect. vii. But what is this vulgar, inaccurate idea,
326 Note V.
but an idea which all mankind have, an instinct, or indis
tinct perception ?
NOTE V. p. 25.
MR. MILL'S argument in favour of the doctrine of necessity
consists of two parts : one the proof of the doctrine ; the
other an answer to an objection to it.
His proof of the doctrine is an inductive one. What
do we mean by necessity, he asks, but causation ; that, the
antecedents supposed, a certain consequent will follow ?
Now, we observe, he says, this law of causation in every
other department : we must therefore suppose it to exist
in the department of the human will. For the proof of
the existence of this law in other departments he refers
us to facts, and simply appeals to observation. ' Between
the phenomena which exist at any instant, and the
phenomena which exist at the succeeding instant, there is
an invariable order of succession .... To certain facts
certain facts always do, and, as we believe, will continue
to, succeed. The invariable antecedent is termed the
cause; the invariable consequent the effect. And the
universality of the law consists in this, that every conse
quent is connected in this manner with some particular
antecedent or set of antecedents. Let the fact be what
it may, if it has begun to exist it was preceded by some
fact or facts with which it is invariably connected. For
every event there exists some combination of object or
events, some given concurrence of circumstances, positive
and negative, the occurrence of which is always followed
by the phenomenon. We may not have found out what
this concurrence of circumstances may be ; but we never
doubt that there is such a one, and that it never occurs
without having the phenomenon in question as its effect
or consequence. On the universality of this truth depends
the possibility of reducing the inductive process to rules.'
—Vol. i. p. 338.
Here is an appeal to our observation for a proof of the
law of causation. Mr. Mill does not go to any a priori
Note V. 327
ground on this question, or avail himself of the maxim
that every event must have a cause. He does not appeal
to any instinct of reason antecedently demanding a cause
for every event ; nor does he attach to the term cause any
sense of necessary and inherent efficiency and productive
ness in relation to its effect — ' any such mysterious com
pulsion now supposed, by the best philosophical authorities,
to be exercised by the cause over its effect.' — Vol. ii. p.
407. By cause and effect he simply means antecedent
and consequent ; and he appeals to our simple observation
for the proof of the existence of this order and succession
in things around us.
Now, it would be obviously begging- the question to
assert that we observe this uniform order and succession in
the events in which the human will takes part ; this would
be asserting to begin with what has to be proved — viz.
that this law of causation exists in the department of the
human will; besides, that it would be asserting our observa
tion of something which we evidently do not observe. For
whatever uniformity we may observe in the conduct of
mankind as a mass, however like one generation of men
may be to another, and a preceding age of the world to a
succeeding one, in general moral features and the prin
ciples on which the race is governed and acts, we evidently
do not observe this uniformity in the case of individuals.
And it is the case of the individual which tries the theory
of necessity or causation as applying to the human will.
Upon the ordinary doctrine of chances there will be much
the same amount of virtue and vice in one generation that
there is in others, and the same general exhibition of
character will take place. The doctrine of necessity re
quires that the individual will act in the same way under
the same circumstances. And this latter fact we certainly
do not observe. Mr. Mill, then, in appealing to our ob
servation for a proof of the law of causation, must mean
to exclude from the events in which this is observed those
in which the human will takes part ; i.e. to appeal to our
observation of material nature only. And therefore his
argument, when he comes to assert this law as prevailing
328 Note V.
in the department of will, is one of induction, — the com
mon argument from the known to the unknown. We
know, he says, that this is the law upon which one large
class of events takes place ; we must therefore suppose it to
be the law upon which another class of events, with re
spect to which we have not this knowledge, takes place ;
we observe this law in the physical world, we must there
fore presume that it prevails in the moral as well.
Of such an argument as this, then, it will, perhaps, be
enough to remark, that it appears to be nothing more than
a presumption at the best. One class of events takes place
according to a certain law ; therefore another does. Is
this a proof to satisfy any reasonable mind ? Such an in
duction is, on the first showing, in the highest degree weak
and conjectural. But when we compare matter and will,
and distinguish the entirely different impressions which we
have with respect to our actions, and events in nature, the
induction breaks down still more. Why should we suppose
that events so totally different in all their characteristics,
as those which take place in matter and will, should take
place on the same law ; and presume that, because causa
tion or necessity rules in the physical world, it therefore
does in the moral ?
But while I interpret Mr. Mill's argument as an induc
tive one — which indeed appears to be the only kind of
argument which observation enables him to use, — I must
at the same time allow that Mr. Mill in other passages
does not appear altogether to interpret his own argument
in this way ; and that he seems to imagine that he has
more than an inductive, i.e. presumptive, argument — viz.
one of actual consciousness and experience in his favour,
on this question. ' Correctly conceived/ he says, ' the
doctrine called Philosophical Necessity is simply this : that,
given the motives which are present to an individual mind,
and given likewise the character and disposition of the
individual, the manner in which he will act may be un
erringly inferred ; that if we know the person thoroughly,
and know all the inducements which are acting upon him,
we could foretell his conduct with as much certainty as we
Note V. 329
can predict any physical event. This proposition I take
to be a mere interpretation of universal experience, a
statement in words of ivhat every one is internally con
vinced of. No one who believed that he knew thoroughly
the circumstances of any case, and the characters of the
different persons concerned, would hesitate to foretell how
all of them would act. Whatever degree of doubt he may
feel arises from the uncertainty whether he really knows
the circumstances or the character of some one or other of
the persons with the degreee of accuracy required ; but by
no means from thinking, that if he did know these things,
there would be any uncertainty what the conduct would be.
Nor does this full assurance conflict in the smallest degree
with what is called our feeling of freedom.' — Vol. ii. p. 40(1.
I quote this passage not for the statement it contains
of the doctrine of necessity so much as to call attention to
the ground of that statement, — the nature of the argument
or evidence on which the writer appears to suppose that
doctrine of necessity rests. ' This proposition,' he says, ' 1
take to be a mere interpretation of universal experience, a
statement in words of what every one is internally con
vinced of; '' the proposition, viz. that the inducements
internal and external to action supposed, the action of an
individual may be predicted with as much certainty as we
can predict any physical event. Mr. Mill then appeals to
actual experience, and to internal conviction or conscious
ness, as the evidence of the doctrine of necessity. Now, if
Mr. Mill were content to mean by this experience and in
ternal conviction of necessity to which he appeals, such an
indistinct or half-perception of a truth in this direction as
is consistent with the same kind of perception of the con
trary truth of our originality as agents, I would agree with
him ; and I have in this chapter accepted the necessitarian
maxim, that every event must have a cause, as supplying
one side of the truth on this question. But it is evident
that Mr. Mill means something more than this ; his argu
ment, as an advocate of necessity against originality,
requires a full and distinct experience and conviction on
the side of necessity, not a divided one. Moreover, the
330 Note V.
ground on which he has placed the whole doctrine of
necessity or causation is a ground of observation — that we
see things, as a matter of fact, taking placje in a certain
order and succession. When he appeals, then, to an in
ternal experience and conviction on the side of necessity,
his argument requires him to appeal to such a full internal
conviction as is grounded on observation. But can Mr.
Mill really mean to assert that we observe a law of causa
tion in operation in our actions, as we do in the events of
the physical world ? Such an assertion would be plainly
untrue, and he himself would be the first to disown it ; for
he explains how it is that we cannot observe such a law in
the case of human actions, as we do in nature : viz. that
we have not the full antecedents before us in the former
case as we have in the latter ; that we do not know all the
inducements, internal and external, operating in a man,
and, therefore, cannot predict with accuracy what his
action will be. But then what becomes of that experience
and internal conviction to which he appeals on this ques
tion ? If we are not able to make the observation that we
act by a law of causation, how can we have the experience
and the internal conviction that we do ? What sort of
conviction, on his own showing, must that be, which has
positively no observation to rest upon ?
The state of the case, then, appears to be this : Mr.
Mill begins with an inductive or presumptive argument on
this question, which, as he proceeds and advances in his
explanation of it, becomes insensibly from an inductive
argument; an appeal to 4 internal conviction,' or conscious
ness. And instead of saying, the law of causation exists
in the case of physical events, therefore we may presume
it does in the case of moral ones or actions — he says at
once we see, we know, we are internally convinced, we have
actual experience, that our actions take place upon this
law.
Having established, however, whether by induction or
experience or internal conviction, necessity or the law of
causation, as the law upon which the acts of the human
will proceed, Mr. Mill has to meet an objection to such a
Note V.
position which naturally and immediately arises from our
consciousness of freedom as agents. ' To the universality
which mankind are agreed in ascribing to the law of
causation there is one claim of exception, one disputed
case, that of the human will ; the determinations of whicli
a large class of metaphysicians are not willing to regard as
following the causes called motives, according to as strict
laws as those which they suppose to exist in the world of
mere matter. This controverted point will undergo a
special examination when we come to treat particularly of
the logic of the moral sciences. In the meantime I may
remark that metaphysicians, who, it must be observed,
ground the main part of their objection on the supposed
repugnance of the doctrine in question to our conscious
ness, seem to me to mistake the fact which consciousness
testifies against. What is really in contradiction to con
sciousness, they would, I think, on strict self-examination,
find to be the application to human actions and volitions
of the ideas involved in the common use of the term
necessity, which I agree with them in objecting to. But
if they would consider that by saying that a person's
actions necessarily follow from his character, all that is
really meant (for no more is meant in any case whatever
of causation) is that he invariably does act in conformity
to his character, and that any one who thoroughly knew
his character could certainly predict how he would act in
any supposable case, they probably would not find this
doctrine either contrary to their experience or revolting to
their feelings.'— Vol. i. p. 358.
I will stop, in the first place, to ask, what is meant by
the word 'character,' in the assertion that | a^ person's
actions necessarily follow from his " character " ?' If the
term character here includes a man's whole conduct and
action, this assertion amounts to nothing. If the term
means simply a certain general disposition and bias of
mind, then the assertion is without proof; the assertion,
I mean, that from this general disposition a particular
act will follow. The main object of this passage, how-
,ever, is to meet the objection to the doctrine of necessity
33 2 Note V.
proceeding from our consciousness of freedom as agents ;
an objection which Mr. Mill meets with a distinction be
tween necessity in the sense of causation, and necessity in
the ' common use of the term,' viz. as coaction or force ;
necessity in the former sense not being opposed to our con
sciousness. The same answer is contained in the follow
ing passage : ' The metaphysical theory of freewill as held
by philosophers (for the practical feeling of it, common in
a greater or less degree to all mankind, is in no way in
consistent with the contrary theory) was invented because
the supposed alternative of admitting human actions to be
necessary was deemed inconsistent with every one's instinc
tive consciousness, as well as humiliating to the pride and
degrading to the moral nature of man. Nor do I deny
that the doctrine, as sometimes held, is open to these im
putations ; for the misapprehension in which I shall be
able to show that they originate, unfortunately is not con
fined to the opponents of the doctrine, but participated in
by many, perhaps we might say by most, of its sup
porters.' — Vol. ii. p. 405.
Now, it must be admitted that the doctrine of neces
sity is not opposed to any express and distinct conscious
ness on our part, for all that we are distinctly anxious of
is our willing itself ; we have no positive apprehension or
perception of anything beyond that fact, i.e. of the source
of such willing, whether this is in ourselves, or beyond and
outside of us. But though we have no distinct apprehen
sion of our own originality as agents, is there not an in
stinctive perception in that direction ? Does not the
whole manner in which we find ourselves, willing and
choosing, debating between conflicting lines of action, and
then deciding on one or other of them, lead us towards an
idea of our own originality as agents, and produce that
impression upon us ? Would not any person, holding to
his natural impression on this head, be disappointed by
any explanation of these characteristics of human action,
which accounted for them on any rationale short of
originality ? Would he not feel that there was something
passed over, not duly acknowledged, and recognised, in
Note V. 333
any rationale which stopped short of this ? You might
explain to him that his will being caused from without
did not imply any force or coaction, but that he might
have all the sensations of voluntary agency while lie was
still really acting from causes ultimately beyond his own
control ; but such an explanation would not satisfy him.
The feeling he has that he can decide either way in the
case of any proposed action, and the regret or pleasure
that he feels afterwards, according to the use which he has
made of this apparent power, will make him think himself
an original agent, and he will be dissatisfied with any
rationale of his action which stops short of this.
Mr. Mill is indeed sufficiently aware of the strength
of this natural conviction of originality in the human
mind, to be induced to meet and satisfy its demands as
far as he can in consistency with his theory ; but he can
not, because his theory prevents him, really satisfy them.
He admits, however, for the purpose of satisfying this
claim, that a man can in a certain sense form his own
character, and is an agent acting upon himself, and he
draws a distinction on this head between the necessarian
and the fatalist ; the former of whom, according to him,
allows, in keeping with true philosophy, this agency upon
self, while the latter, carried away by the fallacy that the
certainty of the end supersedes the necessity of the means
or subordinate agencies, denies it. " A fatalist believes,
or half believes (for nobody is a consistent fatalist), not
only that whatever is about to happen will be an infallible
result of the causes which produce it (which is the true
necessarian doctrine), but, moreover, that there is no use
struggling against it; that it will happen however we
may strive to prevent it. Now, a necessarian believing
that our actions follow from our characters, and that our
characters follow from our organisation, our education,
and our circumstances, is apt to be, with more or less of
consciousness on his part, a fatalist as to his actions, and
to believe that his nature is such, or that his education
and circumstances have so moulded his character, that
nothing can now prevent him from feeling and acting
334 Note V.
in a particular way, or at least that no effort of his own
can hinder it. In the words of the sect (Owenite) which
in our own day has most perniciously inculcated and most
perversely misunderstood this great doctrine, his character
is formed for him, and not by him ; therefore his wishing
that it had been formed differently is of no use, he has no
power to alter it. But this is a grand error. He has to
a certain extent a power to alter Ids character. Its
being in the ultimate resort formed for him is not in
consistent with its being in part formed by him as one
of the intermediate agents. His character is formed by
his circumstances (including among these his particular
organisation) ; but his own desire to mould it in a par
ticular way is one of those circumstances, and by no means
one of the least influential. We cannot, indeed, directly
will to be different from what we are ; but neither did
those who are supposed to have formed our characters
directly will that we should be what we are. . . . We are
exactly as capable of making our own character, if we
willy as others are of making it for us.' — Vol. ii. p. 410.
Here is an attempt, then, to represent the necessarian
system in such an aspect as to reconcile it with all those
sensations of power over ourselves and over our conduct,
which are part of our internal experience. But the
attempt fails, because it will not go the proper length of
acknowledging such power as an original one. A man ' has,
to a certain extent, a power to alter his own character.'
To what extent, or in what sense? While it is cin the
ultimate resort formed for him, it is formed by him as
one of the intermediate agents.'' But does this conces
sion of an intermediate agency satisfy the demands of
natural feeling and instinct on this head ? Would any
person naturally regard that power of choice, of which he
is conscious, as a power which he exerts in obedience and
subordination to some deeper cause working underneath it,
and obliging it to be exerted in a particular way ? Would
not a certain instinctive view he takes of this agency in
him be contradicted by this view of it as intermediate-
Note V. 335
agency, only apparently original, and really produced by a
cause beyond itself? Would not his internal sensations
appear upon such a view to him a spurious outside, a kind
of semblance and sham, pretending something which was
not really true, and deluding him into thinking that he
was an original agent when he really was not ?
While, then, I fully admit, in addition to these ideas
and sensations of originality and free agency, other ideas
counter to them — another side of the human mind to
which philosophy and theology have alike legitimately
appealed, and without which neither necessarianism nor
the doctrine of original sin would have arisen — I cannot
think that Mr. Mill does justice to these ideas — these
true perceptions, it appears to me, as far as they go — of
our originality as agents.
Hume's argument on Liberty and Necessity is a very
summary one. He does not, as Mr. Mill, in the first
instance, appears to do, from the observed fact of causa
tion or necessity in the physical world, presume the same
thing in the moral ; he boldly appeals at once to what
he considers to be an obvious and plain fact of observa
tion. He considers necessity, or the law of antecedent
and consequent, to be as plain and obvious in the case of
human actions as it is in the events of material nature.
' Our idea,' he says, ' of necessity or causation arises en
tirely from the uniformity observable in the operations of
nature. Where similar objects are constantly conjoined
together, and the mind is determined by custom to infer
the one from the appearance of the other, these two cir
cumstances form the whole of that necessity which we
ascribe to matter. Beyond the constant conjunction of
similar objects, and the consequent inference from one to
the other, we have no idea of any necessity of connexion.
If it appear, therefore, that all mankind have ever allowed,
without any doubt or hesitation, that these two circum
stances take place in the voluntary actions of men, and in
the operations of mind, it must follow that all mankind
have ever agreed in the doctrine of necessity, and that
336 Note V.
they have hitherto disputed merely from not understanding-
one another.'
' As to the first circumstance, the constant and regular
conj unction of similar events, we may perfectly satisfy our
selves by the following considerations. It is universally
acknowledged that there is a great uniformity among the
actions of men, in all nations and ages, and that human
nature remains still the same in its principles and opera
tions. The same motives always produce the same actions ;
the same events follow the same causes. Ambition, avarice,
self-love, vanity, friendship, generosity, public spirit; these
passions, mixed in various degrees, and distributed through
out society, have been from the beginning of the world,
and still are, the sources of all the actions and enterprises
which have ever been observed among mankind. Would
you know the sentiments, inclinations, and course of life
of the Greeks and Eomans, study well the temper and
actions of the French and English. You cannot be much
mistaken in transferring to the former most of the obser
vations you have made with regard to the latter. Mankind
are so much the same, in all times and places, that history
informs us of nothing new or strange in this particular.
Its chief use is only to discover the constant and universal
principles of human nature, by showing man in all varieties
of circumstances and situations, and furnishing us with
materials from which we may form our observations, and
become acquainted with the regular springs of human action
and behaviour. These records of war, intrigues, factions,
and revolutions are so many collections of experiments by
which the politician or moral philosopher fixes the prin
ciples of his science, in the same manner as the physician
or natural philosopher becomes acquainted with the nature
of plants, minerals, and other external objects by the ex
periments which he forms concerning them. Nor are the
earth, water, and other elements examined by Aristotle and
Hippocrates more like to those which at present lie under
our observation, than the men described by Polybius or
Tacitus are to those who now govern the world.' — Section
viii. On Liberty and Necessity, v. iv. p. 98.
Note V. 337
No argument on the side of necessity in human actions
can be simpler than this ; and if there is any weight in it,
the question is decided beyond controversy ; for it is simply
an appeal to our observation that such is the case, an asser
tion that necessity is as visible in human actions as it is
in the events of nature. But any reader of common intel
ligence must see at once a fundamental error underlying
this whole argument, which entirely deprives it of force.
The uniformity which the writer observes in human life
and conduct applies to mankind as a whole ; while the
principle of necessity can only be properly tested by the
conduct of men as individuals. On the common doctrine
of chances, mankind as a whole will be much the same in
one generation and age of the world that it is in another ;
i.e. there will be the same proportion of good to bad men,
the same relative amount of selfish and disinterested, gene
rous and mean, courageous and cowardly, independent and
servile characters. But the doctrine of necessity is con
cerned with the individual cases which compose this general
average of human character ; and the question upon which
that doctrine turns is, whether individuals with the same
antecedents — i.e. the same inducements, external and in
ternal, to particular conduct — have uniformly acted in the
same way. The sum total may be the same, but the ques
tion of necessity is concerned with the units which compose
that sum. Have the individuals who have been bad and
good, selfish and disinterested, been so in conjunction with
different respective sets of antecedents ; i.e. different cir
cumstances, education and natural temperament ? Or, have
not persons under apparently the same circumstances,
education, and natural temperament, turned out very
differently ? The latter is certainly the more natural ob
servation of the two. But if we are forbidden to make it,
and reminded that we do not know all the antecedents,
circumstances, and motives, internal and external, to con
duct, in the case of individuals ; then at any rate nobody
can pretend to have made the contrary observation, or pro
fess to have noted a uniform conjunction of antecedents
and consequents in the case of human action. And with
,38 Note VI.
the absence of this observation the whole of this argument
falls to the ground.
NOTE VI. p. 32.
FUIT Adam et in illo fuimus omnes. — Ambrose, Lib. 7. in
Luc. c. 15, 24. n. 234. In lumbis Adam fuimus. — Aug.
Op. Imp. 1. 1. c. 48. Unusquisque homo cum primo
nascitur. — De Gen. Contr. Man. 1. 1. c. 23. Sic autem
aliena sunt originalia peccata propter nullum in eis nostee
voluntatis arbitrium, ut tamen propter originis contagium
esse inveniantur ut nostra. — Op. Imp. 1. 1. c. 57.
Inobedientia quidem unius hominis non absurde utique
delictum dicitur alienum, quia nondum nati nondum
egeramus aliquid proprium, sive bonurn sive malum : sed
quia in illo qui hoc fecit, quando id agit, omnes eramus
.... hoc delictum alienum obnoxia successione fit nos
trum.— Op. Imp. 1. 2. c. 163.
Ipsos quoque hoc in parente fecisse, quoniain quando
ipse fecit, in illo fuerunt, ac sic ipsi atque ille adhuc unus
fuerunt.— Op. Imp. 1. 2. c. 177.
Disce, si potes, quemadmodum peccata originalia, et
aliena intelligantur et nostra ; non eadem causa aliena qua
nostra : aliena enim, quia non ea in sua vita quisque com-
misit, nostra vero quia fecit Adam, et in illo fuimus omnes.
— Op. Imp. 1. 3. c. 25.
Malum est de peccato veniens originis vitium, cum quo
nascitur homo . . . cujus mali reatus non innocentibus,
ut dicis, sed reis imputatur. . . . Sic enim fuerunt omnes
ratione seminis in lumbis Adam, quando damnatus est, et
ideo sine illis damnatus non est ; quemadmodum fuerunt
Israelite in lumbis Abrahse quando decimatus est, et ideo
sine illis decimatus non est. — Op. Imp. 1. 5. c. 12.
Per unius illius voluntatem malam omnes in eo pecca-
verunt, quando omnes ille unus fuerunt. — De Nupt. et
Cone. 1. 2. n. 15.
S. Anselm regards that corruption of nature which is
in the infant at its birth as sin then and at the time in
the infant — cum debito satisfadendi ; so that it is his
Note VI. 339
own sin and not another's for which he is responsible in his
responsibility for original sin (De Pec. Oriy. c. 2.) ; a posi
tion to which he proceeds to give further, and very strong
and exact expression : ' Originale peccatum esse injustitiam
dubitari non debet. Narn si omne peccatum injustitia, et
originale peccatum utique est et injustitia. Sed si dicit
aliquis : non est omne peccatum injustitia, dicat posse
simul in aliquo et esse peccatum, et nullam esse injusti
tiam : quod videtur incredibile. Si vero dicitur originale
peccatum non esse absolute dicendum peccatum, sed cum
additamento, originale peccatum, sicut pictus homo non
vere homo est, sed vere est pictus homo, profecto sequitur
quia infans qui nullum habet peccatum nisi originale
mundus est a peccato Quare omne peccatum est
injustitia, et originale peccatum est absolute peccatum.'
-C. 3.
Aquinas is against the imputation of another's act for
the purpose of guilt, though he allows it for that of satis
faction : 6 Dicendum quod si loquamur de pnena satisfac-
toria, qua3 vomntarie assumitur, contingit quod cum unus
portet poenam alterius, in quantum sunt quodammodo
unum. Si autem loquimur de poana pro peccato inflicta,
in quantum habet rationem poenre, sic solum unusquisque
pro peccato suo punitur, quia actus peccati aliquid pcr-
sonale eat.9— Sum. Tlieol. lma 2dae Q. 87. Art. 8.
The disputes at the Council of Trent on the subject of
original sin touched more on the extent of the effects of it
than on the rationale of its transmission. But the view
of imputation was maintained by Catarinus against the
Dominicans, who followed the Augustinian idea of original
sin as real sin in the individual. « He oppugned the trans
mission of sin by means of the seed and generation ; saying
that, as, if Adam had not sinned, righteousness would have
been infused not by virtue of the generation, but only by
the will of Grod, so it is fit to find another means to trans
fuse sin The action of Adam is actual sin in him,
and imputed to others is original ; because when he sinned
all men did (i.e. by imputation) sin with him. Catarinus
grounded himself principally, for that a true and proper sin
z 2
34-O Note VII.
must be a voluntary act, and no other thing can be volun
tary but the transgression of Adam imputed unto all. . . .
The opinion of Catarinus was expressed by a political con
ceit of a bargain made by one for his posterity, which, being
transgressed, they are all undoubtedly bound.' — PauVs
History of Council of Trent (Brent), pp. 165. 168.
NOTE VII. p. 33.
JEREMY TAYLOR'S argument on original sin is directed
throughout against the received and Catholic interpreta
tion of that sin, as involving desert of eternal punishment,
which he rejects as being opposed to our natural idea of
justice. ' Was it just in Grod to damn all mankind to the
eternal pains of hell for Adam's sin committed before they
had any being, or could consent to it or know of it ? If it
could be just, then anything in the world can be just ; and
it is no matter who is innocent, or who is criminal, directly
or by choice, since they may turn devils in their mother's
bellies ; and it matters not whether there be any laws or
no, since it is all one that there be no laws, and that we
do not know whether there be or no ; and it matters not
whether there be any judicial proofs, for we may as well be
damned without judgment, as be guilty without action.' —
Vol. ix. p. 332. ' And truly, my Lord, to say that for
Adam's sin it is just in Grod to condemn infants to the
eternal flames of hell, and to say that concupiscence or
natural inclinations before they pass into any act would
bring eternal condemnation from Grod's presence into the
eternal portion of devils, are two such horrid propositions,
that if any church in the world should expressly affirm
them, I, for my part, should think it unlawful to commu
nicate with her in the defence or profession of either, and
to think it would be the greatest temptation in the world
to make men not to love Grod, of whom men so easily speak
such horrid things.' — p. 373. 'Is hell so easy a pain,
or are the souls of children of so cheap, so contemptible
,-a price, that Grod should so easily throw them into hell ?
£r<pd's goodness, which pardons many sins that we could
Note VII. 34
avoid, will not so easily throw them into hell for what they
could not avoid.' — p. 14. 'To condemn infants to hell for
the fault of another, is to deal worse with them than God
did to the very devils, who did not perish but by an act of
their own most perfect choice. This, besides the formality
of injustice or cruelty, does add and suppose a circumstance
of a strange, ungentle contrivance. For, because it cannot
be supposed that God should damn infants or innocents
without cause, it finds out this way, that God, to bring
His purposes to pass, should create a guilt for them, or
bring them into an inevitable condition of being guilty by
a way of His own inventing. For, if He did not make
such an agreement with Adam, He beforehand knew that
Adam would forfeit all, and therefore that unavoidably all
his posterity would be surprised. This is to make pretences,
and to invent justifications and reasons of His proceedings,
which are indeed all one as if they were not.' — p. l(i.
' Abraham was confident with God, " Wilt Thou slay the
righteous with the wicked ? shall not the Judge of all
the earth do right ? " And if it be unrighteous to slay the
righteous with the wicked, it is also unjust to slay the
righteous for the wicked. " Ferretne ulla civitas laborem
istiusmodi legis, ut condemneturfilius aut nepos, si pater
aut avus deliquissent ; — It were an intolerable law, and
no community would be governed by it, that the father or
grandfather should sin, and the son or nephew should be
punished."' — p. 39.
No one can, of course, deny the force of these argu
ments, resting, as they do, upon the simple maxim of
common sense and common justice, that no man is respon
sible for another's sins. The mistake in Jeremy Taylor's
mind lies in his conception of the doctrine which he is at
tacking. He supposes the doctrine of original sin to assert
mankind's desert of eternal punishment for Adam's sin, in
an ordinary and matter-of-fact sense ; and he treats all the
consequences of this doctrine— the Divine anger with infants
and the like— as if they took place in the literal sense m
which they would take place, supposing a present visible
execution of this sentence, in this present and visible state
342 Note VII.
of things. But the doctrine of original sin professes to be
concerned with a mystery, not with a matter of fact, and
to be an incomprehensible, and not an intelligible truth.
For all this vivid picture, then, of injustice, and monstrous
cruelty which Jeremy Taylor raises as a representation of
this doctrine, there is no warrant ; because the doctrine
does not profess to assert anything whatever that we can
understand. He argues as if human analogies gave us a
sufficient and true idea of the truth asserted in this doc
trine, whereas the doctrine takes us out of all human
analogies. His whole argument thus beats the air, and
he refutes what no sound-minded and reasonable person
asserts.
His argument against the assertion of the impotence
and slavery of the will, involved in the doctrine of original
sin, is open to the same remark ; i.e. that he takes it as
an absolute assertion, whereas it is only maintained in this
doctrine as one side of a whole truth on this subject, which
is beyond our knowledge. ' To deny to the will of man
powers of choice and election, or the use of it in the actions
of our life, destroys the immortality of the soul. Human
nature is in danger to be lost if it diverts to that which is
against nature ! For if it be immortal it can never die in
its noblest faculty. But if the will be destroyed, that is,
disabled from choosing (which is all the work the will hath
to do), then it is dead. For to live and to be able to
operate in philosophy are all one. If the will, therefore,
cannot operate, how is it immortal ? And we may as well
suppose an understanding that can never understand, and
passions that can never desire or refuse, and a memory
that can never remember, as a will that cannot choose.' —
Vol. ix. p. 47. ' When it is affirmed in the writings of
some doctors that the will of man is depraved, men pre
sently suppose that depravation is a natural or physical
effect, and means a diminution of power, whereas it signi
fies nothing but a being in love with, or having chosen an
evil object, and not an impossibility or weakness to the
contrary, but only because it will not ; for the power of
the will cannot be lessened by any act of the same faculty,
Note VIL 343
for the act is not contrary to the faculty, and therefore
can do nothing towards its destruction. As a consequent,
of this I infer that there is no natural necessity of sinning,
— that there is no sinful action to which naturally we are
determined ; but it is our own choice that we sin.' — p. 88.
This is the Pelagian argument for freewill which we
meet with in 8. Augustine ; and it has the one-sidcdness
of that argument. Nobody, of course, can d ny what is
asserted here, if considered as one side of the truth ; it is
true that the will must have the power of choosing ; that
we are conscious of this power; that there is 'no natural
necessity for sinning ; ' that ' there is no sinful action to
which we are naturally determined.' All this enters into
our meaning of the term will, and our consciousness of its
operations. But there is another side of the whole truth
respecting the will to which S. Augustine appeals : ' To
will is present with me, but how to perform that which is
good I know not. For the good that I would [ do not,
but the evil that I would not that I do. Jeremy Taylor
appeals, as the Pelagians did, to a certain sense of bare
ability to do right which we retain under all circumstances
and states of mind, as if it were the whole truth on this
subject ; he relies absolutely upon it. He goes even to the
length to which the Pelagians went, of saying ' that the
power of the will cannot be lessened by any act of the
same faculty,' so that however long a man may continue in
a course of sin, and however inveterate the habit he may
contract, he has still as much freewill as ever, and on the
very next occasion of acting is as able to act aright as ever.
But this is evidently, and on principles of common sense,
untrue. Jeremy Taylor sees only that side of the human
will which favours his own argument ; he sees in it a simple
unity, a pure undivided faculty, a power of doing anything
to which there is no physical hindrance ; but the will is a
mixed and complex thing, exhibiting oppositions and in
congruities. He proceeds upon an abstract idea of treewil
— ' there cannot be a will that cannot choose ; but the
question is, what is the actual and real will of which we
, find ourselves possessed ?
344 Note VII.
Taylor sees in the doctrine of original sin, according' to
the received strict interpretation of it, a basis of the doc
trine of predestination (p. 319), and argues against them
as virtually one and the same doctrine; in doing which he
is right. But if the ground is only true in a mysterious
sense, that which is raised upon it is only true in the same
sense, and is so deprived of its definiteness, and conse
quently of its harshness ; for a doctrine to be harsh must
positively state something. As a mystery it disowns such
a charge.
The received interpretation of original sin being thus
rejected, Jeremy Taylor substitutes for it the more lenient
interpretation put forward by the early fathers of this sin,
as a deprivation, viz. of certain higher and supernatural
gifts conferred upon man at his creation ; an absence of
perfection, as distinguished from a positive state of sin.
' This sin brought upon Adam all that God threatened —
but no more. A certainty of dying, together with the
proper effects and affections of mortality, were inflicted on
him, and he was reduced to the condition of his own nature,
and then begat sons and daughters in his own likeness,
that is, in the proper temper and constitution of mortal
men. For as (rod was not bound to give what He never
promised — viz., an immortal duration and abode in this
life, — so neither does it appear, in that angry intercourse
that God had with Adam, that he took from him or us any
of our natural perfections, but his graces only. Man being
left in this state of pure naturals, could not by his own
strength arrive to a supernatural end, which was typified
in his being cast out of Paradise, and the guarding of it
with the flaming sword of a cherub. For eternal life being
an end above our natural proportions, cannot be acquired
by any natural means.' — Vol. ix. p. 1. f God gives his
gifts as He pleases, and is unjust to no man by giving or
not giving any certain proportion of good things; and
supposing this loss was brought first upon Adam, and so
descended upon us, yet we have no cause to complain, for
we lost nothing that was ours.' — p. 56.
When he comes, however, to reconcile this modification
Note VII. 345
of the doctrine of original sin with Scripture, and to prove
' that in Scripture there is no signification of any corruj)-
tion or deprivation of our souls by Adam's sin,' he has to
explain away texts. The text Rom. v. 18. ' By the offence
of one judgment came upon all men to condemnation,'
asserts the condemnation, KaTaKpi/Jia, of all mankind as the
consequence of the sin of Adam. Taylor explains ' damna
tion ' first as poena damni, a loss of a higher state ; and,
secondly, of temporal death — which was ' the whole event,
for it names no other — according to that saying of S. Paul,
" In Adam we all die." ' But this is an artificial explana
tion of Scripture. It is true, as he observes, that 'the
KarcLKpifjia passed upon all men, sfi a> Travrzs tf/jLaprov'
(p. 380); but this can only show that the natural truth is
maintained in Scripture together with the mysterious one,
not that the mysterious one is not maintained. So of the
text ' Death passed upon all men ; for that all have sinned,'
he says, ' all men, that is, the generality of mankind, all that
lived till they could sin ; the others that died before, died
j.n their nature, not in their sin.1 — p. 381. He owns,
however, at last, that the language of Scripture is against
him, by falling back upon the ground of justice as over
ruling the natural meaning of such language. « How can
it be just that the " condemnation " should pass upon us
for Adam's sin ? '—p. 380.
So upon the text, ' Behold I was shapen in wickedness,
and in sin hath my mother conceived me,' he says, 4 1
answer, that the words are a Hebraism, and signify nothing
but an aggrandation of his sinfulness, and are intended for
a high expression, meaning that " I am wholly and entirely
wicked." For the verification of which exposition there
are divers parallel places in the Holy Scriptures : " Thou
wast my hope, when I hanged yet upon my mother's
breast ;" and " The ungodly as soon as they be born, they go
astray and speak lies," which, because it cannot be true in
the letter, must be an idiotism or propriety of phrase, apt
to explicate the other, and signify only a ready, a prompt,
a great, and universal wickedness. The like to this is that
saying of the Pharisees, " Thou wert altogether born in sin,
346 Note VII.
and dost thou teach us ? " which phrase and manner of
speaking being plainly a reproach of the poor blind man
and a disparagement of him, did mean only to call him a
very wicked person, not that he had derived his sin origin
ally and from his birth.' — p. 27. But even were the text,
' In sin hath my mother conceived me,' only a phrase
to express the depth and strength of sin in the character
of the person using it, why should that depth and strength
of sin be expressed in that form ? Why does David, on
the first deep perception of his own guilt, and the hold
which sin has had over him, go back to his birth ? Is it
not because he cannot see how he can stop short of it ?
The more he considers the sinfulness of his character the
more rooted it seems, and the further it appears to go back,
till at last he cannot but say, that it is actually coeval with
his existence. The phrase, then, though it may not be a
dogmatic assertion of original sin, is an assertion of a
certain depth and radical position of sin in the human
soul ; upon which, when realised, the doctrine of original
sin naturally arises. Such phrases as this, and the others
in Scripture referred to by Taylor, show that there was
a truth felt respecting sin, which was expressed in this
form as the most appropriate one for it, and that whenever
men perceived the strength of the hold which sin had had
upon them, they went to the idea of its originality, as an
idea nothing short of which would do justice to that truth
which they felt respecting sin, and which the fuller con
sciousness of their own sins had revealed to them.
So on the text, 6 By nature we were children of wrath,'
Taylor remarks : ' True, we were so when we were dead in
sins, and before we were quickened by the Spirit of life
and grace. We ivere so ; now we are not. We were so
by our own unworthiness and filthy conversation ; now we
being regenerated by the Spirit of holiness, we are heirs
unto Grod, and no longer heirs of wrath. This, therefore,
as appears by the discourse of S. Paul, relates not to our
original sin, but to the actual; and of this sense of the
word " nature," in the matter of sinning, we have Justin
Martyr, or whoever is the author of the questions and
Note VII.
347
.answers Ad Orthodoxos, to be witness. For answering
those words of Scripture, " There is not any one clean who is
born of a woman," and there is none begotten who hath not
committed sin ; he says, their meaning1 cannot extend to
Christ, for He was not " TTS^UKMS d^apravsiv — born to
sin ;" but he is ' natura ad peccandum natus — TTS^VKWS
d/jLapravsiv," who, by the choice of his own will, is author
to himself to do what he list, whether it be good or evil, 6
KCLTO, tr)v avOaipBTOv irpoalpsa'LV ciywv savrov sis TO Trpdr-
TSLV a (BovKzrai sirs dyaOa SITS </>at)Xa.' — p. 29. One who
can sin, then, is born to sin, in Taylor's sense of the
phrase ; a man being born to sin means that he can sin,
and no more. But such a meaning is inconsistent with
his own previous meaning of the similar phrase, ' By nature
children of wrath,' which he understands to mean great
and habitual actual sin, or a bad and corrupt course of life ;
for the power to sin and the fact of sin are not the same
thing. Either meaning, however plainly, falls short of the
Apostle's. Why should S. Paul say ' by nature,"1 if actual
sin was all that he meant? The term evidently intro
duces another idea beyond and in addition to an actual
bad course of life.
The modification which Taylor has hitherto proposed
of the doctrine of original sin has been rather concerned
with its effects than with itself. The particular view of
the sin itself which he proposes to substitute for the re
ceived one is, that it is imputed sin, as distinguished from
real sin in us. He objects to the idea of our being parties
to Adam's sin as absurd ; but has no objection to a certain
imputation of that sin, considered to be his and his only,
to us. ' Indeed, my Lord, that I may speak freely in this
great question : when one man hath sinned, his descendants
and relations cannot possibly by him, or for him, or in
him be made sinners really and properly. For in sin there
are but two things imaginable, the irregular action and the
guilt or obligation to punishment. Now, we cannot be
said in any sense to have done the action which another
did, and not we ; the action is as individual as the person ;
and Titius may as well be Caius, and the son be his own
348 Note VII.
father, as he can be said to have done the father's action ;
and therefore we cannot possibly be guilty for it, for guilt
is an obligation to punishment for having done it ; the
action and the guilt are relatives — one cannot be done
without the other, — something must be done inwardly or
outwardly, or there can be no guilt. But then for the evil
of punishment, that may pass further than the action. If
it passes upon the innocent it is not a punishment to them,
but an evil inflicted in right of dominion ; but yet by
reason of the relation of the afflicted to him that hath
sinned, to him it is a punishment. But if it passes upon
others that are not innocent, then it is a punishment to
both ; to the first principally ; to the descendants or rela
tives for the other's sake, his sin being imputed so far,' —
p. 379. ' There is no necessity to affirm that we are
sinners in Adam any more than by imputation.' — p. 378.
Taylor considers this view of imputation as a middle
one between the received and the Pelagian view of original
sin. ' I do not approve of that gloss of the Pelagians
that in Adam we are made sinners by imitation, and much
less of that which affirms that we are made so properly
and formally. But made sinners signifies used like sinners,
so as justified signifies treated like just persons ; in which
interpretation I follow S. Paul, not the Pelagians.' — p.
383.
But what is gained toward reconciling the doctrine
of original sin with our natural ideas, by substituting the
imputation of Adam's sin for sin in Adam ? If it is
contrary to reason that a man should be a party to sin
committed before he was born, it is contrary to justice
that a sin in which he was no partaker should be imputed
to him, and that he should be punished for it. It is true,
he says, l If the evil of punishment passes upon the
innocent, it is not a punishment to them, but an evil
inflicted by right of dominion, and therefore Eabbi
Simeon Barsema said well, that " When God visits the
vices of the fathers upon the children — jure Dominii,
-non pcence utitur — He uses the right of empire not of
Note VII. 349
justice." ' The result of this distinction is, that God, in
cases of punishment for imputed sin, inflicts no more
evil than He has a right to inflict where there is no sin
in the case. But if on such a ground the imputation of
sin is reconciled with our idea of justice, what becomes
of the idea itself of imputation ? There is evidently no
real imputation of, no punishment for, another's sin, and
therefore this whole mode of representing original sin
falls to the ground. Taylor says, ' By reason of the rela
tion of the afflicted to him that sinned, to him it is a
punishment.' Why so ? Whether a certain evil is a
punishment depends on the ground on which it is inflicted.
If it is inflicted on the ground of guilt, actual or imputed,
it is punishment; if it is inflicted simply jure Domini /,
on the ground of that right which the Maker of the
world has over the lives and fortunes of His creatures, it
is not punishment, but Providence. But Taylor is still
unwilling to abandon the idea of punishment, and lie
suggests a form of punishment which, he thinks, is not
liable to any charge of injustice. ' In Adam we are made
sinners, that is, treated ill or afflicted, though ourselves
be innocent of that sin, ivhich was the occasion of our
being used so severely for other sins, of which we were,
not innocent'— ]). 4. God inflicts pain upon us, then ;
•which pain is punishment, because such pain is greater
than it would have been but for Adam's sin ; we are not
punished for Adam's sin, but we are, in consequence of
Adam's sin, punished worse for our own sins. But the
difficulty of punishment is not at all lessened by this
artifice of attaching the punishment to our own actual
sins in the first place, and only charging upon Adam's sin
the increase of this punishment. Increase of punishment
is fresh punishment. Taylor thus oscillates between
acknowledging and disowning punishment for Adam's
sin. He disowns it as inconsistent with justice ; he
acknowledges it because he cannot wholly deny that some
thing very like it is maintained in Scripture, and he
shrinks from wholly giving up the received doctrine. He
350 Note VIIL
thus constructs a kind of indirect vicarious punishment,
which is inflicted for our own personal sins, but inflicted
more severely on account of Adam's sin.
Jeremy Taylor falls into all these forced and incon
sistent modes of explanation, in consequence of the funda
mental misapprehension with which he starts as to the
sense and mode in which the truth of original sin is held.
Had he perceived properly that it was and professed to be
a mysterious as distinguished from an intelligible truth,
he would have seen that all these charges of injustice
against the doctrine were erroneous, and these consequent
attempts at a modification of it superfluous and unneces
sary. The profession of a mystery disarms the opposition
of reason ; for what has reason to object to in that which
it does not understand ? What has reason before it in
such a case ? One who holds the doctrine in this sense
can hold it in its greatest strictness, without the slightest
collision with reason or justice, and is spared this vain
struggle with Scripture.
NOTE VIIL p. 35.
THE doctrine of predestination in Scripture is not uncom
monly interpreted in such a way as to represent that doc
trine, not as opposed to any counter truth of freewill, but
as itself harmonising and coinciding with it. Predesti
nation and election are interpreted to mean predestination
and election to privileges or means of grace, which depend
on freewill for their cultivation. But this is certainly not
the natural sense of the words in Scripture. In the text
Matt. xx. 1 6, ' Many are called but few chosen,' or elect ;
4 elect ' evidently means elect to eternal life itself, and not
merely to the opportunity of attaining it. The same may
be said of Matt. xxiv. 22 : ' For the elect's sake those days
shall be shortened,' the elect being evidently here the
saints, the good, those who will be saved, not those who
have merely been admitted into the Christian Church
and the means of obtaining salvation, many of whom
being wicked men and enemies of God, Grod would not
' for their sakes ' perform this special act of mercy. On
Note_ VIII. 35 1
Acts xiii. 48, ' As many as were ordained to eternal life be
lieved,' the remark is obvious that that to which men are
said to be ' ordained ' (which is the same as elect or pre
destinated) is expressly ' eternal life.' In Eph. i. 4,
' According ' as He hath chosen us in Him, before the
foundation of the world, that we should be holy,' the
election is not to the power but to the fact of holiness.
And the next verse sustains this obvious sense : ' Having
predestinated us unto the adoption of children by Jesus
Christ to Himself,' adoption always implying in the epistles
sanctity. So 2 Tim. i. 9 : ' Who hath saved us and called
us with an holy calling, not according to our works, but
according to His own purpose and grace which was given
us in Christ before the world began,' obviously speaks of
actual holiness and actual salvation, not the mere oppor
tunity of them, as the eti'ect of predestination. And
generally it is evident that the terms elect, predestinated,
adopted, justified, saints, all refer to the same state and
the same class ; and that plainly the state and the class of
actually holy men who will certainly be saved, as the
necessary consequence and reward of such holiness.
The 8th and 9th chapters, however, of the Epistle to
the Eomans, furnish the most powerful, and because the
most powerful the most controverted, evidence for the
meaning of predestination as being predestination to
eternal life itself, and not merely certain means of grace
enabling men to obtain it. In the 8th is the passage :
' We know that all things work together for good to them
that love Grod, to them who are the called according to His
purpose. For whom He did foreknow (know before as
His own with determination to be for ever merciful unto
them— Hooker, Appendix to bk. v. vol. ii. p. 751). He
also predestinated to be conformed to the image of His Son,
that He might be the first born among many brethren.
Moreover, whom He did predestinate, them He also called,
and whom He called, them He also justified, and whom
He justified them He also glorified.' Here it is expressly
said that those who are predestinated are predestinated,
not to the opportunity of conformation to the image of
,52 Note VIII.
Christ, but to that conformation itself, to actual justifica
tion, and to actual glory in the world to come.
The 9th chapter has the passage : ' For the children
being not yet born, neither having done any good or evil,
that the purpose of Grod according to election might stand,
not of works, but of Him that calleth, it was said unto
her, the elder shall serve the younger. As it is written,
Jacob have I loved, but Esau have I hated. What shall
we say then ? Is there unrighteousness with (rod ? (rod
forbid. For He saith to Moses, I will have mercy on
whom I will have mercy, and I will have compassion on
whom I will have compassion. So then it is not of him
that willeth, nor of him that runneth, but of Grod that
sheweth mercy. For the Scripture saith unto Pharaoh,
even for this same purpose have I raised thee up, that I
might show My power in thee, and that My name might
be declared throughout all the earth. Therefore hath
He mercy on whom He will have mercy, and whom He
will He hardeneth. Thou wilt say then unto me, Why
doth He yet find fault ? for who hath resisted His will ?
Nay, but, 0 man, who art thou that repliest against God ?
Shall the thing formed say unto him that formed it, Why
hast thou made me thus ? Hath not the potter power
over the clay, of the same lump to make one vessel unto
honour, and another unto dishonour? What if Grod,
willing to shew His wrath, and to make His power known,
endured with much long-suffering the vessels of wrath
fitted to destruction. And that He might make known
the riches of His glory on the vessels of mercy, which He
had afore prepared unto glory.'
Here it is expressly said that some persons are from
all eternity objects respectively of the Divine love and
the Divine wrath, which love and which wrath involve
respectively eternal 'glory,' and 'destruction' (v. 22, 23).
All the attempts to explain this passage as meaning only
that some persons are predestined to higher and others
to lower means of grace, appear to violate its plain and
natural meaning. It is not indeed necessary to suppose
that the contrast between Jacob and Esau, as individual
Note VIII. 353
men, is that of one finally saved to another finally con
demned; but it is no less clear that the Apostle uses them
as types of these two respective classes, and that the
argument of the passage has reference to man's eternal
end, good or bad ; for ' glory ' and ' destruction ' cannot
mean only higher and lower spiritual advantages.
Archbishop Whately indeed raises an ingenious objec
tion to the predestinarian interpretation of the image of
the potter and the clay, and remarks, ' We are in His
hands, say these predestinarians, as clay in the potters',
" who hath power of the same lump to make one vessel to
honour and another to dishonour," not observing in their
party eagerness to seize an easy apparent confirmation of
their system, that this similitude, as far as it goes, rather
makes against them, since the potter never makes any
vessel for the express purpose of being broken and destroyed.
This comparison accordingly agrees much better with the
view here taken. The potter according to his arbitrary
choice makes of the same lump one vessel to honour and
another to dishonour — i.e. some to nobler and others to
meaner uses, but all to some use ; none with a design
that it should be cast away and dashed in pieces. Even
so the Almighty, of His own arbitrary choice, causes some
to be born to wealth or rank, others to poverty or
obscurity, some in a heathen, and others in a Christian
country ; the advantages and privileges bestowed on each
are various.' — Essay 3, On Election. But to extract thus
an argument from the general nature of an image used in
Scripture is to forget that Scripture, in making use of
images, only adopts them in such respects as it uses them,
such respects as answer the particular purpose in hand ;
it does not necessarily adopt the whole image. What we
have to do with, then, is not the image itself, but the
image as used by Scripture. Now, it is true that a potter
never makes a vessel for destruction ; but some vessels are
certainly in this passage spoken of as ' fitted to destruc
tion,' others as < prepared unto glory;' of which destruc
tion and glory the cause is plainly put further back than
their own personal conduct,— viz. in a certain Divire love
A A
354 Note VIII.
and wrath, before either side had done any actual good or
evil, — ' The children being not yet born, neither having
done any good or evil, it is written, Jacob have I loved,
but Esau have I hated.' And were a predestination to
privileges all that was meant by the passage — that some
are born to wealth or rank, others to poverty or obscurity,
some in a heathen and others in a Christian country, what
ground would there be for raising the objection ? ' Thou
wilt say then unto me, Why doth He yet find fault, for
who hath resisted His will ? ' It is evident that this is a
complaint against the Divine justice, or an objection to
the Apostle's doctrine just before laid down, on the ground
that it contradicts that Divine attribute. But how could
a mere inequality in the dispensing of religious privileges
provoke such a charge, except from a positive infidel?
Inequality is a plain feet of God's visible providence, and
could never support a charge of injustice, except the
objector were willing to go the further step of denying a
Divine creation and providence altogether on account of
this fact. The objector here plainly means to say this :
How can it be just that a man should be the object of
Divine wrath before he has done anything to deserve it ?
That he should be incapacitated for obtaining the qualifi
cations necessary for eternal life, and then blamed because
he has not got them ? ' Why doth he find fault, for who
hath resisted His will ? ' Why does God condemn the
sinner, when His own arbitrary will has incapacitated him
for being anything else but a sinner ?
At the same time I am ready to admit, that there is
ground for saying that a milder sense of reprobation does
come in, in this passage, along with the stronger one ; and
that language is used expressive rather of the modified
than of the extreme doctrine of predestination. It
is at any rate doubtful whether ' honour ' and ' dishonour '
do not mean higher and inferior good rather than positive
good and evil. The use of the words in 2 Tim. ii. 20. —
' In a great house there are not only vessels of gold and
silver, but also of wood and earth, and some to honour
and some to dishonour ' — would seem to attach the former
Note VIII. 355
meaning to them. And if so, so far as this language goes,
the Apostle expresses a modified doctrine of predestination
rather than an extreme one, or predestination to unequal
advantages, rather than to positive good and evil. But
whether this is so or not, such a sense of predestination
only obtains so far as the language which expresses it goes.
The stronger sense of predestination, as predestination to
positive good and evil, is the main and pervading one in
the passage; and this sense must not be lost sight of
because there may be a milder sense too in which the doc
trine is asserted. It is characteristic of S. Paul to slide
from one meaning to another ; and just as a counter doc
trine altogether to that of predestination is put forth in
other passages of Scripture, so the same passage may be
more or less contradictory, and contain its own balance.
But if the milder meaning of predestination is there,
it must not be thought that the stronger meaning is
therefore not there too; or supposed that all that this
passage means is a predestination to unequal privileges
and advantages.
There is another mode of interpreting predestination in
Scripture, so as to make the doctrine agree with the truth
of freewill; viz. that of allowing predestination to be to
eternal salvation itself, but with the qualification that it is
caused by the Divine foresight of the future good life of
the individual. But this qualification is opposed to the
plain meaning of those passages of Scripture in which this
doctrine is set forth. These passages obviously represent
predestination as a predestination of the individual to a
good life, as well as to the reward of one, to the means as
well as to the end ; thus making a good life the effect of
predestination, and not the cause or reason of it. ' He hath
chosen us before the foundation of the world that we
should be holy '....•' predestinated us to be conformed
to the image of His Son.'
But the ninth chapter of Romans, just quoted, supplies
the most decisive answer to this qualification of the doc
trine of predestination ; it being expressly said there that
the purpose of Grod according to election is antecedent to
AA2
356 Note VIII.
any differences of life and conduct between one man and
another ; that it is formed while the children are yet
unborn, and have done neither good nor evil ; that it is
not of works, but of Him that calleth ; and that it is not
of him that willeth or of him that runneth, but of (rod
that showeth mercy; that it is clay of the, same lump
of which some vessels are made to honour, and others to
dishonour.
Jackson, among other commentators, interprets the
predestination maintained in this passage in this way, viz.
as predestination in consequence of foreseen good works.
But in thus interpreting it he endeavours at the same time
by an argument more ingenious than substantial, to ex
plain his own interpretation as not being such an inter
pretation as this ; and tries to show that he does not base
predestination upon foreseen good works. He says, predes
tination is in consequence not of any foreseen works of
the law, but the foreseen work of faith ; which work of
faith being a renunciation of the works of the law cannot
tself be called a work. He interprets the Apostle's asser
tion that election is not in consequence of any ' willing or
running ' of the man himself, in this way, viz. that this
expression applies to works of the Jewish law only, and not
to works of faith ; to the self-willed and self-dependent
kind of good works, which are not really good as not pro
ceeding from a spiritual state of mind ; not to the true
spiritual temper. The work of faith, he says, is ' an opus
quo renunciamus, the formal act by which all works must
be renounced,' and so not properly a work : 'fides justificat
non qua opus sed relative — is essentially included in the
act of justification ; not included in the universality of
works, which are excluded from justification.' And the
' fallacy ' of calling such an act a work he expresses thus :
6 If such divines as urge it most should come into our per-
vices and apply it to matters there discussed, thus —
' Omne visibile est coloratum :
Omnis color est visibilis : ergo
Omnis color est coloratus, —
I hope a meaner artist than this nursery (God be praised !)
Note VIII. 357
hath any, would quickly cut off their progress with a dis
tinction of visibile ut quod, et visibile ut quo, and show
that the major, though universally true of every subject or
body that may be seen, did not nor could not comprehend
colour by which they are made visible, and by whose
formal act they are denominated colorata. The fallacy of
the former objection drawn into mood and figure is the
same, but more apparent.
' Every will or work of man must be utterly renounced
from the act of justification or conversion :
' But to deny ourselves and renounce all works is a work :
' Ergo, This work must be excluded from the suit of
mercy, as no way available.' — Vol. ix. p. 442.
But such a distinction as this applied to works as a
ground of the Divine election is inadmissible. The work of
faith is a work ; not in such an ambiguous sense as that in
which colour is a visible thing, but substantially and cor
rectly. It is a humble, self-renouncing act. It is the
fundamental act of the Christian life. If election, then, is
in consequence of this foreseen work of faith, it is in con
sequence of good works, which it is plainly said by S. Paul
not to be.
Jackson borrows his explanation from Origen, who im
plies the same distinction between 'carnal works' and
other works, as the ground of Jacob's election. ' Quod si
vel Isaac vel Jacob pro his meritis electi fuissent a Deo
quce in came positi acquisierant, et per opera carnis
justificari meruissent, posset utique meriti eorum gratia ad
posteritatem carnis quoque pertinere. Nunc vero cum
electio eorum non ex operibus facta sit, sed ex proposito
Dei, et ex vocantis arbitrio, promissionum gratia non in
filiis carnis impletur, sed in filiis Dei.'— In Rom. ix. 11.
vol. iv. p. 613. Thus Jackson : ' Had not this purpose of
God been revealed before the children had been born,
Jacob's posterity would have boasted that either their father
Jacob or his mother Eebecca had better observed those
rites and customs wherein they placed righteousness than
Isaac or Esau had done ; and that God upon these motives
had bestowed the birthright or blessing upon Jacob before
358 Note VIII.
Esau.' — Vol. ix. p. 436. There is considerable confusion
here, and Origen seems to slide from works not carnal to
no works at all as the ground of election ; though the
former idea in the main prevails. Origen's main view of
the ground of election is foreseen good character. — Vol. iv.
p. 616.
Jackson explains the similitude of the potter and the
clay on the same principle : ' That it was marred in the
first making was the fault of the clay.' — Vol. ix. p. 462.
But is this said in Scripture ? On the contrary, it is said
that all the clay was of the same lump, and therefore the
difference of the Divine design did not arise from any dif
ference in the clay. Origen makes in the same way a
difference in the clay, though the very phrase eadem
massa, which he accepts, as he is obliged to do, from the
Apostle, refutes it. ' Videns Deus puritatern ejus, et
potestatem habens ex eadem massa facere aliud vas ad
honorem aliud ad contumeliam, Jacob quidem qui emun-
daverat seipsum fecit vas ad honorem ; Esau vero eujus
an imam non ita pur am nee ita simplicein videbat, ex
eadem massa fecit ad contumeliam.' — In Rom. ix. vol.
iv. p. 616.
With the explanation of foreseen goodness, however, as
the ground of election, Jackson couples the other mode of
reconciling the passage with freewill ; viz. that of election
to means and opportunities. ' The Apostle imagineth
such a potter as the wise man did, that knows a reason
why he makes one vessel of this fashion, another of that,
why he appoints this to a base use, that to a better.1 —
P. 462.
Hooker's explanation of the passage (given in a recently
discovered and edited writing, made an appendix to Ec
clesiastical Polity, bk. v.) makes, like Origen's and Jack
son's, a difference in the clay, though he will not at the
same time allow that the Divine Justice requires this
reason for its own defence. ' Suppose (which is yet false)
that there were nothing in it, but only so Grod will have
it, — suppose Grod did harden and soften, choose and cast
off, make honourable and detestable, whom Himself will,
Note VIII. 359
and that without any cause moving Him one way or other,
— are we not all in His hands as clay ? If thus God did
deal, what injury were it ? How much less now, when they
on whom His severity worketh are not found like the day
without form, as apt to receive the best shape as any other,
but are in themselves and by their own disposition
fashioned for destruction and for wrath.' — Keble's Ed. vol.
ii. p. 748. Now, of this explanation the first part un
doubtedly adheres to the natural meaning of the passage
in S. Paul more faithfully than the latter, which diverges
from it ; mankind being plainly represented by S. Paul as
being like clay of the same lump, previous to election, and
any difference of disposition in them, in this previous state,
so far from being asserted, being expressly denied. Indeed,
as Jansen says, if S. Paul meant foreseen goodness as the
ground of election, he would not have silenced the com-
plainer by a reference to God's inscrutable will, but would
have given this simple and intelligible answer to his
objection. But non isto nititur cardine. — De Graf.
Christi^ p. 347.
On the whole, that which is commonly called the Cal-
vinistic sense, appears to be the natural sense of these
passages of Scripture ; and the Calvin istic use of them
should be met, not by denying this sense, and explaining
away the natural meaning of the language, but by opposing
to them other passages of Scripture which speak equally
plainly of man's freewill. I may add, that perhaps more
has been made by many of the text in S. James than it
will exactly bear, and that, though proving difficulty, this
text does not prove so much difficulty in those, parts of
S. Paul's Epistles as many would maintain. These epistles
were certainly addressed to the whole Church, and were
meant to be understood by men of average intelligence
who applied their attention properly. Their predestinarian
meaning in parts is, on the whole, clear and decided ; and
the reason why their meaning is thought by many to be so
very obscure and difficult to get at, is that they will not
acknowledge this predestinarian meaning to be the true
ojie. These interpreters create difficulties for themselves
360 Note IX.
by rejecting the natural meaning of passages, and then lay
the difficulty on the passages.
NOTE IX. p. 46.
THE first work of Pelagius referred to in the controversy,
is his letter to Paulinus, which appears to have been
written about A.D. 405, during his stay at Rome. — Benedic
tine Editors Preface^ c. 1. But Augustine's doctrinal
bias had clearly asserted itself some years before, in the
book De Diversis Qucestionibus ad Simplicianum, which
came out A.D. 397 ; and had evidently commenced as early
as the book De Libero Arbitrio, which he began to write
A.D. 388. In his Retractations ( 1. 1. c. 9.) he refers to this
early treatise, with which the Pelagians taunted him as
contradicting his later ones on the subject of freewill, and
shows that, though not consistently brought out, the germ
of his ultimate system was to be found in parts of that
treatise. He refers particularly to the scheme of the two
kinds of Divine gifts laid down in 1. 2. cc. 18, 19 ; accord
ing to which both those which did and those which did not
admit of a bad use (virtutes and potentice] were alike gifts
of God. The explanation which he gives in the Retracta
tions of some of the statements favourable to freewill in
the other treatise may be far-fetched ; but such a view as
this is evidently agreeable to his later doctrine. Nor is
Augustine at all a pertinacious interpreter of his early
writings in the sense of his later ones. Consistency has
less charm for him than development as a writer and
thinker ; and he dwells on the changes he has gone through
with the satisfaction of one who believes his later notions
to be a great improvement in depth and acuteness upon
his earlier ones.
To these two earlier treatises may be added the Confes
sions, written A.D. 400. A celebrated dictum in this book
— da quod jubes, et jube quod vis — was the first apparent
stimulus to the speculations of Pelagius, whom it greatly
irritated. 'Pelagius ferre non potuit, et contradicens
aliquanto commotius, pene cum illo qui ilia commemora-
Note X. 361
verat litigavit.'— De Dono Perseveranticv, n. 53. Neander
says : ' Since Augustine had completed his doctrinal system
on this particular side more than ten years before the opin
ions of Pelagius excited any public controversy, it is clear
that opposition to Pelagius could not have influenced him
in forming it. With more propriety may it be said that
opposition to such doctrines as those of Augustine, or to
the practical consequences which, through misconstruction
or abuse, were derived from such doctrines, had no small
share in leading Pelagius to form such a system as he did."
—Church History, vol. iv. p. 312.
NOTE X. p. 52.
SUNT alii [Pelagiani] tarn validis testimoniis non audentes
resistere ; ideoque dant Deo primitias extrinsecas gratia' et
fidei, ac bonorum similium, sed hominibus gratiam ipsam
et fidem cum caeteris bonis hujusmodi. Dicunt enim Deum
semper praevenire pulsando, et excitando ad gratiam, fidem,
etad bona similia, et hominem subsequi aperiendo et con-
sentiendo, et hoc ex propriis viribus per seipsum, juxta illud
Apoc. 3 : ' Ecce sto ad ostium, et pulso : si quis audierit
vocem meam, et aperuerit mihi januam, introibo ad ilium,
et coenabo cum illo, et ipse mecum.' Hi autem faciunt
Deum suse gratiae publicum venditorem, hominesque emp-
tores. Dicunt enim eum sicut mercatorem pauperculum
clamare, et pulsare ad januas, et ad ostia singulorum ;
aperienti vero pro sua apertione gratiam suam dare, quod
tamen verius commutare, sen vendere diceretur. Faciunt
quoque Deum scriptorem pauperculum et conductitium
suam operam publicantem, et pro pretio parvulo, pro
apertione et ccena, aperientium nomina in libro vitae scri-
bentem ; sicque gratia ex praecedentibus operibus nostris
erit. . . . Homo non potest aperire nee consentire in
talibus ex seipso, sed voluntate Divina, quod et probant
auctoritates superius allegata?. Nemo potest venire ad
me, nisi Pater meus traxerit ilium. Secundum istos
tamen homo licet pulsatus a Deo, non habens adhuc pa-
trem, aperiendo pulsanti, verius traheret ad se Patrem. . .
;62 Note X.
Et licet sic pulsat nihil dat nobis, sed nos aperientes
damus sibi consensum, contra illud Apostoli, Quis prior
dedit illi, et retribuetur ei ? Itane hsec positio tribuit
nobis quod melius est et majus, Deo vero quod deterius
est et minus : quis enim dubitaverit aperire melius et
utilius nobis esse quam pulsare, cum pulsare sine aper-
tione, non prosit sed obsit. — Bradwardine, De Causa
Dei,l. 1. c. 38.
Sentiebant ergo Pelagiani uno omnes consensu, tantas
esse vires in naturali libertate, bonique et mali possibilitate
constitutas, ut qusecunque tandem a rebus sive extrinsecus
irruentibus, sive intrinsecus se commoventibus, vel cogita-
tiones phantasiseque moverentur vel animi desideria mo-
tusque cierentur, quicquid tandem sive homines, sive
Angeli, sive Dsemones, adeoque Spiritus ipse sanctus
suaderet, et suggereret, quicunque vel pietatis vel iniqui-
tatis motus inciderent, quibuscunque passionum bonarum
auris animus propelleretur, vel malarum fluctibus procel-
lisque turbaretur, nihil de suo imperii principatu domina
ilia libertas amitteret ; sed plenissima discernendi potes-
tate penes vim rationis ac voluntatis permanente, sola
fieret ad malum bonumque suasio ac provocatio ; nutus
vero probandi vel improbandi, utendi et repellendi, in ilia
naturalis indifferentise libertate ac naturali possibilitate
persist eret. — Jansen, De Hcer. Pel. 1. 2. c. 3.
Nihil verius de tali possibilitate divino adjutorio
munita dici potuit, quam id quod Pelagius dixit : ' Quod
possumus omne bonum facere, dicere, cogitare, illius est
qui hoc posse donavit, qui hoc posse adjuvat : quod vero
bene vel agimus vel loquimur vel cogitamus nostrum est
quia ha3c omnia vertere in malum possumus.' Quibus
verbis adjutorium possibilitatis explicuit. Vigilantissime
quippe et perspicacissime vidit (quod ego saepius supra
modum admiratus sum Scholasticos eruditissimos acutissi-
mosque viros non agnoscere) quod sicut usus cujuslibet
facultatis sive oculi externorumque sensuum, sive facultatis
progressive, sive intellectus, sive voluntatis, noster est, hoc
est, ad nostrse voluntatis indifferentem flexum et nutum
referri debet, non ad Deum, quatenus solam facultatem
Note X. 363
dedit; ita quoque cujuslibet adjutorii concursus, sive natu-
ralis sive gratuiti, etiamsi esset tanta? prastantia? adjuto-
rium quantam vel angelica cogitatio comminisci posset,
imo etiamsi esset vel ipsa essentia Dei per moduin speciei
ad sui visionem, vel per modum gratias ad sui amorem
concurrentis, similiter prorsus noster sit ; si videlicet sic
solam possibilitatem adjuvet, et usus ejus et non usus in
libero relinquatur arbitrio. — Jansen, De Gratia Christi,
1. 2. c. 9.
Hanc ergo mentem Pelagianorum cum prospectara
haberet Augustinus, quod quicquid motuum vel Dens vel
Diabolus in voluntate suscitaret, isti dominativa* vohmtatis
potestati subderent, non fuit sollicitus iitrum gratiam Irgis
atque doctrinse, sive revelationem sapientijv. sive cxemplum
Christi, sive remissionem peccatorum, sive habitus bonos,
sive succensiones ac desideria volimtatis assererent ; sod
generalissime prophanum eorum dogma quo solum possi
bilitatem adjuvari gratia censebant, ubicunque vel qualem-
cunque ponerent gratiam, velut exploratum errorem
Scripturisque contrarium jugulat. . . . Quamvis enim in
gratiam legis plerumque magis propendere videretur, non
satis tamen certum erat Augustino quam gratiam tarn
vario magnificorum verborum strepitu Pelagius tune de-
fenderet, cum nunc legem, mine doctrinam, mine sapiential
revelationem, nunc exemplum Christi, mine peccati remis
sionem, nunc voluntatum succensionem, nunc desideria
a Deo suscitata celebraret. Fatetur hanc suam incerti-
tudinem passim toto libro Augustinus. . . . Itaque ut
omnis erroribus istis latebra clauderetur, sub quatibet, et
qualilibet, et ubicumque constituta gratia sua in eos tela
dirigit. . . . Nimirum quia utrobique Augustinus quam-
libet, qualemlibet, ubilibet constitutam gratiam quisque
tueatur, si solam possibilitatem voluntatis et actioms
adjuvet, eum sanse et Apostolicaa et Evangelic® doctrinae
violataB reum facit.— Jansen, De Gratia Christi, 1. 2. c. 10.
364 Note XL
NOTE XL p. 54.
AUGUSTINE'S view on this subject is comprehended under
the following heads : —
1. No one of the human race can be without sin abso
lutely or from the first, all being born in sin. ' Qui omnino
nullum peccatum habuerit, habiturusve sit, prorsus nisi
unum Mediatorem Dei et hominum Jesum Christum, nul
lum vel esse vel fuisse vel futurum esse certissimum est.'
— De Pecc. Merit, et Remiss. 1. 2. n. 34. ' Non legitur
sine peccato esse nisi Filius hominis.' — De Perfect. Just.
n. 29. See too De Pecc. Merit, et Remiss. 1. 1. n. 56, 57.
2. Though all men are in sin to begin with, there is
the possibility of attaining to a sinless state in this life ;
but this possibility is through the Divine grace or power,
and by a miraculous exertion of that power. ' Et ideo
ejus perfectionem etiam in hac vita esse possibilem, negare
non possumus, quia omnia possibilia sunt Deo, sive quae
faoit sola sua voluntate, sive quae cooperantibus creaturae
suse voluntatibus a se fieri posse constituit. Ac per hoc
quicquid eorum non facit, sine exemplo est quidem in ejus
operibus factis ; sed apud Deum et in ejus virtute habet
causam qua fieri possit, et in ejus sapientia quare non
factum sit.' — De Spiritu et Liter 'a, n. 7. ' Ecce quemad-
modum sine exernplo est in hominibus perfecta justitia, et
tamen impossibilis non est. Fieret enim si tanta voluntas
adhiberetur quanta sufficit tantae rei. Esset autem tanta,
si et nihil eorum quse pertinent ad justitiamnos lateret, et
ea sic delectarent animum, ut quicquid aliud voluptatis
dolorisve impedit, delectatio ilia superaret : quod ut non
sit, non ad impossibilitatem, sed ad judicium Dei pertinet.'
— Ibid. n. 63. ' Sed inveniant isti, si possunt, aliquem
sub onere corruptionis hujus viventem, cui jam non habeat
Deus quod ignoscat Sane quemquam talem, si
testimonia ilia divina competenter accipiant, prorsus inve-
nire non possunt ; nullo modo tamen dicendum, Deo deesse
possibilitatem, qua voluntas sic adjuvetur humana, ut non
solum justitia ista quae ex fide est, omni ex parte modo
Note XL 365
perficiatur in homine, verum etiam ilia secundiim quam
postea in seternum in ipsa ejus contemplatione vivendum
est. Quandoquidem, si nunc velit in quoquam etiam lioc
corruptibili induere incorruptionem, atque hie inter
homines morituros eum jubere vivere minime moritunim,
ut tota penitus vetustate consumpta nulla lex in membris
ejus repugnet legi mentis, Deumque ubique pra^sentem
ita cognoscat, sicut sancti postea cognituri sunt ; quis
demum audeat affirmare, non posse ? Sed quare non faciat
qua3runt homines, nee qui quaBrunt se attendant esse
homines.' — Ibid. n. 66.
3. While he thus admits the possibility, he denies the
fact that any man has attained to a sinless state in this
life : ' Si autem qua3ratur utrum sit, esse non credo. Magis
enim credo Scripttirae dicenti. Ne intres in judicium,'
&c. — De Pecc. Merit, et Remiss. 1. 2. n. 8. ' Hie fortasse
respondeas, ista qua3 commemoravi facta non esse et fieri
potuisse, opera esse divina ; ut autem sit homo sine peccato,
ad opus ipsius hominis pertinere, idque opus esse optimum,
quo fiat plena et perfecta et ex omni parte absoluta justitia :
et ideo non esse credendum, neminem vel fuisse, vel esse,
vel fore in hac vita qui hoc opus impleverit, si ab homine
impleri potest. Sed cogitare debes quam vis ad homines id
agere pertineat, hoc quoque munus esse divinum, atque
ideo non dubitare opus esse divinum.' — De Spir. et Lit.
n. 2. ' Si omnes illos sanctos et sanctas, cum hie vixerunt,
congregare possemus, et interrogare utrum essent sine pec
cato, quid fuisse responsuros putamus ? Utrum hoc quod
iste dicit, an quod Joannes Apostolus. Rogo vos, quanta-
Tibet fuerit in hoc corpore excellentia sanctitatis, si hoc
interrogari potuissent, nonne una voce clamassent, '
diximus quia peccatum non habemus nos ipsos decipimus,
et veritas in nobis non est." An illud humilius responde-
rent fortasse quam verius? Sed huicjam placet, et recte
placet, " laudem humilitatis in parte non ponere falsitatis.
Itaque hoc si verum dicerent, haberent peccatum, quod,
humiliter quia faterentur veritas in eis esset : si autem
hoc mentirentur, nihilominus haberent peccatum, quia
veritas in eis non esset,'— De Nat. et Grot. n. 42.
366 Note XL
reserves, however, the liberty to except the Virgin Mary
from this general assertion : ' De qua, propter honorem
Domini, nullam prorsus, cum de peccatis agitur, haberi
volo qusestionem.'
4. To assert that there have been persons in this life
who have attained to the sinless state, though an error, is
an error as to a fact rather than a doctrine, and a venial
one. ' Quinetiam si nemo est aut fuit, aut erit, quod
magis credo, tali puritate perfectus ; et tamen esse aut
fuisse aut fore defenditur et putatur, non multum erratur,
nee perniciose cum quadam quisque benevolentia fallitur :
si tamen qui hoc putat seipsum talem esse non putet, nisi
revera ac liquido talem se esse perspexerit.' — De Spir. et
Lit. n. 3. ' Utrum in hoc seculo fuerit, vel sit, vel possit
esse aliquis ita juste vivens, ut nullum habeat omnino
peccatum, potest esse aliqua quaestio inter veros piosque
Christianos. Posse tamen esse certe post hanc vitam quis-
quis ambigit desipit. Sed ego nee de ista vita volo con-
tendere. Quanquam enim mihi non videatur aliter
intelligendum quod scriptum est, "Non justificabitur in
conspectu tuo omnis vivens," et siqua similia: utinam
tamen possit ostendi hsec testimonia melius aliter intelligi.'
— De Nat. et Grat. n. 70.
5. Augustine thinks that the subjection of mankind to
the law of sin works mysteriously in the Divine scheme
for good. ' Idcirco etiam sanctos et tideles suos in aliqui-
bus vitiis tardius sanat, ut in his eos minus, quam implendse
ex omni parte justitise sufficit, delectet bonum. . . . Nee
in eo ipso vult nos damnabiles esse sed humiles.' — De Pecc.
Merit, et Remiss. 1. 2. n. 33. This very imperfection is
in a sense, he thinks, as leading to humility, part of the
perfection of human virtue. ' Ex hoc facturn est, virtutem
quse nunc est in homine justo, perfectam hactenus nominari,
ut ad ejus perfectionem pertineat etiam ipsius imperfec-
tionis et in veritate cognitio, et in humilitate confessio.
Tune enim est secundum hanc infirmitatem pro suo modulo
perfecta ista parva justitia, quando etiam quid sibi desit
intelligit. Ideoque Apostolus et imperfectum et perfec-
tum se dicit.' — Contra Duas, Ep. 1. 3. n. 19. 'Deserit
Note XII. 367
aliquando Deus ut discas superbus non esse. Quidam
traduntur SatanaB ut discant non blasphernare.'- -De Nat.
et Grat. n. 32. Pelagius ridicules the idea that peccatis
peccata curantur.
NOTE XII. p. 79.
ME. COLERIDGE, in his Aids to Reflection, p. 272, strongly
objects to the received doctrine of original sin, as involv
ing the injustice of punishing one man on account of the
sin of another ; in the place of which, he substitutes
(p. 278) a rationale of original sin, in which he rests that
doctrine, upon the principle of cause and effect ; asserting
that all evil action implies an evil in the will as the cause
of it, which anterior evil, when pushed backward and back
ward indefinitely, becomes original evil in the will, or
original sin. ' Whatever resists and, as a positive power,
opposes this (the moral law) in the will, is evil. But an
evil in the will is an evil will ; and as all moral evil is of
the will, this evil will must have its source in the will.
And thus we might go back from act to act, from evil to
evil, ad infinitum, without advancing a step.' This an
terior evil in the will, then, regarded as mysterious, inde
pendent of time and intelligible succession, is, he argues,
original sin. ' Let the evil be supposed such as to imply
the impossibility of an individual referring it to any par
ticular time at which it might be conceived to have com
menced, or to any period of his existence at which it was
not existing. Let it be supposed, in short, that the subject
stands in no relation whatever to time, can neither be
called in time or out of time, but that all relations to
time are as alien and heterogeneous in this question as the
relations and attributes of space (north or south, round or
square, thick or thin) are to our affections and moral feel
ings. Let the reader suppose this, and he will have before
him the precise import of the scriptural doctrine of original
si YI
"it is evident that, according to this rationale, Adam
as first created had original sin, and had a corrupt nature
as truly as any of his posterity. For the first sinful act
368 Note XII.
man is as open as any other to this reasoning from effect
to cause, from an evil act to an evil will, and from an evil
will to a source of evil in the will or original sin : so that
Adam's sin in Paradise was the effect of original sin in
him, or a corrupt nature, only differing from other sins in
being the first effect. ' The corruption of my will may
very warrantably be spoken of as a consequence of Adam's
fall, even as my birth of Adam's existence ; as a conse
quence, a link in the historic chain of instances, ivhereof
Adam was the first. But that it is on account of Adam,
or that this evil principle was a priori inserted or infused
into my will by the will of another — which is indeed a
contradiction in terms, my will in such a case being no
will, — this is nowhere asserted in Scripture explicitly or
by implication. It belongs to the very essence of the
doctrine, that in respect of original sin every man is the
adequate representative of all men. What wonder, then,
that where no outward ground of preference existed, the
choice should be determined by outward relation, and
that the first in time should be taken as the diagram ? '
p. 283.
Such being the rationale of original sin substituted by
Mr. Coleridge for the received doctrine of original sin as
the consequence of the sin of Adam, which he rejects on
the ground of its opposition to reason, my remark is this
—that T cannot think it philosophical in any writer to
overthrow a whole received language, professing to ex
press an incomprehensible mystery, on such a ground.
Contradictory language, or language opposed to reason, is
the only one in which mysteries and incomprehensible
truths can be expressed ; if they could be expressed in
consistent language, they would not be mysteries. More
over, the writer professes that he can only substitute other
inconsistent language for that which he rejects. Mr. Cole
ridge admits the absolute inconsistency of an original evil
in the will with the will's self-determination ; yet, because
he thinks both of these to be truths, he adopts a language
which contains them both, as the only mode of expressing
' an acknowledged mystery, and one which, by the nature of
Note XII. 369
the subject, must ever remain such.'— p. 277. What is
the improvement, then, in consistency, in his language
upon the received language? While,' on the other hand,
the received language, by attributing the fall to an act of
freewill only, which no evil in the will preceded, expresses
an important truth that sin is not fundamental in, but
only accidental to, human nature ; a, truth which Mr.
Coleridge's language of original evil in the will, so fai
from expressing, rather contradicts.
The same remark may be made on Mr. Coleridge's
objection to the received doctrine of the atonement as a
satisfaction for sin ; which he rejects on the same ground
as he does the received doctrine of original sin, viz., its
opposition to our natural idea of justice. ' Let us suppose,
with certain divines, that the varied expressions of S. Paul
are to be literally interpreted : ex. gr. that sin is, or in
volves, an infinite debt (in the proper and law-court sense
of the word debt), — a debt owing by us to the vindictive
justice of Grod the Father, which can only be liquidated
by the everlasting misery of Adam and all his posterity, 01
by a sum of suffering equal to this. Likewise, that God
the Father, by His absolute decree, or (as some divines
teach) through the necessity of His unchangeable justice,
had determined to exact the full sum, which must there
fore be paid either by ourselves or by some other in our
own name and behalf. But, besides the debt which all
mankind contracted, in and through Adam, as a homo
publicus, even as a nation is bound by the acts of its head
or its plenipotentiary, every man (say these divines) is an
insolvent debtor on his own score. In this fearful predi
cament the Son of (rod took compassion on mankind, and
resolved to pay the debt for us, and to satisfy the Divine
justice by a perfect equivalent
4 Now, as your whole theory is grounded on a notion of
justice, I ask you, Is this justice a moral attribute ?^ But
morality commences with, and begins in the sacred distinc
tion between thing and person : on this distinction all law
human and divine is grounded; consequently, the law of
justice. If you attach any meaning to the term justice,
B B
370 Note XII.
as applied to Grod, it must be the same to which you refer
when you affirm or deny it of any other personal agent —
save only, that in its attribution to (rod you speak of it as
unmixed and perfect. For if not, what do you mean ? And
why do you call it by the same name ? I may, therefore,
with all right and reason, put the case as between man
and man. For should it be found irreconcilable with the
justice, which the light of reason, made law in the con
science, dictates to man, how much more must it be in
congruous with the all-perfect justice of Grod ! . . . .
' A sum of 1 ,000£. is owing from James to Peter, for
which James has given a bond. He is insolvent, and the
bond is on the point of being put in suit against him, to
James's utter ruin. At this moment Matthew steps in,
pays Peter the thousand pounds and discharges the bond.
In this case, no man would hesitate to admit, that a com
plete satisfaction had been made to Peter. Matthew's
1,000£. is a perfect equivalent for the sum which James
was bound to have paid, and which Peter had lent. It is
the same thing : and this is altogether a question of things.
Now, instead of James's being indebted to Peter for a sum
of money, which (he having become insolvent) Matthew
pays for him, we will put the case, that James had been
guilty of the basest and most hard-hearted ingratitude to
a most worthy and affectionate mother, who had not only
performed all the duties and tender offices of a mother, but
whose whole heart was bound up in this her only child —
who had foregone all the pleasures and amusements of life
in watching over his sickly childhood, had sacrificed her
health and the far greater part of her resources to rescue
him from the consequences of his follies and excesses during
his youth and early manhood, and to procure for him the
means of his present rank and affluence — all which he had
repaid by neglect, desertion, and open profligacy. Here the
mother stands in the relation of the creditor : and here too
we will suppose the same generous friend to interfere, and
to perform with the greatest tenderness and constancy all
those duties of a grateful and affectionate son, which James
ought to have performed. Will this satisfy the mother's
Note XII. 37 r
claims on James, or entitle him to her esteem, approba
tion, and blessing? Or what if Matthew, vicarious son,
should at length address her in words to this purpose :
" Now, I trust, you are appeased, and will be henceforward
oil
reconciled to James. I have satisfied all your claims
him. I have paid his debt in full : and you are too just
to require the same debt to be paid twice over. You will
therefore regard him with the same complacency, and
receive him into your presence with the same love, as if
there had been no difference between him and you. For I
have made it up" What other reply could the swelling
heart of the mother dictate than this ? "0 misery ! and
is it possible that you are in league with my unnatural
child to insult me ? Must not the very necessity of your
abandonment of your proper sphere form an additional evi
dence of his guilt ? Must not the sense of your goodness
teach me more fully to comprehend, more vividly to feel
the evil in him ? Must not the contrast of your merits
magnify his demerit in his mother's eye, and at once recall
and embitter the conviction of the canker-worm in his
soul ? "
' If indeed by the force of Matthew's example, by per
suasion, or by additional and more mysterious influences,
or by an inward co-agency, compatible with the existence of
a personal will, James should be led to repent ; if through
admiration and love of this great goodness gradually assimi
lating his mind to the mind of his benefactor, he should
in his own person become a grateful and dutiful child—
then doubtless the mother would be wholly satisfied ! But
then the case is no longer a question of things, or a matter
of debt payable by another.' — Aids to Reflection, p. 322.
But is not Mr. Coleridge righting the air, when he
objects, on these grounds, to the received doctrine of the
atonement as a satisfaction for sin ? It is quite true that
such a doctrine is opposed to our natural idea of justice, as
well as to the truth of common reason, that one person
cannot be a substitute for another in moral action. But
who does not acknowledge this contrariety ? Does not the
most devout believer profess to hold this doctrine as »
BB 2
372 Note XI II.
mystery, and not as a truth of reason, or an intelligible
truth ? And if he holds it as such, how can he be charged
with holding anything unreasonable ? How can an asser
tion be called contrary to reason, when we do not know
what its meaning, i.e. the thing asserted in it, is? And
how, therefore, can the maintaining of such an unknown
truth be unreasonable ? The Christian only believes that
there is a truth connected with this subject, which in the
present state of his capacities he cannot understand, but
which, on the principle of accommodation, is expressed in
revelation in this form, as that mode of expressing it which
is practically nearest to the truth.
NOTE XIII. p. 84.
THE connection of this present state of sin and suffering
with some great original transgression was too deeply laid
down in Scripture to offer an easy explanation to the Pela
gians. One main solution, however, of such passages was
given ; viz. that they referred to a connection not of descent,
but example, that the sin of Adam was fatal as an imitated,
not as a transmitted sin. But such an interpretation ob
viously fell short of the meaning of Scripture, nor was it
improved by the details of the application. The Pelagian
comment on the great passage in the Epistle to the Eomans,
that 4 by one man sin entered into the world, and death by
sin ; and so death passed upon all men, for that all have
sinned,' opposed to the received doctrine of transmitted
sin ; first, the expression ' one man,' which sufficed, it was
said, for the view of example, whereas both the man and
the woman were necessary for transmission ; ] secondly, the
distinction that ' death passed upon all men,' not sin ; and,
thirdly, the ground of actual sin, as distinguished from
original, ' for that all have sinned.' But the first of these
objections was futile ; the second was overruled by other
texts of Scripture which made death the consequence of
sin ; and the third can only at most be allowed a balanc
ing, not a disproving weight. The Pelagian was, indeed,
1 Op. Imp. 1. 2. c. 47. 64. ; 1. 3. c. 85.
Note XI I I. 373
the better construer of the Greek words, which our trans
lation with him renders into 'for that,' and not with
S. Augustine into ' in whom.' l But though this particular
clause, thus translated, refers to a ground of actual sin,
not of original, or sin ' in Adam,' as S. Augustine under
stood it; the reference to actual sin does not destroy tlie
previous reference to original, at the beginning of th-'
verse. The previous assertion is plain and decisive, that
'by one man sin entered into the world;' though tl«-
mystery of original sin must still be held together witli
the truth of nature that (rod only punishes men 'for that '
they themselves ' have sinned.'
It was equally vain in a comment on the text that
'the judgment was from one offence to condemnation, but
the free gift was of many offences unto justification,' to
attempt to negative the unity of the sin mentioned in the
preceding clause by the plurality in the next ; and to argue,
that if one sin had been the source of the general sinful-
ness of mankind, it would have been written 'from o,>e
offence,' not ' from many offences unto justification.' -
The unity of the source is not inconsistent with pluralii y
in the proceeds from it. To interpret ' many ' again to
mean many offences of one and the same person was gra
tuitous,3 though convenient for a coveted inference, that
the state out of which a man was raised at justification
was contemplated here only as a state of personal, not
of original sin.
No candid interpreter, again, of the text, ' As by t
offence of one judgment came upon all men to condemna
tion ; even so by the righteousness of One the free jni
came upon all men unto justification of life,' would allow
its obvious force to be negatived by the remark that, as ;
mankind do not attain to justification, the universality
ascribed to the effect of Adam's sin in the first clause
destroyed by the necessarily limited sense of universality
as applied to justification, in the next.4 \\ here the weigh
' Op. Imp. 1. 2. c. 63. Adam quoque universis nocuUso
2 Ibid c 105 fingatur.'— Op. Imp. 1. 2. c. 1
3 t ^ parvulos multis obnoxios Augustine answers, ' Qui pp^ten-a
' esse crimin'ibus.'-Ibid. c. 114. omnes liberate, dictus eat etia
« « Si Christus salvarit universes, quoniam non hberat quenquam HIM
374 Note XIII.
of Scripture goes plainly in one direction, these minute
verbal criticisms on dependent and subordinate clauses,
ought not to be allowed to interfere with it.
From the passage in the Epistle to the Romans the
Pelagian passed to that in the First Epistle to the Corin
thians, ' As in Adam all die, even so in Christ shall all be
made alive' (1 Cor. xv. 22.); and his interpretation was
the same, that whether death was understood here of
natural or of moral death, i.e., sin, Adam was only put
forth as the sample, not as the root of it ; an interpreta
tion which he confirmed by a reference to the succeeding
text, ' As we have borne the image of the earthly we shall
also bear the image of the heavenly ; ' as if this explained
the preceding one in the sense of an actual imitation of
Adam, not of any transmitted guilt or penalty from
him.' l
The curse, at the commencement of the book of Gene
sis, received a double explanation ; first, as imposing no
new suffering on man ; and, secondly, as imposing it, if it
did impose it, only for the warning, and not for the punish
ment of posterity.2 The Pelagian observed that sorrows
were ' multiplied ' on the woman, as if they had existed
before ; 3 and that Adam, again, on whom the curse im
posed labour, had laboured before in the Garden of Eden ;4
and that as a matter of fact labour was not the universal
penalty, because it was not the universal lot of man. The
sentence of death was even more boldly dealt with ; and
when the Pelagian had inferred from the text, ' For dust thou
art, and unto dust shalt thou return, 'that this event rested
upon a physical ground anterior to man's transgression, he
proceeded to observe that the announcement of it at that
time was not intended as a severe, but as a consolatory
ipse.' — Op. Imp. 1. 2. c. 136. indicet cautionem.' — Ibid. c. 27.
1 ' Sicut omnes, i. e. multi Adse 8 Augustine : ' Multiplicabo, mul-
imitatione moriuntur, ita omnes, i.e. tas eas esse faciam. Poterat mul-
multi Christi imitatione salvantur.' tiplicare quse non erant.' — Op. Imp.
—Ibid. 1. 6. c. 31. 1. 6. c. 26.
2 ' Ut commemoratione primi * ' Quid ei novum accidisse credi-
peccati, afflictio succedanea his, quos mus, si sentiret sudorem.' — Ibid.
reos non fecerat, imitationis malse c. 27.
Note XIV. 375
one — a promise of relief from the trials and pains of life.1
But S. Augustine appealed to the evident meaning of the
curse as a judicial sentence, inflicting a punishment in
consequence of man's sin which did not exist before it ;-
he appealed to a larger sense of labour than the narrow
one of his opponent ;3 and he showed to the Pelagian the
unavoidable inference from his explanation of the sentence
of death, that man was wiser after his transgression than
he was before it. For if death awaited him before his sin,
as the lot of nature, the only difference which the curse, in
announcing the event to him, made was, that it gave him
the knowledge of it.' 4
NOTE XIV. p. 85.
JULIAN the Pelagian interprets Adam being created good
as meaning merely that he was created with freewill, or
' the power to do good ; Augustine interprets it as meaning
that Adam was created with a good disposition or formed
habit, and rejects the Pelagian meaning as a false one, for
the' plain reason that to be able to be good is not the same
as to be good ; whereas, Adam was made (food. He admits,
indeed, that in a certain sense, a nature which is able not
to sin is a good nature : ' Bonum conditum Adam non ego
tantum nee tu, sed ambo dicimus. Ambo enim dicimus
bonam esse naturam quae possit non peccare.'— Op. Imp .
16 c 16. But this sense is put aside as insufficient.
<Quid est ergo quod mine dicis ; « Bonus Deiis bonum
fecit hominem," si nee bonus nee mains est, habendo lib
rum arbitrium quod in eo Deus fecit? . . . Et qnomodo
verum est, " Fecit Deus hominem rectum. --Eccl. vn. m.
An rectus erat non habens voluntatem bonam, sed qut
possibilitatem * Ergo et pravus erat non habens volunfc
tern pravam, sed ejus possibilitatem. . . . Ita fit, u
tuam mirabilem sapientiam, nee Deus fecerit rectum
hominem; sed qui rectus posset esse si vellet.—L. 5.
c. 57.
> Op. Imp. 1. 6. c. 27. tenew difficile cst.'-L. 6. c. 27.
« • Imo, inquis et damnatus est, s L. L c. M.
^et nihil ei accidit novi. Hie risum L. 6. c. n.
376 Note XIV.
Adam being created good, then, meant that he way
created with a positive goodness, or a good habit of mind.
Such a habit S. Augustine expresses by the term bona
voluntas, voluntas meaning an established bias or inclina
tion, or what we call character. ' Sed, inquis, u Ideo
potuit oriri voluntas mala, ut oriri posset et bona." Quasi
non cum bona voluntate factus sit vel angelus vel homo.
Factus est rectus, sicut dixit Scriptura. — Eccl. vii. 29.
Non ergo quasritur unde in illo potuerit oriri bona volun
tas, cum qua factus est ; sed unde mala cum qua factus
non est. Et tu dicis, non attendens quid dicas " Ideo-
potuit oriri voluntas mala, ut oriri posset et bona : " et
hoc putas ad naturam liberi arbitrii pertinere, ut possit
utrumque et peccare scilicet et non peccare ; et in hoc
existimas hominem factum ad imaginem Dei, cum Deus
ipse non possit utrumque.' — L. 5. c. 38. ' Quis enim ferat,
si dicatur talis factus, quales nascuntur infantes? Ilia
itaque perfectio naturse quam non dabant anni, sed sola
manus Dei, non potuit nisi habere voluntatem aliquaru,
eamque non malam. Bonse igitur voluntatis factus est
homo . . . neque enim nisi recta volens rectus est quis-
quam? — L. 5. c. 61.
Julian objects to this implanted voluntas on the free
will ground, pronouncing it absurd that a man can be
made good ; on the ground that goodness implied, in its
very nature, choice and exertion of the will. ' Est natura
humana bonum opus Dei : est libertas arbitrii, id est, pos-
sibilitas vel delinquendi vel recte faciendi, bonum seque
opus Dei. Utrumque hoc homini de necessario venit. Sed
voluntas in his exoritur non de his. Capacia voluntatis
sunt quippe, non plena.' — Op. Imp. 1. 5, c. 56. ' Est ergo
ista possibilitas, quse nomine libertatis ostenditur, ita a
sapientissimo constituta Deo, ut sine ipsa non sit, quod
per ipsam esse non cogitur.' — c. 57. Augustine replies :
6 Ut video, nee bonam voluntatem vis tribuere naturae,
quando est homo primitus conditus : quasi non potuerit
Deus hominem facere voluntatis bonse.' — c. 61.
Augustine's bona voluntas only seems to express in a
different form the traditional view of the Church from the
_ _ Note XIV. 377
first, as contained in the writings of the earlier fathers.
Bishop Bull, in his discourse on the State of Man before
the Fall, quotes their principal statements on the subject.
They all take for their basis the scriptural truth, that
Adam was made in the image of God ; and they commonly
interpret this to mean that the soul of Adam had a certain
indwelling of the Holy Spirit in it. Tatian, the pupil of
Justin Martyr, speaks of ;the familiarity and friendship'
of the Spirit with Adam in his created state : rf/s vvv
avro) Stam/s — rov TrvsvjJLcnos rov BwaTwrepov^ whom lie
also calls 77 Aoyov Bvva/jLLs.— Contra 6rrctms, c. 7. Irena'iis
says: ' Spiritus cornmixtus animae unitur plasmati'd. .5.
c. 6.) ; and also speaks of the robe of sanctity which Adam
had from the Spirit : ' quam habuit a Spirit u sanctitatis
stolarn.' — L. 3. c. 23. Tertullian speaks of the Spirit of
God which Adam received by inspiration : ' Spiritum quern
tune de afflatu ejus acceperat.' — De Baptismo, c. o.
Clemens Alexandrinus speaks of ' the characteristical pro
priety of the Holy Spirit superadded ' to the nature of
Adam : Trpoo-yivo/nsvov dylov Trvsv/jLaros ^apaKT^pi^TtKov
. — Strom. 1. 6. c. 16. Athanasius speaks of God im
parting to our first parents the power of His own Word :
avTols KOL -rf}9 rov IBiov Aoyov Swdpscos. — De
Incar. Verb. torn. i. c. 3. Basil speaks of the ' assessiou
of God, and conjunction with him (Adam) by lovi — 77
irpoasSpsla -rov 0sov, /cal rj &t,a Tr)S dydinis trvvdipeia.'—
Homil. quod non Deus est Auctor Peccat. Cyril speaks of
6 that Spirit which formed him (Adam) after the Divine
image, and was, as a seal, secretly impressed on his soul-
TO TT/OOS 0s lav sUova Siapopfovv avrb, Kal a^dvrpov Slicny
airopMrvs ivre0sif^vov:— 7. Dialog, de Trin. This fami
liar abode of the Spirit in the first man, and the character
and seal stamped by the Spirit upon him, evidently imply
a certain disposition of mind or holy habit which was
formed in him, as Cyprian (De Bono Patientm) actually
expresses it, interpreting the Divine image as involving
virtues — virtutes.
37* Note XV.
NOTE XV. p. 102.
THUS Justin Martyr says of the human race : o dirb rov
'ASa//, VTTO Bdvarov ical 7r\dvrjv rrjv rov o<f>sa)s srrsrrr^KSL,
rrapa rr)v ISlav alrlav s/cdarov avrwv rrov^psvaa^svov. —
Dial, cum Try ph. c. 88. rrapa here signifying not besides
(prceter) but by reason of sua propria cujusque culpa,
the latter half of this sentence gives the natural truth —
viz., that the individual sins by the exercise of his own
freewill ; as the former gives the revealed, that the indi
vidual sins in consequence of the sinfulness of the race.
One sentence of Tatian's joins the two in the same way :
£r)0i TCO 0sq) rr)V rra\aiav ysvsa'Lv rrapanovLJiSvos OVK sysvo-
JjieOa TTpOS TO drroOvrjcrtCSlV, drr00V)j(7KO/jLev $£ 6Y SdVTOVS. —
Contra Grcec. c. 1 1 . The * old birth ' is the mysterious,
the ' SL eavTovsJ the obvious and conscious cause of sin.
So far the fathers only follow the precedent of Scripture,
which puts the two grounds together, as in Rom. v. 12.,
4 As by one man sin entered into the world and death by
sin ; and so death passed upon all men, for that all have
sinned ; ' death being referred in the first part of the
sentence to the sin of Adam, in the last to each man's actual
sins. Again, several fathers speak of infants as innocent
beings : ' Quid festinat innocens a3tas ad remissionem pec-
catorum.' — Tertullian De Bapt. c. 1 8. ' 'EA,#<Wes sis
rdvSs rov tcoa/jiov dvafjidpr'rjroL.' — Cyril of Jerusalem, Cat.
iv. 13. 'To aTTSipoica/cov vrJTriov . . fjurj Sso/jusvov rrjs sic rov
KaOapOrjvcu vyisia?, cm /JLTJ&S rr]v dp%f]v rrjv vocrov TTJ ifrvxfj
TrapsBs^aro ... TO fjuiJTS sv dydOq), /JLIJTS sv /cd/cq) svpicricb-
jusvovS — Gregory Nyss. (De iis qui praemature abripiun-
tur). But Hagenbach is precipitate in concluding from
the passage in Cyril, that ' Cyril of Jerusalem assumed
that men are born in a state of innocence ' (History of
Doctrines, v. i. p. 315.) ; i.e. if he means by this that
Cyril denied original sin. It is a truth of reason and
nature, that infants are innocent beings, which may be
asserted, as it must be by every rational person, without
prejudice to the mysterious truth of their guilt as descen-
Note XV. 379
dants of Adam. Tertullian, who asserts it, is at the same
time acknowledged as one of those fathers who have most
strongly asserted the doctrine of original sin ; and Scripture
itself asserts both, saying of children, that ' of such is the
kingdom of heaven,' while at the same time it declares,
that ' in Adam all die.' Chrysostom again denies that one
man can be responsible for another man's sin : TO [lev yap
srspov St' STSpov KoKaCpaQai ov a(f)p6&pa &OKSL \6yov s^siv.
— Horn. X. in Rom. But this is a simple truth of reason
which nobody can deny, and the assertion of it is quite
consistent with holding the mystery of our guilt in Adam.
All the early fathers, moreover, assert strongly the freewill
of even fallen man, his irpoaipso-^ e\£vOspa, avr strove LOV.
But this runs side by side with their assertion of his
6 captivity ' and ' corruption,' as another part of the whole
truth.
The case of Clement of Alexandria is perhaps peculiar,
though too much should not be made of particular ex
pressions, like the ones just quoted, found in him. In
combating, indeed, the Gnostic doctrine of our evil
nature, he uses arguments which would equally tell
against the doctrine of original sin. He denies that any
one can be evil but by his own personal act : Xsyerwo-av
^/jLLV 7TOV ETTOpVSVCTSV TO pSWyOsV TTaiOlOV, Tf 7TWS VTTO TT)V
ToO'ASa/z, {JTTOTTSTTTWKSV dpav TO ^sv hspy^av',— Strom .
1. 3. c. 16. He describes, again, sin after the fall, as if it
were only a repetition, and not an effect of sin at the fall :
sit yap 6 d7raT£a)v avvOsv psv TVV Evai>, vvv oe rjBri Kai
TOVS a\\ovs dvOpUTTovs its dava-rov v-rro^spwv.—Ad
Gentes,vol. 1. p. 7. But Hagenbach is precipitate in
concluding that Clement ' rejects the doctrine of original
sin, properly so called,' simply on the strength of such
passages as these.— History of Doctrine, v. 1. p- 173.
Augustine himself has a similar passage exactly to the one
iust quoted : < Etiam nunc in unoquoque nostrum mh
aliud agitur, cum ad peccatum quisque delabitur, quar
tune actum est in illis tribus, serpente, muliere, et viro.
-De Genesi contra Man. 1. 2. c. 14. Such expressio
are no more than what common sense justifies and obliges,
380 Note XVI.
and are quite consistent with belief in the other truth.
But Clement, though he asserts sin to be ' natural,' TO
yap s^a/jLapTavsiv TTCLGIV s/jt,(f)VTOv KOI K.OLVOV (Peed. 1. 3. c.
1 2), (his language, however, seeming to express here uni
versal rather than original sin), certainly seems to explain
away the passage in the Psalms, 4 in sin hath my mother
conceived me,' interpreting it to refer to sinful custom or
habit, not to sinful nature (Strom. 1. 3. c. 16.), though at
the same time it must be remarked, that he is relieving
the passage of a Gnostic meaning, according to which sin
was inherent in natural generation as such, and not
opposing the Catholic. Jeremy Taylor gives a somewhat
similar explanation with less excuse. ' The words are a
Hebraism, and signify nothing but an aggrandation of his
sinfulness, and are intended for a high expression, mean
ing that ' I am wholly and entirely wicked.' — Vol. ix.
p. 27. On the whole, though Clement, in common with
all the early fathers, is a lenient interpreter of the doc
trine of original sin, and though such passages as these
have not such counterbalancing ones in his writings as
they have in those of other fathers, these passages are no
test of his belief on the subject.
NOTE XVI. p. 114.
Tous- Bs (unbaptised infants, or those who by accident
died without baptism) fjuijrs Sogao-OrjcrsvOai,, /JLTJTS tcoXa-
crQr)<j£aQai Trspl rov Si/calov Kpt-rov, a>s dor<ppafylcrrovs [isv
dTrovijpovs BE, d\\d iraQovras (jiaXkov TTJV ty/jblav rj opd-
o-avras. ov yap OCTTLS ov tco\do~sw$ a£io$ 77877 KOI TifMfjs*
wcrTrsp OCTTIS ov Tt/jLTjs ?j$7} KOI Ko\dascos. — Gregory Naz.
Orat. 40. v. i. p. 653. Gregory of Nyssa formally dis
cusses the question of the future condition of those who
die as infants, without reference to their being or not bap
tised (v. ii. p. 749) ; which, in distinction to the ground
taken by some, that they do not deserve so much happi
ness as the mature good, he maintains to turn, not so
much upon any difference of claim, as of natural aptitude
and capacity for happiness. OVK SO-TLV elirslv tcvplcas aim-
NoteXVL
Socriv TWV svfttftiVKOiwv ysvsffOai rr/i/ rr}s- fo»)y
teal Tipwpiav TO s^Trakiv. "AXV o/zotof ecru rco /cara
<x$6a\fjiovs VTroSsiy/jiaTi TO \sy6fjisvov. OuSe ^ya
Qappsvw TCLS otysis ETra6\6v 11 $apev flvai KCLI
Tr]v TWV opdrcov KuravoTjcnv, rj TW voaovvTi TO
TLVCL TO fJis ^TS^SLV rijs oparifcijs e
avayKaiass STTSTCU TO> Kara tyvcrtv SuiKSifji^vu) TO
TO> TS CL7TO TTaOoVS rrrap£l'£%6sVT I TT/S (£ucr£&>y. TO
pr) Ivspysiv TTJV opao-iV rbvavrbv TOTTOV /cal ?/ fi'i/capi'a fft;?;
<TV/jL(j)Vrj9 SO'TL KOI olfCSta TOL9 KSKaOap/ASVOLS T(l T1]S ^fUVijV
alo-07]Tijpia. Upon this principle lie proceeds to ar^uc
that the happiness of infants in a future state will be in
proportion to their capacity for it, which will be lower
than that of those who have lived virtuously as mature
men ; that it will be analogous to their happiness in this
life, which is of the simpler and unconscious kind. Kada-
Trsp <yap $77X77 KOL yaXtdKTi r) TrpajTq TWV VSTTIMV f)\ircia
TL0vvovfJLSvr] £KTpsd>£Tai' sir a StaSeyfTat TavTrjv KaTa\\i]\o$
rf «f / J^>' v' S> '
STSpa TO) VTTOKSL/jLSVq) T^007), OLKSidJS T£ KOI E7TlTr)G£lO)$ TTpQS
TO Tpsfyb/Jbsvov Ivoucraj sws av ETTL TO TE\SLOV (f>0do"rj'
OUTWS ol/jiai /cal TYJV ^v^rfv &ia TWV ael KCLT* a\\ij\a)i>
Tagst, Tivi /cal afCoXovQta fJLSTSf%stv TTJS /caTa <bvaiv fwr/s, CDS
'Xftipsi /cal SvvaTai TWV sv TTJ puKipioT'^TL'jrpOKSifjLsvw
\afJi(3dvovo-a 'H &s ayevo-TOs Trjs dpsrijs
TWV fjisv EK irovypias ica/cuv, CLTS fJirJTE Trjv ap%r)V
Oslaa ry Trjs /ca/clay vbcrw, SLafJisvei d^iETO^os rijs
s/cslvr)? '\r)v ®EOV yv&vlv TS teal psrovo- lav TOO-OVTOV jierfyei
Trapa TTJV TTpwTrjv, oa-ov x^Pst> ro Tpe<j>6fJievov. — Augustine
maintained a middle state, in his earlier theological life.
— Dicunt enim : quid opus est ut nasceretur qui antequam
iniret ullum vitse meritum excessit e vita ? Aut qualia in
futtiro judicio deputabitur, cui neque inter justos locus
est, quoniam nihil recte fecit ; neque inter malos, quomain
nihil peccavit? Quibus respondetur: ad imiversitatis
complexum, et totius creaturse vel per locos vel per tem-
pora ordinatissimam connexionem, non posse supernuo
creari qualemcunque hominem, ubi folium arboris nullum
superfluumcreatur; sed sane super fluo quaen dementis
ejus qui nihil meruerit. Non enim metuendum est ne
382 Note XVII.
vita esse potuerit media qusedam inter recte factum atque
peccatum, et sententia judicis media esse non possit inter
prsemium et supplicium. — De Lib. Arb. 1. 3. c. 23.
NOTE XVII. p. 121.
IN the first of the following passages all wickedness, in
the second extreme wickedness, is referred to original sin ;
in the third, different degrees admitted in evil, are ac
counted for by different degrees of original sin ; in the
fourth and fifth these degrees in evil appear as the addi
tions of the individual to original sin, though in what
precise sense they leave uncertain.
(1.) 'Ad iram quippe Dei [in consequence of original
sin] pertinet justam, quicquid caeca et indomita concupis-
centia faciunt libenter mali.' — Enchiridion, c. 27. (2.)
' Omnes ex eadem massa perditionis et damnationis se-
curidum duritiem cordis sui et cor impenitens, quantum
ad ipsos pertinet, thesaurizant sibi iram in die irse, quo
redditur unicuique secundum opera sua.' — Contra Juli-
anum Pelagianum, 1. 5. c. 4. (3.) ' Veruntamen taci
turn non est quod erat eorum malitia naturalis ; quae
quidem omnium hominum, sed in aliis minor, in aliis
major est : sicut corpora corruptibilia sunt omnium, sed
alias animas minus, alias plus gravant, pro diversitate
judiciorum Dei, occultorurn quidem, sed sine ulla dubi-
tatione justorum.' — Opus Imp. Contra Julianum, 1. 4.
c. 128. (4.) 'Hi ergo qui non pertinent ad istum cer-
tissimum et felicissimum numerum pro meritis justissime
judicantur. Aut enim jacent sub peccato, quod origin a-
liter generatim traxerunt, et cum illo hsereditario debito
hinc exeunt, quod non est regeneratione dimissum ; aut
per liberum arbitrium alia insuper addiderunt ; arbitrium,
inquam, liberum sed non liberatum; liberum justitise,
peccati autem servum, quo volvuntur per diversas noxias
cupiditates, alii magis, alii minus ; sed ornnes mali.' — De
Correptione et Gratia, c. 1 3. (5.) ' Si autem male
vivunt de suo male vivunt, vel quod originaliter traxerunt,.
vel quod insuper addiderunt. Sed si vasa sunt irse, quaa
Note XVIII. 383
perfecta sunt ad perditionem, quse illis debita redditur,
sibi hoc imputent, quia ex ea massa facta sunt, quam
propter unius peccaturn, in quo omnes peccaverunt, merito
Deus justeque damnavit.' — Ep. 194. c. 6.
Jansen interprets S. Augustine as making the whole
mass of actual sin in the world the simple effect and
development of original. ' Positive reprobationis causa . . .
peccata omnia cum quibus morituri sunt, etiam originale
peccatum. Nam ex illius suppliciis quicquid peccatorum
a reprobatis perpetratum est accessu libeno voluntatis,
fluxit . . . ut proinde ilia tota suppliciorum concatenatio,
usque ad damnationem in ignein 8eternam,radicaliter et me
diate in peccati originalis meritum referenda videatur. Im
mediate tamen prima poenarum istarum promeretur
secundam, et ita deinceps, donee ultima tandem, vclut
praecedentium complement um, inferatur.' — De Gro.tid
Christi,p. 1019.
NOTE XVIII. p. 123.
6 ET propterea conantur parvulis non baptizatis innocentiae
merito salutem ac vitam seternam tribuere ; sed, quia bap-
tizati non sunt, eos a regno coelorum facere alienos : nova
quadam et mirabili prsesumptione, quasi salus ac vita
seterna possit esse prseter Christ! haereditatem, printer reg-
num coelorum. . . . Profecto ill! quibus Sacrament um
defuerit in eis habendi sunt qui non credunt Filio ; atcjue
ideo, si hujus inanes gratisB de corpore exierint, sequetur
eos quod dictum est, " Non habebunt vitam sed ira Dei
manet super eos." Unde hoc, quando eos clarum est pec
cata propria non habere, si nee original! peccato teneantur
obnoxii.'— De Peccat. Merit, et Rem. 1. 1. c. xx.
4 Quia ergo de ovibus ejus non esse incipiunt parvuli
nisi per baptismum ; profecto, si hoc non accipiunt,
peribunt,' — Ibid. c. xxvii.
' Quemadmodum enim omnes omnino pertinentes
generationem voluntatis carnis non moriuntur nisi in Adam
in quo omnes peccaverunt : sic ex his omnes omnino per
tinentes ad regenerationem voluntatis spiritus non vivifi-
384 Note XVIII.
cantur -nisi in Christo, in quo omnes justificantur. Quia
si cut per unum omnes ad condemnationem, sic per unum
omnes ad justificationem. Nee est ullus medius locus ut
possit esse nisi cum diabolo, qui non est cum Christo. Hie
et ipse Dominns volens auferre de cordibus male credentium
istam iiescio quam medietatem, quam conantur quidam
parvulis non baptizatis tribuere, ut quasi merito innocentise
sint in vita oeterna, sed quia non sunt baptizati non sint
cum Christo in regno ejus, definitivam protulit ad haec ora
obstruenda sententiam, ubi ait : " Qui mecum non est,
adversum me est/' Constitue igitur quemlibet parvulum :
si jam cum Christo est, ut quid baptizatur ? Si autem,
quod habet veritas, ideo baptizatur ut sic cum Christo,
profecto non baptizatus non est cum Christo, et, quia non
est cum Christo, adversus Christum est.' — Ibid. c. xxviii.
' Unde fit consequens ut, quoniam nihil agitur aliud,
cum parvuli baptizantur, nisi ut incorporentur ecclesise, id
est, Christi corpori membrisque associentur ; manifestum
est eos ad damnationem, nisi hoc eis collatum fuerit, perti -
nere. Non autem damnari possent, si peccatum utique
non haberent. Hoc quia ilia setas nulla in vita propria
contrahere potuit, restat intelligere vel, si hoc nondum
possumus, saltern credere, trahere parvulos originale pec
catum.' — Ibid. 1. 3. c. iv.
' Absit ut causam parvulorum sic relinquamus, ut esse
nobis dicamus incertum, utrum in Christo regenerati, si
moriantur parvuli, transeant in seternam salutem ; non
regenerati autem transeant in mortem secundam ; quoniam
quod scriptum est, " Per unum hominem peccatum intravit
in mundum, et per peccatum mors ; et ita in omnes
homines pertransiit," aliter recte intelligi non potest : nee
a morte perpetua quse justissime est retributa peccato,
liberat quenquam pusillorum atque magnorum, nisi ille
qui propter remittenda et originalia et propria nostra pec-
cata mortuus est, sine ullo suo originali et proprio peccato.
Sed quare illos potius quam illos ? Iterum atque iterum
dicimus, nee nos piget, " 0 homo, tu quis es qui respondeas
Deo ? " ' — De Dono Perseverantice, c. xii.
' Sed ut id quod dicimus alicujus exempli manifesta-
Note XV II I.
385
tione clarescat, constituamus aliquos ab abliqua meretrice
geminos editos, atque ut ab aliis colligerentur, expositos :
horum sine baptismo expiravit unus, alius baptizatus.
Quid restat quantum ad baptizatum attinet, nisi gratia
Dei quae vasis factis in honorem gratis datur ; quantum
autem ad non baptizatum, ira Dei, quae vasis factis ad con-
tumeliam pro ipsius massae mentis redditur ? '— Contra
Duas Ep. Pel. 1. 2. c. vii.
' Ac per hoc, quia nihil ipsi male vivendo addiderunt
ad originale peccatum, potest eorum merito dici in ilia
damnatione minima poena, non tamen nulla. Quisquis
autem putat diversitatem futuram non esse pcenarum, legat
quod scriptum est, " Tolerabilius erit Sodoma3 in die judicii,
quam illi civitati." Non ergo a deceptoribus inter regnum
et suppliciiun medius locus quaeratur infantibus ; sedtran-
seant a diabolo ad Christum, hoc est, a morte ad vitain, n<>
ira Dei maneat super eos.' — Ep. 1 84. c. 1 .
'Respondeat quid de illo futurum sit, qui, nulla sua
culpa non baptizatus, ista fuerit temporali morte pneventus.
Si non putamus esse dicturum quod innocentem Deus, nee
habentem originale peccatum ante annos quibus habere
poterat proprium, aeterna morte damnabit ; cogitur itaque
respondere quod Pelagius in ecclesiastico judicio, ut aliquo
modo catholicus pronuntiaretur, anathematizare compulsus
est, infantes, etiamsi non baptizentur, habere vitam ;eter-
nam : hac enim negata, quid nisi mors sterna remanebit ? '
— Ep. 186. c. viii.
' Primus hie error aversandus ab auribus, exstirpandus
a mentibus. Hoc novum in ecclesia, prius inauditum est,
esse vitam geternam praeter regnum ccelorum, esse salutem
aeternam praeter regnum Dei. Primo vide, frater, ne forte
hie consentire nobis debeas, quisquis ad regnum Dei non
pertinet, eum ad damnationem sine dubio pertinere. Ven
turas Dominus, et judicaturus de vivis et mortuis, sicut
evangelium loquitur, duas partes facturus est, dextram et
sinistram. Sinistris dicturus, Ite in ignem ccternam, qui
paratus est Diabolo et anyelis ejus; dextris dicturus,
Venite benedicti Patris mei.perdpite regnum quod vobw
paratum est, ab origine mundi. Hac regnum nominat,
c c
386 Note XIX.
hac cum diabolo damnationem. Nullus relictus est medius
locus, ubi ponere queas infantes. De vivis et mortuis
judicabitur : alii erunt ad dextram, alii ad sinistram : non
novi aliud. Qui inducis medium, recede de medio, sed
noli in sinistram. Si ergo dextra erit, et sinistra, et
nullum medium locum in Evangelio novimus; ecce in
dextra regnum coelorum est, Perdpite, inquit, regnum.
Qui ibi non est in sinistra est. Quid erit in sinistra ? Itv
in ignem ceternum. In dextra ad regnum, utique aeter-
num ; in sinistra in ignem seternum. Qui non in dextra,
procul dubio in sinistra : ergo qui non in regno, procul
dubio in igne asterno. Certe habere potest vitam seternam
qui non baptizatur ? Non est in dextra, id est, non erit
in regno. Vitam aeternam computas ignem sempiternum ?
Et de ipsa vita sterna audi expressius, quia nihil aliud est
regnum quam vita seterna. Prius regnum nominavit, sed
in dextris ; ignem seternum in sinistris. Extrema autem
sententia, ut doceret quid sit regnum, et quid sit ignis
sempiternus — Tune, inquit, abibunt isti in ambustionem
ceternam ; just I autem in vitam ceternam.
' Ecce exposuit tibi quid sit regnum, et quid sit ignis
aeternus ; ut quando confitearis parvulum non futurum in
regno, fatearis futurum in igne asterno.' — Serm. 294,
c. iii.
NOTE XIX. p. 131.
HOOKER states S. Augustine's doctrine of predestination as
the doctrine ' that the whole body of mankind in the view
of Grod's eternal knowledge lay universally polluted with
sin, worthy of condemnation and death ; that over the mass
of corruption there passed two acts of the will of Grod, an
act of favour, liberality, and grace, choosing part to be
made partakers of everlasting glory; and an act of justice,
forsaking the rest and adjudging them to endless perdition;
these vessels of wrath, those of mercy ; which mercy is to
Grod's elect so peculiar, and to them and none else (for
their number is definitely known, and can neither be in
creased nor diminished), to them it allotteth immortality
and all things thereunto appertaining ; them it predes-
Note XIX. 387
tinateth, it calleth, justifieth, glorifieth them; it poureth
voluntarily that spirit into their hearts, which spirit so
given is the root of their very first desires and motions
tending to immortality ; as for others on whom such grace
is not bestowed, there is justly assigned, and immutably
to every of them, the lot of eternal condemnation.'—
Appendix to bk. v. Keble's edition, p. 730.
Another statement, a little further on, not so much of
Augustine's doctrine as professing to be founded upon it,
is somewhat less rigid : ' To proceed, we have seen the
general inclination of God towards all men's everlasting
happiness, notwithstanding sin ; we have seen that the
natural love of God towards mankind was the cause of
appointing or predestinating Christ to suffer for the sins
of the whole world — we have seen that our Lord, who made
Himself a sacrifice for our sins, did it in the bowels of a
merciful desire that no man might perish — we have seen
that God, nevertheless, hath found most just occasion to
decree the death and condemnation of some — we have seen
that the whole cause why such are excluded from life
resteth altogether in themselves — we have seen that the
natural will of God being inclined toward all men's salva
tion, and His occasioned will having set down the death
but of some in such condemnation, as hath been shewed,
it must needs follow that of the rest there is a determinate
ordinance proceeding from the good pleasure of God,
whereby they are, and have been before all worlds, predes
tinated heirs of eternal bliss— we have seen that in Christ,
the Prince of God's elect, all worthiness was foreseen ;
that in the elect angels there was not foreseen any
matter for just indignation and wrath to work upon ; that
in all other God foresaw iniquity, for which an irrevocable
sentence of death and condemnation might most justly
have passed over all : for it can never be too often incul-
.cated that touching the very decree of endless destruction
and death, God is the Judge from whom it cometh, but
man the cause from which it grew. Salvation contrari
wise, and life proceedeth only both from God and of God.
We are receivers through grace and mercy, authors through
c c 2
388 Note XIX.
merit and desert we are not, of our own salvation. In the
children of perdition we must always remember that of the
Prophet, "Thy destruction, 0 Israel is of thyself;" lest
we teach men blasphemously to cast the blame of all their
misery upon (rod. Again, lest we take to ourselves the
glory of that happiness, which, if He did not freely and
voluntarily bestow, we should never be made partakers
thereof, it must ever, in the election of saints, be remem
bered, that to choose is an act of (rod's good pleasure, which
presupposeth in us sufficient cause to avert, but none to
deserve it. For this cause, whereas S. Augustine had some
time, been of opinion that (rod chose Jacob and hated
Esau, the one in regard of belief, the other of infidelity,
which was foreseen, his mind he afterwards delivered thus :
" Jacob / have loved ; behold what (rod doth freely be
stow. 7 have hated Esau ; behold what man doth justly
deserve." ' —p. 737.
There is some departure here from the rigour of the
real Augustinian language, though no positive inconsis
tency with the Augustinian doctrine. The modification is
given by suppression ; ' We have seen,' he says, ' that the
whole cause why such are excluded from life resteth alto
gether in themselves.'' S. Augustine would say this, but
he would explain at the same time that this cause in man
himself was not foreseen personal sin, but original sin.
Hooker suppresses this interpretation, and leaves men's
actual foreseen sins as the cause, according to the natural
meaning of his phrase, of their exclusion from the decree
of predestination to life.
A third statement of the doctrine of predestination re
verts to a stricter line. ' It followeth, therefore — 1 . That
Grod hath predestinated certain men, not all men ; 2. That
the cause moving Him hereunto was not the foresight of
any virtue in us at all; 3. That to Him the number of
His elect is definitely known ; 4. That it cannot be but
their sins must condemn them to whom the purpose of His
saving mercy doth not extend; 5. That to God's fore
known elect final continuance in grace is given ; 6. That
•inward grace whereby to be saved is deservedly not given
unto all men ; 7. That no man cometh unto Christ, whom
Note XX. 389
(rod by the inward grace of the Spirit draweth not ; 8. And
that it is not in every one, no, not in any man's mere ability,
freedom, and power, to be saved ; no man's salvation being
possible without grace. Howbeit, God is no favourer of
sloth, and therefore there can be no such absolute decree
touching man's salvation, as on our part includeth no
necessity of care and travail, but shall certainly take effect,
whether we ourselves do wake or sleep.' — p. 752. The
difference between this statement and the Lambeth Articles
consists in an omission and insertion, softening the general
effect of the language, while the substantial ground is the
same. Thus the first Lambeth Article mentions reproba
tion, which the first article of this statement does not ; but
reprobation is implied in it. Again, the 7th Lambeth
Article says, c Gratia salutaris non tribuitur universis homi-
nibus qua servari possint, si voluerint.' Hooker inserts
after 'is not given,' ' desewedlyj which softens the effect,
though the desert may be admitted by the most rigid pre-
destinarian in the shape of original sin. There is a real
difference between the two statements of doctrine, in the
omission in Hooker's of the doctrine of assurance, which is
asserted in the Lambeth document.
NOTE XX. p. 234.
IN the controversy in the Gallican Church, on the subject
of predestination, which arose out of the doctrinal state
ments of Gotteschalcus ; which was conducted by Hinck-
mar, archbishop of Eheims, on the one side, and Kemigius,
archbishop of Lyons, on the other, and which produced the
Councils of Quiercy and Valence ; neither side appears to
have sifted the question to its foundation, or to have
understood its really turning points ; and there is, accord
ingly, a good deal of arbitrary adoption and arbitrary re
jection of language on both sides ; a good deal of reliance
on distinctions without a difference, that is to say, on words.
The doctrinal statement of Gotteschalcus embraces the fol
lowing five points.— Ushers Gotteschalci Historia, p. 27.
' f. Ante omnia secula, et antequam quicquam faceret
3QO Note XX.
a principio Deus quos voluit praedestinavit ad regnum, et
quos voluit praedestinavit ad interitum.
' 2. Qui praedestinati sunt ad interitum salvari non pos-
sunt, et qui praedestinati sunt ad regnum perire non possunt.
' 3. Deus non vult omnes homines salvos fieri, sed eos
tantum qui salvantur : et quod dicit Apostolus " Qui vult
omnes homines salvos fieri," illos dicit omnes qui tantum-
modo salvantur.
6 4. Christus non venit ut omnes salvaret ; nee passus
est pro omnibus, nisi solummodo pro his qui passionis ejus
salvantur mysterio.
' 5. Postquam primus homo libero arbitrio cecidit,
nemo nostrum ad bene agendum, sed tantummodo ad male
agendum, libero potest uti arbitrio.'
This statement of doctrine is substantially Augustinian,
and nothing more ; and Remigius approves of it as a whole,
making an exception against the 5th proposition ; respect
ing the meaning of which he must have been under some
mistake, for the language expresses no more than what is
necessarily involved in the doctrine of original sin. With
this exception, he maintains this doctrinal statement to be
supported, ' uno sensu uno ore, by the fathers and the
Church, and appeals to the undisputed authority of Augus
tine in their favour — ' Beatissimi patris Augustini ab
omni semper ecclesia venerabiliter recepti et usque in
finem seculi recipiendi, explaining the text ' Qui vult
omnes homines salvos fieri,' apparently contradicted in the
3rd proposition, according to Augustine's interpretation :
(1.) ' Ut omnes homines omnia hominum genera accipia-
mus : ' (2.) c non quod omnes salventur, sed quod nemo nisi
miserationis ejus voluntate salvetur.' On the 4th he says :
4 Si inveniantur aliqui patrum qui etiam pro impiis in sua
impietate permansuris Dominum crucifixum dicant ; ' if
they can prove it out of Scripture well, if not, 'quis non
videat potiorem illam esse auctoritatem, quae et tarn evi-
denti ratione et tarn multiplici Scripturarum attestatione
firmatur? .... Si autem placet, propter pacem, non
renuatur Nihil tamen definiatur.' — p. 34.
The Council of Quiercy (Concilium Carisiacense) sum-
Note XX. 391
moned by Hinckmar, condemned the opinions of Gottes-
chalcus, and published a counter statement of doctrine,
which placed the doctrine of predestination upon a ground
of foreknowledge : ' Secundum prccscientiam suam quos
per gratiam praedestinavit ad vitam elegit ex massa per-
ditionis. Caeteros autem quos justitiae judicio in massa
perditionis reliquit, perituros praescivit, sed non ut perirent
praedestinavit.' — p. 67. There is nothing in the language
of this proposition to which the most rigid predestinarian
might not subscribe ; but Remigius interprets the prw-
scientia as the foreknowledge of the individual's good life,
and as implying the resting of the doctrine of predesti
nation on that ground : ' Quod manifesto contrarium est,
Catholicae tidei. Quia Omnipotens Deus in electione eorum
quos prsedestinavit, et vocavit ad vitam aeternam, non eorum
merita prsescivit.' On the subject of the Divine will to
save all mankind the Council decreed : * Deus omnipotens
omnes homines sine exceptione vult salvos fieri, licet
non omnes salventur,' to which proposition Remigius op
poses the fact of the heathen world, the damnation of
which he considers to be a point which has been decided
by the Church. The same question was taken up by the
Council in another form; viz. whether Christ did or did
not suffer for all men, which it decided in the affirmative.
4 Christus Jesus Dominus noster, sicut nullus homo est fuit
vel erit cujus natura in illo assumpta non fuerit, ita nullus
est fuit vel erat homo pro quo passus non fuerit ; licet non
omnes passionis ejus mysterio redimantur.' On this argu
ment Remigius remarks : * Quod dicitur quod nullus homo
est fuit vel erit cujus natura in Christo assumpta non
fuerit Susceptio iUa naturae humanae in Christo
non fuit ex necessitate originis, sed ex potestate et gratia
et misericordia et dignatione suscipientis. Quia ergo ista
tarn divina et singularis generatio homims Chnsl
aliqua naturali necessitate, sed sola ejus potestate et gratia
et misericordia facta est; sic per omnes generations caro
ejus descendit; sic ex eis veraciter natus verus homo factus
est ut quod eiplacuit miserendo, et sanawlo, et redimendo
inde assumeret, quod autem non placuit reprobaret.-
392 Note XX.
p. 79. The argument is, that our Lord's assumption of
human nature being itself a condescension, and special
dispensation, has a particular limited scope, according to
the Divine pleasure, and only brings Him, as possessing
this nature, into communion with a certain portion of
those whom this nature includes, and is only beneficial to
this portion.
The controversy, which is thus substantially between
the Augustinian and the Semi-Pelagian doctrines, exhibits,
however, much confusion, and is encumbered by false dis
tinctions. A great deal is made of the question of the
duplex prcedestinatio. Hinckmar admitting a predesti
nation to life eternal, refuses to admit a predestination to
punishment, and insists on the distinction between leaving
men in their sinful state, of which punishment will be
the consequence, and ordaining men to such punishment.
' Quosdam autem, sicut praescivit, non ad mortem neque
ad ignem prsedestinavit, sed in massa peccati et perdi-
tionis juste deseruit, a qua eos prsedestinatione sua (i. e.
gratiae praeparatione) occulto sed noninjusto judicionequa-
quam eripuit.' — p. 93. But the most rigid predestinarian
would not object to this statement. There is no real dis
tinction between abandoning men to a certain state, of
which punishment will be the consequence, and ordaining
them to that punishment. The only distinction which
would make a difference, respects the nature of this sinful
state, to which men are abandoned, whether it is original
sin or their own personal perseverance in sin. The aban
donment of a certain portion of mankind to the state of
sin in which they are born, is predestinarian reprobation,
whether we express it as abandonment to sin, or as ordain
ing to punishment. Eemigius exposes the irrelevancy of
this distinction : 4 Mirum valde est quomodo negare con-
tendunt eum seternam ipsorum damnationem praedesti-
nasse, quos jam ab ipso mundi exordio, cum primus homo
peccavit, et omne humanum genus ex se propagandum
unam massam damnationis et perditionis fecit, manifeste
dicant in eadem massa damnationis et perditionis justo Dei
judicio deputatos et derelictos. Quid est enim massa dam-
Note XXL 393
nationis et perditionis ab initio mundi divine judicio effecta,
nisi eodem divino judicio seterase damnationi et perdition!
destinata et tradita ? ' — p. 93.
Hinckmar insists again on the Augustinian definition
of predestination as gratice prwparatio (p. 94.), as favour
ing his denial of any prcedestinatio liumnationis ; to
which Eemigius replies, that a predestination to life did
not exclude the predestination to punishment. It is ob
vious that the whole of this discussion is verbal, and is
not concerned with the real grounds and substance of the
controversy.
NOTE XXI. p. 267.
I SEE no substantial difference between the Augustiniau
and Thomist, and the Calvinist doctrine of predestination.
S. Augustine and Calvin alike hold an eternal Divine
decree, which, antecedently to all action, separates one
portion of mankind from another, and ordains one to ever
lasting life and the other to everlasting punishment. That
is the fundamental statement of both ; and it is evident,
that while this fundamental statement is the same, there
can be no substantial difference in the two doctrines. This
statement is the sum and substance of the doctrine of pre
destination : and therefore if Augustine and Calvin agree
in this statement, it may be pronounced in limine idle to
talk of any real difference between their respective doctrines
on this subject. Let persons only consider what this state
ment is, and what it necessarily involves, and they must
see it is impossible that there can be any real distinction
of doctrine on the particular subject of predestination, after
this statement has been agreed in by the two. Those who
suppose that S. Augustine differs from Calvin in his doc
trine of predestination, do not really know the doctrine
which S. Augustine held on the subject, and suppose it to
be different from what it was. They suppose it to be a
qualified doctrine of predestination to privileges and means
of grace ; or they have some general idea that S. Augustine
did not hold such a doctrine as Calvin held-an assump
tion which settles to begin with the question for them.
394 Note XXL
But if Augustine's doctrine was the one which has been
here stated to be his, and if it was expressed in the above
fundamental statement, it must be seen immediately that
it is the same as Calvin's doctrine.
And the identity of the two doctrines thus apparent at
first sight, and from the fundamental statement by which
they are expressed, will appear further from the cautions
and checks by which each guards the doctrine. We may
be referred to various cautions and checks which S. Augus
tine and his followers in the schools appended to the doc
trine of predestination ; from which it will be argued that
the doctrine was not the same as the Calvinistic one. But
it will be found on examination that Calvin has just the
same cautions and checks.
The checks and cautions, which S. Augustine and his
followers in the schools appended to their doctrine of pre
destination, were substantially these two : that God was
not the author of evil ; and that man had ivill, and was,
as having a will, responsible for his own sins. The doctrine
of predestination was relieved from two consequences which
appeared to follow from it. If God is the sole author and
cause of our goodness, how is He not the author and cause
of our sin too ? If we are bound to refer the one to Him,
why not the other ? The doctrine thus led to the conse
quence that God was the author of evil. This consequence,
then, was cut off by a formal check, accompanied with more
or less of argument, that God was not the author of evil.
In the same way the doctrine of predestination, maintain
ing sin as necessary, led to the result that man was not
responsible for his sins. This consequence then was cut
off, as the former was, by a formal check, also accompanied
by more or less of argument — that man had a will, that he
sinned with this will or willingly, and that sinning willingly
he was responsible for his sins.
But this whole check to the doctrine of predestination,
viz. that man is responsible for his own sins, and not God^
is appended to that doctrine by Calvin just as much as it
is by Augustine. Indeed, no one who professed to be a
Christian could teach the doctrine without such a check. No
Note XXL 395
Christian of any school could make God the author of evil,
or say that sin was not blameworthy.
First, Calvin protests generally against fatalism ; i.e.
any doctrine that denies contingency^ and asserts all events to
take place according to a certain fixed and inevitable order,
which could not have been otherwise : ' Vetus ista calumnia
fuit, qua se Augustinus injuste fuisse graviitum alicubi
conqueritur : nunc obsoletam esse decebat. Certe horai-
nibus probis et ingenuis, si modo iidem docti sint, valde
indigna est. Qualis fuerit Stoicorum imaginatio, notuin
est. Fatum suum texebant ex Gordiano causarum com-
plexu : in quem cum Deum ipsum involuerant, fabricabant
aureas catenas, ut est in fabulis, quibus Deum vincirent,
ut subjectus esset inferioribus causis. Stoicos liodie
imitantur astrologi, quibus fatalis ex stellarum positu
dependet rerum necessitas. Valeant igitur cum suo fato
Stoici : nobis libera Dei voluntas omnium sit moderatrix.
Sed contingentiam tolli ex mundo valde absurdum est.
Omitto qua3 in Scholis usitatas sunt distinctiones. Quod
afferam simplex, meo judicio, et minime coactum erit,
deinde ad vitae usum accommodatum. Sic evenire necesse
est quod statuit Deus, ut tamen neque precise neque
suapte natura necessarium sit, Exemplum in Christi
ossibus familiare habeo. Christum corpus habuisse prorsus
nostro simile Scriptura testatur. Quare fragilia illi ossa
fuisse fateri nemo sanus dubitabit. Sed alia mihi videtur
ac separata qusestio, an ullum os ejus frangi potuerit.
Nam integra omnia et illassa manere, quia fixo Dei decreto
ita statutum erat, necessario oportuit. Nee vero quod a
receptis loquendi formis de necessitate secundum quid et
absoluta, item consequents et consequential abhorream,
ita loquor; sed ne quae lectoris argutia impediat, qum
agnoscatvelrudissimusquisqueverum esse quod dico. . . .
Ac memoria tenendum est, quod ante posui, ubi Deus per
medias et inferiores causas virtutem suam exerit, non e:
ab illis separandam. Temulenta est ista cogitatio:
crevit Deus quid futurum sit; ergo curam et studmm
nostrum interponere supervacuuin est. Atqui, cum nob
quid agendum sit, prascribat, et virtutis suae organa n
396 Note XXI.
esse velit ; fas nobis est ne putemus separare quae ille
conjunxit. . . . Ergo quantum ad futurum tempus, quia
nos adhuc rerum eventus latent, perinde ad officium suum
intentus esse quisque debet, ac si nihil in utramvis partem
constitutum foret. Vel ut magis proprie loquar, talem in
omnibus qua? ex Dei mandato aggreditur, successum
sperare debet, ut in rebus sibi incognitis contingentiam
cum certa Dei providentia conciliet. . . . Hac voce pius
vir se divinae providentiae organum constitui agnoscet.
Hac eadem promissione fretus, alacriter ad opus se accinget,
quia persuasus erit, non fortuitam se operam in aere
jacere. . . . Invocationem adeo non impedit, ut potius
stabiliat. . . . Non sequitur quin rerum adversarum cul-
pam vel ignavia nostra, vel temeritas, vel incogitantia,
vel aliud vitium merito sustineat.' — De Prcedestinatione,
vol. x. p. 725.
Here is the doctrine of the schools respecting mediate
and secondary causes ; that events take their character
from the causes that produce them, and are necessary or
contingent, according as their causes are the one or the
other. Calvin refers in the passage to the distinctions of
the schools, with which he says he does not disagree ; and
his statement is only another form of that of Aquinas :
' Deus omnia movet secundum eorum conditionem ; ita
quod ex causis necessariis per motionem divinam sequuntur
effectus ex necessitate, ex causis autem contingentibus
sequuntur effectus contingentes.' Supra, p. 254. He
protests against indolence or carelessness in temporal or
spiritual matters, as a wholly illegitimate result to fasten
on his doctrine ; and says that people must act as if events
were contingent, and not suppose that, because events are
foreordained, that therefore they are foreordained without
the necessary means to bring them about ; which means
lie in our own conduct and course of action.
Thus, while maintaining the Divine infallible decree of
predestination, he protests against men making that decree
their starting point, and putting it in prior order to action,
in their own ideas and thoughts about themselves : 'Neque
ego sane ad arcanam Dei electionem homines ablego, ut
Note XXL 397
inde salutem hiantes expectent : sed recte ad Christum
pergere jubeo, in quo nobis proposita est salus ; qua?
alioqui in Deo abscondita lateret. Nam quisquis planam
fidei viam non ingreditur, illi Dei electio nihil (mam
exitialis erit labarynthus. . . . Hinc minime faciendum
est exordium, quid de nobis ante mundum conditum
Deus statuerit ; sed quid de paterno ejus amore nobis in
Christo sit patefactum, et quotidie per evangelium Christus
ipse prsedicet. Nihil altius nobis quserendum, quam ut
Dei filii simus.'— Vol. x. p. 708.
After this protest against fatalism, Calvin proceeds to
acknowledge a true will in man ; that he acts willingly
and without constraint; and that consequently the blame
of his sins rests entirely upon himself; and that to charge
(xod with the authorship of them is impiety and blasphemy.
The ground he takes is strictly Aiigustinian : 'Voluntas,
quia inseparabilis est ab hominis natura, non periit; sed
pravis cupiditatibus devincta fuit, ut nihil rectum appetere
queat.' — Instit. 1. 2. c. 2. s. 12. 'Non voluntate privatus
est homo quum in hanc necessitatem se addixit. sed volun-
tatis sanitate. ... Si liberam Dei voluntatem in bene
agendo non impedit, quod necesse est ilium bene agere :
si diabolus, qui nonnisi male agere potest, voluntate tamen
peccat; qui s hominem ideo minus voluntarie peccare dicet,
quod sit peccandi necessitati obnoxius ? Hanc necessitatem
quum ubique praedicet Augustinus, dum etiain invidiose
Coelestii cavillo urgeretur, ne turn quidem asserere dubi-
tavit " Per libertatem factum est ut esset homo cum
peccato : sed jam poenalis vitiositas subsecumta ex libertate
fecit necessitatem." Ac quoties incidit ejus rei mentio,
non dubitat in hunc modum loqui, de necessaria peccati
servitute. Ha3C igitur distinctionis summa observetur,
hominem, ut vitiatus est ex lapsu, volentem quidem pec-
care, non invitum nee coactum: affectione ammi yro-
pinquissima. . . . Augustino subscribens Bernardus ita
scribit, "Solus homo inter animalia liber: et tamen, m-
terveniente peccato, patitur quandam vim et ipse, sed a
voluntate non a natura, ut ne sic guidem ingenita liter-
tate privetur. Quod enim voluntarium etjam liberum.
398 Note XX I.
Et paulo post — " Ita nescio quo pravo et miro modo ipsa
sibi voluntas, peccato quidem in deterius mutata, necessi-
tatem facit ; ut nee necessitas (cum voluntaria sit) excu-
sare valeat voluntatem, nee voluntas (quum sit illecta)
excludere necessitatem." Est enim necessitas haec quo-
dammodo voluntaria.' L. 2. c. 3. s. 5. 'Voluntatem dico
aboleri non quatenus est voluntas, quia in hominis conver-
sione integrum manet quod primse est naturae ; creari
etiam novam dico, non ut voluntas esse incipiat, sed ut
vertatur ex mala in bonam.' — L. 2. c. 3. s. 6.
Upon the ground, then, of the existence of this true
will in man, he lays the responsibility of sin entirely upon
man himself : ' Nego peccatum ideo minus debere impu-
tari, quod necessarium est.' — Instit. 1. 2. c. 4. s. 5. ' Eant
mine qui Deum suis vitiis inscribere audent, quia dicimus
naturaliter vitiosos esse homines. ... A carnis nostrae
culpa non a Deo nostra perditio est.' — L. 2. c. 1. s. 10.
' Respondeant, possintne inficiari causam contiimaciaa pra-
vam suam voluntatem fuisse. Si mali fontem intra se
reperiant, quid vestigandis extraneis causis inhiant, ne
sibi ipsi fuisse exitii authores videantur.' — L. 2. c. 5. s. 11.
'Non extrinseco impulsu, sed spontaneo cordis affectu,
scientes ac volentes peccarunt.' — De Freed, vol. x. p. 709.
' Ad reatum satis superque voluntaria transgressio
sufficit. Neque enim propria genuinaque peccati causa
est arcanum Dei consilium, sed aperta hominis voluntas.
.... Intus mali sui causam quum inveniat homo, quid
circuire prodest, ut earn in coelo quserat? Palam in eo
apparet culpa quod peccare voluerit. Cur in coali adyta
perrumpens in labarynthum se demergit ? Quanquam ut
per immensas ambages vagando, deludere se homines
conentur, nunquam ita se obstupefacient, quin sensum
peccati in cordibus suis insculptum retineant. Hominem
igitur, quern ipsius sui conscientia damnat, frustra absol-
vere tendit impietas.' — De Freed, vol. x. p. 711. 'Neque
in Deum transferimus indurationis causam acsi non sponte
propriaque malitia seipsos ad pervicaciam acuerent.' —
p. 727. ' Quum perditis exitium denuntiat Scriptura,
causam in seternum Dei consilium minime rejicit, vel
Note XXL
399
transfert; sed residere in ipsis testatur. Nos vero non
ideo reprobos tradimus destitui Dei Spiritu, ut sceleruui
suorum culpam in Deum imputent. Quicquid peccant
homines sibi imputent. Quod si quis subterfugiat, con-
scientiae vinculis fortius constringi dico, quam ut se a justa
damnatione expediat. ... Si quis obstrepat, prompta est
exceptio, Perditio tua ex te Israel. . . . Non audiendi
sunt qui procul remotas causas e nubibus accersunt, ut
culpse suae notitiam, quae et eorum cordibus penitus in-
sidet, neque occulta latere potest, utcunque obscurent.'—
p. 721.
The cautions and checks, then, which Calvin appends
to the doctrine of predestination are substantially the same
with those we find appended to the doctrine in S. Augustine
and the Augustinian schoolmen. Predestination, according
to Calvin, is no excuse for spiritual indolence or careless
ness ; it does not detract at all from man's responsibility,
who is as much to blame for his sins upon this doctrine as
upon the contrary one; and therefore whether we look to
the fundamental statement of the doctrine, or to the checks
and cautions with which it is surrounded, the doctrine of
Calvin on this subject is seen to be the same as that of
S. Augustine.
It is true Calvin condemns the scholastic treatment of
this question, and after S. Augustine nobody, except
perhaps S. Bernard, seems to satisfy him. But this com
plaint is qualified. He acknowledges, in the first place,
that however their own interpretations of such doctrines
may have fallen short, the fundamental doctrines of the
schools were Augustinian and orthodox on this question :
« Qui postea secuti sunt, alii post alios in detenus contmuo
delapsi sunt; donee eo ventum est ut vulgo putaretur
homo sensuali tandem parte corruptus. . . . Interea
tavit illud in ore omnium, naturalia dona in homne
corrupta esse, supernaturalia vero ablata. Sed quorsum
tenderet, vix cente^imus quisque leviter gustavit.
certe si dilucide tradere velim qualis sit naturae corrupt €
his verbis facile sim contentus.'—Instit. 1. 2. c. As. 4
He admits here a certain foundation in the teaching of the
400 Note XXL
schools which was orthodox, though it was overlaid with
weak or injurious commentary. In the next place he
makes a distinction amongst schoolmen; and while he
complains of the refinements of Lombard and Aquinas,
regards them as in the main orthodox : ' Longiore inter-
vallo a recentioribus sophistis differed — Inst. 1. 2. c. 2.
s. 6. The older commentators he considers to have main
tained, though with too little boldness and openness, and
with too great an appearance of compromise, the Augus-
tinian ground. Thus he complains of Lombard's use of
the term freewill : ' Ac principal em quidem causam in
gratia esse non negant : sed eo tamen contendunt non ex-
cludi liberum arbitrium, per quod sit omne meritum.
Neque id tradunt posteriores modo sophistse, sed eorum
Pythagoras Lombardus ; quern, si cum istis compares,
sanum et sobrium esse dicas. Mirse profecto csecitatis
fait, quum Augustinum toties in ore haberet, non vidisse
quanta solicitudine vir ille caverit ne ulla ex bonis operibus
glorise particula in hominem derivaretur.' — Instit. 1. 3.
c. 15. s. 7. ' Magister sententiarum duplicem gratiam
necessariam esse nobis docet, quo reddamur ad opus bonum
idonei. Alteram vocat Operantem, qua fit ut efficaciter
velimus bonum ; Cooperantem alteram quse bonam volun-
tatem sequitur adjuvando. In qua parti tione hoc mini
displicet, quod dum Gratias Dei tribuit efficacem boni
appetitum, innuit hominem jam suapte natura bonum
quodammodo licet inefficaciter appetere. ... In secundo
membro ambiguitas me offendit, quse perversam genuit
interpretationem. Ideo enim putarunt nos secundse Dei
gratise cooperari, quod nostri juris sit primam gratiain vel
respuendo irritam facere, v*l obedienter sequendo con-
firmare. . . . Hcec duo notare obiter libuit, ut videas
jam lector, quantum a sanioribus scholasticis dissen-
tiam. . . . Utcunque, ex hac tamen parti tione intelligimus
qua ratione liberum dederint arbitrium homini. Pro-
nuntiat enim tandem Lombardus, non liberi arbitrii
ideo nos esse, quod ad bonum vel ad malum vel agendum
vel cogitandum perceque polleamus, sed duntaxat quod
coactione soluti sumus. . . . Optime id quidem, sed
Note XXL 4oi
quorsum attinebat, rem tantulam adeo superbo titulo in-
signire Equidem Xoyofjua^ias abominor, quibus
frustra ecclesia fatigatur; sed religiose censeo cavendas
eas voces quse absurdum aliquid sonant, proesertim ubi
perniciose erratur. Quotus enim quaeso qnisque est, qui,
dum assignari homini liberum arbitrium audit, non statim
concipit ilium esse et mentis sure et voluntatis dominum,
qui flectere se in utramvis partem a seipso possit? Atqui
(dicet quispiam) sublatum erit hujusmodi perictilum, si de
significatione diligenter plebs admoneatur. Imo vero cum
in falsitatem ultro humanum ingenium propendeat, citius
errorem ex verbulo uno hauriet, quam veritatem ex prolixa
oratione.' — Instit. 1. 2. c. 2. ss. 6, 7.
It is evident that Calvin's quarrel with Lombard here
is about the use of a word, and not about a substantial
point of doctrine. In substantial doctrine he considers
they both agree, though he thinks Lombard's distinction
of operative and co-operative grace so worded as to tend
to mislead, and though he objects to the use of the word
freewill altogether, which he thinks will always lie practi
cally understood by the mass of men in the sense of a self-
determining will. He would not object to the word if
Lombard's sense could be fastened upon it ; but he differs
from him as to the expediency of using a term on which it
will be so difficult to fasten this meaning, and which will
always more readily suggest another and an erroneous one.
His disagreement with Lombard is thus of the same kind
with the disagreement noticed above, p. 267, with Aquinas,
which was concerned with language and mode of statement
as distinguished from substantial doctrine.
Calvin's reflections on the schoolmen, then, do not
appear to prove any substantial difference on the subject
of predestination, grace, and freewill, between himself and
the Augustinian portion of the schoolmen. And this con
clusion obliges me to notice some remarks of Pascal bearing
on this question in the Provincial Letters.
I must admit, then, that I have against me, on this
point, the authority of Pascal, who endeavours in the Pro
vincial Letters to prove a strong distinction between the
DD
402 Note XXL
doctrine of Calvin and the Reformers, and the Augustinian
and Jansenist doctrine, on the subject of grace and free
will. But I admit it the more readily, for the obvious
consideration, that Pascal was not in a position to ackow-
ledge such an identity in the doctrine of the two schools.
As an attached member of the Roman communion, he was
obliged by his position to disconnect his own and his
party's doctrine as much as possible from that of the
Reformers, and to make out a wide difference between
them. The Jansenists were attacked on all sides as dis
affected members of the Roman Church, Reformers in
heart, though outwardly Catholics. They disowned and
repelled the charge with indignation. But what is the
natural, the irresistible disposition of a religious party
under such circumstances, with respect to the doctrines
upon which such a charge is founded ? It is, of course, to
make out, in any way they can, a difference between these
doctrines and those of the other school, with which their
opponents identify them. Under such circumstances, the
authority even of Pascal has not, upon the present ques
tion, any irresistible weight. And when we come to
examine his argument, and the reasons upon which he
erects the difference he does between the Augustinian and
the Calvinistic doctrine of grace, any weight that we might
previously have been inclined to give his conclusion is
much diminished.
Every reader of the Provincial Letters will remember
the great argumentative clearness and penetration, sup
ported by the keenest irony, with which Pascal proves the
identity, under a guise of verbal difference, of the Thomist
doctrine of grace with the Jansenist. The Thomist mem
bers of the Sorbonne, siding with the Jesuits against the
Jansenists, had distinguished their own doctrine of grace
from that of the Jansenists by a particular term ; to the
use of which, though apparently counter to their own
Augustinian doctrine, they had by an arrangement con
sented among themselves, but to which the Jansenists
would not consent. This was the term prochain — proxi-
mus. The Thoinists maintained that every Christian had
Note XXL 403
the pouvoir prochain to obey the Divine commandments,
and so attain eternal life ; while the Jansenists, admitting
the power of any Christian to do this, would not admit
that this power was prochain ; the distinction being, that
the term power of itself, in the Augustinian sense (even
supposing every one had such power), committed them to
no assertion contrary to the exclusive and predestinarian
doctrine, which made salvation only really attainable by
the elect. For power in the Augustinian sense onlv means
potestas si vult; in which sense the admission that all
Christians have the power is not at all opposed to the
doctrine that only the elect have the will given to them
to lead that good life on which salvation depends. J>ut
the addition of the term ' prochain ' to 'power' seemed to
fix on the word power a freewill sense, as distinguished
from the Augustinian one ; and to imply the admission
that every one had the full and complete power, in the
natural sense of the term, to attain eternal life, — which
was opposed to the predestinarian doctrine. The Jan
senists, therefore, would not admit the term 'prochain.'
Now it is evident that in this refusal they laid themselves
open to a charge of inconsistency ; for if they were ready
to admit ' power ' in an artificial sense, they might have
admitted 'prochain' in an artificial sense too. But
Pascal adroitly diverts attention from the inconsistency of
the Jansenists in their meaning of the word poiver, to the
inconsistency of the Thomists in the meaning they gave
to ' power prochain ; ' separating, as the latter did from
the Jansenists, on the express ground of this phrase being
refused, when they themselves held the phrase in a Jan-
senist sense — i.e. so as to be consistent with the exclusive
and predestinarian doctrine : ' Mais quoi ! mon pere, s'il
manque quelque chose a ce pouvoir, 1'appelez-vous pro-
chain ? et direz-vous, par exemple, qu'un homme ait, la
nuit, et sous aucune lumiere, U pouvoir de voir? Oui-
da, il 1'auroit selon nous, s'il n'est pas aveugle.'— 1st Letter.
It is obvious that in this sense the whole Chnstian body
might have the pouvoir prochain, and still not a real and
bond fide power of attaining salvation, which might t
D D 2
404 Note XXL
be confined to the elect. He thus shows that the Thomists
only differed from the Jansenists in the use of a word, and
agreed with them in meaning and doctrine. And he
proves the same thing in the case of the term ' grace
suffisantej which the Thomists admitted while the Jan
senists rejected it: 'Mais enfin, mon pere, cette grace
donnee a tous les hommes est suffisante ? Oui dit-il. Et
neanmoins elle n'a nul effet sans grace efficace ? Cela est
vrai, dit-il. Et tous les hommes ont la suffisante, con-
tinuai-je, et tous n'o.it pas efficace? II est vrai, dit-il.
C'est-a-dire, lui dis-je, que tous n'ont assez de grace, et que
tous n'en ont pas assez ; c'est-a-dire, que cette grace suffit,
quoiqu'elle ne suffise pas ; c'est-a-dire, qu'elle est suflSsante
de nom, et insuffisante en effet.' — 2nd Letter. The
Thomists then admitted the term ' suffisante ' in an artifi
cial sense, which enabled them to say that such sufficient
grace was given to all, while they really held that sufficient
grace, in the natural sense of the word, was only given to
the elect. And therefore Pascal shows in this instance
again, that the Thomists only differed from the Jansenists
upon a word, while they agreed with them in meaning
and doctrine.
But the same argument by which Pascal proves that
the Thomists of the Sorbonne agreed in doctrine with the
Jansenists, proves equally that the Jansenist or Augus-
tinian agreed in doctrine with the Calvinist. The eigh
teenth Provincial Letter contains a long statement and
argument to show that the Jansenist doctrine of efficacious
grace differed from the Calvinist : the argument resting
upon a particular admission with respect to this grace,
which the Calvinists did not make, and the Jansenists did
—the admission, viz. that man had the power to resist this
grace. He raises on this ground a broad distinction be
tween the Jansenists and the Calvinists ; that the Jan
senists allow freewill, while the Calvinists represent man
as moved like an inanimate machine. I will extract at
some length from this part of the Letter.
' Vous verriez, mon pere, que non-seulement ils tien-
Note XXL 405
nent qu'on resiste effectivement a ces graces faibles, qu'on
appelle excitantes ou inefficaces, en n'executant pas le
"bien qu'elles nous inspirent, mais qu'ils sont encore aussi
fermes a soutenir centre Calvin le pouvoir que la volonte
a de register meme a la grace ejfficace et victorieuse
qu'a defendre centre Molina le pouvoir de cette grace
sur la volonte, aussi jaloux de 1'une de ces verites que
de 1'autre. Us ne savent que trop que Thomme, par
sa propre nature, a toujours le pouvoir de pecker et de,
resister a la grace, et que, depuis sa corruption, il porte
un fonds malheureux de concupiscence qui lui aiigmente
infiniment ce pouvoir ; mais que neanmoins, quand il
plait a Dieu de le toucher par sa misericorde, il lui fait
faire ce qu'il veut et en la maniere qu'il le veut, sans que
€ette infaillibilite de 1'operation de Dieu detruise en
aucune sorte la liberte naturelle de rhomme, par les
secretes et admirables manieres dont Dieu opere ce
changement, que saint Augustin a si excellemment expli-
quees, et qui dissipent toutes les contradictious imaginaires
que les ennemis de la grace efficace se figurent entre le
pouvoir souverain de la grace sur le libre arbitre, et la
puissance qu'a le libre arbitre de resister^ a la grfice ; car,
selon ce grand saint, que les papes de 1'Eglise ont donne
pour regie en cette matiere, Dieu change le coeur de
rhomme par une douceur celeste qu'il y repand, qui, sur-
montant la delectation de la chair, fait que rhomme,
sentant d'un cote sa mortalite et son neant, et decouvrant
de 1'autre la grandeur et 1'eternite de Dieu, concoit du
degout pour les delices du peche qui le separent du bien
incorruptible. Trouvant sa plus grande joie dans le Dieu
qui le charme, il s'y porte infailliblement de lui-meme par
un mouvement tout libre, tout volontaire, tout amoureiix;
de sorte que ce lui serait une peine et un supplice de s^en
separer. Ce n'est pas qu'il ne puisse toujours^ sen
eloigner, et qu'il ne se'n eloignat efectiyement sti U
voulait. Mais comment le voudraiM, pulque U
volonte ne se porte jamais qu'a ce qui lui plait le plus,
et que rien ne lui plait tant alors que ce bien unique, qui
406 Note XXL
comprend en soi tous les autres biens ? Quod enim am-
plius nos delectat, secundum id operemur necesse est,
comme dit saint Augustin. — Exp. Ep. ad Gal. n. 49.
' Cest ainsi que Dieu dispose de la volonte libre de
1'homme sans lui imposer de necessite, et que le libre
arbitre, qui pent toujours register a la grace, mais qui
ne le veut pas toujours, se porte aussi librement qu'in-
failliblement a Dieu, lorsqu'il veut 1'attirer par la douceur
de ses inspirations efficaces.
' Ce sont la, mon pere, les divins principes de saint
Augustin et de saint Thomas, selon lesquels il est veritable
que " nous pouvons resister a la grace," centre Fopinion
de Calvin. . . .
' C'est par la qu'est detruite cette impiete de Luther,
condamnee par le meme concile : "Que nous ne cooperons
en aucune sorte a noire salut, non plus que des choses
inanimees." . . .
6 Et c'est enfin par ce moyen que s'accordent tous ces
passages de 1'Ecriture, que semblent les plus opposes :
que, comme dit saint Augustin, " nos
actions sont notres, a cause du libre arbitre qui les pro-
duit ; et qu'elles sont aussi de Dieu, a cause de sa grace
qui fait que notre arbitre les produit." Et que, comme il
dit ailleurs, Dieu nous fait faire ce qu'il lui plait, en nous
faisant vouloir ce que nous pourrions ne vouloir pas : A
Deo factum est ut vellent quod nolle potuissent.
'Ainsi, mon pere, vos adversaires sont parfaitement
d'accord avec les nouveaux thomistes memes, puisque les
thomistes tiennent comme eux, et le pouvoir de resister a
la grace, et FinfaiJlibilite de Teffet de la grace, qu'ils font
profession de soutenir si hautement, selon cette maxime
capitale de leur doctrine, qu' Alvarez, 1'un des plus con
siderables d'entre eux. repete si souvent dans son livre, et
qu'il exprime (Disp. 72. 1. viii. n. 4.) en ces termes :
" Quand la grace efficace meut le libre arbitre, il consent
infailliblement ; parce que I'effet de la grace est de faire
qu* encore qu'il puisse ne pas consentir, il consente nean-
moins en effet" Dont il donne pour raison celle-ci de
saint Thomas, son maitre (1. 2. q. 112. a. 3): "Que la
Note XXL 407
volonte de Dieu ne peut manquer d'etre accomplie ; et
qu'ainsi, quand il veut qu'un homme consente a la grace,
il consent infailliblement, et meme necessaireinent, non
pas d'une necessite absolue, mais d'une necessite d'infail-
libilite." En quoi la grace ne blesse pas " le pouvoir qu'on
a de resister si on le veut;" puisqu'elle fait seulement
qu'on ne veut pas y resister, comme votre pere Petau le
reconnait en ces termes (t. i. Theol. Dof/m. 1. ix. c. 7. p.
602.): "La grace de Jesus-Christ fait qu'on persevere in
failliblement dans la piete, quoique non par necessite : car
on peut n'y pas consentir si on le veut, comme dit le
concile ; mais cette meme grace fait que Voti ne le veut
pas."
6 C'est la, mon pere, la doctrine constante de saint
Augustin, de saint Prosper, des peres qui les ont suivis,
des conciles, de saint Thomas, et de tons les thomistes en
general. C'est aussi celle de vos adversaires, quoique vous
ne 1'ayez pas pense ....
' " Pour savoir, elites-veils, si Jansenius est a convert,
il faut savoir s'il defend la grace efficace a la maniere de
Calvin, qui nie qu'on ait le pouvoir d'y resister ; car alors
il serait heretique : ou a la maniere des thomistes, qui
Tadmettent ; car alors il serait catholique." Voyez done,
mon pere, s'il tient qu'on a le pouvoir de resister, quand
il dit, dans des traites entiers, et entre autres au torn. iii.
1. viii. c. 20. : " Qu'on a toujours le pouvoir de resister
a la grace., selon le concile : QUE LE LIHRE ARBITRE
PEUT TOUJOURS AGIR ET N^AGIR PAS, vouloir et 1W
vouloir pas, consentir et ne consentir pas, faire le bien
et le mal ; et que Vhomme en cette vie a toujours ces deux
.libertes, que vous appelez de contraritte et de contra
diction." Voyez de meme s'il n'est pas contraire a 1'erreur
de Calvin, telle que vous-meme la representez, lui qui mon-
tre, dans tout le chapitre 21 ., " que 1'Eglise a condamne cet
heretique, qui soutient que la grace efficace n'agit pas
.sur le libre arbitre en la maniere qu'on 1'a cru si long-
temps dans 1'Eglise," en sorte qu'il soit ensuite au pouvoir
du libre arbitre de consentir ou de ne consentir pas : au
lieu que, selon saint Augustin et le concile, on a toujours
le, pouvoir de ne consentvr pas, sionle veut.'
408 Note XXL
In this passage, then, we have the ground on which
Pascal claims a great distinction to be made between the
Jansenist and the Calvinist doctrine of efficacious grace ;
the ground being that while the Calvinists deny, the Jan-
senists admit — le pouvoir que la volonte a de resister
meme a la grace efficace et victorieuse. Now this admis
sion is in its very form plainly and at first sight unmean
ing ; for the only admission which would carry freewill
with it would be that man could resist effectively this
grace ; and certainly no effective resistance can by the
very force of the terms be made to ' victorious grace/
But the true explanation of this whole argument is to be
found in a particular meaning in which the Augustinian
school understood the term power. Pascal rests the whole
claim of the Jansenists to be considered believers in free
will on their use of this word — their admission that man
has the power to resist grace : ' Us ne savent que trop
quel'homme a toujours le pouvoir de pecher et de resister
a la grace.' But the Augustinian definition of power en
tirely nullifies this as any admission really of. freewill ; for
in this definition power is defined to be potestas si vult+
But, power being thus understood, this admission leaves
the whole question of the will and its determination open,
and allows the person who makes it to maintain that,
while every one has the power to resist grace if he wills,
no one who is moved by Divine grace wills. Nor is this
meaning of the term power at all concealed in this letter,
in which Pascal expressly time after time thus qualifies
the term power, and appends to it this condition : ' Ce
n'est pas qu'il ne puisse toujours s'en eloigner, et qu'il ne
s'en eloignat s'il le voulait. Mais comment ce voudrait-il,
puisque la volonte ne se porte jamais qu'a ce qui lui plait,
etc. . . . Le libre arbitre, qui peut toujours resister a la
grace, mais qui ne le veut pas. ... La grace ne blesse
pas le pouvoir qu'on a de resister si on le veut. . . . Car on
peut n'y pas consentir si on le veut. ... On a toujours
le pouvoir de ne consentir pas si on le veut.' Pascal tells
us, then, that by man's power to resist grace is meant
power if he wills. But would Calvin object to admit
Note XXL 409
man's power to resist grace in this sense? He could not,
for it would leave him free to hold his whole doctrine of
irresistible grace. The doctrine of irresistible grace i>
concerned with the will alone, and its determination ; and
this admission says nothing about the determination of
the will. Calvin, then, would allow at once that man had
the power to resist grace if he willed, but that lie c<m!<l
not will to resist effective grace ; for that this grace de
termined his will and inclination itself, and caused it to
be what it was. He would simply say with Pascal himself,
( Mais comment le voudrait-il ? ' with the writer whom
Pascal quotes, ' Encore qu'il puisse ne pas consentir, il nm-
sente neanmoins en effet ;"* and with Augustine, ' A ]><',,
factum est ut vellent quod nolle potuissent.'
This sense of the term power is the key to the state
ment quoted from Jansen : ' Qu'on a toujours le pouvoir
de resister a la grace, selon le concile; que le libre'arbitre
peut toujours agir et n'agir pas, vouloir et ne vouloir pas.
consentir et ne consentir pas, fa ire le bien et le mal, <-t
que 1'homme en cette vie a toujours ces deux libertes, qiir
vous appelez de contrariete et de contradiction.' The
power spoken of is potestas si vult ; on which understand
ing the admission comes to nothing; Jansen expressly
saying that practically the individual cannot act but in
the way in which grace moves: ' Xon quod cessatio ab
actu quern tune (gratia) elicit, cum graticv delectanti*
influxu consistere possit . . . quamvis fieri nequeat ut
ipsanonactio cum gratia operations in eadem simul
voluntate copuletur.'—De Grat. Christi, p. 870.
short, all that the Augustinian and Jansenist admission
with respect to freewill amounts to, is the admission o
will in man ; and this admission Calvin is equally ready
to make. The position condemned by the Council
Trent, as that of the Keformers, that man was moved
Divine grace like an inanimate thing, was not their por
tion ; they fully acknowledged a will in man, that
acted willingly and without constraint ; they ack:
ledged all the facts of our consciousness ; and, admitt
them, they admitted all that S. Augustine and his
admitted.
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